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With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Lords amendment 2.
Lords amendment 3, and amendments (a) and (b) thereto.
Lords amendments 4 to 15.
Lords amendment 16, and amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendments 17 to 21 and 148 to 178.
It is a pleasure to be muscling in at this late stage of our proceedings on the Bill, but I feel it is a bit of a cheek to do so given that many Members have laboured many hours over these clauses in Committee—
The hon. Gentleman was one such Member.
We are in agreement with all their lordships’ amendments, and this first group demonstrates that the Government have listened to Parliament’s concerns and have amended the Bill accordingly.
The governance of the Bank of England was one area of concern, and it was debated at length in this place and the other place. The Government agreed that the Bank’s expanded responsibilities warranted taking another look at its governance arrangements. The Treasury Committee produced an excellent report on this subject just over a year ago—I note that the Committee Chairman, my hon. Friend Mr Tyrie, is present—recommending that the Bank’s non-executive directors be given a greater role in scrutinising the Bank’s work, including the ability to commission and publish reviews of the Bank’s performance.
The current version of the Bank of England Act 1998 does not actually describe the non-executive directors as non-executive, but various amendments before us in this group will finally clarify the terminology in respect of the Bank’s court of directors by distinguishing explicitly between the non-executive and executive members.
On more substantive governance matters, amendments 3, 6 to 9, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 169, 172 and 173 fulfil the substance of the Treasury Committee’s recommendations in this area via the creation of a powerful new oversight committee made up of the non-executive directors of the Bank’s court of directors. The oversight committee’s remit covers the entirety of the Bank’s objectives and strategy. This remit is already broad enough to allow the oversight committee to look at any aspect of the Bank’s work it believes appropriate to examine, including the effectiveness of its crisis management co-ordination with the Treasury, as suggested in an amendment proposed by Chris Leslie. I am sure he will comment on that.
The oversight committee will have a statutory right to access the meetings and papers of the Financial Policy Committee and the Monetary Policy Committee, and it will have the power to commission reviews of the Bank’s performance from external experts or from the Bank’s own policy makers, and publish the reviews and monitor the Bank’s response to them. In line with the Treasury Committee report, these performance reviews will be undertaken retrospectively. The Committee recommended that they should take place at least a year after the period to be reviewed, in order to avoid second-guessing at the time of the policy decision. Just to be absolutely clear, the oversight committee’s remit to review the Bank’s performance is limited to the Bank’s objectives and strategy only; it does not extend to the Prudential Regulation Authority. The only role of the oversight committee in respect of the PRA is to determine the remuneration of the members of the PRA board. Because the PRA will be operationally independent in carrying out its statutory functions of regulation, it will be directly accountable to Parliament. The Government expect that the Treasury Committee will wish to summon the senior PRA executives and, where necessary, the non-executives to account for the PRA’s actions.
Amendment 167 will require the court of directors to publish a record of each of its meetings, fulfilling another of the Treasury Committee’s recommendations from its report. We have also listened to concerns in respect of the Financial Policy Committee, which focused on the role of economic growth in its decision making and the balance of its membership. Amendment 10 gives the FPC a secondary objective to support the Government’s economic policies, including growth, which will sit alongside existing requirements, such the brake on the FPC taking action that would damage long-term sustainable growth. Amendments 4, 5, 150, 156 and 157 aim to rebalance the FPC by removing one of the Bank members, leaving a voting membership of 10 people—five Bank members and five non-Bank members.
Amendments 16, 17 and 19 to 21 go further to increase the transparency and accountability of the FPC. The FPC will be required to prepare an explanation of each of its actions, setting out publicly the reasons for its decision to take the action and its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with the FPC’s objectives, including to contribute to economic growth, and the various factors to which it must have regard, including proportionality. The FPC is also required to include an estimate of the costs and benefits of the action, where it is reasonably practicable to do so.
Amendment 17 requires the FPC to review the decisions that it has already taken in order to consider whether the actions are still necessary, or whether they should be revoked or removed. That will help to ensure that the FPC’s directions and recommendations do not remain in place for any longer than is necessary. The FPC must publish the explanations of its actions and a summary of its reviews in the next financial stability report.
The remainder of the amendments in this group represent further agreements made in the House of Lords in response to points raised in debate. Amendment 168 makes it absolutely clear that the Chancellor must always appoint a non-executive member of the court to be its chair. Amendments 174 to 176 continue the immunities from liability for damages that the existing regulators have and extends them to the new regulators. The Government have made amendments in the House of Lords to ensure that if the PRA or FCA commissions the other regulator, or the Bank of England, to carry out an investigation or produce a formal report on its behalf, the body that has been commissioned is also covered by the immunity.
