We now come to the motion in the name of the Prime Minister relating to Syria and the use of chemical weapons. The text of the motion that was submitted yesterday, as it appears on the Order Paper, was incorrect. A few words were omitted from line 16. As they are purely factual, I am content that the motion should be moved in a corrected form, a copy of which is available in the Vote Office.
I inform the House that I have selected manuscript amendment (b), which was submitted this morning in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. The text of the manuscript amendment is also available from the Vote Office.
I should also inform the House that I have set a five-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches in the debate.
I beg to move,
That this House:
Deplores the use of chemical weapons in Syria on
Recalls the importance of upholding the worldwide prohibition on the use of chemical weapons under international law;
Agrees that a strong humanitarian response is required from the international community and that this may, if necessary, require military action that is legal, proportionate and focused on saving lives by preventing and deterring further use of Syria’s chemical weapons;
Notes the failure of the United Nations Security Council over the last two years to take united action in response to the Syrian crisis;
Notes that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime under customary law and a crime against humanity, and that the principle of humanitarian intervention provides a sound legal basis for taking action;
Notes the wide international support for such a response, including the statement from the Arab League on
Believes, in spite of the difficulties at the United Nations, that a United Nations process must be followed as far as possible to ensure the maximum legitimacy for any such action;
Therefore welcomes the work of the United Nations investigating team currently in Damascus, and, whilst noting that the team’s mandate is to confirm whether chemical weapons were used and not to apportion blame, agrees that the United Nations Secretary General should ensure a briefing to the United Nations Security Council immediately upon the completion of the team’s initial mission;
Believes that the United Nations Security Council must have the opportunity immediately to consider that briefing and that every effort should be made to secure a Security Council Resolution backing military action before any such action is taken, and notes that before any direct British involvement in such action a further vote of the House of Commons will take place; and
Notes that this Resolution relates solely to efforts to alleviate humanitarian suffering by deterring use of chemical weapons and does not sanction any action in Syria with wider objectives.
May I thank you, Mr Speaker, for agreeing to our request to recall the House of Commons for this important debate?
The question before the House today is how to respond to one of the most abhorrent uses of chemical weapons in a century, which has slaughtered innocent men, women and children in Syria. It is not about taking sides in the Syrian conflict, it is not about invading, it is not about regime change, and it is not even about working more closely with the opposition; it is about the large-scale use of chemical weapons and our response to a war crime—nothing else.
Let me set out what the House has in front of it today in respect of how we reached our conclusions. We have a summary of the Government’s legal position, which makes it explicit that military action would have a clear legal basis.
In a moment.
We have the key independent judgments of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which make clear its view of what happened and who is responsible. We have a motion from the Government that sets out a careful path of steps that would need to be taken before Britain could participate in any direct military action. Those include the weapons inspectors reporting, further action at the United Nations and another vote in this House of Commons. The motion also makes it clear that even if all those steps were taken, anything that we did would have to be
“legal, proportionate and focused on…preventing and deterring further use of Syria’s chemical weapons”.
Why has he instead published just a one-and-a-half-side summary of it, especially when so many legal experts are saying that without explicit UN Security Council reinforcement, military action simply would not be legal under international law?
There had been a long-standing convention, backed by Attorney-Generals of all parties and all Governments, not to publish any legal advice at all. This Government changed that. With the Libya conflict, we published a summary of the legal advice. On this issue, we have published a very clear summary of the legal advice and I urge all right hon. and hon. Members to read it.
I will make some progress and then I will take a huge number of interventions.
I am deeply mindful of the lessons of previous conflicts and, in particular, of the deep concerns in the country that were caused by what went wrong with the Iraq conflict in 2003. However, this situation is not like Iraq. What we are seeing in Syria is fundamentally different. We are not invading a country. We are not searching for chemical or biological weapons. The case for ultimately supporting action—I say “ultimately” because there would have to be another vote in this House—is not based on a specific piece or pieces of intelligence. The fact that the Syrian Government have, and have used, chemical weapons is beyond doubt. The fact that the most recent attack took place is not seriously doubted. The Syrian Government have said it took place. Even the Iranian President said that it took place. The evidence that the Syrian regime has used these weapons, in the early hours of
The differences with 2003 and the situation with Iraq go wider. Then, Europe was divided over what should be done; now, Europe is united in the view that we should not let this chemical weapons use stand. Then, NATO was divided; today, NATO has made a very clear statement that those who are responsible should be held accountable. Back in 2003, the Arab League was opposed to action; now, it is calling for it. It has issued a statement holding the Syrian regime fully responsible and asking the international community to overcome internal disagreements and to take action against those who committed this crime.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. As he knows, a couple of days ago I expected to oppose the Government tonight, but is he aware that his determination to go down the route of the United Nations and his willingness to hold a further vote in this House will be extremely helpful to me in making up my mind tonight?
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. In drawing up my motion I want to unite as much of the country and of this House as possible. I think it is right, on these vital issues of national and international importance, to seek the greatest possible consensus. That is the right thing for the Government to do and we will continue to do it.
The President of the United States, Barack Obama, is a man who opposed the action in Iraq. No one could in any way describe him as a President who wants to involve America in more wars in the middle east, but he profoundly believes that an important red line has been crossed in an appalling way, and that is why he supports action in this case. When I spoke to President Obama last weekend I said we shared his view about the despicable nature of this use of chemical weapons and that we must not stand aside, but I also explained to him that, because of the damage done to public confidence by Iraq, we would have to follow a series of incremental steps, including at the United Nations, to build public confidence and ensure the maximum possible legitimacy for any action. These steps are all set out in the motion before the House today.
I remember 2003. I was sitting two rows from the back on the Opposition Benches. It was just after my son had been born and he was not well, but I was determined to be here. I wanted to listen to the man who was standing right here and believe everything that he told me. We are not here to debate those issues today, but one thing is indisputable: the well of public opinion was well and truly poisoned by the Iraq episode and we need to understand the public scepticism.
I am most grateful to the Prime Minister for giving way. My reading of his motion tells me that everything in it could have been debated on Monday. I believe that this House has been recalled in order to give cover for possible military action this weekend. Has the Prime Minister made it clear to President Obama that in no way does this country support any attack that could come before the UN inspectors have done their job?
I wanted the recall of this House in order to debate these absolutely vital national and international issues. I will answer the right hon. Lady’s question directly: it is this House that will decide what steps we next take. If Members agree to the motion I have set down, no action can taken until we have heard from the UN weapons inspectors, until there has been further action at the United Nations and until there is another vote in this House. Those are the conditions that we—the British Government, the British Parliament—are setting and it is absolutely right that we do so.
Let me make a little more progress and then I will take interventions from across the House.
The deep public cynicism imposes particular responsibilities on me as Prime Minister to try to carry people in the country and people in this House with me. I feel that very deeply. That was why I wanted Parliament recalled, and I want this debate to bring the country together, not divide it. That is why I included in my motion, the Government motion, all the issues I could that were raised with me by the Leader of the Opposition and by many colleagues in all parts of the House—from the Liberal Democrat party, the Conservative party and others. I want us to try to have the greatest possible unity on the issue.
I have read the Opposition amendment carefully, and it has much to commend it. The need for the UN investigators to report—quite right. The importance of the process at the United Nations—quite right. The commitment to another vote in this House before any British participation in direct action—that is in our motion too.
This is important; let me make this point.
However, I believe that the Opposition motion is deficient in two vital respects. First, it refers to the deaths on
Secondly, in no way does the Opposition motion even begin to point the finger of blame at President Assad. That is at odds with what has been said by NATO, President Obama and every European and regional leader I have spoken to; by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Turkey and India, to name but a few; and by the whole Arab League. It is at odds with the judgment of the independent Joint Intelligence Committee, and I think the Opposition amendment would be the wrong message for this House to send to the world. For that reason, I will recommend that my hon. Friends vote against it.
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s decision to go through the UN process, but will he confirm to the House that were we to find during that process overwhelming opposition in the General Assembly and a majority against in the Security Council, as occurred 10 years ago, we would not then just motor on?
I think it would be unthinkable to proceed if there were overwhelming opposition in the Security Council.
Let me set out for the House why I think this issue is so important. The very best route to follow is to have a chapter VII resolution, take it to the UN Security Council, have it passed and then think about taking action. That was the path we followed with Libya.
I want to make this point, because I think it is very important.
However, it cannot be the case that that is the only way to have a legal basis for action, and we should consider for a moment what the consequences would be if that were the case. We could have a situation where a country’s Government were literally annihilating half the people in that country, but because of one veto on the Security Council we would be hampered from taking any action. I cannot think of any Member from any party who would want to sign up to that. That is why it is important that we have the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which is set out in the Attorney-General’s excellent legal advice to the House.
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend for taking the time to listen to the concerns of residents of Shrewsbury about yet further British military intervention in the middle east. However, why cannot our allies in the middle east, such as Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, take military action? Why does it fall on us yet again?
My hon. Friend makes a good point, and let us be clear that no decision about military action has been taken. It would require another vote of this House. However, if we wanted to see action that was purely about deterring and degrading future chemical weapons use by Syria—that is the only basis on which I would support any action—we would need countries that have the capabilities to take that action, of which the United States and the United Kingdom are two. There are very few other countries that would be able to do that.
On the matter of international law, did not the world leaders and the UN sign up unanimously in 2005 to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, which means that if countries default on their responsibility to defend their own citizens, the international community as a whole has a responsibility to do so? Syria has defaulted on its responsibility to protect its own citizens, so surely now the international community and ourselves have a responsibility to undertake what we agreed to do as recently as 2005.
My hon. Friend makes a very important point that relates to what happened in Kosovo and elsewhere, but let me be clear about what we are talking about today: yes it is about that doctrine, but it is also about chemical weapons. It is about a treaty the whole world agreed to almost 100 years ago, after the horrors of the first world war. The question before us is this: is Britain a country that wants to uphold that international taboo against the use of chemical weapons? My argument is that yes, it should be that sort of country.
The Prime Minister cites the issues relating to Iraq and the impact they have on decisions today, but the perception—a justifiable perception in my opinion—of his own preparedness to get involved in this conflict long before the current incident surely has an impact on the decisions of today.
What I would say to the right hon. Gentleman is that the case I am making is that the House of Commons needs to consider purely and simply this issue of massive chemical weapons use by this regime. I am not arguing that we should become more involved in this conflict. I am not arguing that we should arm the rebels. I am not making any of those arguments. The question before us—as a Government, as a House of Commons, as a world—is that there is the
1925 post-first world war agreement that these weapons are morally reprehensible, so do we want to try to maintain that law? Put simply, is it in Britain’s national interest to maintain an international taboo about the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield? My argument is: yes, it is. Britain played a part in drawing up that vital protocol—which, incidentally, Syria signed—and I think we have an interest in maintaining it.
I thank the Prime Minister for giving way. I doubt there are many people in this House who do not believe that the debate is a prelude to a decision that will eventually see us involved in Syria. Will he explain why if, as the briefing states there have already been 14 instances of chemical weapons use, 100,000 people dead and 1.2 million people displaced, it is only now that the Prime Minister thinks that this is the time for greater intervention?
The point for considering this tougher approach is that we know there are the 14 uses of chemical weapons on a smaller scale—at least 14—and now we have this much larger use. This seems to me—and to President Obama, to President Hollande and to many others—an appropriate moment to ask whether it is time to do something to stand up for the prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. I cannot be accused on the one hand of rushing into something, while, on the other hand, being asked, “Why have you waited for 14 chemical weapons attacks before you do something?”
Let me make a little progress.
In my speech I want to do three things: explain what we know; set out the path we will follow; and try to answer all of the difficult questions that have been put to me. Let me try to make some progress and I promise I will take interventions as I go along. Let me set out what we know about what happened.
Médecins sans Frontières reported that in just three hours, on the morning of
There are pictures of bodies with symptoms consistent with that of nerve agent exposure, including muscle spasms and foaming at the nose and mouth. I believe that anyone in this Chamber who has not seen these videos should force themselves to watch them. One can never forget the sight of children’s bodies stored in ice, and young men and women gasping for air and suffering the most agonising deaths—all inflicted by weapons that have been outlawed for nearly a century.
The Syrian regime has publicly admitted that it was conducting a major military operation in the area at that time. The regime resisted calls for immediate and unrestricted access for UN inspectors, while artillery and rocket fire in the area reached a level about four times higher than in the preceding 10 days. There is intelligence that Syrian regime forces took precautions normally associated with chemical weapons use.
Examining all this evidence, together with the available intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Committee has made its judgments, and has done so in line with the reforms put in place after the Iraq war by Sir Robin Butler. Today, we are publishing the key judgments in a letter from the Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The letter states that
“there is little serious dispute that chemical attacks causing mass casualties on a larger scale than hitherto…took place on
On the Syrian opposition, the letter states:
“There is no credible intelligence or other evidence to substantiate the claims or the possession of CW”— that is, chemical weapons—
“by the opposition.”
The Joint Intelligence Committee therefore concludes:
“It is not possible for the opposition to have carried out a CW attack on this scale.”
It says this:
“The regime has used CW on a smaller scale on at least 14 occasions in the past. There is some intelligence to suggest regime culpability in this attack. These factors make it highly likely that the Syrian regime was responsible.”
Crucially, the JIC Chairman, in his letter to me, makes this point absolutely clear. He says
“there are no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility.”
I am not standing here and saying that there is some piece or pieces of intelligence that I have seen, or the JIC has seen, that the world will not see, that convince me that I am right and anyone who disagrees with me is wrong. I am saying that this is a judgment; we all have to reach a judgment about what happened and who was responsible. But I would put it to hon. Members that all the evidence we have—the fact that the opposition do not have chemical weapons and the regime does, the fact that it has used them and was attacking the area at the time, and the intelligence that I have reported—is enough to conclude that the regime is responsible and should be held accountable.
I am most grateful to the Prime Minister. What has convinced him—where is the evidence?—that an action by the international community would cease the use of chemical weapons within Syria, a country where the combatants have accepted 100,000 dead, millions of refugees and the continuing action that is totally destroying that country? Where is the evidence that convinces the Prime Minister that the external world can prevent this?
The hon. Lady makes an extremely serious point. As I have just said, in the end there is no 100% certainty about who is responsible; you have to make a judgment. There is also no 100% certainty about what path of action might succeed or fail. But let me say this to the hon. Lady. I think we can be as certain as possible that a regime that has used chemical weapons on 14 occasions and is most likely responsible for this large-scale attack, will conclude, if nothing is done, that it can use these weapons again and again on a larger scale and with impunity.
People talk about escalation; to me, the biggest danger of escalation is if the world community—not just Britain, but America and others—stands back and does nothing. I think Assad will draw very clear conclusions from that.
That is a very good question. If my hon. Friend reads the JIC conclusions, he will see that this is where it finds the greatest difficulty—ascribing motives. Lots of motives have been ascribed. For my part, I think the most likely possibility is that Assad has been testing the boundaries. At least 14 uses and no response—he wants to know whether the world will respond to the use of these weapons, which I suspect, tragically and repulsively, are proving quite effective on the battlefield. But in the end we cannot know the mind of this brutal dictator; all we can do is make a judgment about whether it is better to act or not to act and whether he is responsible or not responsible. In the end, these are all issues of judgment and as Members of Parliament, we all have to make them.
I am very grateful to the Prime Minister. Does he know whether there were any plans over the last few days for any military action, before next week, planned at all against Syria?
One obviously cannot discuss the details of potential action in detail in front of this House, but I can tell the House that the American President and I have had discussions, which have been reported in the newspapers, about potential military action.
We have had those discussions and the American President would like to have allies alongside the United States with the capability and partnership that Britain and America have. But we have set out, very clearly, what Britain would need to see happen for us to take part in that—more action at the UN, a report by the UN inspectors and a further vote in this House. Our actions will not be determined by my good friend and ally the American President; they will be decided by this Government and votes in this House of Commons.
I agree with the Prime Minister about the horror of chemical weapons, but the vast majority of the 100,000 killed so far in this civil war in Syria have died as a result of conventional weapons. Can he convince the House that military action by our country would shorten the civil war and help herald a post-war Government who could create stability?
It is a good question, but I am afraid that I cannot make any of those assurances. Obviously, we have not made that decision, but were we to make a decision to join the Americans and others in military action, it would have to be action, in my view, that was solely about deterring and degrading the future use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime—full stop, end of story. By the way, if we were aware of large-scale use of chemical weapons by the opposition, I would be making the same argument from the same Dispatch Box and making the same recommendations.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for standing tall and for supporting Britain’s historical tradition of always standing against mass murder by dictators and tyrants. Does he not agree that there is a humanitarian case for intervention, especially given what happened in recent history in Halabja in 1988, when 5,000 Kurds were killed with mustard gas?
I applaud my hon. Friend for always standing up against genocide, wherever it takes place in the world. It may well be that the fact that no action was taken over Halabja was one of the things that convinced President Assad that it was okay to build up an arsenal of chemical weapons.
I am going to make some progress. As I said, the second part of my speech deals with the actions set out in our motion. I want to address those and then I will take some more interventions.
Whatever disagreements there are over the complex situation in Syria, I believe that there should be no disagreement that the use of chemical weapons is wrong. As I said, almost a century ago the world came together to agree the 1925 treaty and to outlaw the use of chemical weapons, and international law since that time has reflected a determination that the events of that war should never be repeated. It put a line in the sand; it said that, whatever happens, these weapons must not be used. President Assad has, in my view, crossed that line and there should now be consequences. This was the first significant use of chemical weapons this century and, taken together with the previous 14 small-scale attacks, it is the only instance of the regular and indiscriminate use of chemical weapons by a state against its own people for at least 100 years.
Interfering in another country’s affairs should not be undertaken except in the most exceptional circumstances. There must be, as my hon. Friend has just said, a humanitarian catastrophe, and the action must be a last resort. By any standards, this is a humanitarian catastrophe and if there are no consequences for it, there will be nothing to stop Assad and other dictators using these weapons again and again. As I have said, doing nothing is a choice—it is a choice with consequences. These consequences would not just be about President Assad and his future use of chemical weapons; decades of painstaking work to construct an international system of rules and checks to prevent the use of chemical weapons and to destroy stockpiles will be undone. The global consensus against the use of chemical weapons will be fatally unravelled. A 100-year taboo will be breached. People ask about the British national interest. Is it not in the British national interest that rules about chemical weapons are upheld? In my view, of course it is, and that is why I believe we should not stand idly by.
Notwithstanding the differences I have with the Prime Minister on the issue of timing and his approach to conflict, may I raise the issue of consequences? Does he agree that whoever is responsible for a chemical weapons attack should know that they will face a court, be it the International Criminal Court or a specially convened war crimes tribunal in the future, because whether there is military intervention or not, somebody is responsible for a heinous crime and they should face the law?
I certainly agree that people should be subject to the ICC and, of course, possession and use of chemical weapons is a crime and can be prosecuted, but we have to recognise the slowness of those wheels and the fact that Syria is not even a signatory to that treaty.
Let me make a little more progress and then I will give way.
As I have said, I have consulted the Attorney-General and he has confirmed that the use of chemical weapons in Syria constitutes both a war crime and a crime against humanity. I want to be very clear about the process that we follow—the motion is clear about that. The weapons investigators in Damascus must complete their work. They should brief the United Nations Security Council. A genuine attempt should be made at a condemnatory chapter VII resolution, backing all necessary measures. Then, and only then, could we have another vote of this House and British involvement in direct military action. I have explained, again, the legal position and I do not need to repeat it, but I urge colleagues to read this legal advice, which I have put in the Library of the House of Commons. But let me repeat, one more time, that we have not reached that point—we have not made the decision to act—but were there to be a decision to act, this advice proves that it would be legal.
Does the Prime Minister agree that our constituents are concerned about Britain’s becoming involved in another middle eastern conflict, whereas he is focusing specifically on the war-crimes use of chemical weapons, which is a very different matter from Britain’s being involved in a protracted middle eastern war?
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. I am fully aware of the deep public scepticism and war-weariness in our country, linked to the difficult economic times people have had to deal with, and that they are asking why Britain has to do so much in the world. I totally understand that, and we should reassure our constituents that this is about chemical weapons, not intervention or getting involved in another middle eastern war.
And Member of Parliament for Blackburn.
The Prime Minister said a moment ago, within the hearing of the House, that one of the purposes of any action would be the “degrading” of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons capability. In a letter that General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent to Carl Levin, of the United States Congress, a couple of months ago, he spelt out that fully to do that would involve hundreds of ships and aircraft and thousands of ground troops, at a cost of $1 billion a month. Given that the Prime Minister is not proposing that, could he say what his objective would be in degrading the chemical weapons capability?
The right hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, however. I think that the Dempsey letter was addressing the point that if we wanted entirely to dismantle, or to attempt to dismantle, Syria’s weapons arsenal, that would be an enormous undertaking which would involve ground troops and all sorts of things, but that is not what is being proposed; the proposal, were we to take part, would be to attempt to deter and degrade the future use of chemical weapons. That is very different. I do not want to set out at the Dispatch Box a list of targets, but it is perfectly simple and straightforward to think of actions that we could take relating to the command and control of the use of chemical weapons, and the people and buildings involved, that would indeed deter and degrade. Hon. Members will ask this point in several different ways: how can we be certain that any action will work and would not have to be repeated? Frankly, these are judgment issues, and the only firm judgment I think we can all come to is that if nothing is done, we are more likely to see more chemical weapons used.
Although the Joint Intelligence Committee says it is baffled about the motivation for Assad’s use of chemical weapons, it says it has
“a limited but growing body of intelligence which supports the judgment that the regime was responsible”.
I appreciate that the Prime Minister cannot share such intelligence with the House as a whole, but members of the all-party Intelligence and Security Committee have top-secret clearance to look at precisely this sort of material. As some of its members support and others oppose military intervention, would he be willing for them to see that material?
I am happy to consider that request, because the ISC plays a very important role, but I do not want to raise, as perhaps happened in the Iraq debate, the status of individual or groups of pieces of intelligence into some sort of quasi-religious cult. That would not be appropriate. I have told the House that there is an enormous amount of open-source reporting, including videos that we can all see. Furthermore, we know that the regime has an enormous arsenal, that it has used it before and that it was attacking that area. Then, of course, there is the fact that the opposition does not have those weapons or delivery systems and that the attack took place in an area that it was holding. So, yes, intelligence is part of this picture, but let us not pretend that there is one smoking piece of intelligence that can solve the whole problem. This is a judgment issue; hon. Members will have to make a judgment.
I thank the Prime Minister for being generous in giving way.
The reason many of us in Parliament oppose arming the rebels is not only that atrocities have been committed by both sides in this vicious civil war, but that there is a real risk of escalating the violence and therefore the suffering. No matter how clinical the strikes, there is a real risk that they would result only in escalating the violence. What assurances can the Prime Minister give, therefore, that this will not escalate violence either within the country or beyond Syria’s borders?
My hon. Friend and I have not agreed on every aspect of Syrian policy, as is well known. If we were to take action, it would be purely and simply about degrading and deterring chemical weapons use. We worry about escalation, but the greatest potential escalation is the danger of additional chemical weapons use because nothing has been done. This debate and this motion are not about arming the rebels or intervening in the conflict, or about invasion or changing our approach to Syria. They are about chemical weapons—something in which everyone in this House has an interest.
The use of chemical weapons has made Syria our business. Does the Prime Minister agree that to miss the opportunity we have today to send a strong message to Assad and others that this House condemns this war crime, the use of chemical weapons, and will stand by our obligations to deter them would be to undermine our own national security?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. One of the questions our constituents ask most is where the British national interest is in all of this. I would argue that a stable middle east is in the national interest, but there is a specific national interest relating to the use of chemical weapons and preventing its escalation.
I will give way a bit more in a minute, but I want to make some further progress and leave plenty of time for Back-Bench speeches.
In this section of my speech, I have tried to address the questions that people have. Let me take the next one: whether we would be in danger of undermining our ambitions for a political solution in Syria. There is not some choice between, on the one hand, acting to prevent chemical weapons being used against the Syrian people and, on the other, continuing to push for a long-term political solution. We need to do both. We remain absolutely committed to using diplomacy to end this war with a political solution.
Let me make this point. For as long as Assad is able to defy international will and get away with chemical attacks on his people, I believe that he will feel little if any pressure to come to the negotiating table. He is happy to go on killing and maiming his own people as part of his strategy for winning that brutal civil war. Far from undermining the political process, a strong response over the use of chemical weapons in my view could strengthen it.
One of the consequences of intervening will be the effect that it will have on other countries in the region, and my particular concern—as the Prime Minister knows—is Yemen, the most unstable country in the area. Has he looked at the possible consequences of intervention and the effect that it will have on the stability of a country such as Yemen?
I have taken advice from all of the experts about all the potential impacts on the region, which in fact is the next question in my list of questions that need to be answered. The region has already been profoundly endangered by the conflict in Syria. Lebanon is facing sectarian tensions as refugees pile across the border. Jordan is coping with a massive influx of refugees. Our NATO ally Turkey has suffered terrorist attacks and shelling from across the border. Standing by as a new chemical weapons threat emerges in Syria will not alleviate those challenges; it will deepen them. That is why the Arab League has been so clear in condemning the action, in attributing it precisely to President Assad and in calling for international action. This is a major difference from past crises in the middle east, and a region long beset by conflict and aggression needs above all clear international laws and people and countries who are prepared to stand up for them.
I believe that my constituents, like those of the rest of the House, want the Prime Minister to make clear on behalf of this country that we will not turn away from the illegal use of chemical weapons, but that we will give peace a chance. Will he assure us that he will continue to engage—however difficult it is—with Russia and the other key countries to try to make sure that the UN route is productive and that the diplomatic process is engaged again as soon as possible?
I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend that we must continue the process of diplomatic engagement. Even after I had spoken to President Obama before the weekend, I called President Putin on Monday and had a long discussion with him about this issue. We are a long way apart, but the one issue about which we do agree is the need to get the Geneva II process going.
The assurance I can give my right hon. Friend is that any action would be immediately taken over by running a political process once again and that Britain will do everything in its power to help make that happen.
Let me answer a final question that has been put in the debate over recent days: whether this will risk radicalising more young Muslims, including people here in Britain. This is a vital question, and it is one that was not asked enough in 2003. This question was asked at the National Security Council yesterday, and we have received considered analysis from our counter-terrorism experts. Their assessment is that, while as ever there is no room for complacency, the legal, proportionate and focused actions that would be proposed will not be a significant new cause of radicalisation and extremism. I would make this point: young Muslims in the region and here in Britain are looking at the pictures of Muslims suffering in Syria, seeing the most horrific deaths from chemical weapons and many of them may be asking whether the world is going to step up and respond, and I believe that the right message to give to them is that we should.
Will the Prime Minister reflect on the question from my right hon. Friend Keith Vaz on the humanitarian situation, not just as it might appear in the future, but as it happens now, with thousands of refugees going to neighbouring countries? Given that aid agencies such as CAFOD have said that this is the worst situation of the 21st century, how can we be absolutely sure that we will not add in the neighbouring countries, including those in north Africa, to the problems that we are facing?
The right hon. Gentleman makes an extremely important point, and we should be proud in the House and this country of the massive role that aid agencies and British aid money are playing in relieving this disastrous humanitarian situation. We are one of the largest donors, and we will go on making that investment because we are saving lives and helping people every day. But we have to ask ourselves whether the unfettered use of chemical weapons by the regime will make the humanitarian situation worse, and I believe that it will. If we believed that there was a way to deter and degrade future chemical weapons action, it would be irresponsible not to do it.
Let me just make this point. When people study the legal advice published by the Government, they will see that it makes the point that the intervention on the basis of humanitarian protection has to be about saving lives.
Let me conclude where I began. The question before us is how to respond to one of the worst uses of chemical weapons in a hundred years. The answer is that we must do the right thing and in the right way. We must be sure to learn the lessons of previous conflicts.
