[1st Allotted Day]

Part of Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism – in the House of Commons at 1:55 pm on 13 July 2016.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Philip Hammond Philip Hammond Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1:55, 13 July 2016

It goes without saying that Ministers—indeed, all Members—should be completely truthful in their utterances to Parliament at all times, and the ministerial code makes that clear.

Specifically on the reconstruction effort, Sir John finds that

“the UK failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required” and that lessons that had been learned through previous reviews of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation

“were not applied in Iraq”.

On the issue of de-ba’athification, Sir John finds that early decisions on the form of de-Ba’athification and its implementation

“had a significant and lasting negative impact on Iraq.”

Limiting de-Ba’athification to the top three tiers, rather than four, of the party would have had the potential to be far less damaging to Iraq’s post-invasion recovery and political stability. The UK chose not to act on its well-founded misgivings about handing over implementation of de-Ba’athification policy to the governing council.

Turning to the equipping and resourcing of British troops, Sir John finds that the Government failed to match resources to the objectives. He records that by undertaking concurrent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Government

“knowingly exceeded the Defence Planning Assumptions.”

At least in part as a consequence, Sir John concludes that the military role ended

“a long way from success.”

Furthermore, he finds that

“delays in providing adequate medium weight Protected Patrol Vehicles and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces...for ISTAR and helicopters should not have been tolerated” and that the

“MoD was slow in responding to the developing threat from Improvised Explosive Devices.”

At the end of this analysis, Sir John finds plainly that

“the Iraq of 2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives...it fell far short of strategic success.”

These findings relate to decisions taken at that time, and the arrangements and processes in place at the time. It is, therefore, for those who were Ministers at the time to answer for their actions. This Government’s role is not to seek to apportion blame or to revisit those actions; it is to ensure that the lessons identified by Chilcot are learned, and that they have already led to changes or will lead to changes being implemented in the future.

The Government, including previous Administrations, have not stood still while waiting for the findings we have before us today. There were a number of important reviews relating to the invasion and occupation of Iraq before Chilcot, including Lord Butler’s review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, Lord Hutton’s inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly, and the inquiries of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee of both Houses. As a result of each, lessons have been identified and changes have been implemented, so a good deal of the work has already been done.