This group of amendments represents a significant package of changes to the legislative framework for the Bank and the FPC, in response to points raised both in this House and in the House of Lords, and I commend them to this House.
It is a great pleasure to welcome the new Minister to these rather long-winded proceedings. I believe we started on this Bill back in February, but he should not worry, as this is shortly to be followed by the banking reform Bill and possibly even a banking standards Bill—to be determined—so we will probably have plenty more opportunities to chew over these issues then. It is a little preposterous to have a knife coming down at 7 o’clock, by which time we have to put the Question on 150 or so of these Lords amendments. That gives us about 25 seconds per amendment [Interruption.] I will get on with it; I lost about a dozen amendments just then.
That is why we have tabled several amendments to those Lords amendments—you will be impressed with that, Mr Deputy Speaker—and I wish briefly to explain why we have done so. The first Lords amendment that we are seeking to amend is Lords amendment 3, which, as all hon. Members here know, deals with the creation of an oversight committee within the Bank of England as a sort of subset of the court of directors, where it is to have a reviewing and, supposedly, a scrutinising role. There is a problem: the oversight committee has a series of responsibilities, not one of which is set out, in overseeing what the Bank of England does. The committee has a set of responsibilities to monitor, to review procedures and to conduct performance reviews, but all of that is retrospective—it looks backwards, not forwards. May I gently suggest to the Minister that it might be more appropriate if he were to call this a “hindsight committee” rather than an oversight committee, because as things stand I do not think there is a sense in which this is a proper check and balance within the governance of the Bank of England?
Why does that matter? It matters because the Government are giving phenomenal new powers to the Bank of England within our economy as an overarching financial regulator. The Minister says that the PRA is independent and will report to Parliament, but let us be honest: this is a creature of the Bank of England and the Bank will control very much what happens in the regulatory framework. Although we welcome the concession that was made to create an oversight committee, people have misgivings—we will probably hear about some of them, perhaps from members of the Treasury Committee, in a moment—that there is still a very hierarchical and centralised set of governance structures in the Bank of England.
We therefore need to make sure that this crucial verb “oversee” is included in the oversight committee’s remit. That would help to shift the balance of power between non-executives and executives in the Bank of England framework just that bit more. These are important lessons of governance, certainly from the private sector. While we are moving towards that executive and non-executive balance, it is important that we recognise that the Bank of England is being dragged into the 21st century. If we are taking the opportunity to do that in legislation, making that particular change would be very welcome.
The other amendment we wish to make to Lords amendment 3 relates to crisis management. As I said, the Bill gives massive new powers to the Bank of England, but in a crisis there will be very little time to figure out and design standing orders, or to work out arrangements for who will meet whom and for how decisions can involve the right people. You will recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, how during the global financial crisis crucial decisions affecting billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money and whether people could access the cash machines were made in the space of hours over weekends. In hindsight, it would have been nice to have had a carefully planned set of arrangements, and this legislation needs to learn the lessons from that. We are concerned that the crisis management arrangements are still thin and inadequate. We have suggested that if there is going to be an oversight committee in the Bank of England, the Bill needs to set out explicitly that it is to have a duty to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of arrangements with the Treasury for crisis management.
There is no role for the new financial conduct authority in the drafting of the arrangements. Apparently it does have a veto, but it is not part of the drafting of that memorandum of understanding. The Government are still resisting proposals to ensure that deputy governors and the chief executive of the FCA can consult directly with the Treasury in circumstances where there might be differences of opinion. Given the import and the size of the FCA, the PRA and the FPC within the Bank, it is important that the deputy governors have an ability and a right to talk to the Treasury, so that everything is not hidden and suppressed within one view of the Governor of the Bank of the England.
There is a very bizarre set of provisions excluding the ability of the memorandum of understanding to make provision about the relationship between the Bank of England and the PRA, which goes to prove that the PRA is very much a creature of the Bank. It also suggests that the Governor will have powers to suppress the voice of the PRA in a crisis. Shockingly, there is no parliamentary approval process for that MOU; no statutory instrument arrangement has been made, as I understand it. The crucial paragraph of the MOU that deals with what happens in the white heat of an emergency simply says, “Oh well, there will be ad hoc or standing committees just to sort these things out.”