We must pursue every avenue at the United Nations, every diplomatic channel and every option for securing the greatest possible legitimacy with the steps that we take, and we must recognise the scepticism and concerns that many people in the country will have after Iraq, by explaining carefully and consistently all the ways in which this situation and the actions that we take are so very different. We must ensure that any action, if it is to be taken, is proportionate, legal and specifically designed to deter the use of chemical weapons. We must ensure that any action supports and is accompanied by a renewed effort to forge a political solution and relieve humanitarian suffering in Syria. But at the same time, we must not let the spectre of previous mistakes paralyse our ability to stand up for what is right. We must not be so afraid of doing anything that we end up doing nothing.
Let me repeat that there will be no action without a further vote in the House of Commons, but on this issue Britain should not stand aside. We must play our part in a strong international response; we must be prepared to take decisive action to do so. That is what today’s motion is about, and I commend it to the House.
I beg to move manuscript amendment (b), leave out from ‘House’
to end and add—
‘expresses its revulsion at the killing of hundreds of civilians in Ghutah, Syria on
believes that this was a moral outrage;
recalls the importance of upholding the worldwide prohibition on the use of chemical weapons;
makes clear that the use of chemical weapons is a grave breach of international law;
agrees with the UN Secretary General that the UN weapons inspectors must be able to report to the UN Security Council and that the Security Council must live up to its responsibilities to protect civilians;
supports steps to provide humanitarian protection to the people of Syria but will only support military action involving UK forces if and when the following conditions have been met that:
(a) the UN weapons inspectors, upon the conclusion of their mission in the Eastern Ghutah, are given the necessary opportunity to make a report to the Security Council on the evidence and their findings, and confirmation by them that chemical weapons have been used in Syria;
(b) compelling evidence is produced that the Syrian regime was responsible for the use of these weapons;
(c) the UN Security Council has considered and voted on this matter in the light of the reports of the weapons inspectors and the evidence submitted;
(d) there is a clear legal basis in international law for taking collective military action to protect the Syrian people on humanitarian grounds;
(e) such action must have regard to the potential consequences in the region, and must therefore be legal, proportionate, time-limited and have precise and achievable objectives designed to deter the future use of prohibited chemical weapons in Syria; and
(f) the Prime Minister reports further to the House on the achievement of these conditions so that the House can vote on UK participation in such action, and that any such vote should relate solely to efforts to deter the use of chemical weapons and does not sanction any wider action in Syria.’.
I start by joining the Prime Minister in expressing revulsion at the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians in Ghutah on
It is right to say at the beginning of my remarks that the Prime Minister said a couple of times in his speech words to the effect that, “We are not going to get further involved in that conflict. This does not change our stance our Syria.” I have got to say to the Prime Minister, with the greatest respect, that that is simply not the case. For me that does not rule out military intervention—I want to be clear about this—but I do not think anybody in this House or in the country should be under any illusions about the effect on our relationship to the conflict in Syria if we were to intervene militarily. As I say, and as I shall develop in my remarks, that does not, for me, rule out intervention, but we need to be clear-eyed about the impact that this would have.
Let me also say that this is one of the most solemn duties that this House possesses, and in our minds should be this simple question: in upholding international law and legitimacy, how can me make the lives of the Syrian people better? We should also have in our minds—it is right to remember it on this occasion—the duty we owe to the exceptional men and women of our armed forces and their families, who will face the direct consequences of any decision we make.
The basis on which we make this decision is of fundamental importance, because the basis of making the decision determines the legitimacy and moral authority of any action that we undertake. That is why our amendment asks the House to support a clear and legitimate road map to decision on this issue—a set of steps that will enable us to judge any recommended international action. I want to develop the argument about why I believe this sequential road map is the right thing for the House to support today.
Most of all, if we follow this road map, it can assure the country and the international community that if we take action, we will follow the right, legitimate and legal course, not an artificial timetable or a political timetable set elsewhere. I think that is very important for any decision we make. This is fundamental to the principles of Britain: a belief in the rule of law and a belief that any military action we take must be justified in terms of the cause and also the potential consequences. We should strain every sinew to make the international institutions that we have in our world work to deal with the outrages in Syria.
Let me turn to the conditions in our amendment. First—this is where the Prime Minister and I now agree—we must let the UN weapons inspectors do their work and let them report to the Security Council. Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, yesterday said about the weapons inspectors:
“Let them conclude their work for four days and then we will have to analyse scientifically with experts and then…we will have to report to the Security Council for any actions.”
The weapons inspectors are in the midst of their work and will be reporting in the coming days. That is why today could not have been the day on which the House was asked to decide on military action. It is surely a basic point for this House that evidence should precede decision, not decision precede evidence. I am glad that, on reflection, the Prime Minister accepted this yesterday.
Now it is true—some have already raised this issue—that the weapons inspectors cannot reach a judgment on the attribution of blame. That is beyond their mandate. Some might think that that makes their work essentially irrelevant. I disagree. If the UN weapons inspectors conclude that chemical weapons have been used, in the eyes of this country and of the world that will confer legitimacy on the finding beyond the view of any individual country or any intelligence agency. What is more, it is possible that what the weapons inspectors discover could give the world greater confidence in identifying the perpetrators of this horrific attack.
The second step in our road map makes it clear that there must be compelling evidence that the Syrian regime was responsible for the attack. I welcome the letter from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee today, and I note the Arab League’s view of President Assad’s culpability. Of course, as the Prime Minister said, in conflict there is always reason for doubt, but the greater the weight of evidence the better. On Tuesday we were promised the release of American intelligence to prove the regime’s culpability. We await publication of that evidence, which I gather will be later today. That evidence, too, will be important in building up the body of evidence to show that President Assad was responsible.
The Leader of the Opposition has said that he might be able to support military action of the kind that the Government are contemplating. He has put in his amendment a list of the requirements, virtually all of which, as far as I can tell, appear in the Government’s own motion. Why can he not, therefore, support the Government’s motion, in order that this House could speak with a united voice to the world on this matter?
I will develop in my remarks why I do not think that is the case. In particular, I would point to the fact that the Government’s motion does not mention compelling evidence against President Assad, and I will develop later in my remarks the fifth point in our amendment, which is very, very important—the basis on which we judge whether action can be justified in terms of the consequences.
The third step is that, in the light of the weapons inspectors’ findings and this other evidence, and as the Secretary-General said, the UN Security Council should then debate what action should be taken, and indeed should vote on action. I have heard it suggested that we should have “a United Nations moment”. They are certainly not my words; they are words which do no justice to the seriousness with which we must take the United Nations. The UN is not some inconvenient sideshow, and we do not want to engineer a “moment”. Instead, we want to adhere to the principles of international law.
I very much welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s doctrine that evidence should precede decision; that is a stark change from at least one of his predecessors. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Does he believe that the evidence that has been presented to us today by the Joint Intelligence Committee is compelling or not?
I think it is important evidence, but we need to gather further evidence over the coming days. That is part of persuading the international community and people in this country of President Assad’s culpability, and I think that is important. Let me also come to the hon. Gentleman’s earlier point, though, because the Prime Minister raised it too. I am very clear about the fact that we have got to learn the lessons of Iraq. Of course we have got to learn those lessons, and one of the most important lessons was indeed about respect for the United Nations, and that is part of our amendment today.
On the question of the Security Council, I am also clear that it is incumbent on us to try to build the widest support among the 15 members of the Security Council, whatever the intentions of particular countries. The level of international support is vital, should we decide to take military action. It is vital in the eyes of the world. That is why it cannot be seen as some sideshow or some “moment”, but is an essential part of building the case, if intervention takes place.
I will come directly to that question. It is because there will be those who argue that in the event of Russia and China vetoing a Security Council resolution, any military action would necessarily not be legitimate. I understand that view but I do not agree with it. I believe that if a proper case is made, there is scope in international law—our fourth condition—for action to be taken even without a chapter VII Security Council resolution. Kosovo in 1999 is the precedent cited in the Prime Minister’s speech and in the Attorney-General’s legal advice; but the Prime Minister did not go into much detail on that advice.
It is worth noting that in the Attorney-General’s legal advice there are three very important conditions. The first condition is that there must be
“convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress”.
The second is that
“it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved”.
That is a testing condition, which we need to test out in the coming days and the coming period. Thirdly,
“the proposed use of force must be…proportionate…and…strictly limited in time”.
So the Attorney-General concludes in his advice—it is very important for the House to understand this—that there could be circumstances, in the absence of a chapter VII Security Council resolution, for action to be taken, but subject to those three conditions. That is the case that must be built over the coming period. These principles reflect the responsibility to protect, a doctrine developed since Kosovo which commands widespread support.
The right hon. Gentleman is right; I did not cover everything in my speech. I could have gone into more detail on the Attorney-General’s advice. The Leader of the Opposition mentioned the three conditions. I just thought for the clarity of the House, for those who might not have had time to read it, I would point out that the very next sentence of the Attorney-General’s advice is:
“All three conditions would clearly be met in this case”.
Well, that is the Attorney-General’s view—[Interruption.] That is the view that needs to be tested out over the coming period. Of course that is the case and a judgment will have to be made. Additionally, the responsibility to protect also demands a reasonable prospect of success in improving the plight of the Syrian people, and that responsibility is an essential part of making this case. That takes me to the final point of the road map we propose.
I am referring to the fourth paragraph of our road map. My right hon. Friend has already touched on the fact that any action must be legal, proportionate and time-limited, but the amendment goes on to say that it must have “precise and achievable objectives”. Will he detail what those objectives are?
I am coming exactly to that point, which is that the Government need to set that out in the coming days. That takes me precisely to the final point of the road map. Any military action must be specifically designed to deter the future use of chemical weapons; it must be time-limited with specific purpose and scope so that future action would require further recourse to this House; and it must have regard for the consequences of any action. We must ensure that every effort is made to bring the civil war in Syria to an end, and principal responsibility for that rests, of course, with the parties in that conflict, and in particular President Assad.
I want to make a bit more progress.
The international community also has a duty to do everything it can to support the Geneva II process, and any action we take—this is the key point—must assist that process and not hinder it. That is the responsibility that lies on the Government and their allies—to set out that case in the coming period.
There will be some in this House who say that Britain should not contemplate action even when it is limited, because we do not know precisely the consequences that will follow. As I said, I am not with those who rule out action, and the horrific events unfolding in Syria ask us to consider all available options, but we owe it to the Syrian people, to our own country and to the future security of our world to scrutinise any plans on the basis of the consequences they will have. By setting a framework today, we give ourselves time and space to scrutinise what is being proposed by the Government, to see what the implications are.
It depends on the case that has been set out and the extent to which international support has been developed—[Interruption.] I say to hon. Members on the Government Benches who are making strange noises that it is right to go about this process in a calm and measured way. If people are asking me today to say, “Yes, now, let us take military action,” I am not going to say that, but neither am I going to rule out military action, because we have to proceed on the basis of evidence and the consensus and support that can be built.
Glenda Jackson asked an important question that I feel the right hon. Gentleman did not answer fully. Paragraph (e) of the Opposition amendment refers to “precise and achievable objectives”, which I assume means that he has in mind precise and achievable objectives. Can he please detail what they would be?
Yes I can, because the amendment goes on to say,
“designed to deter the future use of prohibited chemical weapons in Syria”.
Paragraph (e) also states that
“such action must have regard to the potential consequences in the region”,
so any proposed action to deter the use of chemical weapons must be judged against the consequences that will follow. Further work by the Government is necessary to set out what those consequences would be.
On consequences, I am listening carefully to the Leader of the Opposition and he is effectively making a strong case against military action. The consequences of the military action envisaged are very unquantifiable, because the objectives are, frankly, pretty soft in terms of degrading and deterring and of the link between military effect and the actual effect on the ground. He has also linked this to the consequences for the Geneva II process, which can only be negative.
I am saying to the hon. Gentleman and the House that over the coming period, we have to assess in a calm and measured way—not in a knee-jerk way, and not on a political timetable—the advantages of potential action, whether such action can be taken on the basis of legitimacy and international law, and what the consequences would be.
That intervention is not worthy of the hon. Gentleman. I am merely trying to set out a framework for decision for the House. My interest all along has been to ensure that the House of the Commons can make the decision, and do so when the evidence is available. Some in the House believe that the decision is simple—clearly there are such Members on the Government Benches. Some think we can make the decision now to engage in military conflict. Equally, others believe we can rule out military conflict now. I happen to think that we must assess the evidence over the coming period. That is the right thing to do, and our road map sets out how we would do it.
It is one thing to not rule out military action, but is not the problem with the Government’s motion that it asks for an in-principle vote for military action now, before we hear what the inspectors say and before the UN processes take place?
I say to my hon. Friend and the House that this morning, it was noticeable that the Government motion would be presented, if it was voted for—this is an important point—as the House endorsing the principle of military action. That is why I do not feel ready to support the Government motion, and why I believe the Opposition amendment, which sets out a framework for decision, is the right thing to vote for.
Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that in advance of previous conflicts, such as the intervention in Afghanistan, political parties in the House were briefed in detail, and on Privy Council terms, on the nature of the evidence on why there should be intervention? Can he confirm that there have been no such briefings in advance of this vote?
I will not give way.
As I was saying, by setting this framework today, we will give ourselves the time and space to assess the impact that any intervention will have on the Syrian people, and to assess the framework of international law and legitimacy. As I have said, I do not believe that we should be rushed to judgment on this question on a political timetable set elsewhere. In the coming days, the Government have a responsibility, building on what the Prime Minister did today—but it is also more than what he did today—to set out their case on why the benefits of intervention and action outweigh the benefits of not acting.
No, I want to make this point.
I do not rule out supporting the Prime Minister, but I believe he must make a better case than he has made today on this question. Frankly, he cannot say to the House and to the country that the Government motion would not change our stance on Syria or our involvement in the Syrian conflict. It would, and the House needs to assess that.
Our amendment sets out a roadmap from evidence to decision that I believe can command the confidence of the House and the British public. Crucially, the amendment would place responsibility for the judgment on the achievement of the criteria for action—reporting by the weapons inspectors; compelling evidence; the vote in the Security Council; the legal base; and the prospect of successful action—with this House in a subsequent vote.
I hope the House can unite around our amendment, because I believe it captures a view shared on both sides of the House, both about our anger at the attack on innocent civilians, and about a coherent framework for making the decision on how we respond.
May I thank my right hon. Friend and the shadow Foreign Secretary for the measured approach that they are taking on this very serious issue? Does my right hon. Friend agree that any reckless or irresponsible action could lead to full war in that area? We must understand from previous conflicts that war is not some sort of hokey-cokey concept; once you’re in, you’re in.
The right hon. Gentleman speaks of a road map. Does he not appreciate that the first stage in our response to the atrocities is what we do in the Chamber this afternoon? Given that his perfectly legitimate concerns about consequences, evidence and so on are met by the Government motion, may I urge him to support the motion so that we can send a united, strong message to Assad and others? Otherwise, we will undermine our national security.
We will not support a Government motion that was briefed this morning as setting out an in-principle decision to take military action. That would be the wrong thing to do, and on that basis we will oppose the motion. We could only support military action, and should only make the decision to do so, when and if the conditions of our amendment were met.
We all know that stability cannot be achieved by military means alone. The continued turmoil in the country and the region in recent months and years further demonstrates the need to ensure that we uphold the fate of innocent civilians, the national interest and the security and future prosperity of the whole region and the world. I know that the whole House recognises that this will not and cannot be achieved through a military solution.
Whatever our disagreements today, Labour Members stand ready to play our part in supporting measures to improve the prospects for peace in Syria and the middle east: it is what the people of Britain and the world have the right to expect. But this is a very grave decision, and it should be treated as such by this House, and it will be treated as such by this country.
The fundamental test will be this: as we think about the men, women and children who have been subjected to this atrocity and about the prospects for other citizens in Syria, can the international community act in a lawful and legitimate way that will help them and prevent further suffering? The seriousness of our deliberations should match the significance of the decision we face, which is why I urge the House to support our amendment.
No fewer than 99 right hon. and hon. Members are seeking to catch my eye, meaning that necessarily large numbers of colleagues will be disappointed. As always, the Chair will do its best to accommodate the level of interest, but it will not be assisted by Members coming up to it to ask whether and, if so, when they will be called. I ask Members please not to do so: calmness and patience are required.
On a point of order, Mr Speaker. The Prime Minister—or, at least, a spokesperson—told the media yesterday morning that a UN resolution was to be circulated in the afternoon. I believe that it was, but when I asked the Library for the text neither it nor the Foreign Office was available to provide it. Will you, Mr Speaker, look into that?
The right hon. Lady is an immensely experienced Member—she is now into her 26th year; she started extremely young—and she knows that that is not a matter for the Chair. She has candidly aired her concern, and the Prime Minister and other Members on the Treasury Bench will have heard what she had to say.
I listened in the most charitable manner I could to the Leader of the Opposition explaining why he cannot support the motion. Given that the Government responded not simply to his request but to those made by Members on the Government Benches to wait until the inspectors had completed their task and to enable the Security Council to consider the consequences, we and the country can only conclude that the right hon. Gentleman is incapable of taking yes for an answer.
I want to use the short time available to me to concentrate on one set of words—a reasonable phrase—in his amendment: the need for “compelling evidence” of the Assad regime’s responsibility for the chemical attacks. We should be clear what “compelling evidence” means. Nothing could ever be proven 100%. Someone charged with murder before our courts can be convicted if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. That does not require someone to say, “I saw him pull the trigger.” Sometimes—usually—that is not available.
When we look at the situation in regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, what we know for certain—it is not in dispute—is that chemical weapons were used. The Assad regime themselves admit that. We know that such weapons were used in the middle of a sustained artillery attack by the Syrian Government forces on the very suburb in Damascus where the chemical attacks then took place. We know that the Syrian Government are the only state in the middle east that has massive stocks of chemical weapons, and we know that there cannot have been any ethical objection on the part of the Assad regime to using chemical weapons, not just because they have probably used them before, but because any regime that slaughters100,000 of its own citizens clearly would have no compunction in using chemical weapons as well.
When the right hon. and learned Gentleman says that we know that Syria is the only country in the middle east that possesses stocks of chemical weapons, will he draw attention to the use by Israel of illegal chemical weapons in Gaza—white phosphorus? Surely Israel, too, has such weapons, and we should take that into account in looking at the spectrum.
Let us use another occasion, if we may, to debate these important allegations. The issue is that the Syrian Government themselves do not deny that they have massive stocks of chemical weapons, and therefore the issue is whether there is any credible argument that on this particular occasion, in a district controlled by the opposition, the opposition somehow had both the capability and the will, and indeed did carry out this attack.
The inspectors’ reports will be helpful in two respects, I hope. First, they will give confirmation of the scale of this chemical attack. If only three or four people die, it could be argued that somebody could have been carrying around a bag of chemical agent and dispersed it, as happened in the Tokyo underground a good number of years ago. But when there are not just 300 people dying, but more than 3,000 people treated by Médecins Sans Frontières, clearly this was a massive chemical weapons attack which required rockets and a capability which, as we have heard, no one else in Syria has now or is likely to have in the short to medium term. Against that background, the inspectors could provide us with some helpful additional information.
The question then becomes, what is the purpose if military action is taken? It is not only going to be limited, as the Prime Minister has rightly said, but it has one overwhelming purpose, which has to be to deter further acts of the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. Let me be emphatic about this—I hope no one would argue otherwise—that at this very moment, the Assad regime in Damascus are watching very carefully to see whether they will get away with what they have done. If they get away with it, if there is no international response of a significant kind, we can be absolutely certain that the forces within Damascus will be successful in saying, “We must continue to use these whenever there is a military rationale for doing so.” There is no guarantee that a military strike against military targets will work, but there is every certainty that if we do not make that effort to punish and deter, these actions will indeed continue.
The other point that must concentrate all our minds very comprehensively is that a failure to act is not in itself an absence of a decision. It has profound other consequences, not just the ones I have mentioned, and most profound for the United Nations itself. The League of Nations effectively collapsed in the 1930s when Germany and Italy effectively prevented any sanctions or other action being taken against Italy for the invasion of Abyssinia. That, together with other similar acts of aggression which the League could not handle because of the absence of unanimity, created a chaos which led to the second world war. So if we can take action that has the support of Arab states and of the bulk of the international community, far from suffering, the United Nations and the concept of international institutions and the international community acting to deal with such acts of aggression will be boosted in a way that would not happen through any other course of action.
I believe that what is being recommended and will come back to this House is not only overwhelmingly in the interests of innocent Syrian men, women and children, but is far more likely to boost the concept of international action to deal with gross atrocities and violations of human rights than simply wringing our hands, protesting at the action but failing to make any effective response to it.
I was the final speaker in the debate in this House on
Iraq has not, however, meant that the British public or, still less, this House have become pacifist. Two years ago, the House and the public approved action against the Gaddafi regime. The need for that action to prevent a massacre in and around Benghazi was palpable. It was approved by the Security Council and it was plainly lawful. But Iraq has made the public much more questioning and more worried about whether we should put troops in harm’s way, especially when intelligence is involved.
The question before us now is whether the use of chemical weapons changes the considerations that, up to now, have determined that we should not intervene militarily in Syria. We need to decide whether, as the Government motion proposes, a “strong humanitarian response” to the use of chemical weapons may, if necessary, “require military action” by the United Kingdom’s armed forces. My conclusion at the moment is that the Government have yet to prove their case. I think we are clear that chemical weapons were used, but we will get more information on that from the inspectors. We are also pretty clear that culpability for that is likely to have been with the Assad regime, but I say to the Prime Minister and to my right hon. Friends on the Opposition Front Bench that there was also very strong evidence about what we all thought Saddam held—[Interruption.] No, he had held an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and the issue was much more one of what we should do about that than of a widespread sharing of the assessment by the Security Council that Saddam posed a threat to international peace and security.
The right hon. Gentleman described Iraq as an intelligence failure, but what actually happened was that Tony Blair said in this House that the information was “extensive, detailed and authoritative”, yet it later turned out to be limited, sporadic and patchy. That was the assessment of the intelligence services. It was not an intelligence failure; it was a political failure.
We can debate the Iraq inquiries at another date, and I am sure that we shall do so. I accept my responsibilities fully for what happened in respect of Iraq. I have sought, both before the Iraq inquiry and elsewhere, to explain why I came to my conclusion. I simply make the point, which is widely shared across the House, that one of the consequences of the intelligence failure on Iraq has been to raise the bar that we have to get over when the question of military action arises.
The House was told that there were weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the United Kingdom, and we were also told, in 2006, that we were going into Helmand province in the hope that not a shot would be fired. Does my right hon. Friend acknowledge that the result of accepting those decisions has been the deaths of 623 of our brave soldiers? Does he not realise that those are the reasons that the public no longer trust Government assurances about going to war?
With respect to my hon. Friend, the arguments about Afghanistan, then and now, are very different. There will be other occasions to debate that matter.
Even if there is compelling evidence on culpability, the bigger question arises of the strategic objective of any military action and its likely consequences. The Prime Minister has accepted that such strikes would not significantly degrade the chemical weapons capability of the Assad regime. We need to be clear about that. Sir Malcolm Rifkind spoke about trying to take that capability down. However, if the first set of strikes failed to do that—the Prime Minister seemed to accept that they would be more by way of punishment and deterrence, rather than a degrading of the capability—what would happen after that? We all know—I bear the scars of this—how easy it is to get into military action, but how difficult it is to get out of it.
There is also the issue of precisely what is the objective of the action. The case seems to veer between the alleviation of human suffering and some sort of warning for or punishment of the Assad regime. If the Prime Minister comes back to the House to recommend military action, he must be clear about precisely what the purposes are.
This morning, we woke up to hear the President of the United States, Barack Obama, saying that by acting in
“a clear and decisive but very limited way, we send a shot across”
Assad’s bow. Let us pause and consider the metaphor that was chosen by the President, because it is revealing. A shot across the bow is a warning that causes no damage and no casualties—shells fired over the bridge of a naval vessel. In this case, it might be a Tomahawk missile that is targeted to fly over Damascus and land in the unoccupied deserts beyond. That cannot be what the President has in mind. We need to know what he really has in mind and what the consequences of that will be. There will be casualties from any military action—some military and almost certainly many civilian.
I have one last point to put to the Prime Minister. He sought to draw a distinction in his speech between our response to war crimes and taking sides in the conflict. However much he struggles to make that distinction, let us be clear that if we take an active part in military action, which I do not rule out, we shall be taking sides. There is no escape from that. We shall be joining with the rebels, with all the consequences that arise from that, and not maintaining a position of neutrality.
There are a number of things on which the House will be generally agreed. The first is that, for whatever reason, there is widespread scepticism among the British public about any further military involvement overseas. A number of questions need to be answered before we become involved in any form of military action. The first is what a good outcome looks like, the second is whether such an outcome can be engineered, the third is whether we will be part of engineering such an outcome, and the fourth is how much of the eventual outcome we want to have ownership of.
I do not believe that we can answer any of those questions to our satisfaction with regard to the civil war in Syria. I believe that that is why the British public are deeply sceptical about our being involved in that civil war in any way, shape or form. I share that scepticism. I also believe that there is no national interest for the United Kingdom in taking a side in that civil war. To exchange an Iran-friendly and Hezbollah-friendly Assad regime for an anti-west, anti-Christian and anti-Israel al-Qaeda regime does not seem to offer us any advantage.
However, that is not the issue before us today. There is a separate issue on which we need to have great clarity, which is how we respond to a regime that has used chemical weapons against its civilian population—something that is against international law and is a war crime. The pictures we have seen in recent days have shocked us, even in our desensitised age. The pictures of toddlers laid out in rows were, and should be, deeply disturbing to all of us. The question is whether we are willing to tolerate more such pictures and, if not, how we go about minimising the risk of such pictures coming to our screens in the future.
It is true that if we take action against the Assad regime we cannot guarantee that it will not do something, or similar things, again in the future, but I believe it will minimise the risk and show the people of Syria that we are on their side and that the rest of the world is serious about its obligations in enforcing the existing law about the use of chemical weapons.
Much of the debate has focused on the consequences of taking action, but we must also focus on the consequences of not taking action. Will it make the Syrian people more or less safe from the use of such weapons in the future? On the implications for the Syrian regime, will it make it feel that it is more or less secure in taking such actions again in the future? On regimes in other parts of the world that might decide to use chemical weapons against their domestic populations, what signal would we send them about the international community’s willingness to stop such use in future if we do nothing? Let us also not forget the onlookers in this—Iran—who have their own nuclear intentions and are intent on testing the will of the international community.
I accept many of the points that the right hon. Gentleman is making, but many Opposition and, I think, Government Members would say that this is not a choice between action and inaction; it is simply a choice of what action should be taken. Some of us worry that military action might exacerbate the situation, rather than make it better, and draw us into mission creep, over which we would have very little control.
I entirely understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, which is valid. As the Prime Minister said, it is a judgment call. It is incumbent on those who take these decisions ultimately to determine whether they think it is more likely that we will be drawn into such a conflict or whether we will achieve the objectives without that happening. That is a matter for legitimate debate in the House. I believe that if we do not take action—and that probably means military action—the credibility of the international community will be greatly damaged. What value would red lines have in the future if we are unwilling to implement those that already exist?
I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way. Does he agree that if we do nothing and stand by and watch as the horrific atrocities described by the Prime Minister take place, it will be as if we agree with these chemical weapons that have been spread across Syria?
If we do nothing I believe it would be an abdication of our international legal and moral obligations, which we should take extremely seriously.
Let me say briefly one other thing. The Government should be commended for taking the United Nations route. It is right and proper that we do so and that the appropriate amount of time is given to consideration, but that comes with a caveat. It is clear that Russia has military interests in the port of Tartus and that it still feels very sore about its belief that it was sold a pup over Libya. We are not likely to get Russian support in the Security Council, nor are we likely to get Chinese support there, either. We cannot allow a situation whereby the international community’s ability to implement international law is thwarted by a constant veto by Russia and China. Therefore, I think we should be deeply grateful to the Attorney-General for the clarity of the advice that he has set out on how we can carry forward our international humanitarian obligations were such a situation to present itself.
