‘(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (6).

(2) For the heading before section 47 substitute “Sexual exploitation of children”.

(3) In section 48 (headed “Causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography”)—

(a) in the heading, for “child prostitution or pornography” substitute “sexual exploitation of a child”;

(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “to become a prostitute, or to be involved in pornography,” substitute “to be sexually exploited”.

(4) In section 49 (headed “Controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography”)—

(a) in the heading, for “prostitute or a child involved in pornography” substitute “in relation to sexual exploitation”;

(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “prostitution or involvement in pornography” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(5) In section 50 (headed “Arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography”)—

(a) in the heading, for “child prostitution or pornography” substitute “sexual exploitation of a child”;

(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “prostitution or involvement in pornography” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(6) In section 51 (interpretation of sections 48 to 50)—

(a) omit subsection (1);

(b) for subsection (2) substitute—

“(2) For the purposes of sections 48 to 50, a person (B) is sexually exploited if—

(a) on at least one occasion and whether or not compelled to do so, B offers or provides sexual services to another person in return for payment or a promise of payment to B or a third person, or

(b) an indecent image of B is recorded;

and “sexual exploitation” is to be interpreted accordingly.”

(7) In section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution), in subsection (1), after “person” insert “aged 18 or over”.” —(Mr Buckland.)

This New Clause replaces the references to child prostitution and pornography in sections 48 to 51 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with references to the sexual exploitation of children (without altering the substance of the relevant offences), and also restricts to adults the offence of loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment (a) to new clause 8, leave out

“offers or provides sexual services to” and insert

“prepares to engage in, or engages in, sexual activity with”.

Government new clause 9—Duty to notify police of female genital mutilation.

Government new clause 10—Guidance about female genital mutilation.

New clause 2—Official Secrets Act 1989 (additional defence)—

‘(1) The Official Secrets Act 1989 is amended as follows—

(2) After section 8, insert—

“(8A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under any provision of this Act to prove that he knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the information, document or article disclosed was—

(a) germane to an official investigation of, or inquiry into, historic child abuse, and

(b) provided only to an officer of such an investigation or inquiry.”’

New clause 3—Child sexual exploitation—

‘(1) In section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1059 (Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution), after “female)”, insert “, aged 18 or over,”.

(2) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(3) In section 48 (Causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography)—

(a) in the title of the section, for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”; and

(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “become a prostitute” substitute “be sexually exploited”.

(4) In section 49 (Controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography)—

(a) in the title of the section, for “child prostitute” substitute “sexually exploited child”; and

(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(5) In section 50 (Arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography)—

(a) in the title of the section, for “child prostitution or pornography” substitute “the sexual exploitation of a child or sexual images of children”; and

(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(6) In section 51 (Sections 48 to 50: interpretation), in subsection (2), for “prostitute” substitute “sexually exploited child”; for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(7) References in any Act, Regulation, Order or other legislative instrument to the sections and titles mentioned in this section shall be interpreted as referring to the sections and titles as amended by this section.”

New clause 11—Child protection: 16 and 17 year olds living with their families—

‘(1) The Children’s Act 1933 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 1 insert—

“1A Cruelty to a person aged sixteen or seventeen

(1) If any person A, who has attained the age of eighteen years and is personally connected to a child B aged sixteen or seventeen, wilfully assaults, ill-treats (whether physically or psychologically), neglects, abandons, or exposes him, or causes or procures for him to be assaulted, ill-treated (whether physically or psychologically), neglected, abandoned, or exposed, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health (including injury to or loss of sight, or hearing, or limb, or organ of the body and whether the injury is of physical or psychological nature), that person shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable—

(a) on conviction or indictment, to a fine or alternatively, or in addition thereto, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 10 years;

(b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £400 pounds, or alternatively, or in addition thereto, to imprisonment not exceeding six months.

(2) For the purposes of this section—

(a) A and B are considered to be personally connected if at the time of the offence they live together, and

(i) A has parental responsibility for B

(ii) A is a relative of B

(iii) A is or has been married or civil partner to B’s parent.

(b) A shall be deemed to have neglected B in a manner likely to cause injury to his health if he has failed to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid or lodging for him or if, having been unable otherwise to provide such food, clothing, medical aid or lodging, he has failed to take steps to procure it to be provided to B.

(3) A person may be convicted of an offence under this section—

(a) notwithstanding that actual suffering or injury to health, or the likelihood of actual suffering or injury to health, was obviated by the action of another person;

(b) notwithstanding the death of B.

(4) In subsection (2)—

“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989;

“relative” has the meaning given by section 63(1) of the Family Law Act 1996”.

New clause 15—Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation Warning Notices and Orders (EWNs and EWOs)—

In the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, after section 2A (offence of Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation) insert—

“2B Power to issue an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice

(1) A member of a police force not below the rank of superintendent (“the authorising officer”) may issue an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice (an “EWN”) under this section.

(2) An EWN may be issued to a person (“A”) who is aged 18 or over if the authorising officer has reasonable grounds for believing that A has been encouraging the genital mutilation of women and girls as defined in section 1.

(3) Before issuing an EWN, the authorising officer must, in particular, consider any representations made by A as to the issuing of the EWN.

(4) The authorising officer must take reasonable steps to obtain the representations mentioned in subsection (3).

(5) An EWN must prohibit A from encouraging the genital mutilation of women and girls.

2C Contents and service of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice

‘(1) An EWN must state—

(a) the grounds on which it has been issued;

(b) that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that A is in breach of the EWN;

(c) that an application for an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order (an “EWO”) under section (application for an EWO) shall be heard within 48 hours of the time of service of the EWN and notice time and place of the hearing will be given to A, and shall state that the EWN continues in effect until that application has been determined.

(2) An EWN must be in writing and must be served on A personally by a constable.

(3) On serving A with an EWN, the constable must ask A for an address for the purposes of being given notice of the hearing of the application for the Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order.

2D Breach of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice

‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section (contents and service of an EWN) for a breach of an EWN shall be held in custody and brought before the magistrates’ court which will hear the application for the EWO under (application for an EWO)—

(a) before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest; or

(b) if earlier, at the hearing of that application.

(2) If the person is brought before the court by virtue of subsection (1)(a), the court may remand the person.

(3) If the court adjourns the hearing of the application by virtue of subsection 6(8), the court may remand the person.

(4) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1)(a) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.

2E Application for an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order

‘(1) If an EWN has been issued, a constable must apply for an Encouragement of Female Genital mutilation warning order (an “EWO”).

(2) The application must be made by complaint to a magistrates’ court.

(3) The application must be heard by the magistrates’ court no later than 48 hours after the EWN was served pursuant to section (contents and service of an EWN).

(4) In calculating when the period of 48 hours mentioned in subsection (3) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.

(5) Notice of the time and place of the hearing of the application must be given to A.

(6) The notice is deemed given if it has been left at the address given by A under section 4(3).

(7) If the notice has not been given because no address was given by A under section 4(3), the court may hear the application for the EWO if the court is satisfied that the constable applying for the EWO has made reasonable efforts to give A the notice.

(8) The magistrates’ court may adjourn the hearing of the application.

(9) If the court adjourns the hearing, the EWN continues in effect until the application has been determined.

(10) On the hearing of an application for an EWO, section 97 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 (summons to witness and warrant for his arrest) does not apply in relation to a person for whose protection the EWO would be made, except where the person has given oral or written evidence at the hearing.

2F Conditions for and contents of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order (EWO)

‘(1) The court may make an EWO if two conditions are met.

(2) The first condition is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the conditions set out in section 3(2) are met.

(3) The second condition is that the court is satisfied that making the EWO is necessary to protect women and girls from harm as a result of the encouragement of FGM by A.

(4) An EWO must state that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that A is in breach of the EWO.

(5) An EWO may be in force for—

(a) no fewer than 14 days beginning with the day on which it is made; and

(b) up to a maximum of seven years from that date.

(6) An EWO must state the period for which it is to be in force.

2G Breach of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order

‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section (conditions for and contents of an EWO) for a breach of an EWO must be held in custody and brought before a magistrates’ court within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest.

(2) If the matter is not disposed of when the person is brought before the court, the court may remand the person.

(3) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.

2H Further provision about remand

‘(1) This section applies for the purposes of the remand of a person by a magistrates’ court under section (Breach of an EWN) or (Breach of an EWO).

(2) In the application of section 128(6) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 for those purposes, the reference to the “other party” is to be read—

(a) in the case of a remand prior to the hearing of an application for an EWO, as a reference to the authorising officer; and

(b) in any other case, as a reference to the constable who applied for the EWO.

(3) If the court has reason to suspect that a medical report will be required, the power to remand a person may be exercised for the purpose of enabling a medical examination to take place and a report to be made.

(4) If the person is remanded in custody for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than three weeks at a time.

(5) If the person is remanded on bail for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than four weeks at a time.

(6) If the court has reason to suspect that the person is suffering from a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983, the court has the same power to make an order under section 35 of that Act (remand to hospital for medical report) as it has under that section in the case of an accused person (within the meaning of that section).

(7) The court may, when remanding the person on bail, require the person to comply before release on bail or later, with such requirements as appear to the court to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.

2I Guidance

‘(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance relating to the exercise by a constable of functions under section (Power to issue an EWN).

(2) A constable must have regard to any guidance issued under subsection (1) when exercising a function to which the guidance relates.

(3) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Association of Chief Police Officers;

(b) the National Crime Agency; and

(c) such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks fit.”

New clause 16—Offence of encouragement of female genital mutilation—

‘(1) The Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 is amended as follows:

(2) After section 2 (offence of assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia) insert—

“(2A) Offence of encouragement of female genital mutilation—

(a) a person is guilty of an offence of encouragement of female genital mutilation if he makes a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to mutilate the genitalia of a girl;

(b) A person commits an offence if—

(i) he publishes a statement to which this section applies or causes another to publish such a statement; and

(ii) at the time he publishes it or causes it to be published, he—

(a) intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to mutilate the genitalia of a girl; or

(b) is reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to mutilate the genitalia of a girl.””

New clause 17—Mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse—

‘(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) he is involved in the provision of regulated activity as defined by section 5 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 for which he is paid;

(b) he is a provider of regulated activity as defined by section 6 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006;

(c) he becomes aware that a child has been harmed in connection to the regulated activity; and

(d) he does not inform a relevant authority of this harm.

(2) A person does not commit an offence under this section if—

(a) he can demonstrate he acted in the best interests of the child, or

(b) he complied with relevant professional guidelines or institutional guidelines for the reporting of abuse as he believed them to be, complying with institutional guidelines for the reporting of abuse can include informing another individual with relevant safeguarding responsibilities.