That is not good enough. The whole of best practice in preparedness and in emergency and contingency planning would suggest that now is the time for Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Bank of England to sit down, and calmly and methodically work through what would happen in those circumstances. There should be some draft standing orders to pre-empt those scenarios.
The hon. Gentleman will recall, of course, that the poorly drafted MOU that lay behind the tripartite agreement certainly played a role in the lack of understanding of how to handle the crisis. Does that not point all the more towards a need to think things through very carefully now? That MOU was scrutinised in Parliament; I was in Committee at that time and most of the points made were largely ignored. Surely now, while we have the time, we should think through what is required in such an MOU and take the opportunity to consider that in Parliament.
I entirely agree with the Chairman of the Treasury Committee, who is very knowledgeable and has some strong views on these questions. It is a pity that when we flick through the luminous list of Lords amendments, we find a gaping hole on those crisis management arrangements, where none was accepted by the Government. Some clauses in the Bill deal with that set of scenarios, and it is noticeable that such provision is not included there. That is in part why we have sought to amend Lords amendment 3, as one of the few areas where we can make an amendment is in respect of the role and duties of the oversight committee. I accept that that is only half of the scenario, as we also want Her Majesty’s Treasury to have a process for reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of its arrangements with the Bank of England, but we do not have the opportunity today to propose such an amendment.
If we are to have an oversight committee, it should be able to play a role in ensuring that the crisis management arrangements are up to scratch and that there is joined-up thinking between these variously important branches of governance to ensure that someone at the Bank of England is tasked with thinking these things through very carefully.
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is incredibly important that Parliament gives its view on such issues, given the weight of academic insight into the arrangements in place at the time of the crash? We are trying to learn some of the lessons from that, and one of the key lessons is the importance of rules and thinking them through ahead of the scenarios, since it is literally impossible to know what the next unforeseen shock might be and where it might come from.
My hon. Friend is correct that this is about learning the lessons of preparedness and of what level of forward thinking we can undertake at this point in time. It is still amazing—I know she agrees—that although the FSA conducted a comprehensive review of its role in the financial crisis and the Treasury and Government did the same, we have to this day still not had a comprehensive review by the Bank of England of its role in the financial crisis. That is amazing. It begrudgingly had three minor reviews dragged out of it—it was like getting blood out of a stone—considering small particular areas where it had some failings. Those reviews concluded that there were serious issues to be addressed, and one of the individuals conducting one of those three small arrangements talked about the fact that the governance arrangements in the Bank of England were still too centralised. I hope that the Government will think more carefully about crisis management provisions.
I thank my hon. Friend for being so generous in giving way again. This is a crucial point: Parliament rarely discusses the strategic role of the Bank of England and rarely legislates, in part because the independence of the Bank of England is still a valid economic principle on which we hope to rebuild our economy. We must therefore get the discussion right at this time.
It is worth noting that when we talk about the independence of the Bank of England we are talking about operational decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee. They have to be made, of course, without political interference. We can come on to the questions of quantitative easing and the Chancellor’s recent decisions on that, but we will put them to one side for now. The questions of governance of the Bank of England are a matter for Parliament to take very seriously indeed.
As the debate progresses, we will discuss the vast powers that the Bank will be taking, which are known rather opaquely as macro-prudential powers of regulation. Essentially, the Bank of England can intervene in any number of financial services, products and transactions and affect the financial well-being of businesses, consumers and households in the constituency of my hon. Friend Alison McGovern. We are talking about mortgages, lines of credit and supply and so on. That is why we need to get the arrangements right, and it is a shame that the Government did not do that.
I want to skip on, if I may, to Lords amendment 16, to which we have suggested another small amendment.
While my hon. Friend has his arguments firmly in his mind, for some time many Members of this House have been concerned that the Bank of England has not done enough to encourage our high street banks to invest in deprived communities. Does he think that his amendment to Lords amendment 3 might help to encourage the Bank of England to pay a little more regard to those concerns?
Indeed, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for taking the time to participate in this debate. A string of amendments that we will discuss later cover consumer credit and the interests of consumers, and we will talk about ease of access to financial services when we consider them. He is right, as the Bank of England is a key player in this regard.
That point neatly takes me on to our amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16. It tries to ensure that under the new arrangements the Bank of England—in particular, the new powerful committee that is being established, called the Financial Policy Committee—will, when it explains the decisions it is taking, also have to include an assessment of the impact of its decisions on economic growth. I know that the whole question of jobs and growth is somewhat of a blind spot for Treasury Ministers, but notwithstanding their rather peculiar inability to see the importance of these issues, we feel that it is important to put that requirement in the Bill.
