“Part 20C - Money Laundering

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords] – in the House of Commons at 3:45 pm on 19th April 2016.

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333U Anti-money laundering: guidance

‘(1) The FCA must, prior to relevant regulations coming into force, issue guidance to regulated entities on the definition of one or more categories of “politically exposed persons” (“PEPs”).

(2) Guidance under subsection (1) must include, but need not be limited to—

(a) a requirement to take a proportional, risk-based and differentiated approach to conducting transactions or business relationships with each category of PEP that may be defined; and

(b) specified categories of persons to be—

(i) included and

(ii) excluded

from any definitions of PEPs.

(3) The Secretary of State may, by regulation, make provision about—

(a) the guidance issued, amended and/or reissued under subsection (1);

(b) arrangements for complaints about the treatment of individuals by regulated entities to be received, assessed and adjudicated by the FCA, where—

(i) a person was treated as though he or she was a PEP (and he was not),

(ii) a person who is a PEP was treated unreasonably in disregard of guidance under subsection (1), particularly in regard to specific elements required under subsection (2)(a), or

(iii) a person was refused a business relationship solely on the basis of that he or she is a PEP,

(c) circumstances in which—

(i) compensation payments are to be required from, or

(ii) financial penalties are to be imposed on regulated entities where complaints under paragraph (b) are upheld.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), “relevant regulations” means regulations transposing into UK law measures that EU Member States are required to implement to combat money-laundering (or subsequent regulations amending those regulations) that contain references to PEPs.

(5) The power to make regulations under subsection (3) is exercisable by statutory instrument which may only be made after a draft of any such instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”’—(Mr Walker.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Photo of Natascha Engel Natascha Engel Deputy Speaker (Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 10—Debt management plan charges—

(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 137FBB insert—

“137FBC FCA general rules: debt management plan charges

(1) The FCA must make general rules in relation to debt management plans.

(2) The rules must specify that—

(a) if a majority of creditors agree to a creditor fee arrangement, then all creditors shall be bound by the arrangement;

(b) a creditor fee arrangement may subsequently be varied by the agreement of a majority of creditors; and

(c) a creditor fee arrangement and any variations must take the form of a written contract executed by a majority of the creditors and must be distributed to all creditors upon completion.

(3) In this section—

“creditor fee arrangement” means an arrangement whereby the fees incurred as part of the debt management plan are paid by the creditors, calculated either as a fixed amount, a percentage of the amount owed to them or a combination of a fixed amount and a percentage; and

“a majority of creditors” means a subset of creditors where the amount owed to them is more than half of the total amount owed.”’

New clause 14—Combating abusive tax avoidance arrangements—

‘(1) Section 3B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators) is amended as follows.

(2) At the end of subsection (1) insert—

“(i) combating abusive tax avoidance arrangements.

(1A) (a) in observing principle (i), the regulators must undertake, in consultation with the Treasury, an annual review for presentation to the Treasury into abusive tax avoidance, including measures to ascertain and record beneficial ownership of trusts using facilities provided by banks with UK holding companies or entities regulated by the Bank of England or the FCA, control of shareholders and ownership of shares, and investment arrangements in an overseas territory outside the UK involving UK financial institutions.

(b) in this section “beneficial ownership of trusts” includes ownership of any equitable interest in a trust including being an object of a discretionary trust, power of appointment or similar arrangement as well as any vested interest under a trust;

(c) “control of shareholders and ownership of shares in companies using facilities provided by banks with UK holding companies or entities regulated by the Bank of England or the FCA” shall include control by any person with control over a voteholder in a company as defined in Part VI Official Listing s.89F of the FSMA (2000) as applied mutatis mutandis to this context, whether directly or indirectly, and whether alone or in concert with some other person.”’

Amendment 1, in clause 24, page 20, leave out lines 5 to 10.

Amendment 8, page 20, line 10, at end add

“and insert—

‘(6) Where the authorised person mentioned in subsection (5) is a relevant authorised person, as defined under section 71A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, subsection (5)(d) does not apply and subsections (7) and (8) do apply.

(6A) If the FCA satisfies itself that a person (P), who is a senior manager in relation to a relevant authorised person, is guilty of misconduct by virtue of subsections (5)(a)-(c), then P shall be guilty of misconduct, subject only to subsection (8).

(6B) But P is not guilty of misconduct by virtue of subsections (5)(a)-(c) and (7) if P satisfies the FCA that P had taken such steps as a person in P’s position could reasonably be expected to take to avoid the contravention occurring (or continuing).””

Amendment 2, page 20, leave out lines 22 to 27.p

Amendment 9, page 20, line 27, at end add

“and insert—

‘(6) Where the PRA-authorised person mentioned in subsection (5) is a relevant authorised person, as defined under section 71A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, subsection (5)(d) does not apply and subsections (6A) and (6B) do apply.

(6A) If the PRA satisfies itself that a person (P) who is a senior manager in relation to a relevant PRA-authorised person is guilty of misconduct by virtue of subsections (5)(a)-(c), then P shall be guilty of misconduct, subject only to subsection (6B).

(6B) But P is not guilty of misconduct by virtue of subsections (5)(a)-(c) and (7) if P satisfies the PRA that P had taken such steps as a person in P‘s position could reasonably be expected to take to avoid the contravention occurring (or continuing).”

Amendment 10, in schedule 4, page 62, line 2, leave out paragraph 18.

Photo of Charles Walker Charles Walker Chair, Procedure Committee, Chair, Procedure Committee

New clause 9 is designed to prevent the restriction or withdrawal of banking services from perhaps tens of thousands of people. Those people include soldiers and others serving in the armed forces, judges, civil servants, trade unionists, and local councillors and their officials. Those people, along with their families and associates, are deemed to be “politically exposed persons” for the purposes of the fourth money laundering directive, which is due to be transposed into UK law by no later than June 2017.