(3) In this section “harm” means conduct which amounts to one of the following offences—

(a) cruelty to and neglect of children;

(b) cruelty to children/young persons;

(c) child abduction;

(d) rape of a female child under 16;

(e) rape of a female child under 13;

(f) rape of a male child under 16;

(g) rape of a male child under 13;

(h) sexual assault on a male child under 13;

(i) sexual assault on a female child under 13;

(j) sexual activity involving a child under 13;

(k) sexual activity involving a child under 16;

(l) sexual exploitation of children;

(m) abuse of position of trust of a sexual nature; and

(n) sexual grooming.

(4) The Secretary of State may, by way of regulation, make guidance as to the interpretation of subsection (2) or amend subsection (3).

(5) Any regulations made under subsection (4) must be subject to an affirmative procedure of both Houses of Parliament.

(6) In this section “relevant authority” means—

(a) the local authority with safeguarding authorities;

(b) the local police force; and

(c) the Disclosure and Barring Service.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this Part of this Act shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both such imprisonment and fine;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.”

New clause 19—Child abduction warning notice—

In the Child Abduction Act 1984, after section 2 (offence of abduction of child by other person) insert—

“2A Power to issue a child abduction warning notice

(1) A member of a police force not below the rank of superintendent (“the authorising officer”) may issue a child abduction warning notice (“a CAWN”) under this section.

(2) A CAWN may be issued to a person (“A”) aged 18 years or over if the authorising officer has reasonable grounds for believing that—

(a) A has without lawful authority or reasonable excuse been found in the company of a child (“C”); and

(b) C is reported missing and is found on two or more occasions to be in the company of A; or

(c) there is reason to suspect that C‘s behaviour is, by reason of association with the defendant, giving significant cause for concern.

(3) Before issuing a CAWN, the authorising officer must, in particular, take reasonable steps to gather and consider—

(a) representations made by the person with lawful authority for C; and

(b) representations made by A as to the issuing of the CAWN.

(4) A CAWN must prohibit A from being in the company of C.

2B Contents and service of a child abduction warning notice

‘(1) A CAWN must state—

(a) the grounds on which it has been issued;

(b) that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that A is in breach of the CAWN;

(c) that an application for a child abduction warning order under section 2D will be heard within 48 hours of the time of service of the CAWN and a notice of the hearing will be given to A;

(d) that the CAWN continues in effect until that application has been determined; and

(e) the provisions that a magistrates’ court may include in a child abduction warning order (CAWO) under sections 2D and 2E.

(2) A CAWN must be in writing and must be served on A personally by a constable.

(3) On serving A with a CAWN, the constable must ask A for an address for the purposes of being given the notice of the hearing of the application for the child abduction warning order.

2C Breach of a child abduction warning notice

‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section 2B(1)(b) for a breach of a CAWN must be held in custody and brought before the magistrates’ court which will hear the application for a child abduction warning order (CAWO) under sections 2D and 2E—

(a) before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest; or

(b) if earlier, at the hearing of that application.

(2) If the person is brought before the court by virtue of subsection (1)(a), the court may remand the person.

(3) If the court adjourns the hearing of the application by virtue of subsection 2D(8), the court may remand the person.

(4) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1)(a) of this section ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.

2D Application for a child abduction warning order

‘(1) If a CAWN has been issued, a constable must apply for a child abduction warning order (“a CAWO”).

(2) The application must be made by complaint to a magistrates’ court.

(3) The application must be heard by the magistrates’ court no later than 48 hours after the CAWN was served pursuant to section 2B(2).

(4) In calculating when the period of 48 hours mentioned in subsection (3) of this section ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.

(5) A notice of the hearing of the application must be given to A.

(6) The notice is deemed given if it has been left at the address given by A under section 2B(3).

(7) But if the notice has not been given because no address was given by A under section 2B(3), the court may hear the application for the CAWO if the court is satisfied that the constable applying for the CAWO has made reasonable efforts to give A the notice.

(8) The magistrates’ court may adjourn the hearing of the application.

(9) If the court adjourns the hearing, the CAWN continues in effect until the application has been determined.

(10) On the hearing of an application for a CAWO, section 97 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 (summons to witness and warrant for his arrest) does not apply in relation to a person for whose protection the CAWO would be made, except where the person has given oral or written evidence at the hearing.

2E Conditions for and contents of a child abduction warning order

‘(1) The court may make a CAWO if two conditions are met.

(2) The first condition is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that one or more of the criteria in section 2A(2)(a)-(c) are satisfied.

(3) The second condition is that the court thinks that making the CAWO is necessary to protect C from harm as a result of association with A.

(4) A CAWO must state that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing A is in breach of the CAWO.

(5) A CAWO may be in force for—

(a) no fewer than 14 days beginning with the day on which it is made; and

(b) until the date of the 16th birthday of C.

(6) A CAWO must state the period for which it is to be in force.

2F Breach of a child abduction warning order

‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section 2E(4) for a breach of a CAWO must be held in custody and brought before a magistrates’ court within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest.

(2) If the matter is not disposed of when the person is brought before the court, the court may remand the person.

(3) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial. Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.

2G Further provision about remand

‘(1) This section applies for the purposes of the remand of a person by a magistrates’ court under section 2C(2) or (3) or 2F(2).

(2) In the application of section 128(6) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 for those purposes, the reference to the “other party” is to be read—

(a) in the case of a remand prior to the hearing of an application for a CAWO, as a reference to the authorising officer; and

(b) in any other case, as a reference to the constable who applied for the CAWO.

(3) If the court has reason to suspect that a medical report will be required, the power to remand a person may be exercised for the purpose of enabling a medical examination to take place and a report to be made.

(4) If the person is remanded in custody for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than three weeks at a time.

(5) If the person is remanded on bail for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than four weeks at a time.

(6) If the court has reason to suspect that the person is suffering from a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983, the court has the same power to make an order under section 35 of that Act (remand to hospital for medical report) as it has under that section in the case of an accused person (within the meaning of that section).

(7) The court may, when remanding the person on bail, require the person to comply before release on bail or later, with such requirements as appear to the court to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.

2H Guidance

‘(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance relating to the exercise by a constable of functions under sections 2A to 2F.

(2) The guidance must set out the behaviours associated with “giving significant cause for concern”, including, in particular, behaviours associated with giving cause for concern of sexual exploitation or grooming.

(3) A constable must have regard to any guidance issued under subsection (1) when exercising a function to which the guidance relates.

(4) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Association of Chief Police Officers;

(b) the National Crime Agency; and

(c) such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks fit.””

This amendment establishes child abduction warning notices (CAWNs) on a statutory basis, addressing concerns raised in the House of Lords on the issue, by introducing a two-stage process providing judicial oversight, without compromising the ability of the police to issue a CAWN without delay. The proposed process is similar to that in place for Domestic Violence Prevention Notices/Domestic Violence Prevention Orders (DVPN/DVPO).

New clause 22—Offence of child exploitation—

‘(1) A person commits an offence if they exploit a child.

(2) A child may be in a situation of exploitation whether or not—

(a) escape from the situation is practically possible for the child; or

(b) the child has attempted to escape from the situation.

(3) The consent or apparent consent of the child to the exploitation is irrelevant.

(4) “Child Exploitation” includes but is not limited to, the exploitation of the prostitute of others or other forms of sexual exploitation; the exploitation of labour or services including begging or practices similar to slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour; the exploitation of or for criminal activities including benefit fraud; the removal of organs; forced or servile marriage or enforced surrogacy; exploitation for unlawful adoption; and exploitation by enforced drugs smuggling, manufacture, production or distribution.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.”

New clause 26—Automatic Special Measures: controlling or coercive behaviour cases—

The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows—

In section 17, after “offence” insert “an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family setting contrary to section 73 of the Serious Crime Act 2015.””

New clause 27—Offence of abduction of child by other person—

‘(1) In section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, after subsection (1), insert—

“(1A) Subject to subsection (3)(a)-(c), a person, other than one mentioned in subsection (2), commits an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, he takes or detains a child between the ages of sixteen and eighteen—

(a) so as to remove him from the lawful control of any person having lawful control of the child; or

(b) so as to keep him out of the lawful control of any person entitled to lawful control of the child.”

(2) In section 2(3) of the Child Abduction Act 1984, for paragraph (b) substitute—

“(b) that, at the time of the alleged offence under subsection 2(1), he believed that the child had attained the age of sixteen,

(bA) that, at the time of the alleged offence under subsection 2(2), he believed the child had attained the age of eighteen,””

Amendment 20, in clause 72, page 63, line 27, leave out “the” and insert “a risk of”.

Amendment 21, in clause 73, page 78, line 22, leave out

“he or she was acting” and insert

“their behaviour was necessary in order to act, and”.

Amendment 22, page 78, line 23, in clause 73, at end insert—

“(aa) a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think that A’s behaviour was necessary in order to act in B’s best interests.”

Government amendments 2 to 10.

Amendment 33, in schedule 4, page 117, line 15, at end insert—

“59A In Schedule 2 of that Act (sexual offences to which provisions about extra territoriality application apply) in paragraph 1(d), insert—

“(iii) section 68 (possession of paedophile manual) of the Serious Crime Act 2015.””

Provisions in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 enable certain child abuse offences committed outside the UK to be prosecuted in England and Wales in some circumstances. This amendment enables these extra-territorial provisions to apply to the new offence of possession of any item that contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually contained in Clause 68 of this Bill.

Government amendments 11 to 19.

I am conscious that a number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak, so I will keep my opening remarks as brief as possible. I am doubly conscious of the need to ensure that, as has been mentioned, we have meaningful debates on other groups of amendments.

New clause 8 responds to the compelling case made in Committee by Ann Coffey, to whom I am grateful, that we should remove from the statute book references to the phrase “child prostitution” and limit the scope of the offence of loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution, so that it applies only to adults. As I made clear in Committee, children who are sexually exploited, whether for financial gain or other reasons, should not be referred to as prostitutes. They should be regarded as victims.

New clause 8 will have substantially the same effect as the hon. Lady’s new clause 3, and in one important respect it goes even further. As well as replacing the anachronistic references to “child prostitute” and “child prostitution” in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the new clause will remove references to “child pornography”, to which similar considerations apply.

I thank the Solicitor-General and the Government for tabling new clause 8. It will make a big difference to the language we use when talking about children who are sexually exploited. I know that victims of child exploitation are pleased that the new clause has been introduced, so I thank the Government on their behalf as well.