We are delighted and overjoyed that the Government finally relented and granted a concession in the other place, after months of labour in Committee in this place, by agreeing to Lords amendment 10. It was a major victory for the Opposition when the Government were forced to change the Bill to ensure that the FPC would not only contribute to the financial stability objective but, subject to that, support the economic policies of Her Majesty’s Government, including their objectives for growth and employment. That concession was made because of the amendments we tabled and the evidence heard in Committee from a wide number of organisations, including the British Bankers Association, the CBI, the London stock exchange and others. They all said in submissions to Parliament that the new regulators should have regard to growth, so we are glad that the FPC has that general backstop requirement on its shoulders. However, we do not think it goes far enough.
As I said earlier, the powers the Bank of England will take—that rather opaquely described set of macro-prudential tools—will be very wide ranging. Each time it pulls one of those levers, each time it makes a particular decision, it should explain the impact of that change. The Bank of England will be able to affect a number of key areas. Perhaps the Minister will tell us when the draft order at the back of the Treasury’s consultation document is likely to find its way on to the Floor of the House for debate, because I know that a number of hon. Members will be interested in that.
The Bank will have powers called counter-cyclical capital buffers. I know that the Treasury Bench has a difficulty with the concept of counter-cyclicality, but it essentially means that banks will be required to build up capital when times are rather exuberant and things are going well in the economy, but to unwind those capital buffers in a downturn. The Bank will say that there should be sectoral capital requirements. In other words, the FPC can make the residential mortgage sector have a certain amount of capital or structure its business in a particular way. The commercial property sector will have to do the same. This is a Bank of England decision, not the result of parliamentary or legislative changes. Consumer credit decisions will be made. If my hon. Friends have constituents who pay off their credit card, perhaps currently a 2% or 5% minimum repayment on a monthly basis, at the flick of a switch the Bank of England will be able to say, “No, you have to pay off 10% each month,” or perhaps even more. That is the sort of power that the Bank of England will have.
The situation with mortgages will be similar. I am certain that the FSA’s and the Bank’s insistence on a higher deposit will harm the construction industry. The average price of a two or three-bedroom house is £160,000, and 10% of that is £16,000 and 20% £32,000. We are getting more and more tales of young couples who simply cannot get on to the housing ladder because they are paying excessive rents and cannot save that deposit.
My hon. Friend will not be surprised to learn that there was a little argy-bargy between the Treasury and the Bank of England. As I understand it, the Bank initially said, “Loan-to-value ratios on mortgages, and loan-to-income ratios, are an awfully big decision. There is a lot of politics in that. We are not that keen. Push that back to the Treasury.” I think the Treasury has been saying, “No, Bank of England, this is a decision for you to take.” These are inherently political issues and our constituents would rightly ask whom to hold to account for such big decisions that affect their daily lives: whether or not someone can get a mortgage, what is happening in the housing market, and so on. That is why we still have some reservations about the governance structures and the lack of accountability on policy making. That is why we are asking for an assessment of the impact on economic growth whenever these levers are pulled and whenever these decisions are taken. I accept that there are careful balances to be struck. The FPC of course has to have an eye to stability, but it also needs to recognise, as the Chancellor has said, that we do not want the risk-aversion of the graveyard so that there is no economic activity. That is why we have suggested this particular change.
I am conscious of the time and I know that a number of hon. Members want to speak. Those are the main points that I have to make about our particular arrangements and it would useful if we could hear the views of others.
The Bill came out of the other place only last Wednesday night and it was heavily amended there. It is the most complicated, and one of the most important, pieces of financial legislation for decades.
Much of what we are considering today amends provisions in the Bill, which themselves amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Bank of England Act. The Bill is incomprehensible without constant referral to FSMA. I would go further and say that it is incomprehensible in parts even after considerable referral to FSMA. We now have a piece of legislation that passeth all man’s understanding, like God’s will. FSMA itself was arguably the most complex piece of legislation ever passed by Parliament. I was on the Bill Committee and it was certainly pretty testing.