The scope of new clause 9 is straightforward. It is designed to ensure that when that money laundering directive is transposed into UK law, reasonable regard is given to the parts of the directive that deal with proportionality. The new clause makes it clear that prior to the enactment of the directive, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 will be amended so that the Financial Conduct Authority will be required to publish clear guidance to the banks defining what it deems to be proportionate. New clause 9 also makes regulatory provision for PEPs who believe that they have been treated unreasonably by their banks to ask that their case be adjudicated by the FCA.

Photo of Steve McCabe Steve McCabe Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on introducing the new clause. I understand from what we heard during today’s topical questions that it is likely that the Government will accept it, so he is obviously in the right area. Is he worried that banks are acting in advance of the measure and that there is quite a lot of evidence that they are already gathering information about ordinary, law-abiding members of the public and using it as an excuse to restrict their banking activities?

Photo of Charles Walker Charles Walker Chair, Procedure Committee, Chair, Procedure Committee

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. Banks are de-risking very aggressively at the moment and we need to inject some proportionality into their actions. I believe that the new clause will go some way towards achieving that.

New clause 9 inserts into the Bill a process of adjudication. If a politically exposed person believes that they are being treated unfairly—being denied access to banking services—they can take their concern or complaint to the FCA, which can then adjudicate. The FCA can decide whether banks are interpreting the directive over-aggressively and, if they are, levy a fine on them for doing so. The new clause has nothing to do with reducing accountability; it is about increasing proportionality, which is the right thing to do.

Why is new clause 9 needed? It is needed because it is clear that in interpreting the fourth money laundering directive, banks are making no distinction, when determining who is a politically exposed person, between PEPs drawn from the corruption hotbeds of Nigeria, Russia and parts of the subcontinent, and those drawn from developed democracies such as ours that have high levels of scrutiny and accountability.

Photo of Stewart Jackson Stewart Jackson Conservative, Peterborough

May I put on record the thanks of all of us in the House to my hon. Friend for his diligence, focus and tenacity in bringing this massively important issue to the attention of the Government and for what we hope will be a satisfactory conclusion today? Does he agree that the collateral damage of some of the precipitous action of the banks has been a big impact on people’s families and, as a corollary, their future credit worthiness?

Photo of Charles Walker Charles Walker Chair, Procedure Committee, Chair, Procedure Committee

My hon. Friend makes a good point. As I said, the banks have acted very aggressively, and I shall return to that point in a few moments.

May I thank the Economic Secretary for her time and patience in dealing with this matter? I have been speaking to her about it for four months, and I admit that I have got a little over-excited on occasions. However, she has always maintained high levels of good humour and patience, for which I thank her. It is important to put that on the record.

At this late stage, without the intervention of new clause 9, the directive risks blighting the lives of decent people. They are not just people working in public life and service but, as my hon. Friend Mr Jackson pointed out, their partners, spouses, children, parents, siblings and in-laws. The directive is not proportionate.

Even more worryingly, the directive covers the close associates of politically exposed persons. I am aware that one such close associate is a member of the press lobby. He had some problems with an individual savings account and was subject to close questioning by his bank. When he asked the person on the other end of the phone why the bank was conducting itself in such a way, the response was, “Because we understand that you are an associate of the Prime Minister.” Even the media are caught up in this directive, or rather the banks’ de-risking in preparation for its introduction.

The Financial Action Task Force, whose guidance underpins the directive and is repeatedly referred to in it, states:

“For close associates, examples include”— the House needs to listen carefully to this because it is quite an odd paragraph—

“the following types of relationships: (known) (sexual) partners outside the family unit (e.g. girlfriends, boyfriends, mistresses);
prominent members of the same political party, civil organisation”— that could be the National Trust

“labour or employee union as the PEP;
business partners or associates, especially those that share (beneficial) ownership of legal entities with the PEP, or who are otherwise connected”.

My fear is that, without clear Government-backed FCA guidance, as provided for in new clause 9, the banks, in their rush to de-risk, will continue to draw on the work of the Financial Action Task Force. The Financial Action Task Force states in paragraph 37 of its 2013 guidance:

“there should be awareness that middle ranking and more junior officials could act on behalf of a PEP to circumvent…controls. These less prominent public functions could be appropriately taken into account as customer risk factors in the framework of the overall assessment of risks”.

Photo of Greg Knight Greg Knight Conservative, East Yorkshire

The case that my hon. Friend makes is overwhelming. Will he tell the House whether he is aware of anyone who is opposed to what he is trying to do?

Photo of Charles Walker Charles Walker Chair, Procedure Committee, Chair, Procedure Committee

I am sure that there will always be people who are opposed to what I am trying to do. That is the nature of society—we live in an open society in which people have different points of view on many issues. The fourth money laundering directive should be about capturing bad people in its scope, not capturing all people. If everyone is thought of as bad, it is very difficult to identify who is actually breaking the law. We want to go after the law breakers, not those people who, by accident, are described or identified as PEPs by banks in this country.

Photo of James Cleverly James Cleverly Conservative, Braintree

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that the rush to implement these actions ahead of the directive indicates a desire by the banks to take what seems to be decisive action against a group of people who are quite easy to target, and that the banks will be less keen to take that action against people who are harder to track down? [Interruption.]

Photo of Charles Walker Charles Walker Chair, Procedure Committee, Chair, Procedure Committee

I thought that rather complemented the intervention from my hon. Friend James Cleverly—it was almost like an opera singer opening his lungs.