Let us be very clear that to do nothing will be interpreted in Damascus as appeasement of a dreadful regime and the dreadful actions it has carried out. Appeasement has never worked to further the cause of peace in the past, and it will not now, and it will not in the future.
I was a member of the Cabinet that decided in good faith that this country should join the invasion of Iraq, and I know how heavy the burden is on those who are charged with such a decision. I also agree that, in many cases, doing nothing is as much a decision as doing something and that the present catastrophe in Syria demands a decision of us. As has been said, the use of chemical weapons is prohibited by customary international law and binding conventions. Short of the use of nuclear weapons, it is the most heinous crime a country can commit, made even more dreadful when chemical weapons are used in civil war on its own people.
I am therefore unhesitatingly in favour of taking the step that will deal as effectively as we can with Assad. But what is that step? What is our locus? How can we be effective, and at what cost? I want to deal with the last question first. The cost in human suffering and human life is clear, but there is another long-term cost—the damage that we may do to the rule of international law in international affairs.
It is obviously deeply frustrating that Russia and China have formed a blocking minority in the Security Council, and I know that Members will want to reinforce the importance of diplomatic initiatives to seek to engage Russia, in particular, in negotiation with the Syrian Government. However, it is also clear that to go to war with Assad—that is what it would be—without the sanction of a UN Security Council resolution would set a terrible precedent. After the mission creep of the Libyan operation, it would amount to nothing less than a clear statement by the US and its allies that we were the arbiters of international right and wrong when we felt that right was on our side. What could we do or say if, at some point, the Russians or Chinese adopted a similar argument? What could we say if they attacked a country without a UN resolution because they claimed it was right and cited our action as a precedent?
Legal rectitude may not amount to much, but it is all we have. It remains our best hope, and we cast it aside at terrible peril, hence the importance of the route map set out in the Opposition amendment.
I welcome the decision that the Government have now made to take no action until the UN inspectors have delivered their report, but if or when it is proved conclusively that Assad has used chemical weapons on his people, what can we do to prevent him from doing so again? There will perhaps be time in the future to bring him before the International Criminal Court, but in practical terms, what can we do, even if we are able to get a UN Security Council resolution?
As my right hon. Friend Mr Straw mentioned, the US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff wrote to the Senate armed services committee last month—we are all grateful for the excellent briefing by the Library—about having examined five options. He said that controlling chemical weapons would involve billions of dollars each month and involve risks that
“not all chemical weapons would be controlled, extremists could gain better access to remaining weapons, similar risks to no-fly zone but with the added risk to…troops on the ground.”
The situation is parlous, and—
It is no secret that, notwithstanding the horrors of Damascus, I have reservations about the use of military action in the circumstances with which we are engaged. In particular, I have reservations relating to the absence of a proper role for the United Nations. However, as the Government motion now sets out, there is a role for the inspectors, there is a duty imposed on the Secretary-General, and there is an endorsement to use every effort to secure a United Nations Security Council resolution under chapter VII of its charter. In addition, and I will come back to this in a moment, the motion also provides that for all of us—supporters, sceptics or opponents—there will be an opportunity to pass judgment on any question of British involvement at a further stage when, not surprisingly perhaps, rather more information may be available.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that for some of us at least, tonight’s vote will not predetermine that we are satisfied at the next stage that there is a coherent plan that does not inflict too much damage on neighbouring countries?
I think my right hon. Friend is referring, by way of inference, to the suggestion that there has been briefing that those who voted for the Government motion would be endorsing in principle military action. Most of us have been around here long enough to know how often briefing is a long way from the truth. Anyone who is in any doubt about that should read the precise terms of the Government’s motion.
The effort to achieve a resolution under chapter VII is a vital component of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, because if no such resolution is achieved—here, I agree with the Attorney-General—we turn to what was once called humanitarian intervention and now is called responsibility to protect. It is a fundamental of that doctrine that every possible political and diplomatic alternative will have been explored and found not to be capable.
I want to applaud, if I may, Mr Speaker, the House for taking the unusual step—in my view wholly justified—of publishing the Attorney-General’s advice. Those of us with long memories will remember that 10 years ago we were not favoured with anything like as much detail. It is also worth pointing out that there was no second vote 10 years ago. Within 24 hours of the motion being passed by the House endorsing the Labour Government’s proposals, the Tomahawk cruise missiles began to rain down on Baghdad.
It respectfully seems to me that we need to examine the matter not in response to the emotion that it undoubtedly engenders in all of us. Emotion is no substitution for judgment in matters of this kind. We must look beyond what might be achieved in the short term, to the medium term and the long term.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman spoke a moment ago of the responsibility to protect. One of the criteria is the prospects of success. Is he satisfied with the objectives of this action and the prospects of success on those objectives?
We cannot arrive at a conclusion on the prospects of success until we have more information than is currently available. The hon. Gentleman is right. I should have mentioned that the prospect of success is a part of that evolving doctrine. We should also remember that the doctrine is not universally accepted, and that the mere use of it is, on occasion, regarded as highly controversial. I rather fancy that at the G20 summit in St Petersburg next week the doctrine of the responsibility to protect may not get considerable support.
My questions, which I do not expect to be answered but I hope will lie on the table, are these. Will military action bring the Geneva conference any closer? Is it more likely to produce the political settlement that everyone believes is necessary? Although a strategic objective is set out, I hope I might be forgiven for thinking that military action is more of a tactic than a strategic imperative. That is why we must give consideration to the endgame, to use a colloquialism, and in particular to the whole issue of regional stability—what the consequences might be in an already very unstable region.
What would happen were the next horror to be carried out by some conventional means? What would our response be in the light of the fact that, for two years or so, a number of horrors have been brought about by the use of conventional weapons? My concern is that if we open the gate once, it will be difficult to close it.
I have read the motion and Opposition amendment and I believe that both are motivated by the same determination to do what is right and to see that the House endorses everything that is right. However, I have to confess that, even following the most narrow textual analysis, I can find no difference of substance or principle anywhere in the two offerings. That is why I shall support the Government in the Lobby this evening. I very much hope that the Opposition will, too.
Across the House, in all political parties, there is total revulsion at what has been happening in Syria in the past months and years of the brutal conflict there—in particular following the recent apparent chemical weapons attacks on civilians. There is absolute unanimity, here and internationally, that the use of those indiscriminate weapons is unacceptable and the United Nations is right to be investigating the circumstances of the attacks.
If we are serious about our support for the United Nations, the inspectors must be able to complete their work and report back to the world community before any course of new action is undertaken. If, as we expect, it is confirmed that chemical weapons were used, one of the first things that should be made clear is that whoever ordered and carried out those attacks will, in time, face the full force of the law. Regardless of what may otherwise happen in the short term, the perpetrators of such a crime should understand that they face indictment by the International Criminal Court or by a specially convened war crimes tribunal.
Today, however, we have been recalled to Parliament because of potential imminent military action by UK and other forces. We have been called back four days before Parliament was to reconvene anyway, so it is not unreasonable to conclude that there was a high probability that intervention would take place before Monday. The UK Government expected that we should vote for a blank cheque that would have allowed UK military action before UN weapons inspectors concluded their investigations and before their detailed evidence was provided to the United Nations—or, indeed, Members of this House. Following our having been misled on the reasons for war in Iraq, the least the UK Government could have done was to provide detailed evidence. Frankly, they have not, as was underlined in my intervention on the Prime Minister earlier.
In contrast with the sensible approach taken in the run-up to the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, today we were expected to give the UK Government a blank cheque. However, Members on both sides clearly reminded their leaders that this is a hung Parliament and that there would not be a majority for a blank cheque. Instead there should at least be safeguards.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the public are suspicious about the argument that the issue is not about regime change? Only a few weeks ago, the Government wanted to arm the rebels. That argument is causing utter confusion among everybody.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point that will be noticed outside the House.
I appeal to Government Members to look closely at the amendment and ask themselves what is wrong with the safeguard it proposes. Surely the UN weapons inspectors must be able to conclude their mission and have the necessary opportunity to report to the Security Council on the evidence and their findings on whether chemical weapons were used in Syria. Surely we must have definitive evidence that the Syrian regime or opposition was responsible for the use of these weapons—with the greatest respect, that means not just two pages of A4 paper. Surely the UN Security Council must consider and vote on this matter in the light of the reports of the weapons inspectors and the evidence submitted. Surely there must be a clear legal basis in international law for taking collective military action to protect the Syrian people on humanitarian grounds. And surely the aims, objectives and consequences of any intervention must be made clear and must not run the risk of escalating the conflict, causing further deaths and worsening the humanitarian situation. The safeguards in the amendment are absolutely clear and will bring the issue back for a parliamentary vote before any UK military intervention is possible. Should these safeguards not be satisfied, the Scottish National party and Plaid Cymru will vote against intervention, just as we voted consistently against the Iraq war.
I urge the UK Government to invest more time and effort in supporting an end to the conflict and stepping up humanitarian support for the hundreds of thousands of victims in Syria and refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries. Earlier today, I met Jehangir Malik of Islamic Relief, an organisation that deserves as much assistance as possible to help people in and around Syria. He warned about the potential negative impact of military intervention and why that could significantly worsen the humanitarian situation. May I urge the Government to do yet more to support Islamic Relief and the other organisations involved in the Disasters Emergency Committee? With so many people watching our deliberations, I also urge the public to continue their great generosity in supporting humanitarian efforts.
I also urge the Government to renew their efforts to find a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. Do we think that Tomahawk cruise missiles fired into Syria will make that easier or more difficult? It is clearly understood that this civil war is intractable and that there is little willingness to compromise. Earlier today, I heard an appeal by Sakhr al-Makhadhi, the London-based Syria expert and commentator. He said that the people of Syria, from all backgrounds, are crying out for help to resolve the civil war. Please can the UK Government focus their attention on working with the United States and the Russian Federation, and all others who have influence in the region, including Iran, to bring the different Syrian sides to the negotiating table?
In conclusion, the UK Government must not have a blank cheque for military intervention in Syria. We have already heard that it is being briefed that tonight’s vote on their motion is an agreement, in principle, for military action. We should not give them a blank cheque for military intervention in Syria, either in principle or in practice.
I have only 30 seconds left.
We cannot ignore the lessons of the calamitous Iraq war. We need safeguards, in order to ensure that all is done to provide evidence about chemical weapons and to support the United Nations and international law.
We need a coherent and comprehensive strategy that fully takes into account the consequences of intervention. What is currently a calamity for the people of Syria could worsen and become a conflagration across the middle east. That is why this House should unite around the cross-party safeguards amendment, vote against the Government motion, and make diplomatic and humanitarian efforts the key focus of the international community.
There are four key questions we have to address. Is there a moral case? Does the intelligence stack up? Is this lawful? What is the objective? The moral case is something each individual MP will have to decide, based on his own character, morality and attitude to world affairs. Many colleagues and friends are, in principle, non-interventionists, whereas others have a strong interventionist streak. Others say, “If that criterion is met, or this, maybe.” We all wrestle with the conflict between head and heart. Some say that the murder of hundreds of innocent citizens by chemical weapons is nothing to do with us and that it is easier not to get involved, but I ask them to examine their conscience.
Syria is a signatory to the Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. It was a protocol drawn up in the aftermath of the first world war, when the world said, “Never again.” Do we now say, “Well, never mind, let’s just sit on our hands and ignore the atrocities taking place”? This is not just any ordinary convention; it is a convention on genocide and the abuse of basic morality. Some say, “What’s the difference between being killed by an artillery shell or by sarin gas?” With everything in life there is a red line—a straw that breaks the camel’s back—and, to me, this is it. In my judgment, faced with the mass murder of innocent civilians, doing nothing is not an option.
In his excellent speech, my right hon. Friend Dr Fox made the point about credibility. Britain is a leading member of NATO, it is chair of the G8 and it has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This gives us huge diplomatic clout, but with the benefits come responsibilities, and this is just the moment when we must ask ourselves what those responsibilities are. We can behave like a minor nation with no real international responsibilities and put our head in the sand, or we can live up to the expectations that the world community has of us.
Our objectives must be strategic. A missile strike would make it clear that chemical weapons cannot be used without a response from the world community; it would help to degrade the Assad regime’s future capacity; and it would deter the regime from its future use. In my judgment, those are worthy objectives that have my support.
One component common to both the motion and the Opposition’s amendment is the possibility of our ending up on a path to military action, a missile strike being the first of potentially two steps towards such action. The Prime Minister did not answer the question from my right hon. Friend the
Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) about what that action would entail, although he ruled out the possibility of a large-scale deployment of troops on the ground. In order to degrade Assad’s opportunity to use chemical weapons, would we not have to use either special forces on the ground or launch a missile strike, which could cause even more damage?
We have to take the world as we find it. The situation has been made quite clear, including by the Prime Minister: the aim initially is to attempt to degrade Assad’s capacity, so it is essential that our strategic objective be focused on the command and control of the chemical weapons programme. If that is not successful, I am sure that he and I will be back here asking, “Where do we go from here?”
Will the hon. Gentleman be a bit more precise? Today, the Prime Minister widened the objectives to include degrading the chemical weapons capability, but General Dempsey has made it clear that that is possible to a significant degree only with the deployment of thousands of troops and hundreds of ships. Surely we have to be clear about what we anticipate will result from the use of Tomahawk missiles and such things before, not after, we embark on their use.
I am sorry, but I have used up my two interventions.
The Attorney-General’s view is that there is a legal basis for intervention without a Security Council resolution, which I believe poses more questions than answers. Since the present doctrine was introduced in 2005, there has been no precedent for such a thing, and in my view it has serious consequences. In effect, it means that the UN is now redundant and that the humanitarian doctrine has legs of its own and can be interpreted virtually any way the parties wish. When the dust has settled on this affair, I hope that the House and the United Nations will revisit the responsibility to protect, because at present it is not working as it was intended.
On the intelligence, those of us who were here in 2003, at the time of the Iraq war, felt they had their fingers burnt. The case for war was made and Parliament was briefed on the intelligence, but we were given only part of the story and, in some cases, an inaccurate story. A summary of the intelligence has been published, but it is the bare bones, and I urge the Government in the following days to consider how more intelligence can be provided. The picture is clear, as far as it goes, but it has no depth. I warmed to the suggestion from my hon. Friend Dr Lewis that the Intelligence and Security Committee could look at the JIC analysis, report to the House on the veracity of the intelligence and confirm that it agrees with the opinion in the JIC intelligence letter before us.
This is a difficult time. There are no easy options. We are between a rock and a hard place, but we have to decide, and I, for one, will be in the Government Lobby tonight.
I want to thank the Conservative Back Benchers, a number of Liberal Democrat Members, the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow Foreign Secretary for their intervention over the last 48 hours, which halted what looked like a headlong rush to war. It is widely acknowledged that the American President has set a timetable, most probably for an attack this weekend. He came under pressure last year from the Republicans and McCain to set red lines as parameters. It was inevitable that that would escalate the demand for military action at a later date. That might explain the American position, but it does not explain why a sovereign independent state called Great Britain should automatically fall into line in support of military action. If there is a lesson of the past 48 hours, it is that no Prime Minister and no Government should take this House or the British people for granted on matters of this nature.
The reality is that, yes, time has moved on since Iraq. People have made references to lessons from Iraq, and I want to refer to three. First, there is no automatic approval of, or even trust in, a prime ministerial judgment on an issue such as this involving the country in military action without overwhelming justification, evidence and thorough debate. The evidence before us from the JIC today says that there is “some evidence” to suggest regime culpability in the gas attack and that it is “highly likely” that the Syrian regime is responsible. I have to say that “highly likely” and “some evidence” are not good enough to risk further lives, to risk counter attack, to inflame the whole region, to risk dragging other states into this war and, at the same time, to increase the risk of terrorism on British streets.
The second lesson of Iraq is based upon the principles of humanitarian intervention. It must be objectively clear that there is no practical alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. I do not believe that it has been demonstrated that all practical alternatives have been exhausted. In particular, discussions around the permanent stationing of UN weapons inspectors in Syria to prevent the use of these weapons have not been exhausted. That, linked to an insistence on the participation of all sides in a UN peace conference, has not been exhausted.
That leads to my third lesson from Iraq, and from Afghanistan. It is to ensure that any intervention does not cost lives and does not make matters worse; it is the “do no harm” principle. No matter how surgical the strike that is planned by the
Americans or by us, lives will be lost and lives will be put at risk. A negotiated peace is the only long-term solution for Syria; that is what has been expressed by members of all parties in the House. Military intervention is more likely to undermine the potential for peace talks. Hawks within the Assad regime will be even more intransigent and defiant. The opposition—the so-called rebels—will have no incentive, because they will believe that the US and, yes, the UK and others will be on their side and that they can achieve a military victory. Military intervention would also alienate Iran and the Russians—the very people we look to now to bring Assad to the negotiating table.
If we have learned anything from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is this: military intervention does not just cost lives; it undermines the credibility of the international institutions that we look to to secure peace in the world and, in the long run, it undermines peace settlements across the globe. Therefore, I believe that we should focus on conflict prevention and conflict resolution and not support military aggression. That is why I will not support any motion that, in principle, supports military intervention in Syria, which can only do more harm than good.
In common, I suspect, with all Members, I find this an exceptionally difficult issue. My constituents hate the idea of our getting involved in Syria, and so do I. As I said earlier, I have not yet made up my mind which way to vote, but the Prime Minister’s flexibility over the past couple of days has been extremely helpful.
I should like to look first at the legality of our taking action. The conversations that have been had with the media over the past few days have talked about Syria not having impunity for the use of chemical weapons. The word “impunity” implies that there is a new doctrine of punishment as a reason for going to war—not deterrence, not self-defence, not protection, but punishment. I believe that, if that is a new doctrine, it needs considerably wider international consensus than currently exists.
I want to come to the Attorney-General’s advice. My right hon. and learned Friend is an exceptional lawyer, and therefore I have the temerity to question one aspect of what he says. The third of his conditions to be met for humanitarian action is that
“the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need”.
I believe that he needed to spell out an additional point that there must be a reasonable chance of success. Therefore, the legality of this action, in my view, depends entirely on the precise action proposed, and that we do not yet know. That is why the Prime Minister is absolutely right to say that we need to have a further vote in the House once it is clearer what action is proposed.
Is the right hon. Gentleman’s concern about a possible new doctrine of war as punishment informed by the fact that senior American political sources only last weekend talked in terms of retribution as the basis for taking action against Syria, and that was repeated by a Minister here as well? If the international community takes action on Syria on the basis of retribution as the defining motive, does that not send a very dangerous message and set a dubious standard for the wider middle east?
Well, possibly, although there is a question, if there is a new doctrine, about how far it extends. Why was it not used with Mugabe? Why was it not used with Pol Pot earlier? That is why I question the Attorney-General’s advice, with temerity and diffidence, as I say.
What are the objectives of any military strike? My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that the objective was to deter and degrade future chemical weapons use. As I understand it, a country that can make a non-stick frying pan can make chemical weapons. Personally, I have found it very difficult to find any country that can make a non-stick frying pan. Nevertheless, if Syria could simply recreate any weapons that we destroy, where would we have got by attacking the chemical weapons? What is the risk of collateral damage? What is the risk of hitting the chemical weapons that we are trying to prevent from being deployed? We need further information on that.
Next is the evidence. I am certainly in a minority in this country and probably in a minority in the House in saying that I personally believed Tony Blair when he said that he believed that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I am certainly in a minority in the country when I say that I still believe that he was telling the truth as he believed it to be, but I think that he exaggerated the influence of—[Interruption.] I know, I am naive and a silly young thing, but I still believe that he exaggerated the influence and importance of intelligence. I do not think that we have yet got to the bottom of the precise limitations of what intelligence can tell us.
During my time in this House, chemical weapons have been used against the Kurds; they were used in the Iran-Iraq war; and they were used against the people in Gaza, in the form of phosphorous bombs—certainly a chemical bomb. Is not the real reason we are here today not the horror at these weapons—if that horror exists—but as a result of the American President having foolishly drawn a red line, so that he is now in the position of either having to attack or face humiliation? Is that not why we are being drawn into war?
No, I do not think so. I think the real reason is that unless we do something—it must not be something stupid—Assad will use more chemical weapons time and again. I believe that in order to stop the use of chemical weapons from becoming the norm, the world needs to act. The world, however, does not equal the
United Kingdom. If the world wants us to act as the international policeman, let the world say so, because when we have done so in the past, the world has not tended to thank us.
It could be argued that it is only us who have the capability to act, but there is a paradox here. We are a country with the fourth largest defence budget in the world, yet attacks could still be made on this country using weapons against which we have no defence. Actually, that is true of every country in the world. We should take that concern into account when we decide how to vote. I believe that it would probably be helpful to support the Government tonight, but next week—or whenever the decision comes up—we will need to take that issue very clearly into account.
Looking at the Government motion taken in the round, it appears to me, despite the statement that it has been watered down, to be something of a paving motion for military action. It includes the words
“may, if necessary, require military action”; it refers to a
“legal basis for taking action”; and in the penultimate paragraph, it refers to “backing military action”. It also states that
“in spite of the difficulties at the United Nations…a United Nations process must be followed as far as possible to ensure the maximum legitimacy”.
The serious question is: why was a draft motion not presented to the United Nations before now; why the delay?
It is all very well referring to “difficulties”, but diplomacy has not failed utterly. It was, after all, the Russians who pressed the Syrian Government to allow the UN inspectors in on Monday. My party colleagues and I believe that any military action would prolong the conflict and lead to further bloodshed. We would call on the Government to use their influence and their relations with others to bring all the relevant parties around the table to conduct talks. The chief aim should, of course, be to prevent further loss of life.
There has been an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria for almost two years. The Government should put greater effort into ensuring a greater humanitarian response, gearing up the level of aid sent to the region. Previous military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and other recent examples show that the commitment of troops without an end plan costs a very high price—both in money and in lives lost, not to mention the physical and mental scars that individuals and communities at home and abroad must therefore bear. If the UK backs US Government military action or indeed participates in it, the conflict could well draw in Russia and Iran to back Assad’s regime, possibly making diplomatic talks more difficult, and certainly not easier, in the future.
In yesterday’s Guardian, Hans Blix wrote that even if Assad used chemical weapons, the west has no mandate to act as a global policeman, and that by ordering air strikes against Syria without a UN Security Council mandate, President Obama would
“be doing the same as Bush in 2003”.
In the right hon. Gentleman’s legal experience and opinion, at what point does destroying air defences and preventing a military capability start to become regime change, and would not that be illegal?
Clearly, regime change is unlawful in international law. Any incursion of that kind would have to take sides, so inevitably that will follow. The hon. Gentleman is right.
The timing of the decision must also be questioned. If, as some of us believe, the decision on military action has already been made in Washington and agreed by the UK Government, that is the real reason why we are here: because Washington feels that there should be some bombs falling this weekend. Many atrocities have taken place in the two years since the conflict began. Surely those seeking to take military action could wait a few days longer, to ensure that their facts are straight.
It is obvious that there is no threat to the security of the UK—that we know. The Government seek military action in order to deter and undermine chemical weapons. They may well seek that—that is fine, although military action must be sanctioned by law—but surely they should wait until the full conclusive proof is available, verified by the UN, having had the inspectors’ report. The basis of any decision on military action taken in that light, the Government’s own litmus test, should be undeniable. That is why I believe it is imperative that even within the Government’s own reasoning, they should heed the UN Secretary-General’s call for more time to establish whether chemical weapons were used and, if possible, where they emanated from.
There appear to be two conflicting objectives in what has been set out by the Prime Minister. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that on one hand it is about policing the use of chemical weapons, and on the other a humanitarian agenda is being set out, with legal reasons why a humanitarian intervention would be possible? The three conditions could have been met in Syria at any time for many months, however, and have been met in many other countries around the world where we have not intervened, so which is the real objective in taking us forward in this way?
That is a very good question. The abstract of the legal opinion presumes that there will be no progress via the UN, so it then goes into detail on humanitarian intervention. There are at least four flaws in that debate, but that is for another time, and no doubt we shall have that opportunity.
Even if nothing else is learned from Iraq—there are many lessons to be learned—the one lesson should surely be that weapons inspectors should be given time to carry out their work and report fully to the UN. The situation in Egypt is a timely reminder of western Governments’ fickle adherence to so-called universal principles: first supporting the movements rising against the Mubarak regime in favour of democracy, and then siding with the army when it carried out a coup and overthrew a democratically elected Government. Gaddafi was condemned for Lockerbie, then lauded for opposing al-Qaeda, then condemned again swiftly when the situation turned in Libya. In the recent past, Assad was lauded by the British Government. His actions now clearly are deplorable, as have been the actions of many other groups fighting in this conflict, which has descended into a bloody civil war.
The recent build-up of rhetoric regarding military action has been confusing. Last Friday, the United States and UK Governments were pressing for weapons inspectors to be allowed into Syria. On Monday the inspectors went in, albeit under difficult circumstances, but on Monday evening all indications were that the US and UK had made up their mind, and that a strike was indeed imminent. That may be why we are here today. On Tuesday the UK softened its stance, however, perhaps worried about the consequences of proceeding into conflict where there is very little public support for it—the legacy of Iraq looming large, as has been said.
Plaid Cymru will be voting against the Government motion and instead supporting the amendment tabled by the official Opposition, and if it is called, the amendment tabled by Caroline Lucas. The past decade has seen the UK embroiled in many bloody wars, paying a high price in treasury and blood, and failing to secure any peace. The middle east is in a very precarious state as we speak. We must learn well from those mistakes. I want to place it on the record that our support for the official Opposition’s amendment today does not in any way imply that we shall in any way vote for a military strike in due course, unless the evidence supports it.
As the Prime Minister pointed out, poison gas was extensively used in battle in the first world war. That led to a revulsion that was formulated by the 1925 Geneva gas protocol, which banned the use of poison gases but did not prevent a country from possessing a stockpile so that it could threaten retaliation if attacked by such gases. That protocol had nothing to do with the fact that poison gas was not used in the second world war—what prevented Hitler from using it was the threat of overwhelming retaliation. Indeed, sarin and tabun were nerve gases that Nazi scientists invented in the 1930s and 1940s. Hitler proposed to use tabun in 1943 but was deterred from doing so by the mistaken belief that the allies had discovered it too, although they had not. Similarly, Churchill thought of using poison gas against the V-weapons in 1944, and decided not to do so on military advice. The gas protocol had nothing to do with it.
If my hon. Friend is talking about Hitler’s use of gas on soldiers he should not forget that Hitler used poison gas on innocent civilians—6 million Jews to be precise.
I am delighted to have the extra minute, especially as that was the next point I was going to make, given that a large proportion of members of my family were among those victims who were gassed. Hitler used poison gas against those innocent victims because he did not give a fig for the gas protocol; he cared about whether or not people could hit back. Those victims could not hit back whereas the allies could, and that is why he did not use gas against them.
I do not want to divert too far into that, but it is important to understand the realities of what makes countries use poison gas and what deters them from using it. In my mind, the questions we must consider resolve themselves into two, rather than the four elegantly put forward by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. My two questions are: first, is it proven beyond reasonable doubt that Assad did it; and secondly, even if Assad or his regime did it, is a military strike sensible?
On the first question, the UN inspectors will not tell us anything about whether or not Assad did it, as I understand it. All they will do is tell us whether or not a sarin gas attack took place, so we cannot look to them to point the finger as to who did it. The Joint Intelligence Committee has been cited and we can all read the summary. That summary is not conclusive and in fact states that the JIC is baffled to find a motive for Assad having done this, as well it might be. If Assad did it—and perhaps he did—it was the height of irrationality for him to do the one thing that might get the west intervening against him.
There is a clear motive for Assad to have done this. He has used chemical weapons on five previous occasions, testing the west to see if it was going to respond. He has lost control of Aleppo airport, Homs is still under rebel control and rebels are fighting in the suburbs of Damascus. Assad is getting desperate and that is why he used chemical weapons. There is no question of any circumstantial evidence that points to anyone else.
I greatly respect my hon. Friend’s opinions on this and all other related matters, but nevertheless his point would make more sense if Assad were willing to acknowledge that he had been testing the water, rather than vehemently denying that he did it.