We are now legislating in a huge rush to get this on the statute book by the end of the year in order to meet an entirely arbitrary deadline. The deadline has been rendered all the more absurd by the fact that we will be back here next year anyway amending it as part of the banking Bill, which is required to give effect to the Vickers commission’s recommendations, parts of which have to be done by amending FSMA and cannot be done in any other way. I am not making some recondite point about parliamentary procedure; I am making a point about how to make the Bill effective. It is a point that is being made to me right now by senior regulators, who would very much prefer that we just take a little bit more time to get the legislation right.
This group of amendments deals largely with Bank of England governance. Everyone is agreed that Bank of England governance is in a huge mess. That is why last April the Treasury Committee took the highly unusual step of tabling a new clause in an effort to try to sort it out. I am particularly grateful to colleagues from four parties on the Committee who all co-operated to enable that amendment to go down with unanimous support. I am also particularly grateful to my deputy Chairman, who is sitting on the Opposition Benches, who assisted with the tabling of that clause. It was needed because the Bank has ramshackle governance arrangements that reflect their 17th century origins, as the name “court” demonstrates. As has already been pointed out, better governance would improve its accountability to Parliament. But much more important in some respects, it would also improve the Bank of England’s authority to act and to speak to the rest of the country as it takes tough decisions, such as those that have just been referred to. This is a point that is not lost on very senior people in the Bank of England right now, on the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee, and also a number of deputy governors.
The Treasury Committee clause would not have solved all that, but it would have gone some way to bringing the Bank into line with good practice on corporate governance generally. It would have placed a duty on the court to conduct retrospective reviews of Bank performance and to publish the results, and it would have required the court to publish its minutes. I withdrew the amendment in the Commons only when the Government gave undertakings to make those changes in the Lords. I will come back to that.
In May, the Treasury Committee took another highly unusual step of reporting on the Financial Services Bill, after we had looked at it in the Commons, in order to assist the other place with its examination. Most of the conclusions that we came to in that report were raised as amendments in the Lords. The Government responded to some of them and that is what we are debating now. The Government’s Lords amendment 3 sets up, as we have heard, an oversight sub-committee of the court’s non-executives. That would give the court the power to commission retrospective reviews of the Bank’s performance —that is a step forward—to be carried out either externally or internally. The Government have also inserted an amendment to require the publication of court records of its meetings. While these amendments improve the Bill, they fall well short of what we were hoping for, and what in our view is still required, for several reasons.
First, the amendments place the power of review in the hands of a sub-committee of the court, rather than the court itself. This will further confuse the lines of accountability, not least to Parliament and to the Treasury Committee. These accountability lines are now very complex. I urge the Minister to try drawing them on the back of an envelope. I wager that he will have quite a task on his hands. Senior regulators agree that they will not do as they stand, and they have been telling us that publicly and privately. They want an improvement. They want the legitimacy for their decisions that comes with effective parliamentary scrutiny. Senior people in the Bank of England have seen how the Monetary Policy Committee has been strengthened and bolstered as a result of effective scrutiny by the Treasury Committee.
Secondly, the amendments fall short of what is needed because they require publication not of the minutes of court meetings, but merely of a record of such meetings, which I do not think would necessarily amount to much. A moment’s thought can tell us how unrevealing a mere record might be.
Thirdly, the Bill does not properly reform the court. It does not bring governance of the Bank into line with what most of us would consider to be the norms of corporate practice, whether public or private, right across the country.
Fourthly, no statutory obligation is placed on the court or the oversight board to respond to reasonable requests for information from the Treasury Committee. In practice, they can stonewall. I do not think that is acceptable if we are to have high-quality governance. I think that good-quality scrutiny by Parliament will be much more difficult without such an obligation being placed on the court. I worry that, at worst, the sub-committee could end up owing more to form than to substance. That is, of course, what has been wrong with the court as a whole; it has been as dignified over the years as it has been ineffective.
Fifthly, the Governor’s central and enhanced position is unaffected and the Bank’s hierarchical nature, with him at the apex, will remain. He is a single institutional point of systemic risk in the new governance arrangements. The danger of group-think will remain. Bill Winters recently drew attention in his review to that hierarchical problem and the need to place a requirement on the Governor to consult others, particularly the deputy governor.
May I take the hon. Gentleman back to his fourth point? He mentioned the Treasury Committee’s ability to get information from the Bank. What specifically is he concerned about, and does he think that his Committee ought to be able to access data from the Bank as part of its oversight role? First, how would he improve on that point? What specifics of governance does he think we must look for? Secondly, is it a question of getting data out of the Bank so that group-think can be laid bare and investigated? Am I right to take those points from what he has said?