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady, and I pay tribute to her for the work that she has done, most recently in the report that she prepared about child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester.

New clause 9 will require persons working in regulated professions to notify the police if they discover in the course of their work that an act of female genital mutilation appears to have been carried out on a girl under the age of 18. The new duty will help to ensure that professionals are clear about their responsibilities when they encounter cases of FGM in under-18s, and that those cases are reported to the police, thereby supporting investigations.

The consultation on what a mandatory reporting duty should look like closed on 12 January, and we received nearly 150 responses, including from health care professionals, education professionals, the police, charities and members of the public. We have considered those responses carefully, which is reflected in our approach to the new clause.

The new duty will require regulated health and social care professionals and teachers in England and Wales to report known cases of FGM to the police. Depending on the specifics of the case, a report to the police will not necessarily trigger a criminal investigation immediately. When a report is made, the police will work with the relevant agencies to determine the most appropriate course of action, which may include referral to medical experts for diagnosis of whether FGM has taken place. That is important, because we want to reassure those involved in the detection and exposure of this appalling child abuse that although prosecution and criminal investigation are important, they are not the only means that we have to deal with this scourge.

My hon. and learned Friend will understand that new clause 9 deals only with circumstances in which FGM appears to have been carried out, not with those in which there is a risk of it being carried out, to which I shall refer later.

I look forward to my hon. Friend’s contribution and will respond appropriately when I have heard his full argument.

We recognise that some individuals captured by the new duty may be less likely than others to encounter cases of FGM. The duty will apply only to cases identified in the course of an individual’s professional duties. There will be no new requirement for professionals to look for visual evidence, and we do not expect them to do so.

Where professionals fail to comply with the duty, it will be dealt with in accordance with existing disciplinary procedures. That is in line with the approach favoured by the vast majority of respondents to the consultation and will ensure that appropriate sanctions are imposed in accordance with the circumstances of an individual case. The Government expect employers and the professional regulators to pay due regard to the seriousness of breaches of the new duty.

New clause 10 will confer on the Secretary of State a power to issue guidance on FGM to relevant individuals in England and Wales, and will require them to have regard to it. That guidance will take the form of updated multi-agency guidelines, which will explicitly capture good safeguarding practice, including for non-regulated practitioners. In addition, the existing frameworks for the purpose of dealing with child abuse will, of course, continue to support appropriate safeguarding responses.

We know that, in the past, some professionals feared that addressing certain harmful cultural practices would result in their being labelled politically insensitive. We also want to increase the number of referrals to the police to support investigations of FGM, in order to deter perpetrators and thus prevent this appalling crime from being committed in the first place. We believe that, together with the Government’s wider work to tackle FGM and alongside the introduction of statutory multi-agency guidelines on FGM, the new mandatory reporting duty will allow those changes to happen.

I wish only to repeat, in a sense, what I have already said, namely that this measure will not, in itself, deal with the problem of girls who are at risk.

My hon. Friend has made his point again. We may well have to differ on the issue of the threshold with which his amendment deals, but I will outline my arguments when I have heard all that he has to say.

Amendment 10 relates to the new offence of sexual communication with a child, which was added to the Bill in Committee. While there was cross-party support for the new offence in Committee, there was some debate about whether it should be possible for a prosecution to be mounted in England and Wales in respect of conduct engaged in abroad—that is, whether such conduct should be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Below amendment 10—which, obviously, I support—on the amendment paper is my amendment 33. My hon. and learned Friend will recall the discussion that we had in Committee. My amendment contains essentially the same wording as before, applying extraterritorial jurisdiction to the paedophile manual. Will he comment on that now?

I thank my hon. Friend for the work that he has done in ensuring that extraterritorial jurisdiction has been applied to a range of sexual offences. In a nutshell, our view is that the case for applying extraterritorial jurisdiction to the possession of paedophile manuals has not been made out. We do not expect it to be generally applicable to that type of offence. We think it far more relevant to an offence of communication, given that communications no longer respect national borders, but can take place throughout the world through the internet and social media.

I was explaining the context in which we considered the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It was in the light of speeches made by my hon. Friend Sir Paul Beresford and Seema Malhotra that we reconsidered the issue, and concluded that it should be extended to the offence of sexual communication. Amendment 10 gives effect to that.

I hope that the House will welcome these important amendments. I look forward to hearing from other Members who have tabled amendments in this group, and I will respond to them as best I can when I wind up the debate.

During our debates on the Bill, I have been drawing to Ministers’ attention the exploitation of adults—not elderly adults who cannot help themselves through old age, but young adults—by quacks and bogus counsellors. I rather hoped that the Solicitor-General and other members of the Government would address that issue. I see that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend Karen Bradley, is present. She has experienced the distinct displeasure of having to listen to me going on about this, but I will continue to go on about it until a decision is made. Will the Solicitor-General update me on the Government’s thinking about the exploitation of vulnerable adults who are brainwashed by those quacks and bogus counsellors to their emotional, psychological and financial disadvantage?

I understand that the Government are still considering that issue. The definition of “vulnerable” may, of course, be something of a vexed question. It has tended to apply to adults with learning difficulties, but I understand my hon. and learned Friend to be referring to it in the wider context in which people are brainwashed or duped by cults and other organisations. It is not a straightforward issue, as I know he understands, but the Government are giving consideration to it, so I am grateful to him for raising it.

With those remarks, I will draw my speech to a close.

Well, I will not say the occurrence was unprecedented, but a lawyer finishing his speech earlier than expected is certainly a rarity.

I am very well aware of the pressure in respect of today’s business, and I know that many right hon. and hon. Members have signed amendments that they want to debate later. I will of course attempt to keep my remarks as succinct as possible, but we are dealing with a very wide-ranging group of amendments on child protection issues, ranging from FGM to mandatory reporting to a new offence of child exploitation, so I do not think I will be able to match the Minister’s brevity in setting out the Government amendments. I will do my best, but it is important to recognise that this is an important grouping that needs to be fully debated.

I shall deal first with Government new clause 8 and Labour amendment (a), new clause 3 tabled by my hon. Friend Ann Coffey, and new clause 22, dealing with a new offence of child exploitation and tabled by the Labour Front Bench. I certainly welcome what the Government are trying to do with new clause 8, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for her work on this issue which has led to it going high up the agenda. Her report on child sexual exploitation highlighted the particular issue that children and young adults were being ignored or seen as the problem or even the instigator, when the truth was that they were being abused. One of the recommendations of the report was that our legislation needed to reflect the vulnerabilities of children and the fact that children cannot consent to being abused. A proposed step towards achieving this was to remove the terms “child prostitute” or “child pornography” from legislation to demonstrate that any children taking part in these sexual acts were not instigators and consenting participants, but were being abused. I am very pleased that my hon. Friend is in her place, and she has already paid tribute to the Minister for tabling the new clause. It is very helpful, but I want to highlight some issues relating to it, which is why I have tabled amendment (a).

In particular, I have concerns about the definition of child sexual exploitation, which is defined by new clause 8 as a situation where a child

“offers or provides sexual services” to an adult. Let us be clear: this is about abused children. It is about a child being abused. They are not providing sexual services to adults; they are being abused and exploited, and our legislation should reflect the real nature of that relationship. Indeed, the purpose of the new clause is to ensure that the legislation reflects the fact that those subject to exploitation are victims, not instigators. I do not think moving from the term “child prostitute” to children as providers of sexual services is correct, and amendment (a) would correct that by moving to a definition of child sexual exploitation where a child engages in sexual activity with an adult. We would move away from the concept of the child as the provider or instigator of sexual activity. The term “sexual activity” is used extensively in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, so adopting amendment (a) would mean we have consistent and well-established terminology which will make legislation easier to apply. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and consider this amendment.

I would also like to raise with the Minister the wider consequences of new clause 8 in improving our understanding of child sexual exploitation and our response to it.

We will now have an offence of child sexual exploitation that will cover situations of child exploitation involving payment or photography, but those are just some of the examples of exploitation. I also have real concerns about the ancillary offences under sections 48 to 50 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. We will now have offences of arranging or facilitating sexual exploitation of a child, of controlling a child in relation to sexual exploitation and of causing or inciting sexual exploitation of a child, but none of those offences covers all child sexual exploitation. They provide only for child sexual exploitation involving payment or photography.

I want to put to the Minister the example of a scenario in which control is exerted through threats, intimidation or coercion, or in which a child is plied with drugs or alcohol. We should recognise that those are all forms of child sexual exploitation. However, the Government’s approach is to have an offence of child sexual exploitation involving payment or photography. Other forms of exploitation not covered by that specific offence would therefore need to be prosecuted under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act for the general offence of arranging or facilitating commission of a child sex offence. That is a complicated offence to establish, however, because it relies on proving the commission of another sexual offence under the terms of the Act. In 2012, the latest year for which I have managed to find figures, there were just 32 convictions for that particular offence, and there have been only 130 convictions in five years. There is therefore a problem with the legislation: it is not working as effectively as we would all like it to.

That is why the Opposition have tabled new clause 22, which would create a specific offence of child exploitation for the first time. There has been a lot of comment about such an offence being put on the statute book. I have heard people saying that it could criminalise a parent for getting their teenage son or daughter to do the washing up, for example, because that could count as child exploitation. However, the country’s leading expert in this area, Peter Carter QC, says that to use that kind of argument is to

“miss the significance of the word ‘exploitation’”.

The exploitation of children is, in and of itself, a serious matter that should be recognised in legislation. New clause 22 covers all forms of exploitation, from children being forced into begging or into working on cannabis farms to young girls being controlled by men and forced to submit to their sexual advances and abuse. It recognises that exploitation involves a wide spectrum, and the sentencing guidelines would reflect the fact that some forms of exploitation are more serious than others. Crucially, it would recognise that the exploitation of children is an offence in and of itself.

The new clause is about asserting the right of the child to a life free from exploitation. It is about saying that we will not accept the exploitation of children, just as we will not accept their abuse or their neglect. It would address some of the many problems that are preventing prosecutions under the Sexual Offences Act by moving from a situation in which we look at the commission of individual offences to one in which we look at people who control, manipulate and coerce children for their own ends. It would allow the police to step in where they could see an adult using controlling and coercive behaviour towards a vulnerable child, forcing them into situations involving sexual abuse, drugs, crime or forced labour.

Many prosecutions focus on particular criminal incidents, such as rape or sexual assault, but for victims of sexual exploitation, such incidents might be difficult to separate from the multiple assaults that they have endured. Such prosecutions might not give a true representation of the abuse that had been suffered. One young person has said:

“I was pressurised to go to court. There needs to be a sexual exploitation law. My charge was for rape, this was the wrong charge. So many times it happened.”