I will not give way as I am still answering the previous question. I think it just as likely that if the regime were responsible in some way, it might have been done by some part of the regime unauthorised by another part.
That leads me to the question of contradictory evidence, because from the leaked reports on the one hand we are getting stories that the attack was ordered by Assad’s brother in retaliation for a failed assassination attempt on the leadership, and on the other hand hearing that there is intercept evidence that somebody who was unauthorised was responsible and that there was a telephone conversation in which somebody said, “Why on earth did you do this?” and a panicked reaction to the unauthorised release of poison gas. The point is that it is very far from certain that the evidence stacks up. The Intelligence and Security Committee is cleared to see classified material well up to the level of the material that the JIC and the Prime Minister have seen. I see no reason why those of us who have been cleared for such access should not have it.
I shall now move on to the second question. Let us suppose that Assad did it. Is it then sensible to reply with military action? We have heard the arguments about red lines and the sacrosanct taboo that we must stand up for. If my hon. Friend Mr Jenkin is correct, however, and if the Assad Government did that irrational thing, it shows that they are behaving very irrationally indeed. One thing that bothers me greatly is that it is now being suggested—I say this as someone who is generally supportive of Israel—that Israeli intelligence might be the source of the evidence that the Assad Government did it. If Assad is behaving irrationally and if he is so desperate, what is to prevent him, if he is attacked militarily by us on the perceived basis of intelligence supplied by Israel, from retaliating with a chemical attack against Israel? What will Israel do? It will retaliate in turn. What will America, Iran and Russia do then?
I began my speech by referring to the first world war. Next year, we will commemorate the centenary of the events of August 1914. Those events have a worrying parallel. At that time, a series of actions and reactions drew in, in an escalating fashion, one country after another. Nobody thought that the assassination of an obscure archduke would lead to a world conflagration. As Admiral Lord West has said, this is a powder keg, and we should not be lobbing weapons into the heart of such combustible material.
Syria did not start having an evil regime last week or two years ago; it has had an evil regime for a generation. The murder of 10,000 people in Hama is evidence of that. The world did not criticise in any way whatever.
We are told that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, if proved, transforms the situation. It would certainly make the situation ghastly, disgusting and abominable. However, Syria is not the only country in the middle east to have used chemical weapons in warfare. Israel used white phosphorous in its attack in Gaza in Operation Cast Lead—I saw the consequences for myself when I went there—but Israel gets away with it because it is on the right side of what is regarded as civilised opinion.
There is selectivity right the way through. We are told that we are being bundled into this situation because of President Obama—the same President Obama who sends a stream of drones over Pakistan, violating its sovereignty and murdering its citizens. I have no time whatever for the Syrian regime, and I condemn the use of chemical weapons, but we are being selective. Reference has been made to Egypt, where two regimes have been overthrown in two years, without a whimper. In Libya, we were told we had to protect the citizens of Benghazi, and I voted in the House to do so. Western air forces—British and French—misused a UN resolution to achieve regime change, which was illegal, and resulted in the murder of Gaddafi, vile dictator though he was, whose corpse was dragged through the streets. I do not trust what is regarded as western opinion on the middle east and north Africa.
The motion states that the Government want a UN resolution
“to alleviate humanitarian suffering by deterring use of chemical weapons and does not sanction any action in Syria with wider objectives.”
Pull the other one: they do what they want and make all kinds of excuses to justify random, murderous activity that does not even cure the situation. I ask the Foreign Secretary, if he is to reply to the debate—
Ah, the Deputy Prime Minister is to reply. In that case, we are on a higher moral level.
If action is taken, what would the action be? What would its impact be? How many casualties, including among civilians, would it cause? Would Assad say, “Oh, dearie me, I must be a nice boy now”? Anyone who has been in Syria, as I was when I was shadow Foreign Secretary and was trying to liberate our hostages in Lebanon, knows that this is not a nice regime that will behave as we want. The Foreign Secretary said he wanted to punish Assad, but an Assad punished would be worse than an Assad as he is now. I will vote against the motion and against military action.
When the Prime Minister wanted to take military action in Libya, most of us supported him because there was a clear moral imperative: if we had not acted tens of thousands of lives would quickly have been lost. That clear moral imperative does not stand in the action we are countenancing.
There is no doubt that the Assad regime is evil, but that is not our casus belli: our casus belli is the monstrous crime of killing hundreds, perhaps more, of civilians with nerve gas. The use of chemical weapons is not the first monstrous crime of this regime: at least 100,000 people have been killed in the civil war, most of whom were civilians. Death by dismemberment, burning, being crushed under falling buildings, gangrene or all the other outcomes of the use of conventional weapons is no better than death by nerve gas—these are monstrosities, however they are delivered. In moral, as against legal, terms many people will rightly, as they have in this debate, ask: why intervene now?
To press their case, the Government and American Government, now supported by the JIC, have asserted, in effect, that the gassing of a large number of Syrian civilians could have been carried out only by the Assad regime. Perhaps. There are three possibilities. The first, and probably the most likely, is that nerve gas was deployed by Assad, but even the JIC says that this is an irrational and incomprehensible act. My hon. Friend Dr Lewis pinned that perfectly. Another possibility is that it could have been done by a rogue or panicky military unit in the Syrian army without Assad’s knowledge—that may be the most likely explanation—or it could have been done by the Syrian rebels with the direct aim of dragging the west into the war. These are the only people who have a clear motive that fits the crime. The JIC discounted that last possibility, but there are many reasons for us to worry about this concern. We do not want to be conned into a war, in effect, by actions designed to do just that.
There are plenty of facts around, or at least reported facts. It is reported that the UN representative for human rights for Syria thought there was concrete evidence of rebels having sarin gas. There were reports that the Turkish authorities arrested 12 al- Nusra fighters with 2 kg of sarin gas, and other reports that Hezbollah fighters are in Beirut hospitals suffering from the effects of sarin gas.
A number of people, most notably my hon. Friend Richard Ottaway, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, have said that we must have clear evidence to show the House that, if there is a casus belli, it is real, not confected or constructed. That may mean more aggressive disclosure of intelligence than we would normally have. Given where we have been before in this House, we must consider that our intelligence as it stands might just be wrong. It was before, and we must test it rigorously.
It is impossible to imagine how the rebels would have the capacity to shell a single location from seven different locations, which is what occurred on that occasion. Do we honestly think our own security services have not learned the lesson from Iraq or that they are not extremely cautious about the advice they make public on which decisions are going to be made? Should we not have faith in these devoted and courageous public servants, instead of joining the post-Iraq panic that is paralysing this country?
If I had 10 minutes to take my hon. Friend through the forensics, I probably could. There is plenty of forensic evidence that will come out of the UN investigation and out of other data that we can obtain by other methods. It is not a question of panic; it is a question of getting the facts right before we act. It is very simple: when we are going to do things which will lead to the death of people, civilians in particular, we should get our facts right first.
That brings me to the Deputy Prime Minister on the “Today” programme this morning, talking about chemical weapons and saying—let me quote him exactly—that it is
“the first time in close to a century” that we have seen—in Syria, he means—
“the ever more frequent use of chemical weapons.”
I recommend that he speaks to our American allies. The CIA has recently declassified and published its information on Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, in which the west provided intelligence data in order for the Iraqis to be able to target their activities more effectively, killing 50,000 Iranians. How will our stance now be seen on the Iranian street? What will the pressures be on the Iranian Government when we make our holier-than-thou arguments about chemical warfare now?
I do not have time to conclude the arguments that I want to put. I will make one last point. Putin has said that the reason he provided anti-aircraft missiles to the Syrians was, in his words, to balance the war and prevent external intervention. What will his response be if we attack Syria? His response will be to feed this war more weapons, more deaths—
Thank God for the erudition and historical memory of the last three speakers; those qualities were almost entirely absent from the Prime Minister’s initial address. He was clearly making a speech that was not the one he intended to make here this afternoon. Otherwise, Mr Speaker, he would not have persuaded you to recall the House of Commons, at vast public expense, to decide that we were actually going to decide on this matter next week or the week after, when we shall be back here in any case. It is absolutely evident that, if it were not for the democratic revolt that has been under way in this House and outside among the wider public against this war, the engines in Cyprus would now be revving and the cruise missiles would be ready to fly this very weekend. Any attempt by the Prime Minister to pretend that he had intended to take this course of action all along is just bunkum.
The unease on both sides of the House, demonstrated in two exceptional speeches by the last speaker and Dr Lewis, reflects the feelings of the people of this country. According to The Daily Telegraph this morning, only 11% of the public support Britain becoming involved in a war in Syria. Can any British Government have ever imagined sending their men and women to war with the support of only 11% of the public?
There is no compelling evidence—to use the Leader of the Opposition’s words—that the Assad regime is responsible for this crime, yet. It is not that the regime is not bad enough to do it; everybody knows that it is bad enough to do it. The question is: is it mad enough to do it? Is it mad enough to launch a chemical weapons attack in Damascus on the very day on which a United Nations chemical weapons inspection team arrives there? That must be a new definition of madness. Of course, if Assad is that mad, how mad will he be once we have launched a blizzard of Tomahawk cruise missiles on his country?
As I heard those on the Front Benches describe how bad Assad was, I wondered just why the former Prime Minister forced Her Majesty to billet him in her guest room at Buckingham Palace just a few years ago, and why a former Prime Minister recommended him for an honour. I remembered how he was hailed from all corners as a moderniser. The narrative has now changed, of course, because this Government are intent on regime change in Damascus.
That brings me to the only other point I am going to be able to make in the time available. The reason for the unease is that people can see the character of the Syrian opposition. They have seen the horrific videos that we have heard about. Take a look at the video of one of the commanders of the Syrian revolution cutting open the chest of a human being and eating his heart and liver. He videotaped himself doing it and put it up on YouTube because he thought that it might be considered attractive. Take a look at the videos of Christian priests having their heads sawn off—not chopped off; sawn off—with breadknives. Even a bishop in the Christian Church was murdered by these people. Every religious minority in Syria—there are 23 of them—is petrified at the thought of a victory for the Syrian rebels, whom the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have been doing their utmost to supply with weapons and money over the last two years. They cannot deny that. They say that this is now about this new crime, whoever committed it, but it has been the Government’s policy for two years to bring about the defeat of the regime in Damascus and a victory for the kind of people who are responsible for these crimes.
I have 20 seconds left—
If only for another 60 seconds. The hon. Gentleman made reference to arms supplied to Syria, but let us remember where those arms have come from over decades, from this country.
I now have 60 seconds at my disposal, so let me make this point more clearly. When did the 2.5 billion people of Russia and China cease to be members of the international community? Who are you on the other side to decide what the international community should do, if you are unable to persuade the Security Council to go along with your point of view? Who are you to decide that you will launch a war in any case?
I keep hearing about the unreasonable use of the veto. I have heard that many times in this House over the past few years. The United States has vetoed every attempt to obtain justice for the Palestinian people and to punish and issue retribution for international lawbreaking on the part of Israel, and nobody in this House has said one word about it.
Mr Speaker, I think you will be very interested to know that several constituents have e-mailed me about comments made by the hon. Gentleman on Iran’s Press TV. One constituent claims that he said that Israel supplied the chemical for the attacks in Syria. I find it very hard to believe that the hon. Gentleman said that. Would he like to take this opportunity to refute that claim or to provide the evidence to satisfy my constituent?
That just shows the unreliability of green-ink letters, whether they come in the post or by e-mail. I said no such thing.
But the Syrian rebels definitely had sarin gas, because they were caught with it by the Turkish Government, as the last speaker, the former Government Minister said—I hope he will forgive me because I have forgotten his constituency. [Interruption.] No, I know my constituency. It is where I gave you such a bloody good hiding just over a year ago.
The Syrian rebels have plenty of access to sarin. It is not rocket science. A group of Shinto obscurantists in Japan living on Mount Fuji poisoned the Tokyo underground with sarin gas less than 20 years ago. One does not have to be Einstein to have one’s hands on sarin gas or the means to distribute it.
Russia and China say no to war; so do I and most people in this country.
One does not have to follow the oratory of George Galloway to realise that the spectre of the debate on Iraq in 2003 hangs over this debate. I sat undecided in the gangway listening with care to the then Prime Minister and marched resolutely into the Lobby behind him—a decision which I regret and which split my constituents and the Mitchell family. That debate did huge damage to the noble cause of liberal interventionism.
My first piece of strong advice to the Government is therefore to publish in full the evidence, of which there will be plenty more in the days to come, that has led them to conclude that the use of chemical weapons is unequivocally the work of Assad. My right hon. Friend Mr Davis made the point that there is doubt about the evidence. There will be the opportunity in the days to come to help to clear up that doubt. It is hugely in the interests of the agencies and the intelligence community to do so.
There are allegations in the press today about US intercepts of communications between members of the regime. As much of that evidence as possible should be exposed to give our constituents confidence in the Government’s position. It seems clear to me that the awful events that took place in Ghutah on the night of
Secondly, I do not believe that there is any military solution to the wider situation in Syria. There needs to be a far greater effort to force the parties into a negotiating structure. Above all, that means that there must be much greater engagement by Russia and the United States. I understand the reticence of the United States in such matters, but it has been very late to give this crisis its full attention. Secretary Kerry’s recent involvement in the middle east is much to be welcomed. The UK’s less chilly relationship with Putin and Russia can help. The situation is made worse by the lack of international reaction to the earlier chemical attacks in June. At some point this logjam at the United Nations will be broken, and every sinew must be stretched to achieve that. Britain’s immensely strong and effective diplomatic abilities give us a hugely important part to play in that around the world.
Am I right in believing that, whether or not there is a Security Council resolution, it is still legally possible for the whole of the General Assembly to pass a resolution in considering the matter?
I cannot give my hon. Friend a direct answer, but I refer him to the Attorney-General’s legal advice, which I think makes it clear that that is the case.
My third point is that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will recall from our earliest discussions on Syria in the National Security Council that I have been at the hawkish end of the argument about what to do. That is because, as International Development Secretary, I saw the mounting humanitarian catastrophe developing in the early days. I visited the Zaatari camp on the
Jordanian-Syrian border when it was in its infancy, and women and children who entered it were shot at by the Syrian army as they went over the border. That camp has been strongly supported and funded by Britain and is now, in effect, the fourth biggest city in Jordan. There are now more than 2 million refugees. This is the largest movement of civilians across borders since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Appalling pressure is being exerted on the Governments and people of Jordan and the Lebanon, and more than 100,000 people have been killed, as has been mentioned.
My right hon. Friend was an extremely good International Development Secretary. This is the largest humanitarian crisis of the 21st century and it is taking place not only in Syria, but in the countries surrounding it. One in five people in Lebanon is a refugee, and 45,000 people are trying to cross the border into Iraq. Is my right hon. Friend aware of the views of the non-governmental organisations on the ground, such as Christian Aid and its partners, which believe that an attack of any kind on Syria could exacerbate the situation further?
The views of the NGOs on this matter are mixed, but what is clear is that part of the contribution that Britain can make—and other countries more so—to the humanitarian situation is to fund the NGOs and agencies that are working cross-border. Virtually all the aid currently goes through Damascus. Very little aid goes cross-border into the rebel-held territory, which means that, in effect, the international community is preventing the areas controlled by the regime from starving, but starving the areas held by the rebels.
I am afraid I have had my injury time.
I agree with my hon. Friend Tim Farron, but this is a complex situation and the NGOs on the ground disagree on the matter. Even at this late stage, we must continue to demand unfettered access for those brilliant people in the humanitarian and relief community who are risking their lives daily and to whom my hon. Friend has referred.
Finally, we come to the present situation. Chemical weapons have been used. War crimes have been committed. A violation of international law has taken place. This is a regime which stoops to gas its own people. It is hard to think of a situation which more rightly triggers the Responsibility to Protect that has been referred to this afternoon. In my view, failure by the international community to act would be far more dangerous than taking evidence-based, proportionate and legal military action as a clear lesson to human rights abusers and dictators who murder and terrorise innocent civilian populations.
I rise to agree with many of those present and to say that, in my opinion, we are all united in our disbelief and deep sense of grief and revulsion at the tragedy that is unfolding in Syria. All of us in this House know that this conflict has gone on in its current phase for two years and has ripped the heart out of that country and its long-suffering people. However, my colleagues in the Social Democratic and Labour party and I are gravely concerned about any prospect of military action, the bombing—whether it be selective or non-selective—of Syria and the haste with which this course appears to have been embarked on.
Our objections are based primarily on simple, straightforward moral and ethical grounds. Beyond those ethical grounds, however, are the significant practical considerations and consequences. On a practical level, we believe that any military activity will be counter-productive and will not save lives but in fact cost them. As was said earlier, it is no more pleasant for a person to be killed by a cruise missile than by gas—they are still dead. Our objective should be to be humanitarian and protect lives.
Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern, and that of many Members, about the Christian minority of some half a million, who have been displaced, murdered and ethnically cleansed? Any attack upon Syria, whatever it may be, could have repercussions for the Christian minority, who are concerned about what would happen given the example of Iraq, where there were 1.3 million Christians before the war and only 300,000 afterwards.
I share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, which dovetail with my point that whatever the British Government do, they should ensure that their actions do not make the situation worse or lead directly or indirectly to their excusing or justifying more deaths among those active in the conflict in Syria.
I urge the Prime Minister to pause and resist the temptation to launch a war just because there are pressures coming from some sources or because he feels it is the only option. The opinion poll showing that only 11% of the people feel favourably disposed to the concept has already been referred to, and that means that 89% are hostile to it.
I wish also to pose the question of how the sight of a British and US-led attack is likely to be perceived across the middle east, not just in Syria, especially if it is carried out without credible UN backing or on the basis of uncertain or confused intelligence. That would risk handing the Syrian regime a major propaganda victory at a pivotal point, which its supporters could rally around. The impact on the wider region is even more uncertain and potentially volatile. Even if such action could ever be morally justified, which I and my colleagues do not accept, there surely needs to be a serious prospect of an endgame that has an outcome of success and of benefit in some shape or form.
Does the hon. Gentleman fear, as I do, that if the Prime Minister were to win the vote on his motion tonight, it would embolden him for future adventures? As the hon. Gentleman said, it is clear that the public, and I think majority opinion across the world, are against adding any more to the powder keg in Syria that was referred to earlier.
My view, which I do not think is far removed from that of other Members, is that mission creep is inevitable in any such situation. Whatever justification is put forward today, the mission would creep and change in the light of changing circumstances next week and next month. As such, it would lead to all sorts of consequences that we have not perceived at this point.
To put it more precisely, I do not think anybody in this country, in Europe or around the world wants to see another Afghanistan or Iraq. I have heard little here today to convince me of the merit of any proposed military action. We have been given no clear indication of what success might look like or how it would be measured. We are told that this action might persuade Assad to consider not using chemical weapons in the future, but I have little faith that such a course of action will not make his position better rather than worse. There is a clear risk that even more lives will be lost and even more harm done than we are trying to prevent. I can only see that cruise missile attacks will take lives—hundreds, if not thousands, of lives—of combatants and civilians alike. There is little evidence that any lives would be saved in the long run.
I can only refer the hon. Gentleman to Iraq and its consequences. We have all been left scarred by Iraq.
Many in this House and in Government will have convinced themselves of the courses of action that should be taken, but they have not convinced the public. I think the public know better. The public have long and bitter memories of Iraq and Afghanistan. All the promises and assurances issued then were not worth the paper they were written on. The public remember the contrived situation, the misleading of this House and the needless deaths of so many soldiers and countless civilians. While I would find it difficult, if not impossible, ever to tolerate or support military intervention, I believe that this House should contemplate such action against Syria only if it were UN approved and if we were convinced that it would improve the situation.
We make no more important decision in this House than to give permission to our armed forces to unleash some of their formidable arsenal. We should only do so if we feel there is democratic consent for the aim and the purpose of the conflict, and we should do so only if it is legal so to do. In my adult lifetime in politics I think that we, as a country, have intervened too often. We have too often asked our armed forces to do things that armed forces alone cannot do. I am not against all intervention. Of course, when we had to liberate Kuwait or the Falkland Islands, they were noble aims. Our armed forces performed with great skill and bravery, and the British public were behind them. We must be very careful, however, not to inject them into a civil war where we do not know the languages, where we have uncertain sympathy for the cultures and the conflicting groups involved, and where the answer in the end has to be a political process in the country itself and not external force.
I therefore welcome strongly the three things the Government have set out. I welcome this debate and the fact that we will do things democratically. It is our job to speak for our constituents and, if there is to be military activity, to ensure that the British public will it—they certainly do not at the moment. I welcome very much the Government’s statement that we will not arm the rebels. That is huge progress and I support that fully.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that what we would like to hear from the Deputy Prime Minister when he sums up later is a clear statement that the Government believe that in all future cases military action—immediate external assault—will not be entered into unless this House has given its say-so first?
Of course I agree with that. Any sensible Government would do that, because what Government can commit our armed forces without the implicit or actual support of the House of Commons? That can be tested at any time, so no Government would be so foolish as to try and proceed without it.
Will my right hon. Friend just go a bit further and agree that anybody going through the Government Lobby tonight is not giving their approval for direct military intervention on behalf of the UK, and that the Deputy Prime Minister should make that very, very clear in his summing up tonight? There will be another vote.
I leave the Deputy Prime Minister to speak for himself and the Government.
The third thing I welcome is that the Government are not trying to influence the conflict. That is an important new development, although I am not sure how it marries with possible military intervention. If military intervention is planned, I presume that it will be against Assad and his forces and that, of course, would have some impact on the conflict. That impact might be in the direction that the Government and others wish to go, but they need to accept that there is a possible contradiction or ambiguity between their wish not to have an impact on the balance of forces in Syria and their wish to intervene over the issue of chemical weapons.
Everyone in the House shares the Government’s horror at the use of chemical weapons and the brutality shown, perhaps by the regime. It is quite possible that the regime used them. I agree with right hon. and hon. Members from both sides who have pointed out that there have also been atrocities and horrors enough without chemical weapons—those should also shock our consciences and worry our emotions, and they do.
Given the understandable wish to respond to the use of horror weapons, we need to ask whether the Government could undertake, or assist others to undertake, a military intervention that would fulfil the purpose. That should be the only question. Of course I understand that the Government cannot come to the House and debate a series of targets with us in advance—that would be folly. However, I hope that the House can help steer Ministers to ask the right questions of their advisers about whether there is any type of military intervention that could make the position better rather than worse.
The military experts to whom I have talked say that the last thing we want to do is shower down bombs or cruise missiles on stocks of chemical weapons; that would degrade them, but could let them out as well. It would be a dreadful tragedy if, in an attempt to stop, by destruction, the use of chemical weapons, we infected people in the surrounding areas. That does not sound like a good idea. Bombing the factories might have a similar consequence, although perhaps the risk would not be as great as bombing the stocks of chemical weapons.
Is the idea to bomb the soldiers and their commanders who might use the weapons? That could be a way. However, we would have to ask the Government how many soldiers and officers we would need to kill to guarantee more or less that Assad would not use the weapons again. I fear that the answer might be very many, given that we are dealing with someone as mad and bad as Assad. Would we want to go that far? Are we sure that it would work?
Is the idea to bomb a load of buildings, preferably when people were not in them, so that we destroyed the command headquarters or military installations? That would be possible; western forces have done such things in other situations, normally as preparation for invasion. Again, however, how many would we need to bomb to make sure that Assad never used chemical weapons again?
I hope that the Government will think very carefully about the issues. If they wish to persuade the British people, who are mightily sceptical about our ability to find the right military response to stop Assad and his horrors, they need to come up with some answers privately and find the language to explain to Members, and the public we represent, why they have every confidence that we can achieve the noble aim of stopping Assad from using chemical weapons.
I wish the Government well. If they really can come up with a way of stopping Assad murdering his own people, nobody will be happier than me. Everyone in the House would be extremely happy. But the Government have to understand the scepticism of the British people. Assad is mad and bad and it will not be easy to stop him. I fear that we will not be able to do it in a half-hearted manner with a few cruise missiles in the hope that he will not retaliate.
On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Reports are circulating that No. 10 has indicated that it cannot rule out a recall of Parliament again on Saturday or Sunday to debate this matter further. Have you received any information from the Government in relation to any such request? It would have implications for this evening’s debate.
The short answer to the hon. Gentleman is no; the first I have heard of that has been from his lips. We shall leave the matter there for now. He has put his point on the record.
Later this evening, the House will divide over whether in principle this country should undertake military action in Syria. We will perhaps do justice to the suffering of the Syrian people if we first determine where, as a Parliament, we are at one.
I have no doubt that we are all united in complete condemnation of the deplorable chemical attacks on civilians in Damascus. The gut-wrenching images of those attacks are etched on all our minds as we sit here tonight. All of us seek an outcome that will bring peace and stability to the region. That much we can agree. It is also the case that this motion is less damaging than the one we were originally led to believe we would be debating. That is a tribute to the fact that Back-Bench and Opposition MPs can make a difference. To that extent, this is a good day for Parliament and for public pressure. It is clear to me that those things have helped to force the Government to think twice about their way forward on Syria.
I welcome the fact that this motion recognises that to have proceeded with a military attack as the UN weapons inspectors were still visiting the sites of the alleged chemical weapons assault would have been preposterous. It beggared belief that, once again, we could have been about to embark on military engagement, without apparently having learned any of the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. By seeking to pre-empt the outcome of the inspectors’ work, we would also have increased the likelihood that further requests for access by weapons inspectors would be denied; they would be regarded simply as a ploy for subsequent military action, regardless of the findings. As Hans Blix pointed out earlier this week:
“If the aim is to stop the breach of international law and to keep the lid on others with chemical weapons, military action without first waiting for the UN inspector report is not the way to go about it.”
Although I am pleased that the Government’s motion now accepts that we must wait for the inspectors’ reports, I am deeply concerned at their cavalier treatment of international law and I completely reject their drive towards military action. On the legal question, both the US and our Government are indicating that they are prepared to act against Syria without a UN mandate. For all that the Government’s motion talks of making “every effort” to ensure a Security Council resolution, the bottom line appears to be that they are happy to proceed without one.
We are told that intervention could be legally justified without a Security Council resolution under the UN’s responsibility to protect, but the 2005 UN world summit outcome document, in which the Heads of State unanimously approved the new international norm of the responsibility to protect, subsequently approved by UN Security Council resolution 1674, states clearly that it is still subject to UN Security Council agreement. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who co-chaired a working group on the responsibility to protect, again stressed that it is to be implemented in accordance with the UN charter. That means that the central decision-making authority is the UN Security Council. The conclusion from all this is clearly, if inconveniently for the Government, that military action against a sovereign state, other than in self-defence, without the authority of the Security Council cannot be justified under the responsibility to protect. On that issue the Labour amendment is also, unfortunately, very weak; it regards international law as an inconvenience. That makes it all the more important that our deliberations today are informed by all the relevant information and based on sound legal grounding.
Does the hon. Lady agree that the Government’s position would be far stronger if instead of coming here proposing military action, they had come here to tell us that they were having serious discussions with the new Government in Iran and a new round of talks with Russia, and that they were trying to build a consensus in the region to bring about what must happen at some point—a political solution to this crisis?
I could not agree more with the hon. Gentleman. As he rightly highlights, we have an opportunity now with the new regime in Iran and we should be responding to a more moderate leader there, yet by going ahead and giving a signal that military action is the direction in which we are heading, we absolutely undermine the authority of that new leader in Iran.
I was making the case that we should have seen the Attorney-General’s full legal opinion and that this one-and-a-half-side summary is simply unacceptable. While I am on the subject of further pieces of information that could have usefully informed this debate, I wish to refer hon. Members again to the Chilcot report—that missing report which has gone absent without leave. It is unacceptable that, yet again, many people are talking about the importance of the legacy of Iraq and we do not have that document, which would have given us the lessons to be learnt.
The hon. Lady seems to be making a reasonably powerful case against any use of military force whatsoever. Faced with one motion that does not rule it in and a Labour motion that does not rule it out, is not the logic for all those who have spoken against military action today, including those on the Labour Benches, to vote against them both?