If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will not linger on those points for too long, because the Committee has set that out in some detail in a number of reports. On her first point, in a nutshell, one need only look at the corporate governance arrangements of almost any public sector body, or indeed any public company, to see that the lines of accountability are powerfully drawn between their non-executives and the executive arm. That is almost completely lacking in the court, whose role is heavily circumscribed and, until recently, involved nothing more than oversight of the Bank’s budget. Indeed, I have been told informally that until recently an unspoken requirement of membership of the court was to have no great knowledge of financial matters, and certainly not to interfere with them. That strikes me as the negation of genuine oversight, but perhaps those who whispered such thoughts in my ear were making mischief.
On the hon. Lady’s second point, it is of course crucial that somewhere in the accountability framework there is a group of people who are capable of asking for detailed information in order to make the scrutiny meaningful. The Treasury Committee, in our investigations into Royal Bank of Scotland, found that we needed to send specialist advisers into the FSA to obtain the necessary papers to ensure that they were taken into account in its report on RBS. I do not think that it would be a healthy state of affairs if the Treasury Committee ends up having to send specialist advisers into the Bank of England to perform such a role. It would be far better to have a group of non-executives in the Bank of England whose explicit task is to look for those documents and to be available to help us do the scrutiny directly. My reply to her questions touches only the surface of the more detailed reply that could be given, but it has been set out in some detail in at least two Treasury Committee reports.
Next year we will have a new Governor. He could, of course, grasp the opportunity to improve all this, and no doubt he will form views about governance, ones that might benefit from legislative change. The Banking Commission will also make recommendations on standards, culture, competition, governance, regulation and sanctions for rule-breaking by bankers. Any or all of those might require statutory action. I would be grateful for an assurance on that from the Minister, so will he commit the Government to broadening the scope of the banking Bill to ensure that further amendments to FSMA, including in the areas I have just mentioned, can, if necessary, be made next year?
I can give my hon. Friend that assurance. The Government have already said, I think in response to the question of data on lending to deprived communities, that if we do not succeed in establishing agreement with the British Bankers Association, we will use the forthcoming banking Bill to make those changes. If the distinguished members of my hon. Friend’s Commission, following their considerations, have recommendations that will require legislative changes, we will of course have vehicles available for that.
That reassurance is helpful. I will take it back to both the Treasury Committee and the Banking Commission.
The hon. Gentleman has referred to the new Governor. If it had been a condition of his appointment that he understood the Bill and could explain it, does the hon. Gentleman believe that he would have been appointed?
Well, he is a very clever man. I am confident that at the time of his appointment he would have been unable to pass the FSMA test, but I have no doubt that by the time he comes before the Treasury Committee for his pre-appointment hearing he will have mugged up fully on it all.
I have spoken for 14 minutes already, which is four minutes longer than I make a point of ever speaking in the House these days, so I will move swiftly to one last point. The Minister, as he pointed out, started looking at the Bill three quarters of the way through the process of putting in place a new system of financial regulation. I will wager a pound to a penny that he has found the tangled web of legislation that we have just been discussing extremely confusing. In fact, I wager that he has found it, in places, to be a nightmare and impossible to understand. I wager the same amount that the officials advising him do not always understand it either, and that is no reflection on the high-quality advice he is no doubt getting. Will he be prepared at least to consider rewriting FSMA afresh when he comes to adapt it to take account of the banking Bill, because that is what regulators have told us they would prefer, what the Governor of the Bank of England said he would prefer and what would enable the industry, the public and Parliament to have a much more intelligible piece of legislation?
It is a great shame that that approach, which was vigorously put forward at the time, was rejected when the Government first announced that they would proceed with amendments to FSMA. The Governor was pressing for it very strongly, and he had allies in Parliament. We now have a second chance, and I very much hope that the Minister will consider taking it. He will need to bear in mind that there will be 100—perhaps 1,000—official voices telling him not to do that, but just occasionally there are moments when a Minister can greatly improve the quality of the statute book. Would he be prepared at least to consider rewriting the Bill so that we have one fresh piece of legislation that everyone can understand?
This has been a short but interesting debate, and I am grateful to Chris Leslie and to my hon. Friend Mr Tyrie for contributing to it. I think that my hon. Friend does himself a disservice. If anyone can follow, and indeed have imprinted in his mind, every clause of FSMA, and be able to relate it to any future amendment, I know that he is capable of it. Let me first respond to some of the points made in the debate, including his.