Cases often do not get prosecuted because the young person is considered an unreliable witness. That could be because she was returning to perpetrators and found it difficult to break the contact with them. So practitioners say that the effects of exploitation as a result of duration of relationships, coercion and controlling behaviour are like the Stockholm syndrome, with which we are all familiar, but that is not being recognised in the current drafting of offences, because they all focus on separate counts of rape or sexual assault.

Separate exploitation offences with a focus on children will also enable the prosecution of cases where current legislation does not offer equal protection to all children under the age of 18. For example, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 establishes the age of consent as 16, and children aged 16 and 17 are afforded the additional protection of the Act only if the person who commits the sexual offence is a person in a position of trust in relation to them. Yet those in that age group are likely to be victims of sexual exploitation. The Office of the Children’s Commissioner for England report on sexual exploitation by groups and gangs estimated that out of 16,500 children and young people who are experiencing or are at risk of child sexual exploitation 28% were aged 16 and 16% were aged 17.

Our approach would also enable prosecutions in respect of those children exploited in the course of human trafficking. Over the past two years, the police have identified more than 1,000 child victims of human trafficking, but when I asked the Government how many prosecutions there have been they could not identify a single case where the victim was a child. The total number of prosecutions for all the human trafficking offences collated together was just 41 last year, so it should not have been hard to see whether any involved children. Children often do not understand what is happening to them when they are trafficked. They might not be able to identify who their traffickers were or the links between the trafficker and the exploitation. That is why a huge coalition of charities and eminent lawyers support a specific child exploitation offence.

Let me now deal with the amendments relating to female genital mutilation. New clauses 16 and 15 propose a new offence of encouragement of FGM, and encouragement warning notices and orders. The Labour Front-Bench team proposed these new clauses in Committee, ably led by my hon. Friend Seema Malhotra. I am proposing them again on Report because of the importance of this offence. Clearly, all Members want to end the practice of FGM, and we want to do so within a generation. The measures already in the Bill, although important, are largely reactive—the new offence of encouraging FGM is a preventive measure in the strongest sense.

On 6 February, we had the international day for zero tolerance of FGM and there were renewed calls for nations to do all they can to end FGM. Like colleagues on both sides of the House, we have been meeting and working with amazing young women in Britain who are leading the calls for change in the UK. We have not only a moral duty, but a legal duty to end FGM under international law. The practice can have devastating health impacts for girls, leading to a range of problems, including urinary infections, a lifetime of pain and even infertility. It is not enough simply to react to FGM—to take action after the fact; we need to focus our efforts on prevention, which is why we need to work to tackle some of the long-standing cultural context within which FGM takes place.

Does the hon. Lady agree that it is essential to ensure that girls at risk are also protected?

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman on that point. Research undertaken by Dexter Dias QC with survivors of FGM from around the country highlighted the need for measures to tackle the encouragement of FGM, whereby parents can be put under extreme pressure to cut their girls. Not only are parents told that their daughters will never get married, but whole families can be ostracised and isolated as unclean. We need to support those seeking to change the culture in affected communities that they are part of and send out the message that this practice is against the law. That is why Labour has proposed adding a new offence of the encouragement of FGM to this Bill. As I say, it was tabled in Committee and we feel it is important that we have brought it back today.

I agree with what the hon. Lady is saying. Does she agree that, over the long term, one problem we have had is that we have spent too much time listening to the self-appointed “leaders” of minority groups and not listening to the women within those groups, who are often treated very unfairly by their so-called “leaders”?

I entirely agree that we need to listen to young women, mothers and families, which is why it has been so important that, over the past few years, young women have felt strong enough to come forward and champion the cause for themselves.

The Bill includes a number of vital measures, such as the FGM protection orders, a new offence of failing to protect a girl from FGM and anonymity of survivors for life. We welcome those measures and give them our full support. However, although they address the matter of ways to respond when a girl is at immediate risk of being cut or has been cut, they do not go far enough in helping to prevent the crime of FGM in the first place.

The new offence would, for the first time, give parents and girls the opportunity in law to challenge the public encouragement of FGM. It has a stronger preventative effect than any other measure in the Bill, and it seeks to change the culture and break the cycle.

The measures currently on the statute book are not working. Thousands of girls in the UK are at risk, yet, since FGM was made a crime 30 years ago, there have only ever been two prosecutions and no convictions. Our proposals will criminalise every published statement or speech encouraging FGM, and will allow the police to issue encouragement warning notices and to follow up with encouragement warning orders, the breach of which would be a criminal offence. This would be a proportionate response and would send out a message of zero tolerance of such violence against girls. It is precisely the message that we need to send, as it makes a clear statement that there is no cultural excuse for violence against women and girls. I hope the Minister will feel able to respond positively to those amendments.

New clause 2 was tabled by my hon. Friend John Mann along with many other right hon. and hon. Members. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for his work, for pursuing child abuse cases and for ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice. Labour Front-Bench Members are entirely sympathetic to his approach, and we think that it is absolutely the right thing to do. Perhaps the Minister could comment on that new clause in his closing remarks, and I hope that the Government will feel able to support my hon. Friend. If they feel that the wording needs to be tidied up so that it flows a little better, there is an opportunity to do that when the Bill returns to the other place.

New clause 11, which was tabled by Mr Llwyd, relates to the protection that should be offered to 16 and 17-year-olds. The Children’s Society has provided an informative brief about why 16 and 17-year-olds need that additional protection. Briefly, it recognises that 16 and 17-year-olds in other parts of the world have protections that we do not have in this country, which is why we support the measure.

New clause 17 relates to mandatory reporting. We will be moving to a vote on this matter. An amendment was moved in Committee, which dealt with a consultation on mandatory reporting. We listened very carefully to what was said and feel that our new clause deals with some of the issues that the Government were concerned about, and we hope that they will support it today.

The hon. Lady may know that I have, in the past, spoken up on behalf of Mandate Now and my constituent Mr Tom Perry. I am very keen on mandatory reporting, but having looked carefully at the proposed new clause, I have found that under subsection (2)(a), she is permitting undefined circumstances as a reason not to refer an incident for independent assessment. In the view of Mandate Now, and in my opinion, that completely undermines the concept of mandatory reporting. She may be pressing the new clause to a vote, but those of us who believe in mandatory reporting will not be able support it because it is badly flawed, and looks, I am afraid, like a rehash of some old wording.

I am sorry that the right hon. Lady feels that. Mandatory reporting is clearly complicated and this is quite a technical area. We have proposed the new clause on the basis of the best advice we have received about how to do this, alongside advice and guidance from some of the children’s charities, and we recognise that this is a difficult area. I am sorry that the right hon. Lady does not feel able to support us, but I hope that those on the Government Front Bench will reconsider their view on mandatory reporting. We feel that it is a positive step that should be taken forward.

It is important that we take this seriously, and having dealt with my constituent and these issues for some time I agree with the hon. Lady that mandatory reporting is essential. As I understand it, the Government will have a consultation on the process so that we get it absolutely right so it is a shame to force a vote tonight on something that is flawed and that does not do the job. I ask the hon. Lady and her colleagues on the

Front Bench to think again. Obviously, we cannot start the consultation during the period of purdah, but it will start immediately after the general election, as I understand it.

It is disappointing that we have not been able to have that period of consultation, because the question of mandatory reporting has been around for considerably longer than the Serious Crime Bill. It has been raised by the shadow Home Secretary a number of times over the past couple of years. It is a shame that we are in the position we are in today, because we could have moved on the issue earlier.

Let me move on to new clause 19, for which I pay tribute to my hon. Friend Sarah Champion. Those on the Labour Front Bench are supporting her amendment, which will introduce child abduction warning orders, and I am sure that my hon. Friend will speak with great knowledge and passion about the subject. I know that her experiences as a constituency MP have shaped her view of the changes she wants to see in the Bill. I will not go into the details of the new clause, but I hope that we will have an opportunity to test the opinion of the House on this as it would give law enforcement an important tool for tackling some of the exploitative actions of certain members of our communities towards young people.

New clause 26 sets out special measures for victims of sexual offences in recognition of the fact that they will almost certainly be afraid and distressed at the prospect of giving evidence in court. In particular, someone who has been subjected to domestic coercive control intended to reduce their self-esteem and make them a virtual prisoner of the defendant will inevitably suffer fear and distress at the prospect of giving evidence about it and coming face to face with the defendant in a public court. There can be no doubt that had the offences of coercive control existed at the time of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which the new clause would amend, the authors would have included this provision.

The new clause is practical. Unless a complainant can be given a guarantee from the start that they will not have to give evidence face to face with the perpetrator, they might not have the confidence to proceed. If the best that can be said by others is that at some future stage they will ask a judge to grant special measures, that might not reassure a vulnerable victim enough, which might be the difference between supporting a prosecution and getting a conviction and not doing so. There is a public interest in prosecutions for this type of offence as perpetrators of domestic abuse are often serial offenders and other potential victims need to be protected, but a victim should automatically be entitled to protection in their own right.

Finally, Government amendment 10 builds on the work done by Sir Paul Beresford over a number of years. The extraterritorial nature of the offence was mentioned in Committee and I am pleased that the Government have moved on this. I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for the work he has carried out over many years in the House to improve protection for children.

Several hon. Members:

rose—

Order. There is much interest in these important matters and some sensitivity about subsequent groupings. Therefore, if colleagues while of course expounding with characteristic eloquence can do so with exemplary brevity, that will be received heartily in the House.

I am extremely glad that we have this opportunity to discuss FGM and wish to thank those who have made the discussion happen. I have corresponded with the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Justice and for International Development and the Leader of the House and met them to discuss all the matters to which I am about to refer. We have also had advice from some very capable and senior barristers. Sir Keir Starmer, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, completely supports what I am about to say, as does Aileen McColgan of chambers. These matters have been pushed forward by the not-for-profit organisation Justice for FGM Victims, and I would like to pay tribute to Sarita Bingeman for her work on this over many months.

Amendment 20, which stands in my name, is simple and incredibly short—all it would do is leave out “the” and insert “a risk of”. As I have said repeatedly in interventions, it is not good enough simply to rely on the fact that the act of female genital mutilation has been carried out, for example when notifying the police or dealing with guidance, which is quite vague and is not specific enough to deal with the problem of girls being at risk.