The hon. Gentleman’s point is, unfortunately, a very strong one—[Interruption.] He knows what I mean.
I remain to be convinced that a military attack would deter, rather than escalate, conflict in the region, which is why I agree with what Martin Horwood just said. I have yet to hear what the strategy would be for Syria and the wider region in the event of an attack. I listened carefully to the Deputy Prime Minister on the radio this morning. It was put to him that Assad could well retaliate against an attack, but when he was asked what we would do in the face of such an escalation, answer came there none. I remain concerned as well about the impact of flouting international law. To intervene without the due resolution would send a message to everyone else that international law can be ignored when it is inconvenient.
As the law of the jungle takes hold, it will be increasingly difficult to condemn similar actions by others. I am increasingly convinced, therefore, that only a political and diplomatic solution will solve the war raging in
Syria and by extension hold its spread beyond the region. That is why I will not support the Government’s motion and why I tabled my own amendment setting out that the case for military action had not been made. I am sorry that we will not have an opportunity to put that amendment to the vote, because it would have addressed the issue raised by the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Had it been accepted, we would have had a genuine choice tonight.
We need to strain every sinew to get all relevant parties around the table for peace talks. On so many levels, as others have said, this is a proxy war, which is why we need China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and many others involved as well. We also absolutely need to redouble our efforts to support refugees. We are hearing from many of the development agencies, including Oxfam, that the situation facing those refugees, both in Syria and the wider region, is appalling. More than 8 million people are now in desperate need of supplies. That is why people who say, “If we don’t have military action, it is equivalent to doing nothing”, are so misguided. There is much we can do on refugees and a political solution.
In this kind of debate, there comes a point when people say, “Everything’s been said, but not everybody’s said it”, but I hope that all of us who speak in the second half of the debate will help to reinforce the key arguments and still manage to draw out some particular aspects that have not yet been addressed.
Had we been debating the motion we expected earlier in the week, I would not have been able to support it. I still have grave reservations, however, and if I support the Government tonight, that will not give them any right to expect me to support them in a subsequent vote. It is important that that is understood. As is agreed on both sides of the House, that does not mean that there is not a case to be made; at the moment, however, it has not yet been made.
I understand the passion expressed, people’s abhorrence and the desire that something be done, but it is very dangerous if we do not decide that that something will work rather than make the situation worse. My concern is that we do not know what the response will be. The argument is that there would be a highly forensic, targeted attack to eliminate the regime’s capability to continue with such acts. Apart from the fact that we cannot ensure that there will not be collateral damage, there is the added problem that if it does not take out the regime, the regime and its allies will still have some capacity to act and might act in ways that escalate the situation.
Speaking as Chairman of the International Development Committee, which is responsible for holding to account the Government’s aid programme, I welcome the contribution from the former Secretary of State, Mr Mitchell, who addressed with deep knowledge and passion the commitment we are making. Of course the United Kingdom should be using humanitarian assistance to help the people distressed in this conflict, but so far £345 million of our aid programme has been diverted to supporting refugees in this conflict zone, an area of the world where we would otherwise not be spending any of our aid money, because it is not a poor region. By definition, that money has been taken away from poor people in Africa and south Asia because of a conflict. We must not do anything that makes that conflict worse and results in even more displaced persons and refugees, whom we will inevitably want to help.
I think it is a matter of judgment. I am giving my judgment and the Prime Minister has given his.
The point that the motion and the amendment have in common—that is the result of the progress made in the past few days—is that we should allow the UN process to continue to the point where, we hope, it can be a determinant, and that this House will have an opportunity to decide before any military action takes place. Those are two important facts, which I would not want to vote against. If neither the motion nor the amendment is carried, the Government presumably could say that they had a mandate to do something immediately. We have to be careful what we vote out, as well as what we vote in.
My right hon. Friend expressed earlier his concerns about the case for military intervention not having been made, and those concerns will be shared by many people across the House, but has he recognised that the motion is in fact not about military intervention? It simply does not rule it out, which is why the amendment tabled by Caroline Lucas, which said that the case has not yet been established, was irrelevant. That is the case that would have to be made for any future motion. Does my right hon. Friend agree?
I accept that, and I think I have made clear that what I want to see is how this action will take place in a way that will not make the situation worse. If I do not hear that, I will find it impossible to support that proposition. That is why I am grateful that we are being given time.
The truth is that we are being asked to make a decision because the American Government have made a decision on the basis of a red line that President Obama set. I am not sure whether, when he set that red line, he was naive in the assumption that it would not be stepped across or whether it was a challenge. Certainly it has reached a point where he feels bound to respond and is looking to his allies to support him. I do not think that we should be discourteous or unreasonable as allies, but we are entitled to consider our own interests.
On the point of the UN process and the point at which it would be legitimate to take action even without the UN, we must understand that Russia has a very direct interest that it is promoting. It has the capacity, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to use its veto. I do not believe that Russia should be entitled to say “That is the end of the matter” and that no action can be taken regardless of how the situation escalates. Clearly there has to be a legal framework that does not paralyse the UN because one member takes the view that its interests will not allow it to support what the rest of the international community wants. That is why the proposal that perhaps a General Assembly resolution might be part and parcel of the process is important.
That leads me to the conclusion that we need to determine the British position—not just how much we would like to support our allies, of which generally I am in favour, but the extent to which our involvement matters and our position in the world is enhanced, and on the bases that we will have improved rather than deteriorated a situation and that the British people will understand what we are doing. At this moment, I do not think any of those points has been answered satisfactorily.
I suspect that action is likely to take place in the next few days. I wonder whether my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister will be able to explain to us what will be the position of the British Government if action takes place before the House meets again, whether there is any likelihood of the House having to meet sooner than Monday and, indeed, if we would be asked to sanction a specific programme. The Government need to be able to make it clear what action is being taken, why they believe it will be effective and why they do not think it will make the situation worse. It will be only on that basis that I can be persuaded to support a second motion.
It is a pleasure to follow Sir Malcolm Bruce and I agree with a number of things he said. I also very much welcome the change of heart of the Government, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in not calling us here today to vote for immediate action against Syria. I would ask the Deputy Prime Minister, who is in conversation at the moment, to answer this simple question: why are we here today? Why could this not have waited for a few days?
With reference to the earlier point of order that Parliament could be recalled on Saturday, does the hon. Gentleman agree that to recall Parliament before Monday would be absolutely farcical?
It would be farcical, and folly. I think it is folly that we are here today, to be honest.
The Foreign Secretary, whom I admire as an individual, has been out of sync with many of my constituents and the British public in the way he has dealt with events in the past few days. I join my hon. Friend John McDonnell in praising Government Back Benchers, the Leader of the Opposition, the shadow Foreign Secretary and others for putting pressure on the Prime Minister and No. 10 to change their minds and to allow us to have two votes and to listen to the UN. I believe that that is what the British public want. They want us to have a rational debate, to look at all the issues and to come to the right conclusion.
I feel that what has happened has slightly tainted the Government on this occasion and that our international reputation has been slightly damaged.
I agree that the Government have made a tactical change from calling the House to debate a motion that would have supported military action, but the fact that we are called here to debate a motion that includes the option of military action surely places us on the first step of a slippery slope that leads to a new mood and a climate in which that becomes acceptable.
I believe that it is an escalator and that this could be the first, very dangerous, step.
I praise the Leader of the Opposition and others for getting, at least, a breathing space to allow us to take a step backwards. Using the UN is the right way forward. The UN is not a perfect organisation but it has greater legitimacy than the United States, the United Kingdom and other nations acting alone. That is important.
I have been consistent on this point since I have been in the House. I voted against my own party and against the Government on Iraq, because I did not think that it had the legitimacy of the UN and the international community. I voted with the Prime Minister and the coalition Government on Libya, as the operation had greater legitimacy because of the UN support. We saw clearly that Benghazi would have been invaded and that there would have been thousands and thousands of deaths. That was the right action to take.
I strongly agree with General Lord Dannatt, who is reported as saying that if the international community were of one voice on this matter, the case would be compelling. At the moment, it is not. There is a lot of work to be done. There is a real danger that a divided international community, as many others have said, would lead to a proxy war by some of today’s superpowers, using Syria to unleash greater dangers than we are seeing internally in that country. Let us be clear: what has happened in Syria is abhorrent. There are no ifs and buts about that, but we have to be careful to ensure that we do not make the problem worse in that country, that region and the whole world.
On the UN inspectors and chemical weapons, let us not forget that these inspectors were called in before the most recent atrocity. They were investigating alleged gas attacks—we have heard different numbers today—and they were aided to get into Syria by Russia. We should be putting more pressure on Russia in future, at the G20 and other meetings, to get the Russians to help us to resolve the crisis in Syria. The UN inspectors had a few days to do their work, and yet action has been proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom and others that will hamper their work if it goes ahead.
Let us not forget that we have been here before with the Iraq debacle and whether the international inspectors could carry on their work. The reality here is that, if we were to unleash a strike on Syria, it would not just hamper Syria, but put at stake the UN’s credibility. So I hope that issues become clearer over the next few days and months. In the words of Ban Ki-moon, we must give the UN inspectors and peace a chance. There are other routes that we could be going down now. The humanitarian route is an obvious one. Why are we not talking about creating humanitarian corridors in Syria, protecting the people there and getting in the UN inspectors to make it clear what has happened and how we can help those people who are suffering by civil war?
A UN peacekeeping force could be used. There are many ways to do that, but I would rather see that alleviate people’s suffering than bombing from Cyprus and ships. Yes, we must consider helping people on the ground, but military action should not be our first option—it should be the last—and humanitarian corridors could work if we had the will of the Security Council and the United Nations working together, rather than polarising them, which is what we are doing by threatening military strikes now.
We need a rationale; we need an international solution; and we need to listen to our constituents. Overwhelmingly, the people of Britain are telling us no to immediate action and no to strikes. We should listen to them. The country was divided over Iraq. On this issue, it is united in saying no to military action now. Let us get the humanitarian effort under way.
I am extremely reluctant to endorse military action in Syria. My reluctance does not spring from any doubts about the facts of the use of chemical weapons by Assad’s forces. Those who suggest that the atrocity of
Nor does my reluctance spring from doubts about the legality of action to deter or prevent the further use of chemical weapons, even without a UN resolution, but I am puzzled why the United States, the United Kingdom and France stepped forward with alacrity to take on this unpopular task. France, from which I have just returned, is the country whose willingness to do so can most easily be explained. The decline in President Hollande’s support was checked only by his successful intervention in Mali, with boots on the ground. More importantly, France has always believed that it has a special involvement in Syria. However, President Hollande, and indeed anyone else who is thinking of serious involvement on the ground in Syria, should read a report of the last time that France was involved in Syria, written by President Hollande’s predecessor, de Gaulle, when he was still a commandant in 1931, describing how it took six years and nearly 10,000 French dead to restore peace in Syria after the first world war. We all do well to remember just how difficult that country is to pacify.
The involvement of the United States and the United Kingdom is much more puzzling. Obama voted against Iraq. By no stretch of the imagination is he a interventionist cowboy; nor are my right hon. Friends the Foreign
Secretary and the Prime Minister rabid neo-cons. I can only suspect that one reason is the fear that inaction now that red lines have been crossed would send a message to Iran that it has little to fear if it continued to develop nuclear weapons. That is a legitimate and powerful reason, but it can have difficult consequences.
My main concern is that, although the Government’s intentions as laid out in the motion are limited, military action will unleash pressures to become further involved. If Assad takes whatever blow we inflict upon him but then goes on and appears to be winning, would we tolerate a war criminal being allowed to win? Would there not be enormous pressures to switch the balance back against him, and would it not be hard to resist pressures to arm the rebels? If we are partly motivated by a concern to send a message to Iran, will it not be seen as difficult to allow Iran’s ally to win?
Let us suppose that Assad desists from the further use of chemical weapons, to go on committing what might be called conventional atrocities, as he has. Will not our commitment and its legal basis that this is not about chemical weapons but about the duty to protect people lead us to be pressed to take action against that type of atrocity? Indeed, if those atrocities are committed by the other side, or sides, in the war, will we not be pressed to take action about them?
What keeps me out of the No Lobby tonight is my confidence in the judgment of the Foreign Secretary, with whom I have worked in many roles, subordinate and inferior, and my confidence that he would not use his good judgment unwisely in this matter—nor would the Prime Minister—but what I need to persuade me to join them in the Yes Lobby is the clearest possible assurance that they will resist the forces to go further if we do get involved and say, “So far, but no further.”
I have been to Syria on two occasions as part of delegations and had audiences with President Assad, and they were certainly illuminating. Syria is ruled by him as a family fiefdom and has a history of brutality. Its political structure—the Ba’athist party—is modelled on the old Russian Communist party. I say that because I do not, however, believe that President Assad is a fool, but I will return to that later.
What has happened to the people of Syria is a crime against humanity, and it is imperative, as the Leader of the Opposition said, to bring the conflict to an end as soon as possible. War crimes have been committed by both sides, and Assad should be held accountable in due course for declaring war on his own people. When it was alleged that chemical weapons had been used in the latest atrocity, I welcomed the fact that UN weapons inspectors were to go to the site. However, I was very concerned when almost immediately the Foreign Secretary appeared on television, dismissively making pre-emptive comments about the fact that the evidence that they might find may already have disappeared or have been contaminated and that they might not find anything. I do not believe that the Foreign Secretary is not an honourable man, but his comments reminded me very much indeed of what was said in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq by the USA and Britain.
We were told at the time that Saddam Hussein’s regime had weapons of mass destruction. We were told that the weapons inspectors would not find any WMDs because they had been very well hidden. We were told that there was incontrovertible evidence from the intelligence services that WMDs existed. Finally, in the last debate on the subject in the Chamber, we were told that the WMDs could hit this country within 45 minutes. What happened subsequently? We found out that what was said was not true, that the intelligence had been sexed up, that the weapons of mass destruction did not exist and that political decisions had been taken at President Bush’s ranch in America way before the conflict began.
Indeed, I ask the Government to answer this tonight: if the Chilcot committee report could be published, instead of disappearing into the ether, a lot of people would like to know whether what I and other people have said is correct, so when will the Chilcot report be released? Furthermore, as I and others have said, the consequences of Iraq caused poison to enter British politics, leading to a total distrust of politicians and Governments. There are, of course, consequences in this case, and they have been well outlined by other Members.
Turning back to President Assad, I said at the outset that I did not think he was a fool. He was educated in the west; he was trained as an eye specialist; and he is married to someone who was brought up in this country and worked for a merchant bank. The Assad family has ruled Syria for generations and it is not, of course, averse to brutality or atrocities. Assad’s father killed 50,000 people after an uprising in Homs during his reign. This is a brutal family, but let us consider this: the regime, as we all know, has chemical weapons, and it used to have a nuclear capability, which was taken out by the Israelis in 2007.
On that point, I agree that Assad is not a fool. Will he therefore sit up and take notice of the fact that although Syria is not a member of the International Criminal Court, if we built up a dossier to convict him as a war criminal at some point in the future, he would have nowhere to go if he did not comply?
As I have clearly said, I believe that Assad should be held accountable for his actions and should be brought before the international courts.
The regime has the full patronage of Russia, which can veto resolutions in the Security Council. Syria has some of the most sophisticated weaponry around, supplied by Russia and Iran, and it has total control over the skies in Syria. It has helicopter gun ships, and also a surrogate army fighting with Syrian Government forces in the shape of Hezbollah. As my good friend Dr Lewis rightly said, what is in this for Assad? Why should he deliberately participate in an atrocity guaranteed to bring an international response—the one thing that he does not want, and the one thing that all the disparate organisations fighting against him do want?
The American intelligence services believe that Assad did this; the British intelligence services believe Assad did it; the French and even the German intelligence services believe it; and the whole Arab League thinks Assad did it. Is this debate to be conducted on the basis that we in this House know better than all these experts? Can the hon. Gentleman name one expert on Syria who does not believe that President Assad is responsible for this attack? Name one.
Let me answer the hon. Gentleman in this way. I said earlier that what happened over Iraq had poisoned British politics, but more to the point, many Members vowed privately at the time—the hon. Gentleman was here—that they would never again believe one single solitary assurance given by any Prime Minister who came to the Dispatch Box to say, “Trust me; I’m taking this country into a military adventure.”
Let me return to this point: why would Assad do this? What is in it for him? Dictators have one unifying thing in common: they want to remain in power; they want the spoils of being a dictator and all that goes with it. Why on earth, then, would the Assad regime wish to bring on itself cruise or Tomahawk missiles? Why on earth would it want western countries to get involved in the Syrian civil war? Why on earth would it want to lose power?
We should reflect first on the awful responsibility of our leaders who find themselves as chief executives in these circumstances. The witnessing of an appalling crime on television, played out endlessly on YouTube and other internet sites, showed that something utterly dreadful had happened. The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom or the President of France, who all command armed forces that could do something about it, then faced many pressures. The shadow Health Secretary spoke emotionally about wanting to address this appalling crime when he appeared on television last Sunday, but I think the shadow Foreign Secretary was probably not wildly enthusiastic about the implications of what his right hon. Friend said when he gave vent to his feelings. It then falls to this Parliament coldly to consider the effect of taking action when it is felt that something must done, yet the evidence shows that the action might makes things worse rather than better.
On the issue of attribution, there was an intriguing piece of information, perhaps a leak, placed in The Timesabout what was apparently a SIGINT—signals intelligence—report of a conversation between the Assad defence ministry and the field commander of the chemical weapons unit. It was described as a rather panicked conversation. I can see no conceivable reason why Assad would have directed this particular use of weapons on this occasion, although I can see that such weapons could be used where the responsibility has been delegated to field commanders to help them out when they are in desperate situations. The Joint Intelligence Committee information seems to suggest that that might have happened on this occasion. As the JIC suggests, there has been low-level use, and I would agree that the responsibility almost certainly sits with the Assad Administration, although whether it sits with President Assad personally is another issue.
If our aim is to deter further use of chemical weapons and protect people, is my hon. Friend aware of any ultimatum previously given by the west to Assad on the use of chemical weapons? If not, would not the more logical response be to lay down a credible threat, rather than one artificially limited by some time frame, stating, “If you fail to undertake not to use chemical weapons, we will degrade and deter you by military strike and bring you to the table”? Might that not have more effect than a short-term military strike now?
The difficulty is legality, which is why the Government have been dancing on the head of a pin, making the case that this is absolutely and only about the use of chemical weapons—because nothing else in international law would justify the sort of intervention that is being proposed if agreement at the UN Security Council cannot be reached. If we get to that grave position, I think we have to be pretty certain about the effectiveness of the military action before we take it. Are we going actively to degrade chemical weapons? There are hideous practical problems in attempting that, with the potential of awful collateral damage. If we go after the command and control structure in a way that is sufficiently active to degrade it, that plainly means going after Assad himself, thus actively intervening on one side in the conduct of the war.
The critical point about the consequences was put by the Leader of the Opposition in his speech, and it is implicit in the motion. I rather wish that the Opposition had been more direct about the implications of what the right hon. Gentleman was saying. He was saying that if the consequences of our military action were to threaten the Geneva II process, which should mean Assad and his Government on the one side and the rebels on the other sitting down, engaging in politics and reaching a deal to escape from the current position, the action would not be worth engaging in. I think that case is overwhelmingly strong. It is the Russians, supported by the Chinese, who have put themselves in this position by vetoing any attempt to bring about wider international action, so the responsibility is theirs to get their client to the negotiating table.
The responsibility to act is not ours, particularly on much more doubtful legal ground around the use of international humanitarian law, which could get us into a potentially hideous situation with unforeseen consequences. If we are lucky, what we are debating here and perhaps again next week is a very limited British involvement in quite a small international operation of firing off some scores of cruise missiles to make a point about deterring action. We might be firing one cruise missile so that our hand is, as it were, on the dagger of international action.
I suppose that if Prime Minister Blair did nothing else, he at least so sensitised the body politic that we are here having this debate in recess, and we are yet to be in a position where we are even authorising a very limited use of military action. However, we are intervening in a situation where, in the analysis of Eugene Rogan, this is not about winner takes all in Syria; it is about loser must die. So the idea that we will send an effective deterrence message with a limited use of military action does not stand up.
We need to consider other responsibilities. This month, the Egyptian Government have, with malice aforethought, murdered well over 1,000 of their own citizens to suppress people who were supporting what had been previously an elected Government. What are they to think about the fact that we are getting ourselves into a position to intervene over Syria, and yet we have said precious little about a crime that is on the scale of five or 10 times what we are debating here? It has not been part of an insurgency yet, but the Egyptian Government have almost certainly kicked an insurgency off as a result of what they are doing.
We need to examine what we are doing and whether it will work. I do not think it will; I cannot support it.
Syria’s use of chemical weapons is either a huge mistake or, in my view, a calculated attempt to test the resolve of the west, post Iraq and post Afghanistan. If we look at the possibility that it was a mistake, it could have been an official or a general who gave orders to the relevant Government department for the use of chemical weapons without the direct instruction of Assad; that scenario has been put forward by reports appearing in Foreign Affairs magazine. Alternatively, it could be a test to see whether Syria could get away with the use of weapons of mass destruction, and whether the west would not have the stomach for a challenge. Chemical weapons have been used in Syria earlier, and until the recent red line from Obama the west did not react, other than to threaten a red line.
The weapons inspectors said that they needed another four days to finish their investigations, plus, I am sure, a short time after that for their report to be collated. Many of us believe that the regime is responsible for the attacks, and those attacks are probably authorised from a very senior level—probably Assad himself. But the inspectors need to report back to the UNSC purely and simply to establish due process—something that did not happen through the Iraq conflict and the Iraq war that followed. I was a relatively new MP, sat on the Bench just behind the Prime Minister, in 2003 when we took the decision. We thought we had good intelligence, and that intelligence was later found to be false. One of the lessons of the Iraq war is that we wait for due process to be followed through the UN before action is taken.
Obviously, the resolution tabled by the Prime Minister under chapter VII preceded the weapons inspectors’ report, so we knew full well that the Russians and Chinese would be likely to veto that resolution. Our debate today obviously takes place before the weapons inspectors have finished, because powers elsewhere have decided to go ahead before the Security Council has determined whether the evidence from the inspectors is sufficient to meet the burden of proof required. It is clear that without that Security Council resolution, any military action would, like that of a previous Labour Government, be illegal.
The hon. Gentleman is putting huge stock in the UN, but the UN will not apportion blame. The only thing that the UN is doing is validating that chemical weapons were indeed used, and we all know that.
Yes, we do all know that, but it is a prerequisite of the due process, and the UN procedure, that that is established through the inspectors. That must be the basic building block on which the Security Council makes a decision. In addition to that, as the Prime Minister has said, there must be a lot of intelligence from different intelligence services around the world, and the inspectors’ report will add to that information. So that is just a basic building block; it is not a decision in itself.
Therefore, as I said, action may be illegal, despite the doctrine of responsibility to protect. Despite what the Attorney-General says, I and many others around the world are not convinced that the six criteria required by the doctrine have been met. The unintended consequences of that could be catastrophic, for the following reasons.
By using those weapons, Syria has crossed the red lines set by Obama. Iran is watching, helping to arm the regime and sending its own forces to the regime. The Russians are arming the Syrians to the hilt and wondering whether the west will act against the use of WMD. Iran knows that if Syria can get away with using WMD, its own WMD, as well as its development of nuclear weapons, could well be ignored, and Iran could go on to produce more WMD and nuclear weapons without the intervention or involvement of the west. That may provoke a response, if that were to be allowed, from the Israelis. The Israelis will be looking, at some point short of Iran’s having developed nuclear weapons, to possibly take matters into their own hands. Indeed, if the situation kicks off with the western intervention in Syria, and Iran responds, and if Syria responds with an attack on Israel, that could be the perfect excuse for the Israelis to try and deal, not only with the WMD question and Syria, but also the nuclear question and Iran. We need to take these things into consideration before we decide, as a result of any UNSC deliberations and a UNSC decision, what action we take.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has taken the right decision. Let us go the UNSC route. If Russia and China say no and veto, for political reasons rather than the reasons of the evidence that we all know about, we must make a decision. Only once we have seen the evidence from the inspectors will we be able to decide what that decision shall be.
The House has been recalled not to sanction military strikes in Syria, but to deplore the use of chemical weapons. I think we can all agree on that. I hope we can agree, too, that there must be a second vote in this House before any direct British military response: no vote, no strike.
Certain of our traditionalists will no doubt delight in pointing out that under the rules of Crown prerogative, no Commons approval is actually technically required for a Prime Minister to take us to war, and historically they are correct, but Parliament is waking up and asserting itself. As the Prime Minister himself pointed out as Leader of the Opposition, the Crown prerogative, that constitutional quirk that has handed 10 Downing street the powers of a mediaeval monarch, needs changing. No Prime Minister should embark on a non-defensive war without the consent of this House. In recognising that, the Prime Minister has been wise, not weak.
Having a sovereign Parliament means that sometimes, yes, a Prime Minister will be told to pause and think again. Good. Democracy works.
Not unreasonably, the Leader of the Opposition, like most on the Government side of the House, would like to see more evidence—evidence from UN inspectors— before voting on military action. If the casus belli is the use of chemical weapons, let us be certain who used them. If the UN is going to help provide us with the evidence, though, we must not make the mistake of believing that the UN can confer legitimacy on military action. Legitimacy to go to war comes not from the UN, nor from international law or international lawyers, nor even from our own National Security Council. That sort of legitimacy comes only from below, not from above. It comes from the demos and those they elect. When the time comes for that second, crunch, vote, there can be no buck-passing, no deferring to a higher authority, no delegating. It will be our responsibility alone, and all the more weighty for that. If I am certain that this House needs the final say on our policy towards Syria, I am far less certain as to what that policy should be. There are, I think, no good outcomes.
Has my hon. Friend just demonstrated the shortcomings of this system of decision making and giving executive decisions to a legislative body? That is contributing to the paralysis of our nation. If we do not trust our Prime Minister to take decisions of this nature, we should not have trusted him with the office of Prime Minister.
If the alternative to rushing into a conflict that may have significant implications is that we pause, I would not describe that as paralysis but as good governance. It is vital to recognise that the Executive do not control the legislature; the legislature must control the Executive. Sending our young men and women to war is a decision of massive consequence, and it is right and proper that the House should exert its authority and give legitimacy to that decision. I understand and respect the case for intervention, and I think no one in this House or anywhere else is calling for a land invasion. What is envisaged is an aerial bombardment to punish and deter those behind the chemical weapons outrage.
The hon. Gentleman says that the only thing envisaged is an aerial bombardment, but does he have any idea about the envisaged length of time of that bombardment?
That comes to my next point—no, I do not. I am deeply unconvinced about what missile strikes and bombing will achieve or how long they will need to continue, and we have yet to hear how they might achieve their objective. Neither am I clear where British military involvement might end. Since the second world war, Britain has mostly fought what might be called wars of choice, but if we initiate hostilities in the eastern Mediterranean, will what follows continue to be fought on our terms and in the way we choose? Ninety-nine years ago, almost to the day, the Austrian chiefs-of-staff launched a punitive attack on Serbia. It did not end there.
There are serious players in this fight with serious military kit lined up behind the different factions in
Syria. Are we ready to deal with what they might do and how they might respond? I need to know before I vote for any strikes, and I think the good people of Essex would like us to know whether the Government know what they are doing before we vote to sanction such action.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have argued with great passion and determination that we in the west must take a stand for democratic values, and I agree. The Arab spring of 2011, like Europe’s spring of 1848, saw the hopes of liberals and reformists raised. However, the autocrats fought back in Egypt and Syria as they once did in Italy, Paris, Poland and Austria. As we once did in the 19th century, so we must do again in the 21st century. We must promote the liberal and reformist cause, and the constitutionalist one where possible. As in the 19th century, where possible we must avoid war with the autocrats.