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. Banks need to invest their resources, time and energy in going after high-risk people. Banks know which people are high risk. To be perfectly honest, whatever people in this country think about their Members of Parliament, trade unionists, council officers and leaders, Assembly Members and Members of the Scottish Parliament, they are, in the main, not bad people indulging in money laundering. I am not saying that there will not be a bad apple, but those people do not present the real and current risk. Banks’ energies should be focused not on chasing after the good, but on chasing after the very bad.

The Financial Action Task Force catch-all that says that even middle-ranking people can be involved in money laundering basically puts everyone above grade 7 in the civil service in the frame. Think of people in a Government-backed organisation or trade union regional organisers. If banks follow the FATF guidance, those people could be deemed to be politically exposed persons, so not only their banking facilities, but those of their families and associates, could be withdrawn or curtailed.

I will make some progress, as I was not planning to speak for so long. Once a PEP, always a PEP. Although article 22 of the directive states that after 12 months have passed from the point at which the politically exposed person has left office, a bank can decide that that person is no longer a PEP—that sounds like good news—it goes on to say that banks will

“be required to take into account the continuing risk posed by that person and to apply appropriate and risk-sensitive measures until such time as that person is deemed to pose no further risk specific to politically exposed persons.”

That is the lobster pot from which few will escape. Banks are risk averse, so they will feel that it is much better to keep someone as a PEP indefinitely than to take the risk of downgrading them to the status of a normal customer unless they are obliged to do so.

Forget people serving in public life; let us think about those who have left it. Without the protections and guidance in new clause 9, ex-Army officers, ex-judges, ex-trade union representatives, ex-community leaders, volunteers and ex-members of political parties, and former Members of Parliament could be denied the opportunity to serve on charitable and company boards because their presence would confer the status of politically exposed person on the rest of the board. That status is best avoided by individuals who are not yet stigmatised. If conferred, such a status could lead to a withdrawal of the relevant charity or company’s banking services. This is not supposition and I am not making this up. Along with the restriction of banking services, the closure of personal accounts and the blackballing of family members, it is happening now. In accepting new clause 9, the Government will enshrine in an Act of Parliament that banks have a legal duty to act proportionately and in accordance with FCA guidance, and that is the correct thing to do.

New clause 9 is not about protecting politicians. Politicians are politically exposed people, but I understand that even a Parliamentary Private Secretary in the Treasury has had difficulties with this issue. Although the rights of politicians and their families are no less deserving of respect than anyone else’s, this is about protecting the banking, financial and future employment rights of the many thousands of people whose names appear in the civil service year book. It is about protecting the rights of military personnel who serve our country, committed council officials who serve their community and trade unionists. New clause 9 not only protects those people’s rights, but the rights of their extended families who had no say in their relation’s career choice, but are dragged into the scope of the directive.

Finally, I thank the Government for indicating that they will accept new clause 9. By doing so, they will reduce the chances of an Army officer who is serving their country somewhere hot and dangerous receiving a telephone call from his or her spouse saying, “Darling, while you’re being shot at, we’ve had our bank account closed and we’ve lost our mortgage.” I congratulate the Government on doing the right thing today.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Labour, Bishop Auckland 4:15 pm, 19th April 2016

I am pleased to follow Mr Walker who made an excellent speech on an important subject. He showed his characteristic bravery and forcefulness in addressing an issue that many other hon. Members wanted to address, but were unenthusiastic about putting themselves in the firing line.

The Minister said earlier that everybody is happy with this Bill, but now that we are discussing the regulation of financial services, she may discover that Labour Members are not quite so happy with this part of the Bill. I wish to speak in support of amendments 8 and 9, and I am also sympathetic to amendment 2 tabled by the Scottish National party. Getting the senior management regime right is vital for reducing the risk of further irresponsible behaviour in financial institutions, particularly the banks. We all know the devastating impact that the behaviour of the banks had on rest of the economy—anyone who is in any doubt about that should see the film “The Big Short”, which wonderfully describes that episode, albeit from an American point of view.

The clauses on the senior management regime are a retreat from the sensible legislation introduced in 2012, following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which recognised that one way of changing behaviour and culture is to make those people at the top of the banks accept their full responsibility. The clauses in the Bill no longer do that. It is completely sensible for people to be expected to have the same responsibility for the behaviour of those who work for them that other institutions have for health and safety.

We have heard a number of arguments for the Government’s decision to reverse the reversal of the burden of the proof—rather an awkward mouthful—and one of the main arguments is that the regulatory approach that was legislated for in 2012 is too burdensome. This, however, misses the whole point, which is that we want people to spend more time looking at how to reduce risk rather than spending a great deal of time on how to make lots and lots of money irrespective of the risks posed to the economy. The risk does not apply ultimately to themselves on their own account, but it infects all other financial institutions.

I attended a seminar in the City last week, and senior practitioners from law firms, accountancy firms and from some of the big asset managers were in attendance and proved to be supportive of the original parliamentary commission approach. I expressed my feeling that it was disappointing that the Chancellor was going back on this, and suggested that he was not doing it as a whim, but because he had been lobbied to do so. I asked why they thought he had been lobbied in this way. It was, of course, a naive question, and I had no idea what the answer would be. They all roared with laughter and said, “Well, it’s obvious. It’s a way to facilitate people making millions of pounds without facing any downside risks.”

We cannot put ourselves in that situation again. The cost of the bail-out in 2008 was £133 billion. We really must take seriously the lessons that can be learned from that, which is why the amendments tabled by my Front-Bench team and by the SNP should be taken seriously and accepted by the Government.