I will briefly give the House some figures. About a decade ago the number of girls and women in England and Wales who had undergone FGM was approximately 66,000. Shockingly, that figure is now estimated to be 137,000. Equally worrying is the number of girls in England and Wales under the age of 15 who are at risk of FGM, which over the same period has increased from about 20,000 to an estimated 60,000. I am talking about 60,000 girls under the age of 15 who are at risk. That rise is further demonstrated by official figures recorded since the new reporting system was introduced by hospitals in the UK last year. They show that 2,269 girls and women who had undergone FGM were treated in hospitals in November 2014 alone, and of those 466 were newly identified cases. That is very alarming and unacceptable, and there is an urgent need to prevent the number growing further. This is an unforgiveable crime. It is beyond imagination that it is going on, and indeed that it is increasing exponentially at the rate I have described.

I am glad that the Government have brought forward a power to make an FGM protection order. All I am asking for, on the best legal advice, is that the words “a risk of” be included in paragraph 1(1)(a) of schedule 2, which is set out in clause 72. Sub-paragraph (1) would therefore read:

“The court in England and Wales may make an order (an “FGM protection order”) for the purposes of —

(a) protecting a girl against a risk of commission of a genital mutilation offence”,

rather than simply

“(a) protecting a girl against the commission of a genital mutilation offence”.

The Bill currently does not state explicitly, despite the intention that it should do so, that the order may be applied for and/or granted in the event of a risk that a genital mutilation offence may be committed. Although some are arguing that there could be some difficulty interpreting the words in relation to forced marriage orders, the fact is that it is apples and pears.

When we are dealing with forced marriage, we are dealing with people who are much older and with different circumstances. We are not dealing with five and six-year-old children who do not know what is being done to them. The horror and brutality of FGM must be dealt with. We cannot simply deal with the circumstances by analogy, as has been suggested to me by some technical advisers and lawyers. I am a lawyer myself; I was shadow Attorney-General. I do not misunderstand the nature of questions of interpretation. We have to tailor the circumstances to the problem that we are faced with. We are faced with a massive problem so it is essential that we deal with it.

Some have said that guidance would be sufficient. The guidance, which everybody in the House can look at, does not deal with the specific problem of those at risk. As I said, on the issue of notifying the police, that would apply only where the mutilation had already taken place. These are small girls. The practice cannot be allowed to carry on. We must do something about it. If I may suggest it, everybody should vote with me on this issue, including the Government. I ask the Opposition to be good enough to vote with me as well.

Let me give an example. On 3 April 2014 the Department for Education published updated statutory guidance on safeguarding. It was called “Keeping children safe in education”. The guidance tells teachers how to identify girls who are at risk or who have suffered FGM. It was e-mailed to every school in the country and on the same day a letter from the Secretary of State was e-mailed to all head teachers, drawing their attention to the guidance. The letter was e-mailed to 31,660 addressees in 25,000 schools. As at 30 April only 43% of recipients had opened the e-mail, and only 30% of recipients had clicked through to the guidance on safeguarding. That is why the legislation is needed.

Further statistics for each London borough show that the response rate was significantly worse in some areas, including some where large numbers of girls were from communities that had traditionally practised FGM. In Hackney, for example, only 25% of the 91 heads had read the guidance, and in Lambeth and Southwark the proportion who did so was only 34%, yet those girls are at risk. Other front-line workers have said that faced with the confusing number and breadth of guidelines, protocols and regulations that often appear conflicting, they have turned to the legislation—the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—to provide clarity for themselves. But as the shadow Minister said, only two prosecutions have taken place and neither was successful. What are we doing in this country? How are we allowing FGM to happen? I appeal to Members to vote for my amendment.

A number of front-line professionals from the health, education and social services, including the child protection sector, were interviewed by Justice for FGM Victims. All of them stated that they would welcome the guidance that would be provided if the amendment were accepted, but not otherwise. They believe that the explicit mention of the requirement to apply successfully for a protection order would support front-line staff and empower them to take action where they thought there was a risk of FGM being committed against a young girl or woman.

FGM is practised in secret. It is extremely difficult for care professionals to know whether a person is at risk. Therefore as a deterrent and in order to catch the perpetrators, it is essential that the words “a risk of” are included. This is not a small matter. It is a small amendment about a very, very big matter. Girls are being victimised, abused and terrorised by FGM, and it is happening on our watch. It must be stopped.

I welcome various sensible and positive suggestions. I shall speak to new clause 2, which I trust the Government will accept. If not, we will give the House the opportunity to decide whether it should be accepted. I am sure, Mr Speaker, that in today’s rather confused timetable you will indicate the appropriate time at which to do so.

I wish to make three substantive points in relation to the new clause. I thank those in every part of the House who have added their name to it. The abuse in Rotherham has been described as the tip of the iceberg. It is a rather easy phrase to use. I do not think that the majority of people out in the country, if they have thought about the language used, believe that that is true. They think they have seen the bad side and that there may be a bit more of it, but that it cannot get worse than that. My experience is that Rotherham is no different from anywhere else, except that it has had a detailed inquiry which has quantified the problem better than in other places. There are some specific and uncomfortable elements to the problem there that certainly differentiate it from my area, but I know that my area is no worse than anywhere else.

When I have used the opportunities I have in my weekly newspaper columns to suggest to victims, current or past, that they should come forward, I expected a few people to come forward. What I did not expect is somebody new to come forward every week. I did not expect people to fly back to my constituency from across the world, as they have done and as more wish to do, to give me precise evidence that they have given to nobody in 30 years. They know that that will never lead to a prosecution, but when they spoke out before they were not believed. They speak of individual, specific, single incidents of sexual violence, on different scales, of differing natures, yet every week new people—my constituents—are coming forward.

It is almost as if the process began with the easier cases—easier in the sense that the people were more prepared, and the cases were more specific, more identifiable and more prosecutable—and, as the weeks go by, the bigger ones come. I have a brand-new case now. People do not make up such allegations. One cannot make up what I was told by somebody younger than me. The sexual violence and other violence is not even the most horrific part of it. At the age of 11, that person was put into slavery in a workplace and location that I can identify. I am not going to name it as that is the prerogative of the person involved. I think he will name it, then everybody in my area will be able to identify it. He mentioned witnesses whom he could identify and names that I know.

That went on year after year, and what did my constituent and other kids of 11 or 12 do? They ran away. What happened when they ran away? They were returned time and again to the same perpetrators by the police and the social workers, until one heroic social worker rescued my constituent, unlike the other kids living in that foster home, who were not rescued. He has got on with his life and has spoken to nobody until he came to me. The report is being prepared in great detail and will go to the police. I do not know whether those who covered up for the school by falsifying its records in saying he was there when he was not—the employer and those working there alongside an 11-year-old, then a 12, 13, 14 and 15-year-old, during those years—are all still alive; presumably some of them will be. There will be a major investigation.

That is just a single example; I have not mentioned the other victims. If it happened in my constituent’s time, what about the kids before or the kids after? I make a few discreet inquiries and vast amounts of things immediately come out that people know about—a huge web. This was just one foster family among many. It was horrendous, systemised abuse. The system was at fault, and everyone within it, because these kids were regarded as commodities. They were to be sold, and they were sold—in this case, into actual, technical slavery. It was a money-making activity.

It is vital that we get on top of the responses needed for the future, for now—because of course this kind of thing, in different ways, still goes on—and for the past. What is absolutely clear to me is the volume of people directly affected and the number of lives blighted. Many of these people cannot come to me, or anybody else, because they are dead, or beyond being able to explain anything even though they are still technically alive. Some of those who come to see me can say nothing at all because what has happened has so traumatised and affected their lives.

That is a microcosm, but it goes deeper. Rampton special hospital is the only secure psychiatric unit for women in this country. Let us look at the conclusions of the research about every single woman in there—they have all committed the most horrendous of crimes; that is why they are in there—and see what happened to them in their young lives. There is a causation—a direct link. We talk about early interventions in dealing with some of the most horrific, terrible things that we hear about and sometimes have to deal with. Those things do not just come from nowhere. That is why it is so vital that there are no no-go areas in what is looked at.

The new clause is about only one small aspect. Prominent people are not the majority in these cases. Only one of the many people in my constituency who have come forward—a Savile victim—has named so-called prominent people, so that is not the problem in my area. However, there is a problem about how a number of investigations have been curtailed. In 1988, I gave evidence to the police on corruption in relation to buildings in Lambeth. A blockage was put on that investigation for no good reason. I now find from a police officer who served in later years that seven years later the wine bars I had identified for all sorts of malpractice were referred to the police again for similar activities. Yet there was no police investigation; each time, it was blocked. I have my suspicions regarding that case.

It would be tempting to name the prominent people—one would get plenty of headlines—but it would be highly inappropriate. Some of the names floating around were undoubtedly blackmailed as opposed to being perpetrators. One of the problems is deciding who was the perpetrator and who was the victim. One of the ways of covering tracks is to try to spread things around, and that is a danger. That is all the more reason why one kind of evidence that has not been made available should be made available. I have spoken to someone in an appropriate position who saw the Dickens dossier. I have a good idea of what is in it, but they will not tell me because of the restrictions of the Official Secrets Act. It would be helpful to the inquiry and to the police for that information to come out. In 1980, special branch closed down investigations into Coronation buildings in south Lambeth, again with no explanation, although plenty of people were involved. Knowing why these things happen would be important to the inquiry and to ongoing police investigations.

The Don Hale files are a set of minutes from the Home Office—I think they are its detailed investigations into the Dickens dossier—that were seized by special branch. I am not interested in Mr Hale’s recollection of the names—he did not take a copy—but I am interested in the fact that a lot of people saw those files. The Dickens dossier was copied 20 times. The person who told me that they had seen it was at a meeting when it was there, and the copies were then collected in. Lots of people have seen these things. Lots of police officers—special branch and others—have information about them.

Individuals have said to me, and some have informed me anonymously, that the restrictions of the Official Secrets Act are holding them back. Some fear prosecution. More, I think, fear that they will lose their pension because of the technicalities of breaching the Act. The new clause would create a defence against prosecution. Its wording is drawn up not by me but by people who know how to draw up such things—the experts in this building. Creating such a defence would allow those people to give information, not to me or my friends in the media, but to the relevant investigating authorities. Indeed, they would have an obligation to give it, because they would have the protection and the guarantee given by us in statute. That would have a huge and significant impact in sorting out who did what, who of those still alive should be prosecuted, and which of those whose names are circulating are entirely innocent and may well be victims themselves. From what I have seen and heard over the years, I believe that some of the prominent names that circulate are victims as opposed to perpetrators. The perpetrators who are still alive could then be more easily prosecuted with additional and significant evidence.