Democracy and liberalism will one day seem as firmly rooted in the south and east of the Mediterranean as they do to the north, but if spreading democratic values is to be the cornerstone on which we are to build British foreign policy, let us do so consistently. We cannot act in defence of democratic values in Syria two months after we failed to speak out in defence of the democratically elected Government in Egypt. We cannot act when hundreds of civilians are murdered in Damascus, but continue to arm the Egyptian junta that slaughtered a thousand in Cairo. We cannot champion the right of self-determination in one part of the Arab world, yet ignore those who seek basic human rights in another, including the Gulf.
I am unconvinced that the Government’s intended course of action in Syria is part of a coherent strategy, and I will not support military action until I am convinced that it is part of such a strategy. I am still undecided whether we should support the motion, oppose it, or abstain. I am fearful of being seen to back military action, I am unwilling to abstain, yet I find there is little in either the Government or the Opposition motion with which I can disagree.
A lot has been said already in this debate for those who come in at this late stage, but I agree with the powerful points made by Mr Blunt, who talked about the context in which individual decisions are being made. Let us be brutally honest. The Americans were not really interested in the middle east; they were going to look to the far east, and Syria was contained in a number of different ways.
We see on television one brutal reality on the ground, but there is another reality that has not come out, because we never really debated properly how we would arm the rebels. The rebels are already being armed. We know about the Saudi and Qatari money; we know about buying Croatian arms and how they pushed through Jordan. We know about a whole series of grading operations, not by official US forces—no, but there is a lot of “brigadier, retired”, “general, retired”, who are there helping to do what the Americans needed to do, which is to try and find out who could and could not be properly armed. There is a lot of mythology about where we are in terms of the reality of how the Syrian conflict has been contained.
Let us look at what has been proposed today. What are we going to do? Apparently we are going to send in a few Tomahawk land attack missiles to give Assad a bit of a spanking because he has used chemical weapons. That is nonsense and a ridiculous proposition that will lead us to the position that a lot of people have already begun to explain. We cannot write Assad a letter and say, “By the way, the TLAM missile was only to give you a spanking over chemical weapons. It didn’t mean that we were interfering in your conflict in any way, shape or form.” Frankly, that is nonsense. We cannot compartmentalise such activities in the way suggested, and there will be an effect. What will that effect be? Well, there is lots of information about why we are trying to do this. “He has used chemical weapons.” Who has used chemical weapons? Dr Lewis dealt with that point earlier in a powerful contribution. It could have been a rogue commander. Assad is not necessarily directing. It could be that the regime’s assets are being used, but who is using them?
I remember being involved in all sorts of discussions about Iranians kidnapping British forces when we were in Iraq—hon. Members may remember that exercise. That was not sanctioned by the central regime in Iran— whatever that might look like—but it was a rogue operation by an Iranian guard commander who saw an opportunity when everybody was on holiday to nick the boat. They obviously took advantage of that as best they could—why would they not?—and we got into all sorts of mess. Do not imagine that under such circumstances, and particularly in a war situation, Assad and his people are so monolithic and well-organised that there are no differences among them. This is difficult information to try to grade out and decide who was responsible on any day for any particular activity.
The hon. Gentleman is making a good point. Does he think that if a rogue commander under the Assad regime made use of chemical weapons, the fact that that regime has those detestable and illegal weapons puts responsibility for their use, if they have delegated responsibility, on the Assad regime itself?
I do not disagree. Those responsible should be punished, although I am not sure that sending TLAM missiles is a punishment. People have mentioned the International Criminal Court, and I agree. These people must be held to account for their actions at some point. We do not now have an immediate almost knee-jerk reaction—it was going to be knee-jerk but it is a week late now—to the situation. The strike is apparently “targeted”, but I do not know what that means. It is targeted in the sense that we know where we will throw the missile, but it is hardly a surgical, contained or compartmentalised activity. Will we do that, or will we have a broader constituency of people who can start to prosecute the idea of bringing those people to account at some time or another?
The idea that if we do not do something now for those stated reasons we will not do anything is nonsense. There are lots of other things that can be done that we should probably have been doing for a long time and will have to do now. We must accept one thing: we will not get anywhere towards resolving the problem for the Syrian people unless and until we grapple differently with the question of those terribly difficult Chinese people and them nasty Russkies. We must incentivise the Russians to be involved in a process that caters for some of their needs. Libya has been mentioned several times, and it has often been said that they are smarting from what happened in Libya. Well, I do not know where we will be on Monday—according to certain reports, we might be here on Sunday—and things might have happened that are out of our control. The Americans might have done something. However, unless and until we can say to the Russians, “Okay. We understand some of your concerns,” and incentivise them to be in the plan, we will not resolve the situation. Any American activity now will not resolve the situation. Later, the UN could agree and we might have to take military action. The idea of sending half a dozen aeroplanes to Akrotiri is a good one, because if some of the whizz-bangs go bang at the weekend, we might well be dealing with a situation in the area—
I very much welcome the decision to delay the vote on whether we should take military action until the UN inspectors have had their chance to report. It makes no sense whatever for the west to make great play of getting the UN weapons inspectors in to inspect the site only to have a vote in the House without getting their report and without determining the evidence on the ground.
Perhaps the rationale for the debate has moved on. Welcome though that is, the debate gives hon. Members the opportunity to ask questions of the Government. I remain unconvinced by the arguments for military action that I have heard this evening. It is important that the House lays down markers, so that, when we have the next debate, the Government hopefully come to the House with better answers.
Let us begin with the evidence. There is no doubt that foreign policy should be based on firm evidence and grounded in legitimacy. We know there are no easy answers on Syria, but we must acknowledge that atrocities have been committed by both sides in this vicious civil war. There have been claims and counter-claims on both sides in relation to chemical weapons, and yet nothing has been verified. Even the JIC document, brief though it is, is in terms of probabilities and possibilities, but not of certainty. At the end, the JIC admits that it has no idea as to Assad’s motivation in committing to chemical weapons when he was gaining ground and winning the battle. We must therefore have careful consideration of the evidence.
The JIC concludes that it is highly probably that the Assad regime is responsible for the attack. That is the consensus among all reputable intelligence services, including the Arab League intelligence service. I put it to my hon. Friend that the only people who contest the evidence probably do not want to believe the certainty that Assad did it. I include my hon. Friend among those people. He does not want us to get involved, and is therefore reluctant to believe in the certainty that Assad did it.
My hon. Friend is attributing motives to me, which does not do him justice. The bottom line is that we have asked the UN inspectors to go in and inspect the site. We should at least wait and see what they say when they return—[Interruption.] If my hon. Friend wants to intervene again, he is welcome to do so. We are talking only of a couple more days before we get the report. One hundred thousand people are already dead. We need only a couple of days to ensure we have a calm assessment of the evidence. That is not asking too much, yet the motion reads that the
“House…Deplores the use of chemical weapons in Syria…by the Assad regime”.
That is a statement of fact, but it is not correct until we at least have the UN inspectors’ report.
I will try to save Mr Jenkin from saying for a sixth time what he has said. The JIC report comes to a strong conclusion. It says not that it is bewildered, but simply that it cannot put a “precise motivation” on the attack, and concludes that there are
“no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility”.
As the motion states, it is not the responsibility of the UN weapons inspectors to attribute blame.
The JIC document states clearly that it cannot understand the “precise motivation”. The document is in terms of probability. I put this question to the House, and particularly to those who want to intervene militarily: what is the harm in waiting for the UN inspectors to come back and present their evidence? We should not forget that the west did its utmost to get those weapons inspectors to the site. At the very least we can wait a couple of days to see what they say after their due inspections. Otherwise, what was the logic of sending them there in the first place? Sending them there and not waiting for the report would not make sense.
The second question is of legitimacy. Is military intervention without a UN resolution legitimate?
International law is terribly subjective—there are no hard and fast rules, but the best we have is the UN. Is such action legal? Many have suggested that we should look to the concept of the responsibility to protect, which was introduced in 2005, but that is not linked to chemical weapons. R2P could have been invoked 100,000 lives ago. Therefore, the idea that it becomes relevant because chemical weapons have been used is a non-starter.
We must also ask questions about the military objectives—there are many questions on, for example, the scope of the operation and the potential for mission creep. What happens if Assad uses chemical weapons again or if the rebels use them? There are very few answers, and we need more. The decision to commit to military intervention and potentially to commit soldiers to war is one of the most serious the House can make, if the not the most serious. We need to base such a decision on firm evidence and not on speculation.
Many accuse those of us who question the idea of military intervention by saying, “You believe that nothing should be done. You’re in that camp that says, ‘We should wash our hands of it and let them get on with it.’” Utter tosh! So much more could be done on the humanitarian front. The refugee camps are desperately short of basic amenities. Britain has a good record—we have done a lot of the heavy lifting—but we could do a lot more, as could the international community. Tens of thousands of women and children are living in extremely poor conditions, and yet the west is saying, “There’s very little more we can do to help the humanitarian situation,” which is utter nonsense.
The west could also do a lot more on the diplomatic front. It makes no sense whatever to exclude Iran from the forthcoming peace talks, but that is what we currently intend to do. Iran is a key regional player and a participant in this conflict. Excluding Iran from the talks is utter nonsense. We need to go that extra diplomatic mile. This is a cliché, but it is true: you make peace with your enemies, not with your friends. We need to talk to the Iranians if we hope for a diplomatic solution. A political and diplomatic solution, and not a military one, is the only long-term solution to this vicious civil war. The Syrian people have suffered enough. We must have answers to those questions.
A few days ago, I found myself rushing to switch off the television because my five and seven-year-old boys were in front of the news when it was showing images of men, women and children who had been gassed and were lying on the floor dead—they were in front of our eyes. It is impossible to have watched events unfold in Syria in the past few years and to have thought anything other than, “If not now, when?”
It is impossible to have watched the footage in the past week and not to have felt the instincts of liberal interventionism pulsating in our consciences. That instinct tells us that we cannot be isolationist, and turn a blind eye to mass murder and wash our hands of the responsibility to act. It is impossible not to think back to the difference that British intervention made for the people of Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Libya and wonder how it can be replicated for the people of Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. However, the tempering of those instincts should be a resounding message seared on the memories of many Members: liberal intervention can fail—and it can fail badly. It can fail if we have no vision of the outcome, no definition of success and no route map to the exit; it can fail if we allow our thirst for justice to trump the patience to secure the greatest possible legitimacy for our action; and it can fail if we forget that our first responsibility is not to make matters worse.
Iraq is not a reason to absolve ourselves from our responsibilities in Syria, but it is a reason to exercise caution, invoke clarity and define a conclusion. This Government seek a blank cheque to use British armed forces in Syria without convincingly and coherently answering the most crucial questions. What constitutes success for a military intervention? If a negotiated settlement is the goal, will military intervention make it more or less likely? Are we comfortable that our intervention is limited to punishing the use of chemical weapons, rather than explicitly to protecting the lives of the Syrian people?
Is it fair for the Prime Minister to imply, as he did today, that this is a humanitarian intervention, when his only ambition is for Britain to be the dispassionate referee of a brutal civil war? If a short and limited military intervention leads not to the cessation of the use of chemical weapons but to an escalation of hostilities or, even worse, retaliation, do we further escalate our involvement or back away entirely? If we escalate, are we comfortable with the slow creep that will place the lives of more war-wary members of our armed services at risk? We need to know the scale of our intervention, the limit of our commitment and the nature of our involvement before we can be asked to affirm it. Parliament cannot be expected to vote on pure sentiment; it needs to vote on specifics.
My right hon. Friend, like me, is sickened by the number of times we have voted for war, sometimes to my great shame. What is the hurry? The civil war has been going on for two years. Is it not time that we got on with negotiation and diplomacy?
Order. I know that hon. Members turn away because they think I might not stop them if their intervention is too long. I remind Members that they should address their comments through the Chair so that I can sit them down if they go on too long.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend Mr Sheerman, who is precisely right: there is nothing in the motion that could not have been debated next week. We should be very concerned about the speed and haste that is indicated beyond this place.
We should remember that conflicts do not take place without context. This conflict will not take place without history, without suspicion of our intentions or outright hostility to our presence. Syrian Government assertions that French, British and American agents launched the chemical attacks to pave the way for intervention might attract ridicule in this Chamber, but let us not be so naive as to think that there will not be many willing subscribers to this conspiracy theory across the middle east. We must never under-estimate the cynicism that surrounds our motives and those of our allies. We must never under-estimate the fact that even the most humanitarian of objectives can be misconstrued as a nefarious attempt by the west to project its power. We must never under-estimate the fact that we must first win the battle of perception above all else.
Any intervention needs to be demonstrably scrupulous, must involve more than just the usual suspects and must be the last resort of a process that has visibly exhausted all diplomatic means. The recent ratcheting up of rhetoric has come at the expense of reason and has eschewed responsibility. The cacophony of tough words and the insidious indication that attacks could take place as early as this weekend have not facilitated diplomacy or the forging of alliances.
We need cooler heads rather than broader shoulders. The Government must abandon the march for “war by the weekend” and assure the House that any military intervention will be countenanced only after the weapon inspectors have been given time to investigate, free from external pressure. The process might be long and arduous but it is necessary and right.
We are holding this debate on the anniversary of the speech that Martin Luther King made, but he made another speech in 1967 against the Vietnam war. We should reread his words.
Like many Members, I have deep reservations about the actions we are contemplating. I am therefore pleased by the changes made to the Government motion, regardless of whether they were prompted by last-minute demands by Labour Members—although quite why they proposed an amendment almost the same as the revised motion is a little beyond me.
I welcome the common-sense decision to allow the weapons inspectors to report before we take the final decision to act and the UN’s work to secure consensus for action. Colleagues on both sides of the House have expressed scepticism about whether Russia will vote for it, but I urge the Government to wait until a Security Council resolution can be proposed and voted on before taking any further action.
Russia and China abstained in the vote on the no-fly zone over Libya, and there is scepticism among colleagues who believe that this will happen again, but in the face of overwhelming support among the rest of the international community Russia would be further marginalised and the legitimacy of international action, with or without a supporting UN Security Council resolution, would be increased.
Regardless of whether we agree with Russia, it is entitled to its point of view, which is that action could lead to further destabilisation in the middle east. Ironically, if we do not get the Russians to vote on a resolution we give them an opportunity to make mischief and blame western imperialism and themselves to contribute to destabilising the region.
The third change that I welcome is that a further vote must be held before any military action is agreed. Without that, I would not have been able to support the motion.
I still worry that we might be embarking on a slippery slope: that what we agree today will pave the way to further action. I worry that we are being softened up. The motion still provides that the UN must be allowed as far as possible to ensure the maximum legitimacy for any action taken. It states that
“every effort should be made to secure a Security Council Resolution…before any such action is taken”.
The implication is that if we do not get the UN resolution we will take action anyway and that that will be the next step. If the UN cannot get the consensus it needs, will we not already have tacitly supported military action? It is only one small step to approve “limited” action, and once you have done that you are on the road. It is a bit like pregnancy: a woman cannot be a little bit pregnant—either she is or she is not.
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s concerns, but I think she is debating something we are likely to discuss next week. Does she agree that we should not allow the conscience of Russia and China to be our conscience when we are considering potential action?
I entirely agree. I am not suggesting that we take no action; I simply think that we must have international approval before taking that step.
Having bombed supposed chemical weapons sites, what then? With all that human suffering, surely we should intervene further. As Mr Lilley commented, would we really want to allow President Assad to win? Several hon. Members have expressed concern about military action and they, like me, fear mission creep. Not every member of the public has researched these issues in detail, but they have a strong feeling. Only one person in four supports military action. Members of my own party are fearful of that and have urged me to vote against. Even the chambermaid at my hotel yesterday, before I left my family holiday in Wales, said to me, “Please don’t let them vote for war.” I will not.
In summary, I do support action, as I said to the hon. Lady, but under the present circumstances, not a military solution.
No one wants war, but does the hon. Lady agree that there is a war, whether we want it or not, and if we choose to do nothing at all and further atrocities are committed and further chemical weapons attacks take place, what comfort will that be to any of us?
I am not suggesting that we do nothing, but in order to ensure that we act with maximum legitimacy, we must have transparent international law on our side and make sure that the actions that we take have wide international approval. If not, we run the risk of being condemned as a pariah by Russia and giving the Assad regime an excuse for more action. At present I support action, but not a military solution. I want to make it clear that unless we act with a wide international coalition within transparent internationally agreed law, I will not vote to take military action in Syria in the future.
I remember, 10 years ago, like many Members, sitting on the Government Benches listening to the whole of the Iraq debate and agonising about how I should vote. I remember my heart telling me that I should support my leader—I particularly wanted to support my right hon. Friend Mr Straw, my good friend—and my head telling me throughout that debate, “No, there’s something wrong here,” and I voted no. I voted no, understanding that many members of my own party in Vauxhall probably supported the war, although most did not. Many people in my constituency supported the war, although most did not. There was an even split at that time.
On this occasion, 10 years on, I am very clear and I am not agonising. I oppose military action in this case.
Whatever the Attorney-General says and despite all the legal paraphernalia that we have been bombarded with, for the general public this is almost like agonising on the head of a pin. Legal arguments will not wash with the public or with me when it comes to what is right and what is wrong. It would be wrong and, importantly, counter-productive to take military action against Syria. I am not a pacifist. I was one of the first people, together with a number of my colleagues but long before my Front-Bench team did so, to argue strongly for intervention in Bosnia. I also supported the Falklands war, so I am not a pacifist.
The question is how bombing, no matter how strategic, how precise and how short, will make things if not better for the Syrian people, at least not worse. I believe that it will not do so and I have yet to be persuaded by anyone who has spoken in this debate that it would make things better for the Syrian people. I found the speech by Dr Lewis very commanding indeed. I do not support Assad or the regime. As many Members have said, it has been an appalling regime for many years. It is worth remembering that we provided many of the regime’s arms. I wonder who provided the components that make up the chemical weapons. I would not be a bit surprised if some came from this country and other countries in the west—[Interruption]—and of course from Russia, as my hon. Friend Mike Gapes says.
It has not been proven absolutely that the chemical weapons were used by Assad. It probably was Assad—
We have had information before that poison gas had been used and Carla Del Ponte, who was the UN commissioner in Syria, pointed out that it was the rebels who had used it. Will the Deputy Prime Minister tell me when he winds up the debate, if, despite what everyone thinks, the weapons inspectors find that it was the rebels or some rogue general who used the chemical weapons last week, the Prime Minister will be saying the things that he did about the use of chemical weapons? The doctrine of prevention, which I had hoped—
I have huge respect for the hon. Lady. To help her in her thinking, let me point out that Damascus is defended by the president’s brother, Maher. He is responsible for the fourth division and he is ultimately responsible for the heinous chemical attack that took place. Given the industrial scale with which those chemicals hit three, four or five different areas, it would be impossible for the rebels to do it to themselves, besides the fact that it would be incredibly counter-intuitive.
I do not think that has been proved or that we have any proof that bombing will make things any better or get rid of the chemical weapons, if they are there. We need to remember that once we cross that line of military action, as other Members have said, even if it is a short strike and very few civilians are killed, which is highly unlikely, the result will be that when anyone is killed in future years in Syria, whoever has killed them or whatever the background, the west will be blamed. The United Kingdom will be blamed, as has happened throughout the middle east, and we will see the repercussions on our streets in the form of increased extremism.
My hon. Friend mentioned that some of her constituents in the past were for and some against, but that in this case they were almost unanimous in opposing military intervention. She may be aware that I am one of her constituents. If I came to her surgery and said, “I am disgusted and horrified by pictures of children being poisoned by chemicals and I want something done about it,” and if she says that military intervention is not the answer, what would she suggest? What is the alternative?
I have many suggestions and many Members have made suggestions. I do not think we have worked through the United Nations mechanism. It may not be a brilliant organisation and we may all have criticisms of it, but there is a lot more that could be done. We should be putting much more diplomatic pressure on Russia. We should call in the Russian ambassador and say, “We are going to expel you from this country if you do not change Russia’s attitude.” There are a number of things that we could do. Military action is the very last option. I do not believe that we should go down that line.
Any military action will, as I said, lead to a completely different attitude among many of our Muslim communities in this country. It will be the catalyst for the build-up of all sorts of extremism. I know that it is an extraordinarily difficult decision for Governments in these situations and for the Opposition, but in such cases we must always reflect on what is in our national interest. I do not believe that our national interest will be served by military intervention in Syria or that that is the way forward for this Parliament. We may return to the issue in a few days, just because America is calling the shots. What will the Prime Minister say if, over the weekend, America decides to go it alone? How much influence will we have had? It is quite wrong that we are being pushed by America. We should take our time, reflect and make it very clear that we are not going to rush into something that will ultimately not be in our national interest.
I am delighted to follow Kate Hoey, for whom I have huge respect. I want to begin by agreeing with the Foreign Secretary that this is a moment for democratic nations to live up to their values. The use of chemical weapons by President Assad’s regime is a moral outrage that cannot go unchallenged. I will therefore be supporting today’s motion.
Less than 24 hours ago, I was on the Syrian border, where I have spent the past few days meeting Syrian opposition fighters from the Free Syrian Army—the FSA. The brigade commanders and fighters I met were from all backgrounds. Many were doctors, teachers, farmers and engineers; they represented a broad cross-section of Syrian society, including Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, Druze and, yes, Alawites as well. I also had the opportunity to meet General Idris, the head of the FSA, and President Jarba, the head of the Syrian Opposition Council. As colleagues will know, I also met
President Assad several times over the five-year period between 2006 and 2011. So I come to this debate fairly well informed on Syria and its people.
The use of chemical weapons in war is particularly abhorrent, as we saw in 1988 when Saddam Hussein gassed 5,000 Kurds in Halabja, and again last week when the Assad regime inflicted a chemical weapons attack on Ghutah, a suburb of Damascus. According to Médecins sans Frontières, that attack resulted in at least 3,600 casualties. In 1925, in the aftermath of the first world war, the Geneva gas protocol was passed to ban the use of such weapons.
A year ago, a red line on the use of chemical weapons was drawn by the Assad regime, but since then, it has been testing the elasticity of that red line with the repeated small-scale use of such weapons, according to witness statements, video evidence and physiological samples that have been tested here at Porton Down as well as in the US and elsewhere. In fact, last week’s chemical weapons attack was possibly the 14th such attack by the Assad regime on its own people. It was only the fact that it was on such a large scale and took place in the capital itself that led us in the west to decide that enough was enough.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech based on his knowledge of the situation on the ground. What assessment has he made of the size of the chemical weapons arsenal, and of which country might have helped Syria to establish it in the first place?
That is a very good question, and I suspect that I know my hon. Friend’s direction of travel in asking it. There is no evidence, at least that I am aware of, that the Russians or the Iranians helped Syria to develop that arsenal, although I would not be surprised if they had done so.
Peter Hitchens wrote recently, in support of the Assad regime, that the Syrian Government were not lying and that it made “more sense” for the opposition to poison and kill more than 1,000 of their own people. If that is the case, however absurd, why, if they had nothing to hide, did the Syrian Government and their chief sponsor on the Security Council, Russia, block the United Nations chemical weapons inspectors from going to the site when they were only 15 minutes away? Instead, they continued to bombard the area and to degrade the evidence as much as possible. I find it astounding how this kind of double-think has become common currency among many of those who oppose the war. That includes some Opposition Members who have been retweeting articles along those lines from the Voice of Russia. Frankly, I would rather believe our Government and our intelligence agencies than Russia and President Assad.
That chemical weapons have been used in Syria is in no doubt. The question is whether the regime itself delivered them. My understanding is that the intelligence drawn from eye-witness statements, video footage and electronic intercepts is extremely compelling. This raises another question: do we have any confidence in our intelligence agencies at all? My answer is yes. Just because Tony Blair and Alastair Campbell were economical with the truth about the intelligence that they used to get us into Iraq—through what has become known as the “dodgy dossier”—that should not taint our view of the current evidence that the intelligence services have been collecting on this matter. That evidence puts the blame squarely on the shoulders of Bashar al-Assad and his brother, Maher.
I was an officer trained in nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, and one of the things that I learned on my course was that only a professional army could manage and use chemical weapons. There is no doubt in my mind that the rebels would not have the capacity or the ability to use such weapons. I am sure that when the report comes back from the United Nations inspectors, it will not be able to identify who threw them or used them but it will perhaps be able to say that they were used. In my mind, however, there is no doubt that only a professional army—and not the rebels—could use chemical weapons.
I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his thoughtful intervention.
Those opposing military action say that, notwithstanding the increasing evidence that Assad used chemical weapons, we should let the UN inspectors do their work first. To them I say this: of course, but we should remember that the inspectors’ remit is not to apportion blame for this atrocity; it is merely to confirm that chemical weapons were in fact used. Does any Member in the House doubt that such weapons were used? Of course not. Those opposing military action say that we need a UN resolution to back any action, but we will never get such a resolution while Russia, the Assad regime’s key supporter, remains a member of the Security Council. In fact, Russia has blocked every single move to condemn the Assad regime since this conflict began.
No, I am afraid I cannot.
The result is that the UN is failing to live up to its mandate to protect. We therefore need to find a coalition of the willing. Why? Because we cannot allow the use of chemical weapons to go unchallenged. As President Jarba said to me earlier this week, western silence and inaction are killing his people. If we do not support today’s motion, and if we do nothing, it will give a green light to the Assad regime to go on slaughtering and gassing its people with impunity. For that reason, I support the motion.
The Democratic Unionist party has never been found wanting when it has come to supporting military action on behalf of our nation when it was deemed necessary. That has happened on at least three occasions during my time in Parliament. I have to say, however, that I have not yet heard a compelling argument today to convince me that military intervention in this case is either necessary or in our national interest.
One of the things that I have learned about sectarian conflict is that perception is a very powerful thing. I have heard the Government make many nuanced explanations today about why military action would be appropriate, but let me tell them that those nuances would be lost on the middle east. The region is riven by conflicts between the Shi’a and Sunni factions, and any action that we take against Syria will have an impact. We can control the manner of our intervention, but we have learned from our experiences in Iraq and Libya that we cannot control the outcome of any intervention.
There are many powerful forces at work in Syria. In addition to the two sides in the civil war, there is Hezbollah, which brings Lebanon into the equation. When we bring in Lebanon, we bring in Israel, and when we bring in Israel, we bring in Iran. The situation could escalate quickly as the perception spread across the middle east that the west had intervened in a way that set one side against another.
Indeed; that is one of the weaknesses in the Government’s motion that is causing us concern. The Government talk about voices in the Arab world being raised in support of intervention, but that does not mean that any such intervention would not have consequences for the stability of the wider region. If we intervene, where does it begin and end? I accept what the Government say about intervention being focused on removing or diminishing the capacity to use chemical weapons. That is a noble objective, but I am concerned about the outcome of such an intervention. That is why I am not convinced that military intervention is in our national interest, never mind conducive to building stability in a troubled region.
Further to that point, does my right hon. Friend recognise the implications for the ethnic minorities in Syria, and in particular for the Christians, who have been subject to ethnic cleansing? Those Christians just want the support of the Syrian state and unity in their country, and yet they are subject to intimidation and persecution.
Indeed. Other right hon. and hon. Members have referred to the religious minorities in Syria and the impact that the conflict is having on them. We have heard colourful and dreadful descriptions of what is happening in Syria.
If the Government choose to take military action and are able to persuade Parliament to take that path, we need to have some understanding of what diplomatic and humanitarian efforts will be made alongside it. There have been some contributions on humanitarian issues. In Iraq, we had Operation Safe Haven, which was designed to safeguard civilians. I would like to hear more from the Government about what we are doing on that front.
How are we using our powerful diplomatic influence across the region? Ambassadors such as Tom Fletcher in Beirut do an excellent job in trying to bring stability to the region. I would like to hear what our diplomatic outposts are saying to the Government about the potential impacts of military action in the region, because that would be important in informing this House about the global and regional consequences of what we decide to do.