Photo of Gary Streeter Gary Streeter Conservative, South West Devon

I should like to take this opportunity to introduce my new clause 10, which is aimed at safeguarding the free debt management sector. Let me reassure the Minister that this is very much a probing amendment; I know she is looking forward to responding to it.

There has been a long debate over the “fee versus free” principle in the provision of debt management plans for indebted consumers. It is not my intention to re-open that debate now, although my concern is about free providers that are facing a looming capacity crisis.

Organisations such as PayPlan and Christians Against Poverty operate the “fair share” model of free debt management that sees creditors covering the cost of customer plans on a polluter-pays basis—in other words, through schemes that are free to the debtor. These organisations are facing increasing pressure as a consequence of fee-charging firms leaving the marketplace after failing Financial Conduct Authority authorisation. In one recent case, this left 16,000 debt management clients unsupported, and these customers are now being are being signposted to free providers. The last thing people want to happen when they are caught up in the desperation of heavy debts and are trying to slog their way out of it is, of course, that the person advising them suddenly disappears so that they have to start again with new people.

The debt management sector is nearing a desperate point, and the market is becoming increasingly inefficient, with consumers treated badly in many cases. The fair-share operators I mentioned have seen their revenue reduce as a consequence of consumers’ disposable income falling. As more and more fee chargers leave the market, we will soon face a situation in which fair-share operators are unable to provide economically viable plans. Plainly, we now face a situation in which consumers will be charged higher fees and their options for free debt management services will be severely limited—again, we are going in the wrong direction.

There were considerable and commendable efforts over the course of the last Parliament aimed at safeguarding free debt management provision, most notably on the creation of a voluntary protocol. Members of all parties have tried to make similar long-term changes, reflecting the cross-party nature of this issue. More recent efforts have come from the parliamentary debt management working group, of which I am a member. I see in her place our chairman, Yvonne Fovargue, who is poised to speak in, I hope, support of my new clause.

Recent efforts have been aimed at establishing an industry-wide offering of free consumer debt management services. I accept that, while desirable, such an approach may not be feasible at this time. The new clause provides for a small tweak to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, mandating all creditors, via an FCA rule change, to fund free-to-consumer debt management plans under the “fair share” model. Many large creditors—banks and credit card companies—do accept a reduction in the amount due in exchange for the establishment of a coherent plan, but some still do not, and the new clause is intended to tackle that. While it falls short of outlawing the provision of fee-charging plans, it provides a strong safeguard for the “fair share” model, ensuring that customers can continue to access free debt management plans.

I am certain that this is a robust mechanism for desperately needed reform in the debt management sector, and I hope that, subject to Members’ approval, it can be implemented without delay. I thank the Economic Secretary for her interest in the matter, and for her helpful guidance behind the scenes.

Every age has its challenges, and it may well be that historians will look back at our era and marvel at the levels of unsustainable personal debt that were carried by so many people. Such debt may arise from grave misfortune, poor choices or the actions of others, but whatever the reason, it is vital that the right help is at hand to help people to step their way out of debt, and the FCA can assist that process by making the rule changes I have proposed. I thank the Economic Secretary again for her patience and kindness, and commend the new clause to her and to the House.

Photo of Yvonne Fovargue Yvonne Fovargue Shadow Minister (Business, Innovation and Skills)

I am afraid that I cannot support new clause 10. While I have great sympathy with the aim of Mr Streeter to keep the free-to-consumer plans going, I do not feel that his new clause will achieve that.

I am slightly unclear about the use of the term “fee”. As the hon. Gentleman said, this is currently a voluntary arrangement. I am a little concerned about what public benefit would result from his proposal. Would it merely ensure supplier revenues for certain service providers? If so, is that really a legislative issue? I have wider concerns. I feel that too few debt providers give advice on debt, but I also feel that the current landscape is fairly confusing. I do not think that introducing a statutory funding mechanism for one debt solution—a debt management plan—is the right way forward. Plenty of options are available to people in debt, including bankruptcy, debt relief orders, debt management plans, administration orders, debt consolidation, and individual voluntary arrangements.

Many of those plans are not funded sustainably. I think that one organisation that offers them is paid £35 for each order that it issues, and that is not a sustainable solution. I do not want providers to offer plans on the basis of how they are funded rather than on the basis of what is best for the individual, but I fear that the new clause could lead to their doing so. I am sure that many would not, but the new clause might lead to more providers’ choosing to offer the “fair share” solution because it is statutorily funded, whereas they make a loss on every debt relief order that they issue. That is not the best solution for the individual who is in debt.

I think that we need a proper review of the current debt solution landscape. I believe that it is too complex, and that it is not properly costed. I also believe that the providers have insufficient funding. As the hon. Gentleman said, there has been a problem with the debt management plans. In fact, a review of the fee-charging debt management companies found that 60% of their clients were put in a worse position. That cannot be allowed to continue, and I am pleased that the FCA is cleaning up the market. However, I worry about what will happen to people who come off debt management plans. They took a big step to deal with their debts—and facing up to the fact that you cannot pay your bills is a difficult decision to make—and went to a provider. Now they have been told, “Actually, your provider was not providing a good service. Go and find somebody else.” I worry that those people will not look around, and I hope that the Minister will look at ways of promoting opportunities for them to go to other providers.

I also hope that funding will be available for the other providers, and that they will not be left in the unsustainable position of having to pick up a large number of people all at once. It might be sustainable to pick up 16,000 people over a few months, but to pick them all up immediately when a company goes bump is really difficult. I have sympathy for the motives behind new clause 10, but I do not feel that it will solve the main problem, which is that many debt solutions providers do not have sufficient funding. The new clause would focus on only one solution and could well skew the market in the wrong way, to the advantage of the providers rather than of the people who need the solution.