The Bank of England is obviously at the heart of the financial system, and the changes are among the important reforms of its powers in history, alongside nationalisation in 1946 and independence in matters of monetary policy in 1998. Notwithstanding the few remaining issues of debate, I think that the whole House would agree that the changes made in the Lords represent a significant improvement in this part of the Bill. The amendments will strengthen the governance and accountability of the Bank. They will give the Financial Policy Committee a more positive and proactive mandate around economic growth and shift its membership to reduce the influence of the Bank’s executives. In addition, there are clarifications to simplify the drafting and terminology, if perhaps not going as far as my hon. Friend would wish to go. The name “court” is retained, despite his preferences.
On the Opposition amendments, I do not think that there is, in practice, a huge degree of difference between us. As the hon. Member for Nottingham East said, amendment (a) to Lords amendment 1 would add the word “overseeing” to subsection (2) of new section 3A of the Bank of England Act 1998. That was well debated in the House of Lords, as he will know. Some clarity was achieved there, in that the kind of oversight in which the oversight committee is expected to engage is common to non-executive directors elsewhere. Baroness Noakes made particular reference to that. The opportunity to review decisions and to consider how they are made is well understood in the context of the term “oversight”. The hon. Gentleman is proposing something that goes beyond that: that oversight should contain a more real-time role as well as a backwards-looking role. That could involve second-guessing the Bank’s policy decisions while they are being taken, which would not be appropriate. Indeed, it would go against the recommendations of the
Treasury Committee, which said in its report that it agreed with the Governor that the Bank’s governing body should place more emphasis on oversight and ex-post scrutiny that would not authorise it to become involved in second-guessing immediate policy decisions. That is the advice that we have taken.
That should be qualified by the fact that the current Governor of the Bank of England does not want to be second-guessed by anyone. In fact, he would suggest that the best decision-making process is himself sitting in a room taking the decisions, questioned by no one.
The hon. Gentleman has more experience of questioning the Governor than I have. The Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, of which he was a member, volunteered to agree with the Governor on that assessment, at least. We followed the Committee’s advice on that, as was recognised in the other place.
I understand the Minister’s argument. However, we are talking about a lot of power in the hands of a single individual—the single point of potential institutional disruption, as the Chairman of the Treasury Committee called it. Surely the sun king is capable of responding to some internal questioning, scrutiny and challenge, and that would be a healthy thing to have. Some kind of more proactive oversight might therefore not be such a bad idea after all.
All those things are provided for in the Bill; the question is whether the word that the hon. Gentleman seeks to introduce is a matter of semantics or would bring in scrutiny of current decisions. That is a point of difference between us. In the House of Lords there are many people with experience of being very effective non-executive directors, as I know from my distinguished constituent, Baroness Noakes. Most people would recognise that she is meticulous and robustly independent in the scrutiny that she brings to matters, and she regarded the wording of the Bill as entirely compatible with that. It is not right to go against what the Treasury Committee recommended and to have the second-guessing of immediate decisions.
Let me say something about the existing powers. The report by the Treasury Committee recommended that ex-post reviews of the Bank’s performance should be carried out, and those are provided for. In fact, the current wording of subsection (2) of new section 3A of the 1998 Act requires the oversight committee to
“keep under review the Bank's performance”,
and that is consistent with the Committee’s recommendations. We think that this wording strikes the right balance between ensuring effective retrospective scrutiny of the Bank’s policy performance and avoiding a situation whereby the non-executive members of the court would be constantly second-guessing the decisions taken by the Bank’s expert policy committees and executives.
Amendment (b), tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, would give the oversight committee an additional function to keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness of the Bank’s arrangements with the Treasury for crisis management. It is very important that that should be under review, for all the reasons he said. Subsection (2) of new section 3A gives the oversight committee a broad remit to keep under review the Bank’s performance in relation to all its objectives and strategy. It is absolutely clear—I would like to confirm this from the Dispatch Box—that the effectiveness of the Bank’s relationship and co-ordination with the Treasury in crisis management is fundamental to the Bank’s achievement of its objective to protect and enhance stability. As such, the oversight committee can already undertake or commission a review into the effectiveness of these arrangements if necessary. In fact, in January this year the Bank said in its response to the Treasury Committee that the oversight committee should, among other things, assess whether the Bank is fulfilling effectively its duty to notify the Treasury of risks to public funds at the appropriate time. There is no substantial difference between us that the amendment is seeking to expose.