My party is not the kind of party that takes the soft option on such matters. We recognise the atrocities that have been committed in Syria. It is terrible that 300 or more lives have been lost as a result of this atrocity. However, as other Members have rightly said today, almost 100,000 lives have been lost in Syria. If the Assad regime commits another atrocity with conventional weapons tomorrow, the next day or five days after military intervention, what will we say when we see the body bags and the scenes from Damascus, Aleppo or wherever it might be? What will we say about the human disaster that is taking place there? Is it only because of the use of chemical weapons that this House will decide that military intervention is necessary? What about the continuing use of conventional weapons, some of which were supplied by western states to the Assad regime? We need to give those matters careful consideration.
I also want to mention our capacity in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence. I say this as a member of the Defence Committee. We recently announced that the reserve capacity on CBRN is to be axed. We have axed the CBRN regiment in our armed forces. If chemical warfare is so important to us, why are we diminishing the capacity of the UK armed forces to deal with it? That is an issue that the Government need to address, and not just within the context of a review of the strategic defence and security review.
In conclusion, we will think long and hard before we vote for military action. To date, including in the debate in the House today, we have not heard anything that convinces us that it is the right thing to do in our national interest.
Having listened to all the arguments today, read everything about this issue over the past couple of days and listened to our constituents, it is easy for Members to form an opinion against taking action in Syria. There are many compelling arguments for doing nothing. Military action is expensive. We have all heard the argument that we should be building hospitals, not spending money overseas. People say that it is wrong on principle for the US to interfere in foreign countries. We are unsure of the consequences of action in Syria and, as many right hon. and hon. Members have said, of how it might extend to other countries. There is no exit strategy. The history of Afghanistan and Iraq looms large in people’s minds.
Those arguments all have strong merits and are compelling. It is certainly true that the British public have little appetite for further military engagement in the middle east. Because of the merits of the above arguments, I could not stand here and argue for full-scale intervention to force regime change or to bring about a western-style democracy. My instincts are that it would be great to do those things in theory, but that we should not do them.
Like all colleagues, I have received my fair share—or possibly more than my fair share—of correspondence on this matter over recent days. It has largely been against military intervention. However, a piece of correspondence from one of my constituents, Ian Peck of Hempstead road in Watford, summed up the crucial question: should there be very precise, selective action to prevent the further use of chemical weapons? Like Mr Peck, I believe that there should be such action following confirmation in the weapons inspectors’ report.
We have to accept that any action that is taken may have unintended consequences. As Danny Finkelstein—soon to be Lord Finkelstein—argued in The Times yesterday, at the start of most military actions that history has shown to be the right decision, there was no guarantee of any definite result. He cites Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis and Tony Blair in Serbia. On the grand scale, we could cite Winston Churchill in 1940, when he decided to fight on against the Germans without any clear idea of what would happen. We have to accept that there will be uncertainty. More importantly, although we cannot guarantee or fully predict the outcome of any action in Syria, we can assume with greater certainty that taking no action would allow Assad to continue carrying out chemical attacks on his own people.
My hon. Friend is making a thoughtful speech. Does he agree that in this case, we are damned if we do and damned if we don’t? If we do nothing, we accept that the Assad regime can use chemical weapons and destroy its own people, with terrible consequences. However, if we do something, we must ensure that we do not do so much that we get into another war from which we cannot extricate ourselves.
I agree very much with my hon. Friend’s sentiments. Many decisions in politics, war, business and many other spheres of life have similar damned if you do, damned if you don’t consequences. However, decisions have to be made.
As I have said, I could not stand here and argue for full military intervention. We should do everything that we can on a humanitarian level to support the people of Syria. I am sure that we would all agree that they are the overriding concern in any decision that is made today.
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. He says that he would stop short of any further intervention. However, suppose that we attack Assad and our Tomahawks take out a number of facilities and do some damage, but he says, “Okay, we will dust ourselves down and carry on using chemical weapons.” What then? At what point do we take further steps?
I remind the hon. Gentleman that when the western allies attacked Belgrade with Tomahawk missiles, it took them eight months to get President Milosevic to do what they wanted. I accept that this is not definite. I wish that there was a way of doing it in a day or two. I agree that there is uncertainty. I believe that we all have a responsibility not to blindly follow party lines, but to consider for ourselves, according to our own conscience, what is best. I hope that my constituents will agree that, whether one agrees with intervention or not, this is a grave and important matter.
The truth in my case—this is a fundamental point—is that in my lifetime I have spoken to people who survived the holocaust in Nazi Germany as children and I have visited the sites of genocide in Rwanda, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I feel that if there is any way in which through my vote in this House today I can do anything that may—I agree that it is a case of “may”—deter a ruthless dictator from gassing innocent children, it is my duty to do it.
It would be ideal to be able to predict the consequences exactly. In fact, it would be ideal if we could prevent dictators such as Assad from appearing anywhere in the world. Whenever my political career ends—I hope it is just Opposition Members who hope that that will happen sooner rather than later—I do not want to wake up one morning and see children similar to those we have seen in Syria lying on the ground as victims of gas and chemical weapon attacks and find myself thinking that there was something I could have done, however small, to make a difference. That is why I support the motion and why I will support a motion for limited action based entirely on the hope that it will deter Assad and other dictators from carrying out chemical attacks.
Like Richard Harrington, I begin by citing an e-mail I received from a constituent who was opposed to any intervention and who described himself as an ex-member of the armed services. Having listed some cogent reasons why military intervention was not in his view acceptable or sensible, he said at the end of his e-mail that, of course, we run the risk of washing our hands of the fate of the people of Syria, who are likely to be gassed in the future. He summed up neatly the dilemma we all face today. I would not use the phrase, “Damned if you do, damned if you don’t,” but there is a fine line involved in deciding between one course of action and another.
I want to address two points raised by the Prime Minister, but I will not do so in a spirit of party political contention, because I want the debate to progress in such a way that by the time we get to episode two we can all understand more fully the Government’s intentions, the action that might be taken and under what circumstances. It would be helpful if the Deputy Prime Minister could address my points later.
First, the Prime Minister made it clear that any action taken would have the primary if not sole objective of either deterring or degrading Syria’s chemical weapons capability. There is a strong argument in favour of taking such action, but unfortunately, when pressed by my right hon. Friend Mr Straw, the Prime Minister was not able to give enough information—or certainly was not able to put it clearly enough—to convince me that his proposed course of action would achieve that end. That case needs to be put more clearly. A stronger narrative about how it might work would be a big help, not just to Members of this House, but to the wider public, who have serious concerns about what is being proposed.
Secondly, the Prime Minister said that, in the end, this comes down to judgment. Each of us has to form a judgment about what is the right course of action. I accept that all such difficult decisions inevitably come down to forming a judgment. In order to help me and others form that judgment we need to discuss two things over the next few days, and perhaps longer. First, what is the intelligence that exists: what do we know about it, what does it prove and show, and what can we be certain of? I accept that it is not always possible to share intelligence with the public or even with Members of this House. In his very good speech, Dr Lewis made the point that the intelligence could at least be made available to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I sit on, so that at least a few more people—nine of us, to be exact—would know exactly what is at stake. I do not want to over-claim anything. If the intelligence cannot be shared nationally, I am not sure that simply sharing it with the ISC would necessarily resolve that problem.
My right hon. Friend is talking about sharing information. I listened carefully to the Prime Minister’s speech, and he said that he had convincing evidence that young Muslims in Britain would not be alienated by this, and indeed that they were calling for military action to protect people in Syria. Would it not be a good thing if the whole House could see that evidence, because that is not what I am hearing from my constituents?
It would be a good thing if as much information as possible could be put before not only the House but the wider public. I have already made that point.
The second point that needs to be addressed is: where is the weight of world opinion? It seems to me that whenever there is a crisis of this kind—I have no qualms about saying this—the United Nations fails to live up to its promise. What tends to happen is that the United Nations Security Council will pass resolutions—I think it passed 14 on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction before any action was taken—but in the end, whatever the UN does, it tends to fall on the shoulders of coalitions of the willing to enforce its will. I am not condemning the United Nations—it is all we have—but we need to have a better way of doing these things in the future. We need to think very carefully as a country about where we fit into each of the coalitions, particularly the one under discussion.
I am enjoying my right hon. Friend’s contribution; it is very good and sound. This is not a new issue. Why is it that we seem to have the same discussions time and again?
That is the point I am making. I do not think that the machinery of the United Nations is able to enforce decisions, and this is an obvious example. I accept that probably the overwhelming balance of evidence is that it is the regime that is carrying out these attacks, rather than the rebel forces, which probably do not have the capability. There is a further argument that a rogue commander might be carrying out these attacks without the knowledge or consent of the leadership and the President. If that is the case it is even more worrying if the regime works in such a way that random commanders can decide to do such things almost at will rather than be directed from the centre.
So far, so good: the debate has taken us a little further, but it has not taken us all the way. I hope that over the days and weeks to come the Prime Minister can get the narrative a bit clearer, so that those of us—
Before I came into the Chamber today I looked at the archway through which we walk and the broken stones that were left there when the Chamber was rebuilt to remind us that we have the power of life and death over our citizens. I think that today’s debate is a prime example of the decisions we all have to make which could result in life or death not just for our citizens, but for others. However, having listened to the debate carefully all day, I still do not feel that I have enough accurate or verifiable information to support direct UK military action in Syria. At the same time, I want to send a message that we will not stand idly by while others use chemical weapons to destroy their population.
The Prime Minister did absolutely the right thing by recalling Parliament and bringing us back here to debate the situation. I believe that he also recalled us because there was a real possibility that intervention could be almost immediate. I hope that that possibility may have diminished a little with the developments that have occurred over the past two days, and I certainly praise the Prime Minister for moving his position and meeting the concerns of many of my colleagues in the House. It is a wise Prime Minister who listens and reacts to what Members of Parliament have to say on such issues. Of course, as he acknowledged in his opening speech, many of us are reluctant about matters involving peace and war because we previously sat here and listened to a Prime Minister tell us from the Dispatch Box what I now believe to have been a fabric of lies. I cannot sit here and be duped again by any Prime Minister, whether of my party or the Labour party.
My constituents’ instinct is also against any direct UK military action. Like, I am sure, all my colleagues throughout the House, I have received not just form e-mails sent by some lobbying organisation but individually composed e-mails showing the strength of feeling and fear that lie in the British population. Having said that, and despite feeling strongly that my constituents’ instincts and my own should be followed, what I have seen on the television and experienced through reports of what has gone on in Syria has struck at the very fabric of my being. However, I am unclear about our response and our objectives. What are punitive strikes? Will they send a message to Assad to use it or lose it when it comes to chemical weapons? What will be the reactions of other countries? What are the capabilities of the people who may be deployed in support of Syria? There are still many questions that need to be answered.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the most dangerous aspect is the unintended consequences that military action may bring? I fear that missile strikes may further inflame tensions in the middle east, bring conflict to the wider world and provoke more terrorist attacks on British streets or those of our territories and allies abroad. What can we do to prevent that?
Those fears have been reflected in many communications that have been made to my office over the past few days. We need more time to consider our response, the whole situation and the implications of intervening directly through military action.
I am listening to my right hon. Friend’s logic, and I absolutely agree with it. I have been to Syria twice, and I met President Assad a few years ago. I came away not knowing who on earth ran that country and which powers were behind that dictator. Does she agree that “What next?” is the most important question about the impact that any reaction by us will have, and that it has not been properly answered?
The situation is so complicated that I believe very few people in the House, if any, know the full state of affairs. In that case, we owe it to our constituents and our armed forces to be very cautious before we take the next step of a full UK military plan.
I have spoken to the Prime Minister because of my fears. Because I am not naturally disloyal, I want to support my Government, but I have said that at this stage, with the amount of information that has been made available to me, I cannot support direct UK military action.
To me, the way in which the motion has been drafted means that it is still ambiguous. It states that the situation may,
“if necessary, require military action that is legal, proportionate and focused on saving lives by preventing and deterring further use of Syria’s chemical weapons”.
I would need further and better particulars on that. However, I seek to rely tonight on the last line on page 4 of today’s Order Paper, which states that
“before any direct British involvement in such action a further vote of the House of Commons will take place”.
The Deputy Prime Minister is in his place, and I know that he will sum up this long, emotional and hard debate. I can walk through the Lobby to support the coalition Government only if he gives me a firm undertaking that the vote will not be used or interpreted as Parliament’s agreement to UK military involvement, or as cover for any UK military involvement. I need that categorical assurance about today’s motion, and further, I want to hear again from the Dispatch Box that there will be a further vote in the House before military action takes place or is contemplated. I hope for that undertaking, and if I get it I will support the Government tonight. However, I hope that the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister will understand the way I, my constituents, and, I believe, the whole country, feel about intervention in Syria at this stage.
It is a pleasure to follow Mrs Gillan. She is obviously thinking hard about how to vote later, and I know that a lot of right hon. and hon. Members feel the same way.
I wish briefly to address the words of the corrected motion and the intent behind it, then I will turn to the Opposition amendment. First, however, I congratulate the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow Foreign
Secretary on effectively putting the brakes on a Government who were heading for military action this weekend. Of that I think the House can agree there is no doubt. My right hon. Friends have served the country and the Commons well through their actions, especially over the past 24 hours, and I hope that the Opposition will continue to lead in the same way and act as a restraint on the Government.
This is not the debate that the House expected to have, it is certainly not the debate that No. 10 was planning, and it is not the one that the media predicted would happen, but there have none the less been some excellent contributions. Despite the fact that there will be another debate and vote next week, this has been a useful exercise in testing the issues at stake.
I turn to the motion, which I have real problems supporting. That is not because I am a supporter of President Assad—I am not—but neither do I support the jihadist element of the Syrian Opposition that has been referred to in many contributions today. The wording of the corrected motion is important. The first and second paragraphs are straightforward in their commentary and condemnation. The third introduces the requirement of military action, and the fourth, fifth and sixth are very instructive. The fourth notes
“the failure of the United Nations”.
That is the softening-up line. The fifth notes
“that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime…and that the principle of humanitarian intervention provides a sound legal basis for taking action”.
The sixth mentions the “wide international support”, including from the Arab League, for action from the international community.
Sir Menzies Campbell said that tonight’s vote was not really important, because the important vote would be next week. I say to the Liberal Democrats in particular that if we get another debate and a vote next week, I predict that those words will come back to haunt them. The Conservatives are boxing them in by saying, “You’ve got to support military action, since the UN has failed, and we don’t need it anyway. We’ve got legitimacy, because the Attorney-General says so, and we’ve got international coalition support. It’s only the Russians and Chinese who don’t support it.”
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing that information to the House. It clearly demonstrates the fragility of the international coalition lined up behind the attempt to intervene militarily in Syria.
The Opposition amendment, it is fair to say, is at least more open and honest. However, from my reading it essentially endorses the same principle: if we address certain issues and if certain conditions are met, military action can happen. I do not believe that it should happen under any circumstances. The Opposition amendment is stronger and clearer, but whereas the
Government motion is explicit in its direction of travel towards military action, the Opposition amendment states that we will go there if the conditions in six of the paragraphs it lays out are met. My concern is about the end game and the exit strategy. There have been many excellent contributions to the debate—
I have exactly the same difficulty as the hon. Gentleman—I do not know what they are either. I do not think that they are identifiable. I do not think that they are achievable. My objection, as I was saying a moment ago, is that there is not an exit strategy or an end game. There have been many contributions to the debate in which colleagues have said, “If we do this, that will happen. If we do not do that, this will happen.” Only one thing is absolutely guaranteed: nobody knows what will happen if we go down the road of military action. We have seen that too often in recent decades. The difficulty I have is the fact that we do not have an exit strategy.
In conclusion, and for the hon. Gentleman’s information, I have problems with both the Government motion and the Opposition amendment. Ultimately, I do not believe that either is able to achieve the honourable ends that both sides of the House want. I am opposed to military intervention in Syria full stop. To be honest and consistent on both questions, I will vote in the No Lobby against the Government motion and against the Opposition amendment.
I am a former human rights and criminal lawyer who has worked in this country and abroad, and I want to address the legality of the process we face today. The effectiveness of chemical weapons is beyond doubt—that is why people want to use them. Their usage is a war crime and a humanitarian catastrophe, and I agree that the perpetrator, in any circumstance, should face justice.
It is a sad fact that all of our constituents are scarred by the Iraq and Afghanistan experience, which has poisoned the well of public confidence in so many ways. The public clearly lack confidence in our attempts at foreign policy. I know that the majority of my constituents in Northumberland and the majority of those in this House of Commons do not want to get involved in a civil war in Syria. Neither do I. I am clear that I have no desire for land forces or long-term involvement in this civil war, however abhorrent both sides are. I am grateful that both the Government and the Opposition have made that point clear. The reality of the situation is that we are only discussing the limited use of potential air strikes to diminish chemical weapons capacity.
I welcome the Prime Minister’s approach in holding the debate today, the decision to hold a second debate in the future, the publication of the JIC report and the Attorney-General’s legal summary. I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for the meeting yesterday. The revised motion gives a stronger and greater role to the
United Nations. If anybody could urge the United Nations to resolve this, all of us would do so. Both the motion and the amendment seek the UN’s assistance. Whether we would be able to achieve that is a separate matter.
On usage and evidence, many have made the case that there is widespread and extensive evidence—from multiple intelligence agencies and the Arab League—of the repeated use by Assad of chemical weapons in the past couple of years, certainly in excess of a dozen times. All participants admit the usage on
I am listening carefully to my hon. Friend’s analysis of the UN. The General Assembly is about to meet. Does he agree that using the General Assembly as a mechanism by which we could obtain a recommendation for action in Syria would be a sensible option for us to consider before exhausting all mechanisms within the UN?
I completely endorse that. In Kosovo in 1999 there were three broadly supported UN resolutions. Although not enough to get over the UN hurdle that we seek to overcome, they did provide assistance and support that such a course would entail. We have to address what the legal basis is for any proposed action by the British or other international troops.
I will make one point. I very carefully studied United Nations Security Council resolutions in 1992 as an authority for action. It is only the Security Council of the UN, as it is currently constituted, that will give authority for international action under article 6 or article 7.
With no disrespect to my hon. Friend—my honourable and respected military friend—I disagree. Subsequent to 1991, the responsibility to protect protocols were introduced, particularly post-1999 in Kosovo. I accept that we are not in a UN article 51 charter case. We are not acting in self defence. We are not, as a nation, in any way threatened. However, the process of R2P does allow NATO to act when certain preconditions, as set out in the Attorney-General’s guidance, are maintained.
On this particular point, I urge my hon. Friend Bob Stewart and anyone who is concerned about this issue to go through the Attorney-General’s guidance, which has been published today. An objective has to be identified. In this case, it would be the objective of attempting to stop the specific spread and repeated use of chemical weapons. There could be little doubt that such an outrage constituted a humanitarian disaster, and we would need to be satisfied that every means, short of force, had been taken to resolve this specific situation in Syria. To that end, the revision of the motion and the encouragement of the UN makes specific the assistance on this particular problem that a military officer, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham, would have previously had in those circumstances. We would then have to consider that the proposed action was the only means to averting further and immediate human catastrophe. As the Attorney-General made clear, the force proposed would need to be both proportionate and specifically directed to stop the possible future use of chemical weapons.
I have already mentioned the example of Kosovo in 1999, but historians and lawyers could set out similar actions. Action was taken in Liberia in 1990 and elsewhere in the past 20 years. Surely the point is this: R2P was brought in to address the question of whether, as a last resort, humanitarian intervention is authorised under international law. We are clearly not yet in that situation, but the power to act and a lawful course are clearly set out.
Today is not about military action or involvement in another country’s civil war; all agree that the issue is not about boots on the ground. It is about a war crime—the massive use of chemical weapons—and several countries in the world attempting to prevent the extended and further use of such weapons. Before any further specific action is taken, the House will have a second debate and will be provided, I hope, with an understanding of our objectives and strategy, the upsides of action or inaction, and an exit policy. I welcome and support the revised motion on those grounds.
I am glad to have this opportunity to take part in this important debate. It seems that tonight Parliament has stepped back from the brink of giving the Prime Minister carte blanche to involve British forces in the bombing of Syria this weekend. I believe that the British public, whatever political party they support, will be glad that we have done so. We know—the polls tell us—that the public are overwhelmingly against such a military strike. The British public do not want to be drawn into yet another war in the middle east. They have seen that movie and know how it ends.
For the avoidance of doubt, I should say that had I been pressed by my own party to vote on a motion that authorised the bombing of Syria, in the current state of knowledge, I was always going to vote no—whatever the pressures and consequences. It would not have been a party political gesture, which some Government Members have mentioned. I was one of the Labour MPs who voted against their own Government on Iraq. I say to Government Members who may be wondering what to do tonight that I have never had reason to regret that vote.
It seems that the Prime Minister may be coming back to the House of Commons to authorise his war, and it may be helpful for me to set out my reservations as matters stand. The first question is about the facts. Have chemical weapons been used and who has deployed them? I heard what the Prime Minister said about the
Joint Intelligence Committee and I know the opinion of Vice-President Biden. It is clear that the balance of probability is that Assad used chemical weapons. However, whatever the Americans say and the Joint Intelligence Committee conjectures, I do not believe that it is wise entirely to rule out the possibility that the chemical weapons were wielded by Assad’s opponents.
In these circumstances, we always have to ask, “Cui bono?”—“Who benefits?” Assad’s opponents know that only chemical weapons would trigger a reluctant President Obama to authorise a military intervention. Whatever the Prime Minister says, a military strike would inevitably tilt the scales of the civil war in favour of Assad’s opponents. Earlier, we heard that the UN investigator Carla Del Ponte said in May:
“according to testimonies we have gathered, the rebels have used chemical weapons, making use of sarin gas”.
They did it in May, and they may have done it again.
My other point is about legality. I have heard a lot about Kosovo and how in some sense it sets a precedent for this Syrian war. At the time of the Kosovan war, I was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We carried out a major inquiry into Kosovo, taking a great deal of evidence about its legality. We took oral evidence from Professor Christopher Greenwood QC, Mark Littman QC and Professor Vaughan Lowe, among others, and there was a whole host of written evidence from others. What the all-party Select Committee concluded was that the Kosovo operation
“was contrary to the specific terms of what might be termed the basic law of the international community”.
We went on:
“at the very least, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current international customary law, and…this renders NATO action legally questionable.”
Those who want to rest the argument for a Syrian war on the Kosovan precedent need to read their law again.
Finally, let me say this. In the run-up to the Iraq war, Colin Powell cited the Pottery Barn rule—Pottery Barn is a string of American china shops. The rule is, “You break it? You own it.” The notion that we can make a military intervention on the narrow point of chemical weapons is disingenuous to say the least. Were we to intervene militarily in Syria, we would take ownership of the outcome of the civil war. I see no endgame, no idea of what victory would look like in those circumstances.
I am glad to be here to speak for my constituents. I will be glad to follow my leader into the Lobby tonight, but in my view we cannot support war in the House unless it has the stamp of the United Nations.
Order. I am afraid that in the past hour and a half there have been only 11 Back-Bench contributions, as everybody has taken his or her full time and interventions. The consequence is that a lot of people want to speak but there is little time for them to do so. The limit is reduced to three minutes with immediate effect.
Bashar al-Assad is a very lucky man. Were we having this debate in 2002, following an attack on
Assad is lucky, of course, that we are having this debate not in 2002, but in 2013. The year 2003, which so many have referred to, intervened. We must not beat around the bush—Tony Blair and his Administration were dishonest. The result has been to injure our democracy to a degree that no other single action has done, I believe, in the 85 years since women gained full voting equality. And so we are in a position now where our decision now is being influenced by that failure in 2003, and we are asked to draw lessons from that.
If the rebels were found to have used chemical weapons, would we feel it was fine for the Russians to bomb them, using the same basis as that for our proposed intervention?
One of the problems of this debate is the number of counter-factuals that people have put before the House; the Prime Minister has answered a variation of the hon. Gentleman’s.
We are dealing with facts, in this instance, where most people agree that the full likelihood is that President Assad has bombed his own people. We are asked to draw lessons, in coming to a conclusion on this matter, from the experience of 2003. One of the principal lessons is that we should expect our leaders to act with transparency, conviction, consistency and principle and to accommodate colleagues who have doubts and be responsive to their concerns. I do not think that, on many of these points, President Obama, President Hollande or our own Prime Minister can be faulted.
But a lesson is not an excuse to prevaricate with questions of increasing sophistry. It is not an excuse to change one’s mind at the first whiff of political opportunity. It is not an excuse to come to the House with a view different from the one that might have been professed in private and public some days before.
If we allow this ghost of Iraq to influence our decision in this important debate, we risk a double calamity. Because in not considering those things that we should do, we risk not intervening when we should because we intervened when we should not have. The victims in that would not just be international humanitarian law, which without force is meaningless and a dead letter. The victims would not only be the Syrian people, who will then be attacked with Assad knowing that he would get no response. The victim also could be our own Parliament, which was shown to have lacked resolve and conviction when it knows what it is right to do.
The situation in Syria and the surrounding area is catastrophic—at least 100,000 people have been killed and 2 million have been forced to flee the country, with the refugee camp at Zaatari alone containing an estimated 130,000 people, half of whom are under 18. It is difficult to ensure that aid reaches those still inside Syria—in some areas, it is impossible—or even to know their situation. Over the past two years, the international community has stood on the sidelines. Some countries, including the United Kingdom, have provided funds and resources for the refugees in the surrounding countries, but the numbers leaving Syria get larger by the day, as we have seen recently with the thousands crossing into the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
Many countries say that the situation in Syria is difficult and that intervention from outside would make it worse, and we have heard that argument time and time again today. However, the situation has got progressively worse without intervention. Are there any signs that it will get better? It is beyond question that everyone here would prefer a negotiated diplomatic solution to the crisis, but despite the considerable efforts of many, including the Foreign Secretary, all attempts at obtaining a United Nations Security Council resolution to try to secure that have proved impossible. It is clear that any moves at the UN would be vetoed by Moscow and Beijing. Russian and Chinese support for Assad means that there is little incentive for him to make meaningful concessions or even to discuss a ceasefire. But now the use of chemical weapons has escalated the crisis. The Joint Intelligence Committee has confirmed today that the Syrian regime has used lethal chemical weapons on 14 occasions since 2012, and the world has done nothing. However, last week’s large attack has led to international condemnation and, I believe, a determination to do something.
Some argue that last week there was not a chemical attack and a few say that such an attack was carried out by someone other than the Assad regime, but I believe Assad to be responsible. I accept the judgment of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It has concluded that
“there are no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility.”
We have known for years—this is by Assad’s own admission—that Syria has chemical weapons. Intelligence leads us to believe that they can be delivered on a variety of platforms. To those who are not persuaded by the need to relieve the humanitarian crisis and who say, “Intervention has nothing to do with us; it will play into the hands of al-Qaeda”, I say that the reverse is true. We can and must intervene.
The hon. Lady is making a powerful point eloquently. Does she agree that although we have heard a lot this evening and earlier today about the risks of taking action, there are also risks in not taking action?
There are clearly risks in not taking action; for more than two years we have not taken action. We should have been having this debate two years ago. We should have been doing something two years ago. Our delay has led to there being no good options. We have heard time and again today about why we should not do something, but I say that we have a responsibility here. The UN’s doctrine of a responsibility to protect, which was born out of those humanitarian disasters of the 1990s, is widely accepted and must be invoked. If a diplomatic initiative at this stage could succeed, we would, of course, all prefer it to military action, but at the moment it seems to me that diplomatic and peace efforts have completely failed.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition stated that the amendment will enable action to be taken even without a Security Council resolution and, on that basis, I will support it. Kofi Annan said when he resigned last year that
“as an envoy, I can’t want peace more than the protagonists, more than the security council or the international community”.
The Assad regime, bolstered with units of the Iranian republican guard and Hezbollah, wants to win, whatever it takes in lives and misery. Are we really going to continue to sit on the sidelines wringing our hands?
I know that the Prime Minister would have preferred us to be debating a motion that provided the necessary sanction for military intervention in Syria, and many have welcomed the Government’s altered position and motion, with some congratulating them on it. Perhaps that has arisen as a result of the circumstances in which they find themselves. The motion is certainly different from the one they intended to bring forward when they were seeking to recall Parliament two days ago. Although today’s motion waters things down, rows back or back-pedals to a certain extent, it still softens up Parliament, crosses a threshold and puts a firm foot on the slippery slope towards military intervention in Syria by creating a climate and the mood music which makes it easier for such action to be taken in future.