Photo of George Kerevan George Kerevan Scottish National Party, East Lothian 4:30 pm, 19th April 2016

I should like to speak to amendments 1 and 2, tabled in my name, and in passing to amendments 8 and 9, tabled by Labour Members. I shall not press amendments 1 and 2 to a vote, but should Labour Members move on amendment 8 and the consequential amendment 9, we will support them.

There is much in the Bill to commend it to us and to the House, and much that will add to the regulatory regime and its performance in the UK. However, the worst part of this legislation—the time bomb ticking away inside it—is the Government’s attempt to shift legislation that they put in place only four years ago on the reverse burden of proof for major financial infractions. That is the nub of the matter. Legislation was introduced four years ago that identified senior managers in major banks and other financial organisations and stated that if a serious infraction of regulations was encountered on their watch, they would automatically be held responsible unless they could prove that they had taken due steps to prevent it from happening.

That legislation had a great deal of support in the House and among the public, because it was the one sure way of ensuring that those at senior level in the financial sector would not continue to do what they had done all through the 2007-08 crisis: blame everyone else and say that it was not their fault. The legislation made senior managers responsible, just as senior managers in other organisations and utilities have become responsible for major crises.

Why would the Government want to change that law before it even came into operation this month? That sends out the wrong signal. When we put legislation in place that has consensus behind it, we should try it and see whether it works. However, the Chancellor, whose constant refrain is that he has a long-term economic plan, has decided to change the legislation before it has even come into operation. That change sends out all the wrong signals. The Minister will probably say that the measure is disproportionate now that the Government have widened the number of people being caught up in the senior management regime to tens of thousands, and that applying the law could become problematic. I know all the explanations, but I put it to her that by reneging on legislation that was put in place with great fanfare four years ago before it is even operational, the Government are simply signalling to the rest of the world that they are loosening the regulatory bonds. They might think that they are not doing that, but they are sending out the wrong signal.

The Government have been sending out another signal as well. For years, the Chancellor and other Treasury Ministers have been telling us that we should pay lower taxes, that taxes are bad, and that we should keep more of our own money. Suddenly, however, when we discover that hundreds of thousands of people are setting up secret offshore bank accounts, the Government get all holy and moral, saying, “We didn’t mean you to do that!” This Government sometimes speak with two voices. Individual Ministers are honest and sincere, but they do not understand that they sometimes speak with one voice on taxes and regulation and then do the opposite. It sends out the wrong signal. The Government cannot go on blaming other people. They are to blame if they change the rule without having put it into force for at least a few years to see whether it works. That is why we must leave the provisions in the Financial Services Act 2012 until it has been proven that they do not work.

Photo of Richard Burgon Richard Burgon Shadow Minister (Treasury)

I rise to speak to new clause 14, amendment 8, and amendments 9 and 10, which are consequential on amendment 8, tabled in my name and those of my hon. and right hon. Friends. I will first discuss new clause 14 on combating abusive tax avoidance arrangements and then our amendment on the reverse burden of proof, or the presumption of responsibility, as I choose to call it, for senior managers in the banking sector.

Labour tabled new clause 14 in the wake of Panama papers leak, which George Kerevan just mentioned. The new clause sets out that combating abusive tax avoidance should be established as new regulatory principle for the FCA, and requires the FCA to

“undertake, in consultation with the Treasury, an annual review for presentation to the Treasury into abusive tax avoidance”.

The new clause makes it clear that the new principle should involve

“measures to ascertain and record beneficial ownership of trusts using facilities provided by banks with UK holding companies or entities regulated by the Bank of England or the FCA, control of shareholders and ownership of shares, and investment arrangements in an overseas territory outside the UK involving UK financial institutions.”

Members will be aware that Labour published its tax transparency enforcement programme following the Panama papers leak, and the release of the information that thousands of companies listed in the Mossack Fonseca papers have financial services provided by UK banks. Our programme makes it clear that Labour will

“work with banks to provide further information over beneficial ownership for all companies and trusts that they work for.”

The new clause seeks to establish a procedure to enact that.

Last week, the Government announced a deal on the global exchange of beneficial ownership. We of course welcome that as an initial step, but it is insufficient. The measures announced by the EU this week are also welcome, but they do not go nearly far enough, because they require only partial reporting. My hon. Friend the shadow Chancellor said last week:

“The turnover threshold is far too high, and Labour MEPs in Europe will be” doing the right thing in

“pushing to get that figure reduced much lower to make it more difficult for large corporations to dodge paying their fair share of tax.”—[Official Report, 13 April 2016; Vol. 608, c. 369.]

Banks need to reveal the beneficial ownership of the companies and trusts with which they work. That means establishing a record of ownership of the companies and trusts supported by UK banks, whether or not the owners are resident in the UK. We must ensure that Crown dependencies and overseas territories enforce far stricter minimum standards of transparency for company and trust ownership, but when UK banks are involved, it is right that a record is maintained of the beneficial owners that they advise.

The tax expert Richard Murphy has written that Jersey, Guernsey and the Cayman Islands are

“cock-a-hoop at having rebuffed calls from David Cameron that they must have readily accessible registers of beneficial ownership even for the use of UK law enforcement agencies”.

The shadow Chancellor said in response to those calls that the

“agreement is a welcome step in the right direction but it fails to do anything to tackle the tax havens based in British Overseas Territories. Failure to take responsibility for these British Dependencies substantially undermines the effectiveness of this agreement.”