The problem is the threadbare nature of the memorandum of understanding, particularly the infamous paragraph 20, which says:
“However, the Chancellor and the Governor may agree to establish ad hoc or standing committees.”
That is so thin that it is important for the oversight committee to make it a top priority to ensure that there is preparedness and that it is thinking through the circumstances in which a crisis may occur, and that needs to be placed explicitly in the Bill.
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s clarification. We should bear it in mind that the Bill requires the Treasury to lay the MOU before Parliament and to publish it. It will be subject to full transparency. For example, I would be very surprised if my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester did not call the Chancellor or the Governor to explain it. The oversight committee will be responsible for overseeing the Bank’s performance and, clearly, the MOU is a key part of its work in bringing to bear the Bank’s financial stability work. The committee will, therefore, consider from time to time whether it is working well and Parliament will itself have every opportunity to address the issue.
Amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 would require the Financial Policy Committee to produce explanations of its decisions to exercise its recommendation and direction powers. Proposed new section 9QA(1) of the Bank of England Act makes it clear that the FPC’s explanations must set out how its decisions are compatible with its objectives, including the new objective to support the Government’s objectives for growth. It is clear that it has an explicit responsibility to do that. The FPC’s explanations will have to set out publicly how it has considered the impact on economic growth when deciding to take action and its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with its obligations in relation to economic growth.
Lords amendment 16—specifically subsection (3) of proposed new section 9QA of the 1998 Act—already requires the FPC to produce estimates of the costs and benefits of the decisions, including those areas to which Mr Mudie has referred. This will cover the impact on financial stability, both directly and indirectly, and the impact, both positive and negative, on economic growth.
I reassure the House that the FPC is giving considerable care and thought to the impact of these tools. The Bill requires the committee to produce and maintain policy statements for its direction tools. The statements will discuss the likely impact on both financial stability and economic growth. The Bank is preparing a draft of the statements, to be published early next year, so that they can be considered alongside the secondary legislation that will set out the FPC’s direction powers. We do not, therefore, think that amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 is necessary.
Both the Treasury Committee and the Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill were concerned about the important parts of the Bill that will be delivered through statutory instruments. That means a discussion in Committee for an hour and a half, with no provision for amendment. We would either have to accept the whole instrument or vote against it, and we would not have a majority on such a Committee. We pressed the Chancellor for a different, more flexible structure of decision making on secondary legislation so that the House or the Treasury Committee could debate it with the prospect of convincing the Chancellor, at some stage, to amend his direction of travel.
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s point. I am not able to produce a novel parliamentary procedure, but I can certainly tell him and the Chairman of the Treasury Committee that when the time comes to publish the statutory instruments, if they or their Committee would like to consider and advise on the discharge of the commitments, I would be happy to engage with them in good faith and take on board any suggestions.
I am delighted to hear that concession from the Minister. We have suggested a super-affirmative procedure for some of the regulations. That would give the Treasury Committee and others more time to look at the issues and ask the other Select Committees about the effect on, for example, housing and communities and local government. If the Minister is willing to open that door, we would support him.
I give the hon. Gentleman an inch and he takes a mile. I will not commit to a different procedure but, as I have said, I will certainly commit, in good faith, to considering personally any points that are made. [ Interruption . ]
They may be fresh instructions, but I have decided not to read them. I may be countermanded, but I will not retract my statement.
I will conclude by addressing what the Chairman of the Treasury Committee has said. I am reliably informed by my predecessors that this Bill, though complex and voluminous, has been well considered in numerous Committee sittings in this House, and I think that most people will conclude that their lordships have done a good job in their scrutiny. The Bill is important and it is right that it has been scrutinised to the extent that
I think it now commands the broad support of the House, as evidenced by the relatively few amendments that have been tabled to their lordships’ amendments.
As I said in response to an earlier intervention, opportunities will be presented to the House in the years ahead—new Bills are already gathering speed on the runway—to accommodate further changes, should they be necessary. If so, I am sure we will have further conversations about them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Chichester issued me a challenge to rewrite the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and anticipated that I would be besieged by objections from officials and others.
I will not turn around and look at my officials in the Box, because I am sure I would get some black looks. My hon. Friend would not expect me to make a commitment, but I know—this is the case with everything he says—that he speaks from experience and that he examines the issues meticulously. I will look at what he has said, but I ought not, at this late stage, to raise his hopes too high.
Lords amendment 1 agreed to .
Lords amendment 2 agreed to .
After Clause 2