My final point is about Cyril Smith. There is no problem in naming Cyril Smith; he has been named many times before. Police officer after police officer, and special branch officer after special branch officer, has said to me and to others that they were stopped from arresting and prosecuting Cyril Smith, and no one has answered the question why. Why was Cyril Smith, for a significant period, given immunity from prosecution given that a significant number of people, including many police officers, have come forward about it, to me never mind anybody else? Why would they come forward to me, in particular, for no particular reason? That tells me that there are many more people out there who know what was going on and why he was given protection. This question has to be answered. Passing the new clause will mean that these people will come forward, as some say they will. That will help to provide some justice for the victims, help with some prosecutions, and, crucially, help the truth to come out.

Several hon. Members:

rose—

All of a sudden, a sprouting. I call Nicola Blackwood.

There is much to debate in this group of amendments and I particularly welcome new clauses 8 and 9, but for the sake of brevity I will stick to my new clause 27 and the associated clauses, which seek to resolve the much debated problem of child abduction warning notices applying unequally to children in care and those out of care.

New clause 27 is a probing amendment, so I shall not press it to a vote, but I would like to emphasise my disappointment that the Government have not found a way to resolve the problem. There has been plenty of time to do so and the issue has been debated extensively at all stages. It is a relatively contained problem. The fact that police can only use CAWNs to protect victims up to the age of 16 if they are living at home, and not those up to the age of 18 if they are in care, is a real-world problem created by the fact that these administrative orders are reliant on two separate pieces of legislation. It should be perfectly possible to resolve the situation if we put our minds to it.

A number of solutions have been proposed to the Government during the Bill’s progress, including putting CAWNs on a statutory basis, which would also create a penalty on breach, as suggested by Sarah Champion; amending the offence of child abduction so that it applies to children up to the age of 18; and my new clause 27, which would create a secondary offence, under the Child Abduction Act 1984, of abducting a child aged 16 to 18. All of those proposals have been rejected by the Government because they say that they are unnecessary, that they would create additional bureaucracy and that they would risk creating unintended consequences for prosecutors in relation to consent.

The first point has no merit. The reforms have been requested directly by serving police officers, social workers and parents who are battling child sexual exploitation on the front line and who have found that the inability to use CAWNs to protect children aged 16 to 18 living at home is a gap in their armoury as they wage an already incredibly challenging battle against abusers.

Ministers have said that the new risk of sexual harm orders will address that gap, but they will not. As the MP who led the campaign to reform the old civil prevention orders and replace them with the current orders under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, I welcome them wholeheartedly, but for police to obtain a ROSHO they must prove the sexual element of risk to a criminal standard of evidence in court. As administrative orders, CAWNs do not require either that evidential threshold or the proving of the sexual element. Police officers and others have told me that that is precisely why CAWNs are so successful in disrupting child sexual exploitation where the sexual abuser may not be the individual who is transporting or controlling the victim and therefore sexual risk may be indirect.

It is unquestionably true that ROSHOs, gang injunctions and trafficking orders have significant roles to play in disrupting grooming, but, as statutory orders that require judicial oversight, none of those can replace the CAWN in the architecture of powers available to police for disrupting CSE. They simply do not have the immediacy or the simplicity I have described.

For that reason, I am not convinced that putting the orders on a statutory footing is the best solution. The Government have said that that would create additional bureaucracy, which is not the best turn of phrase, because it sounds like there would just be a bit more paperwork. That is not the concern that has been raised with me by senior police officers. If CAWNs were put on a statutory footing, they would become a civil order, like the ROSHO, which, rightly, has an evidentiary threshold and judicial oversight. That very process of having to apply through the courts and gather increased evidence risks creating an inappropriate situation not only of fewer CAWNs being sought, but of the CAWN losing its unique place in the policing toolbox as a quick response tool that can be applied as a deterrent and disruption device that is also valuable in establishing association and bad character in prosecution.

Although I understand that the value of introducing a statutory basis would be to bring in a penalty on breach, that aspect is already covered by the statutory civil prevention orders—from ROSHOs to trafficking orders—which all involve penalties on breach. Of course, most of those orders, in their current form, are new and I urge the Government and the College of Policing to develop guidance on how they should operate as a progressive and interrelated set of powers now available to police to deter, disrupt and prevent serious organised crime against children in particular. However, if filling in the gap in CAWNs is necessary but making CAWNs statutory is not the answer, then what is?

As we have heard, CAWNs for children living at home have their legislative basis in section 2(1) of the Child Abduction Act 1984. The Government object to changing the age limit for that offence of abduction from the legal age of consent of 16 to 18 on the grounds that it would risk the victims, even those under the age of 16, being challenged by defence barristers on questions of consent. I accept that we have fought too many battles to improve protections for vulnerable witnesses against aggressive cross-examination in court to want to do anything to weaken a prosecutor’s arm, especially on questions of consent, and that is why I tabled new clause 27, proposing a secondary offence, with a higher threshold, of abduction of 16 to 18-year-olds.

I do not believe that would compromise the integrity of the current child abduction offence for under 16-year-olds, but it would offer a legislative basis to close the current gap in CAWNs and give the police the power to intervene quickly and effectively to protect 16 to 18-year-olds who we know remain at high risk of child sexual exploitation where grooming gangs are operating, whether they happen to be living at home or not.

I do not for a moment believe, however, that that is the only way to solve the problem and I really do not care whether my proposal is accepted or a non-legislative solution is found, provided that the Minister makes two clear commitments. The first is to work with Members from across the House, children’s charities and practitioners to find a way to close the gap in CAWNs so that they apply equally to children in care and those out of care up to the age of 18, preferably by the time this Bill reaches the other House. The second commitment is to commission, as a matter of urgency, guidance on the new architecture of civil prevention and administrative orders, specifically the way in which they relate to the protection of children from serious organised crime.

These are despicable crimes committed against the most vulnerable of victims and no stone should be left unturned in equipping the police and other agencies to protect victims and prevent abuse all the way up to the age of 18, no matter where those people happen to live.

Thank you for removing the time limit, Mr Speaker, not only because the voices of victims and survivors do not get enough air time in this place, but because, as those who have spoken before me have shown, there is a lot of passion about this topic and an awful lot of commitment to it.

I welcome new clauses 8 and 3 and Government amendments 13 to 17, which aim to remove the term “child prostitution” from legislation. Victims and survivors I have met say that the term makes them feel incredibly dirty and as though they colluded in the crime in some way. However, the amendments remove the term from only three of the 16 relevant pieces of legislation. If I pass the list to the Solicitor-General, will the Government make a serious, long-term commitment to remove the term from each of those pieces of legislation? I would be very grateful for that.

I want principally to speak to new clause 19 and follow on from the contribution of Nicola Blackwood, who spoke eloquently and has done most of the preparatory work. I have met the Solicitor-General, spoken at Committee stage and exchanged letters with him. He has expressed the view that, if child abduction warning notices were to become statutory, that would cause an unnecessary replication of sexual risk orders, which are being introduced by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. However, given that the legislation has not yet been enacted and guidance not yet published, I cannot be entirely satisfied that SROs will close the gap that has been identified in child protection.

One concern is that the application of SROs to low-level grooming activities seems to depend on an officer taking a very wide interpretation of an

“act of a sexual nature”.

Unless the guidance is very specific and the training given to police very thorough, I am not convinced that officers will feel confident to use SROs on, for instance, a 20-year-old who is hanging around with a 14-year-old.

My cross-party inquiry with Barnardo’s last year found that police officers were clearly familiar with the use of child abduction warning notices, and everyone we interviewed asked that they be made statutory. My fear is that, rather than reducing bureaucracy, the Solicitor-General will create more by having another power, as opposed to strengthening the existing one.

I thank the hon. Lady for her extreme succinctness.

Several hon. Members:

rose—

What a delicious choice. I call Mrs Cheryl Gillan.

I want to continue my challenge to new clause 17, specifically on behalf of MandateNow, which was set up by my constituent Tom Perry and seeks to introduce a new law making it mandatory for people working in regulated activities to report their suspicions to the local authority.

I am delighted that the Opposition support mandatory reporting, but I am disappointed with the flaws in their new clause. I believe that mandatory reporting is inevitable, but its design will be critical. It is not a law that, as MandateNow says,

“can be lifted from a shelf, applied and switched on.”

It is a complicated and nuanced subject and such a law needs very careful construction, as I am sure Diana Johnson appreciates, particularly having adopted the position that Opposition Front Benchers have taken up recently.

John Mann struck a chord with me when he said that there should be no no-go areas, which is absolutely right. I am worried that new clause 17 would create such no-go areas, and protect and enshrine them in a flawed law.

It appears from new clause 17(1)(c) that the duty to report would apply only when harm is caused in the setting of a regulated activity. As I understand it, children who are abused at home would remain outside its scope. Multiple concerns, or even any concern about any child, brought to the attention of staff—for example, at their school—would not necessarily be caught by the provision as currently drafted.

The right hon. Lady and I have already had an exchange on this issue. What happens in a school is obviously a regulated activity, so my understanding is that if teachers working in the school become aware of the issue, that would be covered by the new clause.

MandateNow’s understanding is that such a situation would not be covered. If abuse occurs outside one of the regulated activities, but is brought to the attention of someone involved in a regulated activity, there appears from the drafting of subsection (1)(c) to be a possibility that the abuse would not be a mandatorily reportable incident.

Subsection (1)(c) would require that a person

“becomes aware that a child has been harmed”.

That requirement is problematic. So often with sexual abuse, it is very difficult to suspect it, let alone to know about it. MandateNow’s challenge to the proposal from the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

Children is absolutely right. A law that depends on somebody being “aware” is drafted in a dangerously vague way. It will not catch most cases. The hon. Lady should therefore consider using the phrase that a person must act on “reasonable grounds of suspicion”. Such a change would improve the drafting of her new clause 17.

Similarly, the exemption in subsection (2)(a) permitting undefined circumstances as a reason not to refer an incident for independent assessment totally undermines the concept of mandatory reporting. When might it be in the interests of a child to be harmed and for those who know or suspect to do nothing about it? Such a situation needs to be made explicit.

Subsection (2)(b) is almost a facsimile of the current and porous position. In complying with current non-mandatory reporting clauses in institutional child protection procedures, personal liability seems to be avoided. The proposal continues a failed narrative in which reporting to the local authority for independent assessment is reliant on what the person responsible for reporting believes. For example, if a member of staff refers a case to the head teacher as the designated person and nothing happens, because the head believes it is not in the child’s interests to refer it or follows the inadequate professional guidelines—as it happens, they are discretionary—then the new clause will produce no change. As MandateNow has stated, the exceptions in subsection (2) undermine the already underpowered provisions in subsection (1).