Similarly, we are aware that the Financial Conduct Authority wrote to banks urging them to declare their links to Mossack Fonseca by 15 April. The FCA’s call on UK financial institutions to review links with Mossack Fonseca is welcome, but the regulator should recognise the need for complete transparency to retain public confidence.

The FCA should seek full disclosure and act without delay. The slow, drip-drip responses of the Prime Minister’s office in recent weeks have served only to fuel public concern and have been very much a lesson in how to raise suspicion unintentionally. The FCA should publish details of which financial institutions it has written to and why; what information it has asked them to provide; and what action it will take, now that the 15 April deadline has passed. Importantly, it cannot allow banks and their subsidiaries to conduct an open-ended internal investigation, but must establish an early deadline for the disclosure of all information on their relations with Mossack Fonseca, so that the regulator can take all necessary action. Campaigners Global Witness responded by saying:

“These are welcome first steps…but the UK authorities are missing the wider point. Mossack Fonseca is no bad apple;
it is just one small part of a much deeper problem.”

That is why it is necessary for us to have a clear direction of travel towards recording beneficial ownership of trust services by UK banks, as we are seeking to do with this new clause.

Given the widespread concerns about tax avoidance, the British public, who bailed out the country’s banking sector, deserve to know the facts about the role of UK banks in this unfolding story. With new clause 14, Labour has made a positive and practical proposal to take steps to increase tax transparency and publicly available information on the beneficial owners of companies and trusts registered in tax havens.

Let me now deal with the remainder of the amendments. Labour’s position was set out clearly on Second Reading and in our amendments in Committee: removing the reverse burden of proof—the presumption of responsibility—is unreasonable, unwise and, I am sorry to say, risky. We continue to support the current legislation, which was agreed by the Chancellor and in both Houses as recently as in consideration on the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. That is why we have re-tabled our amendments on keeping the presumption of responsibility. It should not be forgotten that this measure was a key recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which said that it

“would make sure that those who should have prevented serious prudential and conduct failures would no longer be able to walk away simply because of the difficulty of proving individual culpability in the context of complex organisations.”

The presumption of responsibility, as currently set out in legislation, applies to senior managers. It means that to avoid being found guilty of misconduct when there has been a regulatory contravention in an area for which they are responsible, they will have to prove that they took reasonable steps to prevent that contravention. This Bill removes that onus on senior bankers. The onus is entirely reasonable, proportionate and, as bitter experience tells the British people, necessary. Misconduct and misdemeanours in financial services are not merely a tale from history. In 2015, for example, the FCA had to fine firms more than £900 million, and we have also seen the LIBOR scandal, foreign exchange fines and the mis-selling of payment protection insurance to the value of up to £33 billion. The presumption of responsibility is so reasonable and necessary that the policy was introduced with cross-party support; that should not be forgotten.

The 2013 Act applied the presumption of responsibility, through the senior managers and certification regime, to all “authorised persons”. This Bill extends that authorised persons regime to a wider range of businesses but has watered down the presumption of responsibility to a mere “duty of responsibility”. The vast majority of people working in the financial sector were not, and are not, affected by the existing legislation, and would remain unaffected should our amendment pass. That is why the legislation was passed by Government Members in the first place.

In December 2013, speaking of the stricter measures being introduced by the Government, including the reverse burden of proof, the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Sajid Javid, said:

“The introduction of this offence means that…in future those who bring down their bank by making thoroughly unreasonable decisions can be held accountable for their actions…Senior managers could be liable if they take a decision that leads to the failure of the bank…The maximum sentence for the new offence…reflects the seriousness that the Government, and society more broadly, place on ensuring that our financial institutions are managed in a way that does not recklessly endanger the economy or the public purse.”—[Official Report, 11 December 2013; Vol. 572, c. 252.]

On that, at least, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. It is a shame that there has been a change in position.

The Chair of the Treasury Committee said:

“Far from imperilling the UK’s global competitiveness, high standards will make the UK a more attractive place to locate.”—[Official Report, 8 July 2013; Vol. 566, c. 76.]

Other commentators and campaigners who have expressed their support include Martin Wolf of the Financial Times. We have re-tabled this amendment to state our clear opposition to this unwelcome, unnecessary and risky change.

The legislation was introduced by the Chancellor in 2013, and Members of the House should not forget that it was due to come into force in March this year. It has yet to be even tested, as the hon. Member for East Lothian said. Now is not the time to make this concession to top bankers. Both the announcement of the Chancellor’s “new settlement” with financial services—including as it does the departure of Martin Wheatley from the FCA and the scrapping of the FCA’s review of banking culture—and the recent discovery that UK banks, Crown dependencies and overseas territories are at the heart of the Panama papers tax haven scandal mean that the proposal in the Bill to remove the presumption of responsibility is the wrong proposal at the wrong time. We urge Members to support our amendment.

Let me turn to new clause 10, which was tabled by Mr Streeter. We recognise the concern about fee-chargers in the debt management sector, who often charge clients exorbitant amounts to set up plans that can clearly add to clients’ problems, rather than helping to alleviate them. In the scenario proposed, instead of charging fees to customers, the commercial debt management companies would receive income though a statutory levy on creditors, and all creditors would be bound by a fee arrangement to which the majority agree. However, it is not clear how that helps consumers specifically. The rules could bind some commercial organisations to paying fees to other ones. There are serious competition issues here, and I am aware of the FCA’s concerns on that point.

There are questions to ask about how the creditors set the level of fees. The measures would not stop commercial debt management companies charging consumers in addition to the fee. In some circumstances, they could lead to commercial providers advising people on the basis of their creditors and not on their actual needs.