The motion may be a tactical decision—perhaps an artifice—taken to paper over cracks in what is, without question, a difficult situation, given the range of views within the Government, but we are now on that slippery slope. I will leave aside what I may think about the appalling Assad regime. I accept that, on the balance of probability, there is little plausible explanation for the chemical attack other than that it was carried out either by a rogue commander or under the instruction of the Assad regime—that is almost certain. However, I still do not believe that that justifies military attacks or that it would be wise for it to result in them.
There has been a lot of speculation about the consequences of taking such action. If we say that Assad has behaved irrationally in using chemical weapons in the first place, the risk is that the proposed military intervention will mean he is likely to become even more irrational. The situation may escalate into war and may involve other countries stepping in. We do not know which direction this is going. No one has persuaded me this afternoon either that such action will quell the situation or that it will not make it worse. We also need to consider the risk of mission creep. We may be saying that a war crime has been committed, but war crimes have been going on in Syria and in other civil wars in the past 10 years over which the international community has failed to take any action. In Syria alone, innocent children and non-combatants been killed. What is the difference between killing a child with a conventional weapon—
So many speakers seem to have offered the choice between military action or doing nothing, but I do not think that anybody is suggesting that we should do nothing. If there is a war crime, there is a war criminal. We are talking about an international crime, the action that should be taken is against the war criminal responsible and that does not necessarily mean military action.
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about that. I say that instead of bombing them with bombs, let us bomb them with diplomacy, humanitarian aid, shelter, support, humanitarian corridors, and international negotiations with Iran and other neighbouring countries in order to address this issue. We should do that instead of carrying out the kind of surgical strikes proposed here today.
I return to what I was saying a moment ago. What is the difference between an innocent child—a non-combatant—being killed by a conventional weapon and that child being killed with a chemical weapon? It does not much matter to them or their family, because it is still a horrendous death of an innocent. We therefore need to ask whether we are being consistent in saying that this is the red line and it is appropriate for us to take this action. The key point, and the reason I am saying it is not just about the words on the page but what is between the lines, the context and having had Parliament recalled for this debate, is that it sends out a message to others that we are already on this slippery slope—the context is already there. What happens if in the next few days the intelligence suggests that the chemical weapons are being moved around the country? This Parliament cannot be called back, but other nations, such as the US and France, may see this debate and the vote we have this evening as sufficient sanction—perhaps an amber light or even a green one—to their taking military action in Syria.
When the Prime Minister performed his U-turn yesterday on taking action this weekend, I wondered what we would be debating today. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow Foreign Secretary on forcing the Prime Minister to do a handbrake turn over the action we were clearly called back to vote on today. The Prime Minister may have changed the text of the motion, but he certainly made the same hawkish speech today. I do not accept that wanting to exhaust all the avenues with the United Nations is somehow an argument for doing nothing.
I heard the Deputy Prime Minister being interviewed this morning on the “Today” programme, and it was not his finest hour. He said that this was an atrocity that could not be ignored, which I accept, and that he did not want ours to be remembered as the generation that sat idly by, but our motion does not suggest doing that. He then said that the Government were seeking a mandate for a limited response. There we have it. That is why we are here today; the Government are seeking a mandate for a limited response, which is why our amendment is necessary and needs to be supported. Their intention was not to wait for the UN process to be exhausted, but to take precipitate action.
What is a limited response? We have no mandate to punish—that is not our role—so what is the objective? Who or what is the target? It has been suggested that we aim to “deter” and “degrade” chemical weapons. These are technical terms quite often used to make it easier for us to vote in favour of military action. We have also heard about “precision strikes”, “selective strikes”, “technical strikes” and the intention to “degrade”. We even have civilian deaths described as “collateral damage”. These are all terms used to convince us that we should vote in favour of a strike, but how do we contain a missile attack on a chemical weapons dump or manufacturing centre? How do we ensure that no civilians die? Would those deaths be acceptable? Would they somehow be laudable for having been created by us, rather than by chemical weapons?
We do not have an end plan, a strategy for what we want to achieve with an incisive strike or an exit strategy. We have been here before. I voted against a similar motion when my Government attempted this in 2003, and exactly the same things are being said today.
This has been a great two days for Parliament; I think we have won. This time yesterday morning, the motion would have been used to justify war, perhaps this very weekend. War is not going to happen. The Prime Minister has listened to his Back Benchers. We made it perfectly clear to our Whips yesterday afternoon that we were not prepared to vote for any motion that justified war, and so the Prime Minister has offered us another motion. This is not a motion for war. I will not vote for war. I would never vote for war against Syria. If there is a second vote, I will definitely vote against, but I do not believe there ever will be a second vote, because I do not believe that the parliamentary arithmetic stacks up. It does not stack up because MPs are doing their job and listening to what the public want, and the voice of the public is completely clear: they do not want war. They are scarred by what went on in Iraq. We were lied to in Parliament and we are not going to go down that route again. I voted against the Iraq war and I will vote against this one.
What would it achieve? That is what we must ask ourselves. Why is it any of our business? Has Syria ever been a colony? Has it ever been in our sphere of interest? Has it ever posed the remotest threat to the British people? Our job in Parliament is to look after our own people. Our economy is not in very good shape. Neither are our social services, schools or hospitals. It is our job to think about problems here. If I am told that we are burying our heads in the sand, I would ask: are there anguished debates in other Parliaments all over Europe about whether to bomb Syria? No, they are getting on with running their own countries, and so should we.
If we were to punish—that is the word that springs to mind—every appalling regime by dropping missiles on it, would missiles not be criss-crossing the skies on a daily basis?
Absolutely. Although we have spoken with great moral certitude in this debate, the fact is that our contribution to an attack on Syria would be infinitesimal. Have we not degraded our own armed forces in the past three years, contrary to repeated warnings from myself and others? Do we have an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean? In reality, we would simply be hanging on to the coat tails of President Obama. He was foolish enough to issue a red line. His credibility is on the line, not the credibility of the British people or ourselves. We do not have to follow him in this foolish gesture.
We know that we cannot destroy the chemical stocks of President Assad. We know that we can only degrade them. We know that no significant group in Syria would praise us, apart from these famous rebels, whom we have been supporting over the past two years. Who are these rebels? Does the west seriously want Assad to lose power? Do we want him replaced by a regime that includes Sunni jihadists? That is why we have over the years been buttressing what has been a stable regime. It is simply not in our national interest to bomb Syria. It would not degrade his chemical stocks and it might result in more pressure being placed on minorities in Syria.
I am listening carefully to what my hon. Friend is saying and he is making some very powerful points. Is he aware of comments from Sir Andrew Green, chairman of Migration Watch and formerly a respected ambassador to Damascus, who has said in the last couple of days that if the regime was to fall, chaos would follow, because the kind of jihadists to whom my hon. Friend has referred would take control, which would be hugely against the interests of the UK?
Absolutely. We have heard very little about what is happening on the ground in Syria. How many of those who have spoken with such moral certainty have actually visited Syria? I must confess I have only been there once, but as far as I could see, the minorities were protected. The 2 million Christians are protected by Assad. What will be their fate when Assad falls? What will be the fate of the 2 million Alawites? What will be the fate of the 22 other minorities? How much does the House know about what is actually happening in Syria? Yet we believe that we, who know so little about the complexities of the situation, have the moral right to commit execution on people. That is what we are talking about. We cannot send cruise missiles into a country without killing people. That is what we would be doing. What right has the House to say with any certainty that we know what went on that day? What right have we to say that we can sort out the situation? No, there is a better way—the way of peace and diplomacy, not of war. I cannot, therefore, support the motion tonight. I give some credit to the Prime Minister, but I will not vote for the motion.
This debate inevitably takes place in the shadow of the decision taken in the House a decade ago to go to war with Iraq, and it is absolutely right that we learn from that experience, but the past should inform us rather than imprison us. After the experience of the 20th century, chemical weapons are rightly regarded with unique horror by the world.
It is completely understandable, in the light of the decision taken by this House a decade ago, that people want to know more about the facts of the use of chemical weapons this time. That is why it is right that we should look closely at the facts and at the reports, and analyse them very carefully. The bar to action is necessarily higher now because of the experience of the past decade. But in asking questions and calling for evidence, it is important that this is done as a means of taking a decision rather than a means of avoiding a decision. Let us see the evidence and the reports, but let us not escape the fact that we will still have a responsibility to decide; if not tonight, then very soon.
If the lesson that we drew from Iraq was that we must never again intervene, that military action could never again take place where repression was taking place and that it is impossible to act no matter how brutal a dictator is being to his own people, and if our policy was governed by a world-weary resignation that these issues are difficult and complex and therefore there is little that we can do, then I say that would be a dismal conclusion for victims of repression around the world. It would also be an open recognition of the diminished stance and capability of the international community, and it would beg the question as to what international law banning chemical weapons would mean if it could not be enforced.
For many in this Chamber such as me, it is not about not taking action; it is about what that action is and what it is seeking to achieve. Action that is taken that makes things worse creates a worse situation.
I understand the fears expressed by my hon. Friend, but for the reasons I have set out, I believe that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was right in his speech and in the amendment not to rule out military action. People say that it is difficult and complex, and of course it is. We cannot predict with certainty the consequences of action. But difficulty and complexity cannot be reasons to give dictators the right to do as they wish to their own people. Difficulty and complexity cannot be justifications for abandoning people to their fate, including death through the use of chemical weapons. In terms of consistency, the fact that we cannot do everything and that we do not act in every circumstance is not a reason never to act, whatever the circumstances.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s last statement, but the issue of consistency is important. The question in the minds of the public, and many of us in the House tonight, is, “Why in some cases and not in others?” Surely in order to reassure the public, we need to have a clear framework as to how these decisions are taken.
The use of the fact that we have not acted in the past where perhaps we should have done as an argument against action in every circumstance is, in the end, a counsel of despair and an abdication of our responsibilities.
I do not believe that tonight’s votes are the key because I do not think that this is the debate or the motion that the Government intended. But that decision and that key debate is coming. We will soon be faced with the decision and the responsibility as to what we, as permanent members of the UN Security Council and as people who have stood up against repression in the past, will do in the face of chemical weapons being used against innocent civilians. That decision is coming soon and we will have to take it.
I have listened carefully to the debate all afternoon, and for me there are two occasions where military action can be justified. The first is where British interests are imminently threatened, and clearly that is not the case in this particular debate. The other is as part of a UN-sponsored humanitarian mission to prevent dictators from causing damage to their own people. I am not convinced that the Government have made that case this evening. The reality is this; there is an evil dictator, but the opposition to that evil dictator is even worse. These are people who will oppose the west at all costs and will cause damage to their own people. They are barbaric and inhuman and we should not support them in any shape or form. I would not support any regime change, or attempted regime change.
I am delighted that the Prime Minister and the Government have moved substantially over the past few days on the motion and on the rhetoric behind it. I will make clear my personal position: I will not support any military intervention at all. Should there be a second vote in this Chamber, I will oppose military intervention, because I think that it is wrong in principle. I say that for several reasons.
First, we are talking about a country involved in a civil war at the moment, and we intervene at our cost. Also, Syria is adjacent to Lebanon and Israel. The border between Syria and Israel has been peaceful for about 40 years. If we escalate the violence, do we not think that the Syrians and the Russians will react? We then escalate the problem of the middle east conflict. At the moment, this House has endorsed the principle of direct peace talks between the Palestinians and the Israeli Government. What do we think the reaction would be if we acted against Syria and then Syria reacted against Britain and potentially other countries in the region? That would destabilise those talks and probably end the chances of peace in the middle east for ever. That is the key issue.
The other thing that we must consider is that Syria is a satellite state of Russia. Do we think that the Russian Government will sit idly by and allow the US and Britain to bomb one of their satellite states? They will react in some way, shape or form. So we should be clear that, if we embark on military action, there will be direct military consequences for the whole region and for this country. We should send a message to President Assad, if we are convinced that he and his regime are responsible for the chemical attacks, to say, “Identify those who are responsible. Make them come before the criminal courts,” so that they can be punished in the best way possible, through due process of law.
We are asked by the Government tonight to approve a so-called strong humanitarian response, with the implication of using force in principle and a second vote after the UN inspectors have reported, but there is no case in international law for this military attack—neither with a UN Security Council resolution authorising it, nor under article 51 of the UN charter, which permits a right of self-defence, but that clearly does not apply to a chemical gas attack in eastern Damascus, as that is obviously not an attack on another state. That is why the Prime Minister switched today to quoting long-standing international conventions that prohibit the use of chemical weapons. However, nothing in those conventions inherently allows other nations to take military action against such a state just because it has used chemical weapons—certainly not without wider international sanctions.
There is a second argument: what exactly—I have listened all day—is the aim of the military strike? Will it realistically succeed in achieving those goals? The stated aim is to hit Assad’s military targets, but not the chemical weapons, obviously, for fear of releasing poison gas into the atmosphere. Whatever else, this will certainly not be a short, surgical strike. I remind the House that it took 78 days of continuous bombing of Serbia before the Milosevic regime could be shifted from Kosovo, and only then when the US and UK threatened a land invasion. Even leaving that aside, no one has answered the question what will happen if the attack is made and Assad retaliates by using chemical weapon attacks on perhaps a greater scale, as his sites are all over Syria.
Let us not forget that Syria is no Libya. It is far stronger than Libya, with far more disciplined and larger armed forces, and it is still powerfully backed and reinforced by Russia. At worst, there is a very real danger of the west being sucked into a long-term war that it cannot win and that will only expose its impotence, as has happened already in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
None of that is to say that we should do nothing. We should press to have Assad arraigned before the International Criminal Court. We should freeze Syrian assets throughout the west. We should impose travel bans on all members of the Syrian leadership deemed responsible for the atrocities. Above all, we should press much harder for a regional peace conference, to achieve a settlement involving all the relevant parties, including the Russians. That is the only way to settle this conflict.
It is a great pleasure to follow Mr Meacher. He made a powerful point, to which I want to return a little later.
May I thank you, Mr Speaker, and the Prime Minister for recalling Parliament? Today’s debate was absolutely necessary. It has been a very good debate. Party politics have not been involved. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have argued different points of view. That is what is good about today.
I have been under no pressure from my Whip to vote one way or the other. That is a really good sign. Hon. Members are wrestling today with a very difficult issue. I find these occasions, when we have to decide what is morally right and whether or not we will kill people and whether, by killing them, we save other people in the long run, immensely difficult. I have made it clear to the Prime Minister that I have not made up my mind tonight, and that my decision will rely entirely on the summing up by the Deputy Prime Minister—[Interruption.] I would like to thank the Deputy Prime Minister for spending much of the afternoon listening to the debate.
Thank goodness we have a British parliamentary democracy. We MPs can come here and influence the decision of the Executive. Everybody knows that MPs from both sides of the House have influenced the Prime Minister to change the position of the Executive. In the States, there are 100 Congressmen begging the President to let them debate the issue. We are so much better off in this House.
In response to what the right hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton said, the question is indeed what we should do to solve this exceptionally difficult problem, because just bombing will not solve it. There needs to be a disproportionate response. What I think President Obama has done is to have got out “The West Wing” series and looked at what President Bartlet would have done under the circumstances. There is exactly that episode: “If we bomb Damascus airport, we are going to kill thousands of people, but they will never do it again.” Of course, the expert then says, “If you do that, the whole world will be against you.” The President asks “Well, what do we do?” and the reply is, “You just bomb a few buildings, which have been emptied because everybody knows which buildings are going to be bombed.” The President says, “That will have no effect,” but the experts say, “Yes, but that is actually what you have to do. You have to have a response.” That may be how it works in America, but it does not work like that here.
I am very interested in one point that I hope the Deputy Prime Minister will help us with tonight. If we vote against the motion and both motions happen to be lost, does it mean that there is no guarantee that there will be a second vote in this House?
I shall be brief. My principal question to pose to the Treasury Bench is, what happens next if Assad does not stop his outrages? My hon. Friend Hugh Bayley posed that question to the Prime Minister and got no satisfactory answer, so let me pose it to the Deputy Prime Minister.
I refer tangentially to the sensible comments of Dr Lewis, who I see in his place. I also think it important for the Security and Intelligence Committee or an appropriate group of parliamentary colleagues to be apprised of some of the intelligence information. It is hugely important that we understand where the weapons are, whether they are mobile and what volumes we are talking about. We appreciate that a lot of people are working on that.
When we hear the advice coming from such an august body of colleagues, I believe that we will conclude that the guidance in the Attorney-General’s report is almost unachievable; indeed, it will be unachievable. The problem we must face—the House must be mature about it—is that if we are to achieve either the goals set out in the Government’s motion or the programme of events set out in the Opposition amendment, that will almost inevitably mean putting boots on the ground. Now everyone is saying that we are not in favour of that, and I am certain that that is the view across the country. Before we get to a debate next week, it is hugely important that the analysis is done and that the House is apprised of it in a mature way, recognising the need for security considerations.
I am sure my hon. Friend has noticed in this debate that no thought has been given by the Prime Minister—or, for that matter, the Deputy Prime Minister, who will be winding up—about the consequences for the aftermath. Are we going to be in another situation like Iraq, for example, where no thought was given to the aftermath?
My hon. Friend is quite right. I am sure that those discussions are happening in private, but the Attorney-General’s briefing, a welcome document, refers entirely to the humanitarian issues. Let me repeat the sentence I cited earlier:
“Such an intervention would be directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and the minimum judged necessary for that purpose”.
The motion, the amendments and the advice before us tonight are about that point, and that point alone. But can we achieve that goal by means of a clinical operation? It is my assertion that that is not possible.
Before we have a further debate, therefore, that analysis needs to take place. Members need to be properly briefed, recognising the sensitivities of some of those briefing issues, so that we can make a decision fully informed of all the facts, because these are hugely important issues. I do not believe for a moment that it is possible to take out the chemical weapons capacity remotely. Does that mean it is special forces on the ground—ours or other people’s? We need to understand such issues fully before we take the decision next week. I hope that Members on the Treasury Bench take those points seriously.
Our long debate today has served two valuable purposes. First, it has served to underline the huge complexity of the issues before the House and the country. As one who came to the debate as a sceptic about military intervention, I have found it extremely useful and I hope that the country and the newspapers will have observed that Parliament is taking this issue very seriously.
Secondly, the debate has served a valuable purpose in enabling the Prime Minister and the Government to set out their precise position. In that respect, the categoric statement by the Prime Minister that it is not the Government’s intention to get involved in the wider Syrian civil war is hugely welcome. As many hon. Members have said, the message that we are getting from our constituents throughout the country is that there is no appetite for further military intervention by this country when no British national interest can be identified. I personally indorse the remarks made by my hon. Friend Sir Edward Leigh about the nature of the opposition in Syria, many of whom, I think, are absolutely disgusting. I cannot see, personally, that there is much likelihood of a better flavour of regime than the present one; my hon. Friend Bob Blackman made that point too.
The Prime Minister has made it clear that he is talking about a specific, narrowly focused response to the use of chemical weapons. That is the sole objective. My colleague the former Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend Dr Fox, said that doing nothing was equal to appeasement, and that the two issues could be kept completely separate. I am not sure that is possible, but just simply focusing—
Can the right hon. Gentleman reconcile the two statements—that one can be involved in military action and somehow keep out of the civil war in Syria? Surely that action involves us, necessarily, in that civil war.
The hon. Gentleman makes an entirely valid point. That is a question that, as parliamentarians, we are entitled to ask: to what extent would the nature of the operation that the Government are proposing constitute taking sides? Hon. Members have made that point already, but let me address my concerns about the clinical strike.
I fully understand the argument that doing nothing would send a green light, that there would be further atrocities by Assad or others, and that it would send a message to others in possession of chemical weapons that they could get away, with impunity, with using those revolting weapons. There are extremely difficult issues here. However, we need to ask ourselves some questions. If it is the Government’s position that there is a narrowly defined objective, which is to send the message, “This is unacceptable. We do not wish to get involved in the wider civil war, but we wish to send you a message, ‘Do this again to your people and you will be zapped,’” I believe that we have the military means to deliver a precision strike. However, I think we need to ask ourselves, “What would the consequences be?” Mr Straw asked the question: “What if this does not work and Assad continues? What then do we do?” What is the response of Russia likely to be? As parliamentarians, it is entirely right and proper that we ask such questions on behalf of ourselves and our constituents. That is what the country expects and I hope the Government will provide some answers to those points. If this does not work, what happens then? Will we get our hand in the mangle and be drawn into further military operations beyond clinical strikes? I expect to support the Government tonight because I think the Opposition have been playing politics with this issue.
The options in Syria have never been easy or risk free, and today all options are bad ones. The reality is that in the past two and a half years, the international community has betrayed those secular, enthusiastic people who tried to get democratic change in their country. Because of our hang-ups about our past, because President Obama was not interested, and because of Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council, we have not given support, and that has led to the brutality, radicalisation and extremism that we confront today.
This debate has not made me proud. I am sad and I believe it tells me something about our country today when I hear people saying, “It’s none of our business” and “We shouldn’t get involved” when 100,000 people are dead and 4 million displaced from their homes. Today, increasing numbers of Kurds are fleeing Syria to go to the Kurdish region of Iraq where Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons to kill the Kurds in the Anfal campaign in 1988, yet nobody seems to realise the significance of that.
I have reservations about both the Government motion and the Opposition amendment because I believe they are inadequate. They both talk about deterring the future use of chemical weapons, but I do not think one can deter the use of chemical weapons simply by firing missiles symbolically—a “shot across the bow”, or whatever phrase President Obama used. I think the strategy the United States is about to launch is doomed to fail in its objectives.
The hon. Gentleman is extremely knowledgeable about Syria and I am extremely concerned about the implications for the wider region if we launch military action—heaven forbid that we agree to do so. Will he outline to the House his assessment of the implications of military action for the wider region?
If military action is simply based on the kind of inadequate gesture politics that we seem to have coming from across the Atlantic, it will be a disaster and will inflame the people in the region. I believe, however, that non-involvement and non-intervention also has consequences, the most serious of which is that simply saying we will deter the future use of chemical weapons assumes that only the Assad regime will possess such weapons. What happens when areas of the country where chemical weapons are stored are overrun by elements of the jihadist-linked opposition who get them and pass them to al-Qaeda? What happens when, to try to secure some of those weapons and not let them get into the hands of the opposition, Assad gives them to his ally, Hezbollah, which tries to take them for potential use against Israel or elsewhere?
We must talk not only about deterrence but about the removal and ultimately the destruction of those chemical weapon stockpiles that date back to when the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia provided them to Assad’s father and his regime. I believe that these issues will be with us, however we vote today, next week and next year. In three or four years’ time we will still be confronting the issue of chemical weapons and we must get real about that. I will be supporting the Opposition amendment today, but I think we must go further.
I want to explain why I cannot support the motion. The House is predicated on procedure and rules—we seek fairness in things—but the very first sentence of the motion states that the House:
“Deplores the use of chemical weapons in Syria on
We have gone from an assumption to a declaration that we know that Assad did that. I could not support that under any circumstances, because I believe in some form of due process that identifies the perpetrator. We have the opportunity to do so. The Labour party amendment would take out the possibility of doing the thing that most offends most other people around the world—power determining the outcome irrespective of the facts.
I am also a victim—if I can put it that way—of past judgments, dossiers and information. In the Prime Minister’s speech, he used only the words “highly likely”—taken from the JIC’s observations. I can see no other reason, but we normally seek to ask, “Cui bono?” No one has given a plausible explanation of why, with UN investigators in Damascus, the Assad regime would want to let off these weapons there and then. I cannot give an explanation for the actions of the most odious and horrible regime. Two generations of Assad have been prepared to slaughter. We are now faced with an empty land of hope, to which we contribute little if anything, because of our lack of knowledge of lands beyond our understanding. It was a French colony; we are British.
We ought to reject the concept that we have already tried the regime and therefore should push to war. I want my constituents to know why I cannot support a motion predicated on such a thought.
The fundamental judgment that we all must make this evening and over the next week or two, as individuals and as a House, is whether military intervention in Syria by foreign countries, including our own, is more likely to end the civil war or to add fuel to the fire, perhaps in the ways my hon. Friend Mike Gapes has suggested. I do not believe the Prime Minister made the case today that intervention will do more good than harm.
The Prime Minister argues in his motion that
“a strong humanitarian response is required” and I agree with that. A humanitarian response is needed to protect civilians, but how can it be a humanitarian response to propose to use UK military might to protect Syrian civilians from one class of weapons—chemical weapons—but not to use it to protect civilians from conventional weapons, which have of course killed far more of the 100,000 dead so far in this civil war? In effect, such a proposal gives the Assad regime impunity to continue to use guns, bombs and missiles as long as they are conventionally armed and not armed with chemical weapons.
Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. He was absolutely wrong, because war is qualitatively different from diplomatic action, from humanitarian relief, and from the kind of action we have taken hitherto on the crisis in Syria. It is qualitatively different because, by taking military action, we become involved in the conflict morally and in international law, and because we require young British servicemen and women to fight and risk their lives. I do not believe that we should shoulder the first burden, and nor should we ask our military personnel to shoulder the second one—to risk their lives—without having a credible plan to bring the Syrian conflict to an end. The Prime Minister did not set out such a plan today.
Would it not have been so much better if the frenetic activity of the past few days to try to build international support for military action had been devoted to trying to build international support for a peace conference?
Yes. I do not rule out the possibility that in future circumstances might be such that I support military action, but an overwhelming, international shared objective would have to be built around a military plan that appeared credible as a way of ending this conflict.
We know that it is much easier to start military action than it is to bring it successfully to a conclusion. After the first Gulf war the decision was taken not to topple Saddam but to impose a no-fly zone to prevent him from using his weapons of mass destruction. We and the Americans alone, under a UN mandate, operated that no-fly zone at a cost of millions of pounds for more than a decade, but it failed to bring Saddam to heel and eventually it escalated into the second, controversial Iraq war. Once a small military step is taken, conflicts are likely to escalate because of the uncertainty involved in military action. If the Government want the support of the House and of our people, they need to provide a clear strategy for managing a military campaign.
In 1990, the brutal regime of President Assad senior ruled three quarters of Lebanon. I was on a visit to east Beirut, part of the free enclave, when the Syrian army broke through and captured the rest of the city. A few weeks after the fighting, they butchered, in cold blood, a friend of mine, and when they found his five-year-old son hiding under the bed they killed him too. I have never since had any illusions about how evil this man is, but I have healthy respect for how rational and clever he and his horrible allies, Hezbollah, are.
I and my friends who live in Lebanon are convinced that when Hezbollah’s star began to fade under the emerging Lebanese democracy—the Cedar revolution—Hezbollah manufactured a border incident with Israel to bring on a bombardment that hugely strengthened Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon.
I firmly believe that President Assad was responsible for this atrocity, and although I do not know why he did it I would not rule out the possibility, which bears a little thinking about, that the election of President Rouhani in Iran was a disaster for Assad and Hezbollah. One of the best ways of undermining the tentative moves President Rouhani might make to build links with the opposition and a more peaceful attitude to the west would be western bombing.
I support two things that the Prime Minister brought out very strongly, the first of which is that we will go through the UN process and take it as far as we can. I agree that we cannot make the UN process, successfully overcoming the veto in every case, an absolute requirement. There might, for example, be an occasion when a vital British interest is threatened but we cannot get UN support, as well as the humanitarian examples that my right hon. Friend gave.
In saying that I shall support the Government tonight I would like to make three brief points. First, we must listen and not simply talk to countries in the neighbouring area. Secondly, we must continue to build on the excellent work we are doing in neighbouring countries, especially Lebanon and Jordan, because that is what is preventing a national horror from turning into a regional catastrophe. Thirdly, we must remember that if we take military action, and if it is to have any effect at all, we must do so with the full intention of being willing to turn up the wick if the other side responds in the wrong way, which is a sobering thought.