As the hon. Lady will know, an earlier amendment on mandatory reporting was moved in the other place, but was withdrawn on an assurance from the Government that they would start a consultation on mandatory reporting. She and I know, as does the Solicitor-General, that the terms of reference for the consultation have not yet been drawn up.

We are approaching something called the general election, so there is purdah. I have a proposition to make to both Front Benchers: it would be good to work on this matter on a cross-party basis. It should not be a political subject, but something on which we agree. Rather than putting new clause 17 to a vote, it would be good if they met behind the Chair and agreed to the Government drawing up the terms of reference with the Opposition and publishing them as soon as possible during the period of purdah before the general election. In that way, all the victims and people relying on this place to improve the situation for our all future children, and to learn from the history faced by many of our constituents, would have a lot more confidence that we are doing our job correctly.

In dealing with subsection (2) of new clause 17, my right hon. Friend alights on one of the problems. An awful lot of well-motivated proposals are brought forward in relation to such Bills, but her point demonstrates that we must be careful not to legislate without thinking very carefully about what is intended. It is not clear to me that having

“acted in the best interests of the child” is demonstrated on the subjective basis of the person who believes they have so acted, or is to be tested against what a reasonable person believes from looking at how that person has acted. If we agree to the subsection without analysing that, we will get into trouble. I urge her to ask the two Front Benchers to talk about that if they meet behind the Speaker’s Chair.

My hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. He reinforces the position spotted by the commentators at MandateNow about the drafting of new clause 17. As I say, I want the matter to be non-party political—it should be irrespective of politics—so it would be good if we showed the House doing its best by coming together, with the Government and the Opposition working together on the guidelines for the consultation and getting them out as soon as possible.

MandateNow’s membership base is 114 survivor charities in England, eight in Scotland and 10 in Wales, so there is a substantial body of opinion behind its views. I very much hope that both Front Benchers will take them seriously and not force us through the Lobby against new clause 17. I believe in the concept, but I cannot vote for the new clause because of its quite obvious flaws.

About an hour ago, Mr Speaker, you expressed your pleasant surprise at the Solicitor-General’s brevity, and I hope that I do not revert to type. I, too, shall keep my remarks short.

I welcome new clauses 8 to 10, which relate to the language applied to young children who are victims of sexual exploitation in the FGM provisions and so on. I am fully in sympathy with the very powerful speech made by Sir William Cash. I support new clause 2, and John Mann also made a powerful speech.

The provisions in part 5 relating to the new offence of child cruelty are of fundamental importance and should be welcomed. The new offence balances both physical and psychological harm, because psychological abuse can have such a debilitating impact on children. However, my new clause 11 reflects my concern, and that of organisations such as the Children’s Society, that the Government have not taken the opportunity presented by the Bill to offer protection to 16 and 17-year-olds at risk of cruelty and neglect. After all, the United Nations convention on the rights of the child and the Children Act 1989 both define a child as a person under 18. In Committee, I sought to amend the Bill by redefining a child as a person under 18, and I made the case for extending the legislation on child abduction to 16 and 17-year-olds. Unfortunately, I was unable to persuade the Committee of the merits of my amendments, so I withdrew them. My intention in retabling them today is to highlight the issue once more.

New clause 11 would amend the Children’s Act 1933 by inserting a new section on cruelty to a person aged 16 or 17. The new section would ensure that anyone aged 18 or over who wilfully assaulted, ill-treated, neglected, abandoned or injured a 16 or 17-year-old would be guilty of an offence. Crucially, the new clause acknowledges that ill treatment can be both physical and psychological.

When I first made the point in Committee that the definition of a child in this provision should include 16 and 17-year-olds, concerns were raised about the implication for young people of those ages who live independently. For that reason, an adult may be found guilty of an offence under new clause 11 only if they are proven to be “personally connected” to the victim—that is, if the victim and perpetrator were living together at the time of the offence, if the perpetrator had parental responsibility over the victim, if the perpetrator was a relative of the victim, or if the perpetrator was or had been married to or been the civil partner of a parent of the victim. If found guilty under the new clause, a perpetrator could face up to 10 years in prison on conviction or indictment, or six months in prison on summary conviction.

I believe that this change would send the important message that 16 and 17-year-olds can be every bit as vulnerable as their younger counterparts and that they deserve our protection or, rather, the protection of the law. Because the existing law disregards them, I would argue that 16 and 17-year-olds are in some ways more vulnerable to neglect than younger children, since there is the perception that they can make it on their own.

According to the Children’s Society, approximately 16,000 16 and 17-year-olds were at risk of homelessness last year as a result of a breakdown in their relationship with their family. It is therefore no surprise to learn that 35% of all those who are reported missing are aged between 15 and 17. Last year in England, 42,000-plus 16 and 17-year-olds became children in need, 24,000-plus of whom were identified as being at risk of abuse or neglect. Distressingly, the Office of the Children’s Commissioner has estimated that 7,260 16 and 17-year-olds are at risk of child sexual exploitation.

I hope that the House will recognise the severity of this issue. I am sure that those who oppose this change will argue that the laws of common assault, kidnapping and sexual exploitation already apply to this age group. However, the fundamental point is that child cruelty laws are different, in that they acknowledge the breach of trust between the parent or guardian and the child. The guardian has a responsibility to protect and care for the children who live with him or her. I see no reason why 16 and 17-year-olds should be denied the legal protections that are afforded to those younger than them. We should keep it in mind that 90% of 16 and 17-year-olds live with their families—a number that is unlikely to decrease in the current fiscal climate. I urge the House to support new clause 11.

I also support new clause 27, which was tabled by Nicola Blackwood. It seeks to create an offence of child abduction that pertains to 16 and 17-year-olds. It is important to note that 16 and 17-year-olds who are taken into care by their local authority are already protected by child abduction warning notices under section 31 of the 1989 Act. However, that represents only a tiny proportion of the children who are looked after by local authorities. Last year, for example, 190 children in that age bracket were taken into care, but 4,510 young people in that age bracket had become looked after. Equally, 4,000-plus 16 and 17-year-olds left care last year, many of whom will have gone on to live in supported accommodation, leaving them still very vulnerable, I am afraid.

People in this age group who approach their local authorities for help with housing as a result of homelessness are usually given housing support, rather than being taken into care. According to the Children’s Society, at least 12,000 16 and 17-year-olds seek such help with homelessness every year. At present, the authorities cannot protect them with a child abduction warning notice. As I have said, 42,260 16 and 17-year-olds became children in need last year. Under the current provisions, the police are unable to use a child abduction warning notice to protect them by taking them away from an exploitative adult who could abduct them from their parents.

New clause 27 would extend the protections that are afforded to those who are under 16 to the 2,330 16 and 17-year-olds who are registered as in need in Wales, the thousand 16 and 17-year-olds who are looked after by local authorities in Wales and many more young people who are housed by their local authority under homelessness legislation.

In 2012, the all-party parliamentary groups for runaway and missing children and adults and for looked-after children and care leavers held an important inquiry on children who go missing from care. The report drew attention to how frequently children’s homes are targeted by exploitative individuals, yet the law protects only a tiny minority of the 16 and 17-year-olds who are vulnerable to such exploitation and abduction.

I urge the House, if there is a Division, to vote for new clause 27, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon.

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 greatly strengthened the legislation that deals with paedophiles. Year by year, some of us have used various Home Office Bills to put little baubles and bangles on it and there has been a huge number of changes. One result has been that persistent predatory paedophiles in this country have often moved overseas. Many of them moved to south-east Asia until the south-east Asian nations tightened up and now many of them are moving to Brazil. I have a particular interest in the situation in Brazil.

Some of the ammunition has come from the fact that much of our paedophile legislation is extraterritorial, so when individuals from this country go to other countries, do their dastardly deeds and come back, we are able to deal with them under our legislation when we have the evidence, perhaps provided directly by the security or police forces in the other countries. The effect of that has been a move away from south-east Asia, mainly to places such as Brazil. People are picking on Brazil because of the big sports events. We saw that recently with the World cup. A group in my constituency has been fighting for street children and it had a big campaign called “It’s a penalty”. It explained to people from this country who were flying to Brazil that if they had sex with children out there, they could be prosecuted here.

In Committee, Members on both sides were congratulating ourselves on getting two new offences on contact with a child and on predatory paedophile manuals. In the middle of all that, one of us suddenly noticed that we were taking away the extraterritorial aspect of both offences. Not too surprisingly, there was a faint squawk.

We have had a decent response on one issue. Amendment 10 will bring back the extraterritorial aspect for contact with a child, but not for predatory paedophile manuals, as I brought to the attention of Front Benchers. If we are going to prosecute individuals in this country because they have predatory paedophile manuals, why should we not penetrate overseas to catch them doing exactly the same thing? Logic tells me that if it is good enough to do it here, it is good enough to apply it to predatory paedophiles in other countries. That has been very successful with other bits of legislation. However, it was indicated clearly in the opening speech that it will not apply to this provision.

It is probably pointless to push the Solicitor-General on that issue at this point. [Interruption.] He is nodding with a smile on his face, which is not particularly helpful. I would love to push the issue, but I will not. However, I will reflect on where I have made mistakes between Committee stage and this stage, gather my ammunition and knock on his door as I move on to ten-minute rule Bills and the next Home Office Bill to try to add it. For tonight, I am sitting tight, but the warning is there: I will be back.

I will concentrate on new clause 17. I assume that the Solicitor-General will not accept the proposal, but I hope he will tell the House where he is with the 12-week consultation. I join Mrs Gillan in asking that we try to hammer out a sensible agreement on the issue—preferably between all parties and before the election—so that we get something done in the interests of children.

I assume that most of us here want children to be protected and that the vast majority of decent people who choose to work with children want to protect them. However, I do not want people to be driven into some kind of defensive posture whereby they are more concerned about protecting themselves than using their professional judgment because of a badly framed mandatory reporting rule. No one who has looked at Rotherham or at any of the other scandals can fail to have a sense of revulsion at those senior staff who turned a blind eye, those who did not want to know when they should have been asking serious questions of the more junior staff, and those who blamed the victims who they should have been protecting.

We need a measure of mandatory reporting that prevents people from evading their responsibilities, and ensures that there is no, “I didn’t know; they didn’t tell me” get-out clause, and no opportunity for institutions or individuals to view reputational damage as an excuse to sweep things under the carpet. That kind of mandatory reporting could be useful in helping the rest of us to protect children. I therefore hope that the Minister will tell the House what his intentions are and where he is with the consultation and that, in the spirit of cross-party support, he will consider the offer from me and the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham.