Although the new clause can be admirably presented as a way of killing off fee charging, it may well result in a lifeline being thrown to the sector. Critics may well ask why the Government should intervene to prop up this market, just at the point when the FCA is cleaning it up. Secondly, it introduces a statutory funding mechanism for one debt solution—debt management plans—when in fact there are many options available for people in debt, including bankruptcy, debt relief orders, debt management plans, administration orders, debt consolidation and individual voluntary arrangements. Only about one third of those people seeking debt advice are provided with a debt management plan; for others, it is simply not the right fit. Although we welcome the debate, we feel that it is necessary to consider how best we meet the needs of all people with debt problems, so we do not support the new clause.

Finally, let me turn to new clause 9 in the name of Mr Walker. I am aware that this is an issue of concern to Members in all parts of the House. The global rules against money laundering require banks and regulated businesses to carry out enhanced due diligence on all politically exposed persons—individuals entrusted with a public function—but if the transposition of the EU directive into domestic legislation is mishandled, a wide range of other people could be affected. It could adversely affect tens of thousands of people, including civil servants, city workers and even, as has been described, the families of armed forces officers serving our country abroad.

The EU’s fourth money laundering directive, passed last year, will need to be transposed into UK law within two years, as has been mentioned. We need to get this right to ensure that the safeguards proposed to prevent tax avoidance and money laundering and, in the light of the Panama papers, the provisions governing the register of beneficial ownership of companies and trusts do not get in the way of individuals using their bank accounts, securing mortgages or supporting charities. We believe that this is an important issue, and we are grateful to the hon. Member for Broxbourne for all his hard work explaining the potential risks to the House.

Photo of Harriett Baldwin Harriett Baldwin The Economic Secretary to the Treasury 4:45 pm, 19th April 2016

Let me start with new clause 9, tabled by my hon. Friend Mr Walker and others, which addresses the important issue of politically exposed persons. My colleague is an expert not only in oratory but in parliamentary procedure and I commend him for his use of both in this example. The Chancellor and I are very concerned about this issue, as my hon. Friend knows, and we are grateful to my hon. Friend for his assiduous work in collating examples that he has heard from colleagues and from the banking sector.

It is absolutely right that the “know your customer” requirements should be tailored to the risk posed, and I reassure the House that we are very much on the side of colleagues in this regard. I therefore welcome the amendment and the strong message it sends to banks as they implement these rules. The new clause also addresses guidance, and I fully agree that guidance will help the banks to take an effective, proportionate and commensurate approach to politically exposed persons. The Government intend to implement new money laundering regulations by June next year at the latest and this amendment will come into force at that time. We will consult on the new regulations this year.

As well as accepting the new clause, I want to take the opportunity to update the House on other action that we have taken to resolve these issues on behalf of Members since my hon. Friend had his Adjournment debate on 20 January. On 1 March we had a meeting with the banks that I organised with the Minister for Security from the Home Office, and on 23 March the Chancellor wrote to the banks to explain our views. We will continue to work with the banks, with the FCA and with others to ensure that a sensible and proportionate approach prevails.

I have also written not once but twice in a “Dear colleague” letter to all Members and Peers giving colleagues the name of a senior designated person to contact at each major bank should they or a family member encounter any problems. To conclude on this new clause, I thank my hon. Friend for bringing the issue to the House so that I can give this reassurance about the attention that the Government are paying to this challenge.

New clause 10, on debt management plans, was tabled by my hon. Friend Mr Streeter, and I thank him for his collaborative approach in tabling the amendment and the ongoing commitment shown by him and his all-party group to supporting all households in problem debt. The Government share his concerns about the potential for detriment to occur to consumers participating in some debt management plans and I recognise the importance of protecting this vulnerable group of consumers. The Government’s focus has been on comprehensively reforming the regulation of the sector to ensure that financial services firms are on the side of people who work hard, do the right thing and get on in life. Responsibility for regulating debt management firms, like that for all other consumer credit firms, transferred from the OFT to the FCA on 1 April 2014. The FCA has made addressing the risk posed to consumers by non-compliant debt management firms the highest priority, alongside payday lending.

Indeed, debt management firms were in the first group of firms to require full authorisation, and the FCA is thoroughly scrutinising firms’ business models and practices. Firms that do not meet the FCA’s threshold conditions will not be able to continue to offer debt management plans. Removing non-compliant debt management firms from the market will fundamentally reduce the risk of harm to consumers and will ensure that consumers have access to sustainable repayment plans as a result of providers acting in the best interest of consumers.

Yvonne Fovargue raised the question of the handover of clients with debt management plans whose firms have not been authorised by the FCA. That is an issue to which the FCA is playing close attention, to try to ensure that data protection issues are taken into account and to accommodate the disheartening position of someone with one of those plans whose firm fails to be authorised, for whom a better alternative must be found.

On the issue raised by the amendment—how debt management plans are funded—charities such as StepChange and Christians Against Poverty already successfully negotiate voluntary funding agreements with creditors through the fair share model. Introducing changes to this funding arrangement, such as mandatory contributions, may have unintended consequences, disrupting a successful funding arrangement for charities. Consequently, setting the level of this share is not supported by the not-for-profit sector. Similarly, not-for-profit providers are concerned that formalising fair share contributions may change charities’ relationship with creditors and compromise their independence. The perception of charities by their clients as impartial advocates is essential to encouraging households in problem debt to come forward for support.

With the FCA’s authorisation process ongoing, and the anticipated changes in the market that that will bring, now is not the right time to introduce changes to the way debt management plans are funded. Any consideration of changes to funding arrangements should take place when the shape of the debt management market is known. The best setting for looking at the full landscape of debt advice funding will be in the context of the public financial guidance review, which includes a commitment for the Government to monitor the impact on the FCA authorisation process. If necessary, the funding arrangements for debt advice will be reviewed, and the Government may consider broadening the funding base to include other sectors, to ensure that consumers continue to get the help they need. I trust that this assures my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon that the Government continue to consider it a priority to help those facing problem debt, and that he will not press his amendment to the vote.