The hon. Gentleman finished just before I expected him to and the Minister will now wind up this group of amendments. There has been considerable demand to contribute to the separate groupings, so perhaps I can say publicly what I would otherwise have said privately, namely that if the Minister is able to wind up on behalf of the Government so that it is possible for us to move on by 7 o’clock—perhaps even earlier—we will dance round the mulberry bush in joyous appreciation of his efforts.

Best endeavours, Mr Speaker, best endeavours.

I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for taking part in this wide-ranging debate. I am grateful to Steve McCabe for a thoughtful contribution. The Government have committed to a full 12-week consultation within 18 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. We are coming to the end of this Parliament and into purdah, and practical issues arise, as my right hon. Friend Mrs Gillan said. However, the Government are committed to moving on a consultation as soon as practical obstacles are removed—we cannot be clearer than that. With respect to Labour Members I am somewhat puzzled about their undue haste to move their new clause. My right hon. Friend has already mentioned some deficiencies that she has found in the provision, and I will not reiterate her points. I say simply that we need a proper consultation on the issue and for all voices to be heard. For FGM and mandatory reporting provisions we held a consultation that gave us clear evidence to act, and to create and change the law on mandatory reporting. We must do exactly the same for child abuse.

We all agree that these issues are sensitive, important, and involve new obligations on professionals who work in this difficult field, and we must approach them carefully and with evidence. I therefore strongly urge Opposition Members to consider the matter carefully before dividing the House or supporting the new clause. With great respect the provision is premature, bearing in mind that a consultation will occur as soon as possible.

Will my hon. and learned Friend comment on my suggestion that those on the two Front Benches should work together on drawing up the terms of reference for the consultation, because I am sure that would help speed up the procedure? It may not be possible to bring something out before the election, but at least working together would show that it is a cross-party effort and give great comfort to those watching this debate.

I am interested in suggestions from any quarter about the terms of reference for a consultation. I want it to be meaningful and comprehensive, which is why there will be a full 12 weeks to allow many people to make submissions. I am open to all constructive suggestions, wherever they come from. As my right hon. Friend said, this issue is about much more than mere party politics, and I hope that that gives her the assurance she seeks.

I am listening carefully to the Minister, and of course we all want to get this issue right. I am struck by the fact that the Government managed to have a consultation on the reporting of FGM, and the Bill now contains amendments to take that forward. It seems to me a missed opportunity that we are not able to do that with mandatory reporting at the same time.

I hear what the hon. Lady says and take her remarks in the spirit that I know she intends. We are moving on these issues, and much has been achieved in the past few years in acknowledging that we are dealing with children and can no longer have a sort of double standard when it comes to their protection. In Committee we debated so-called “ostensible consent”, which at one time was in sentencing guidelines. That has gone from the law—indeed, a case I conducted in the Court of Appeal last week made it absolutely clear that for young children the concept of consent in sexual activity has no place in the law of England and Wales. Let me reiterate my point: we are making progress and there will be a consultation as soon as possible. I therefore urge the hon. Lady and Opposition Members not to divide the House on the new clause.

On new clause 2, I listened carefully to the impassioned speech of John Mann. It was the sort of speech that we need to hear in this House because it reiterated not only his determination to uncover child abuse—whether historical or current—but the determination that we should all have to follow evidence wherever it may lead without fear or favour.

As we know, the Official Secrets Act is intended to protect certain classes of particularly sensitive information such as security and intelligence matters, and it provides for a number of offences that prevent current or former Crown servants or Government contractors from disclosing certain information without lawful authority. It does not prevent protected information from being disclosed to an officer of an official investigation or inquiry into historical child abuse. In particular, information may be disclosed where the disclosure is made in accordance with that person’s official duty or is otherwise authorised. Departments and Ministers can permit current and former civil servants and Government contractors to share knowledge and documentation with an inquiry. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made clear in her statement to this House on 4 February, official authorisation would be given for the Goddard inquiry.

On the historical institutional abuse inquiry in Northern Island, the Attorney-General has already made a public undertaking that no evidence given by a person to the inquiry will be used as evidence against them in any criminal proceeding, including any offence under the Official Secrets Act. Indeed, the Attorney-General would be ready to consider any similar request from Justice Goddard if one were made. I assure the hon. Member for Bassetlaw that the Government are committed to assisting Justice Goddard’s inquiry and all other inquiries into child abuse. We are satisfied that the Official Secrets Act is not, will not, and should not be a bar to evidence being provided, but I am grateful to him for raising that important issue.

Let me turn to new clause 11, in the name of Mr Llwyd. As he said, this has been covered in Committee. I reiterate that anomalies will inevitably exist when it comes to how we classify children and young people in law. I am afraid there is no one age division to fit all circumstances. Despite the fact that, with his usual cunning, he has come up with a slightly different way of dealing with some of the mischiefs I mentioned in Committee, I am still concerned that, in genuinely attempting to correct one anomaly, we might end up creating another. We still believe that in this area of the law we need to focus on the protection of children and young persons under the age of 16.

In that spirit, I will come on to new clause 27, which was tabled by my hon. Friend Nicola Blackwood. Her tenacity knows no bounds. She has done a lot of work to expose the scourge of child sexual exploitation in both her local area and nationally. I am grateful to her for once again raising this issue. We need to have the correct balance between additional protection, and recognition of relevant rights and responsibilities of young people in this age group. We have given much thought to this matter. The key question for the Government is whether we think the police have sufficient powers to replace restrictions and prohibitions on people who pose a risk to vulnerable young adults aged 16 and 17. We think that the new sexual risk orders—I will come on to them in a moment—will provide the police with the powers to tackle predators. Breach of such an order will carry a sentence of up to five years imprisonment. We think the right balance is being struck with the combination of child abduction warning notices and sexual risk orders. We therefore do not think that we need to change the law on child abduction at this stage. That allows me neatly, I hope, to deal with new clause 19, tabled by Sarah Champion.

Will the Minister give way?

I will give way very briefly.

The Solicitor-General is aware that the combination of child abduction warning notices and risk of sexual harm orders leaves a gap for 16 to 17-year-olds where it is impossible to prove sexual risk and where there is a need for immediate action without going to court.

I remind my hon. Friend that other mechanisms and other types of order exist, and ask her to bear it in mind that the law was reformed by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which is just coming into force. There are other tools available to the police and enforcement authorities. We have to be careful not to seek to be over-reliant on one particular type of order. Reading carefully the recommendations and observations made by Louise Casey in the Rotherham report published only two weeks ago, there are certain concerns about an over-reliance on child abduction warning notices, as opposed to taking more direct action that has the force of statutory breach and criminal sanction on breach.

New clause 19 was tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham. I am grateful to her for providing information she wished me to consider. I confirm that we plan to implement the new sexual risk orders before the end of this Parliament. As we all know, that is a very short space of time indeed. I reassure her that we will publish guidance on their use and we will work with the police to review their effectiveness, including in the context of how child abduction warning notices are used. As a result of our productive meeting, Barnardo’s will be consulted as a part of that process.

Ann Coffey made a point about references to the phrase “child prostitution” in a number of other Acts and regulations. The Government’s amendments to schedule 4 pick up the references to child prostitution in primary legislation, and we have a power in clause 79(2) to amend secondary legislation. That should help to clean up and clear up references to child prostitution in a number of regulations.

indicated assent.

I will put on the record the assent of the hon. Lady. I am grateful to her for all her work on this matter.

I will move on briefly to the proposals in new clauses 15 and 16 to tackle the encouragement or promotion of FGM. In Committee, Seema Malhotra rightly said:

“encouragement to commit an offence is not an issue of free speech.”––[Official Report, Serious Crime [Lords] Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015; c. 157.]

However, we need to distinguish between actual active encouragement and the expression of a distasteful opinion. As the law stands, there must be some direct connection between the encouragement or assistance and the principal offence. We believe that that is the right approach. It is settled law that applies to a whole range of criminal offences. We are not convinced of the need to go beyond that and create an offence or introduce civil measures that prohibit any or all encouragement, regardless of the intention behind it. It is too general, in our view, and there will be evidential difficulties. Members of this House and practitioners in the field are familiar with the term FGM, but it is not, of course, a term that would necessarily or colloquially be used by those who support, or have sympathy with, that form of abuse. We therefore need to think about the practicalities and the realities of seeking to prove such a general offence in the field. I am not convinced, with respect to those who moved the new clauses, that they would achieve their aim.

Amendment 20 was tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Stone (Sir William Cash) and for Mid Derbyshire (Pauline Latham). We heard a characteristically impassioned speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. I remind him that it is a passion we all share. A large number of Members—including the Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend Jane Ellison, who will be speaking to a later group of amendments, myself and others—all share his passion to see an end to FGM. With respect, the test that would be applied in his amendment would not help. The phrasing and terminology of FGM protection orders replicates provisions we already have in law in relation to forced marriage protection orders. It is clear that we are talking about prevention and the protection of young women and girls from FGM. Therefore, and with respect to him, references to risk are wholly otiose.

Will the Minister give way?

I would like to give way, but I am afraid I am going to stick to the Speaker’s exhortation and stick to time.

It is not only the proposed legislation, but as a result of a significant public awareness programme being—

Will the Minister give way?

I am afraid I cannot give way to my hon. Friend.

Coupled with a widespread public awareness programme, the provision will deal with the mischief my hon. Friend rightly talks about without unnecessarily complicating the Bill by otiose references to risk. It is simply not necessary.

The Opposition spokesperson, Diana Johnson, tabled amendment (a) to Government new clause 8. I entirely understand the spirit with which she wishes to move her amendment. The Government’s aim is to replicate the offence in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in a way that removes the offending phrase “child prostitution”. What we do not seek to do is widen or create a new offence. The danger of her amendment is that it would involve a substantive change in the law. For that reason, we do not support it.

Briefly, on new clause 22 with regard to child exploitation, the Modern Slavery Bill will deal in large measure with the abuse identified by all corners of the House. We do not think—this is supported by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the National Crime Agency, the National Policing Lead for Modern Slavery and the independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner—that the new offence would add anything other than confusion to the existing legislative position.

I hope I have already answered my hon. Friend Sir Paul Beresford with regard to amendment 33. I listened to him carefully. We have made progress. We think the most likely scenario involving paedophilic manuals and individuals who travel abroad is that they will come into possession of such a manual either in this country by downloading it or by bringing it in to this country. We therefore think that some of the problems he rightly talks about will be covered.

In the light of the explanations I have given, I hope Members will not press their amendments and new clauses. I commend the Government’s amendments to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 8 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.