I shall deal now with amendments 1, 2, 8, 9, and 10, which would apply the reverse burden of proof to senior managers in the banking sector or in all authorised financial services firms. We reject both sets of amendments, above all because the senior managers and certification regime with a statutory duty of responsibility will be an extremely effective tool for holding senior managers to account.

The duty of responsibility will extend to all senior managers. The discredited approved persons regime will be replaced. Firms must identify exactly what their senior managers are responsible for. Senior managers will not be able to wriggle off the hook because they did not know what was being done in the areas for which they are responsible. The reverse burden of proof is not needed to deliver what we want to deliver—a culture change.

Lord Turnbull, who was a Cross-Bench member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, said:

“In future, senior managers will have to take responsibility for what goes on in the teams for which they are responsible and for the actions of the people whom they have appointed and thereby given accreditation.”

He went on to say:

“I still fail to see why the reverse burden of proof is the only way to get people to understand that. . . I believe that the proposal now in the Bill— that is, the duty of responsibility— is superior.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 December 2015; Vol. 767, c. 2026-28.]

In written evidence to the Public Bill Committee, the Building Societies Association stated:

“The lack of individual accountability to date is mainly the result of a failure to allocate responsibilities in firms’ corporate governance frameworks. Because this deficiency will be fully addressed by the new strengthening accountability in banking rules (through responsibility maps, individual statements of responsibility, handover arrangements), the reversed burden of proof is unfair and is redundant”— not my words, but those of the Building Societies Association.

Today’s debate is about what happens when things go wrong and a firm breaks a regulatory requirement. Under the reverse burden of proof, the senior manager responsible for the area of the firm where the breach occurred would have to prove that they had taken reasonable steps to prevent it. The Bill will impose a statutory duty of responsibility on senior managers. Senior managers would still be required to take reasonable steps to prevent breaches of regulations in the areas of the firm’s business for which they are responsible. However, when such a breach occurs, it will fall to the regulators to show that the responsible senior manager had failed to take such steps. This duty will be extended with the senior managers and certification regime to senior managers in all authorised financial services firms, ensuring that they are held to the same high standards as those in banks.

Contrary to the allegations of Richard Burgon, the duty is in no way “soft” on bankers. A senior manager can be found guilty of misconduct if a breach of regulatory requirements occurred in the area of the firm’s business for which they are responsible and they did not take reasonable steps to prevent it, whether they were aware of the contravention or not. The hon. Gentleman quoted a previous Economic Secretary, my right hon. Friend Sajid Javid. I think that he might be confusing the reverse burden of proof with the criminal offence of recklessness causing a bank to fail. I can assure him and the House that that criminal offence, with a possible seven-year sentence attached, came into effect in March.

New clause 14 seeks to give the FCA and PRA a statutory duty to have regard to combating tax avoidance, and for them to report annually to the Treasury. I welcome the opportunity once again to set out the measures that this Government have taken—far more than any previous Government—to tackle tax evasion, tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning. We have become a world leader in tax transparency. However, as the UK tax authority is Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, rather than the FCA or PRA, it is responsible for ensuring that businesses and individuals pay the taxes they owe.

Last week we set out a far more effective package of proposals to tackle the problem of tax evasion and avoidance, ensuring a multi-agency approach by strengthening HMRC and involving relevant bodies such as the FCA. The Government are committed to giving HMRC the tools to do its job, whether by introducing over 40 changes to the tax laws, or by providing additional funding to strengthen its capability in key areas. I could go on, Madam Deputy Speaker, about all the measures we have introduced—

Photo of Harriett Baldwin Harriett Baldwin The Economic Secretary to the Treasury

Okay, the hon. Gentleman wants to hear more. In the July 2015 Budget we confirmed an extra £800 million investment to fund additional work to tackle evasion and non-compliance. HMRC’s specialist offshore unit is currently investigating more than 1,100 cases of offshore evasion around the world, with more than 90 individuals subject to current criminal investigation. Even before last week, HMRC had already received a great deal of information on offshore companies, including in Panama, and including Mossack Fonseca. This information comes from a wide range of sources and is currently the subject of intense investigation.

We are going further by providing new funding of up to £10 million for an operationally independent cross-agency taskforce. It will include analysts, compliance specialists and investigators from across HMRC, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the Financial Conduct Authority. It will have full operational independence and will report to my right hon. Friends the Chancellor and the Home Secretary.

Of course the FCA has a role to play. Its 2016-17 business plan states that the fight against financial crime and money laundering is one of its priorities. Its rules require firms to have effective systems and controls to prevent the risk that they might be used to further financial crimes. That is why the FCA has written to financial firms asking them to declare their links to Mossack Fonseca. If it finds any evidence that firms have been breaking the rules, it already has strong powers to take action. However, it is HMRC that is ultimately responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences associated with tax evasion.

Finally, with regard to trusts, we believe that we have secured a sensible way forward by ensuring that trusts that generate a tax consequence in the UK will be required to report their beneficial ownership information to HMRC. By focusing on such trusts, we are focusing on those where there is a higher risk of money laundering or tax evasion, which arise when trusts migrate or generate income or gains, and minimising burdens on the vast majority of perfectly ordinary and legitimate trusts.

Although I appreciate the spirit with which the new clause has been tabled, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to change the role of the FCA or the PRA, so I urge the hon. Member for Leeds East not to press the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 9 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.