Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

This is a crucial Clause because of what it shows about the potential of our relationship with the European Union, and our ability to negotiate and change that relationship. As stated in the Bill’s explanatory notes, the Irish protocol

“agreed that the concerns of the Irish people in respect of the Lisbon Treaty relating to taxation policy, the right to life, education and the family, and Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality would be addressed to the mutual satisfaction of Ireland and the other Member States”.

That does not change a word of the Lisbon treaty, but it clarifies the law so that Ireland knows it has a slightly different relationship with the EU, and clarifies any rulings that might be made in future by the European Court of Justice. It allowed Ireland, which said no to the Lisbon treaty in a referendum, to put the question back to the Irish people, who then said yes in a referendum. Coming as it does at this stage, that is important as a reminder that every accession treaty is a full-blown treaty of the European Union, and has the ability to amend any of the previous treaties that led to the creation of the European Union, including what is now the treaty on the European Union and the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Both those treaties can be amended by accession treaties, or by any future treaties of the European Union.

We must consider the position of the United Kingdom, and the growing dissatisfaction with our membership of the EU and how things are currently carried out—I have a great deal of sympathy with what my hon. Friend Mr Nuttall said about the growing reservoir of discontent with the European Union. With the accession treaty—and, indeed, with any future accession treaties—we had the ability to renegotiate our position and get to something with which the British people feel comfortable, rather than the current situation.

When considering the Irish protocol we must understand how thorough it is and what it includes for Ireland. It goes to some fundamental parts of what Europe is about, including the “right to life” that Ireland wishes to preserve but was concerned the EU was taking within its ambit. It was something Irish electors thought was under attack. On taxation policy, we know that negotiations on the multi-annual financial framework have looked to change the EU’s revenue-raising powers, and during the discussion about own resources they looked at whether there should be a financial transaction tax or a change in how the European Union is funded through value added tax. Proposals for a single corporation tax across the European Union would be allowable under current treaties if agreed on unanimously. Ireland has sensibly achieved a clear, legally binding opt-out of movements in that direction, and clarified its position.

The protocol covers education and the family. Education is not really a matter that should be the responsibility of the European Union. The EU is extending its talons into areas with which it was never intended to be involved. It extends its powers—its competences—into areas that those who voted in the 1975 referendum never conceivably thought would have anything to do with the European Union. Instead, the powers were the rights and responsibilities of the House and those sent to Parliament to represent the people of the United Kingdom, rather than powers to be given to a multinational body. It is interesting that the Irish felt it necessary to have a clear protocol to state that such matters are not to be decided at European level, as they did on military neutrality. Military neutrality is important for the UK, which still has a substantial Army, Navy and Air Force—one of the most important in the world—which we do not want to be subsumed within a European Union defence force. We want to maintain our independence, and Irish clarity on the matter is helpful.

My central point is that the Government could have negotiated opt-outs on a swathe of European policy in the form of treaty amendments that would have been fully binding, fully recognised within European law, and would have begun to resettle our relationship with the European Union. For various reasons, the Irish Government decided to do that and the British Government did not. It may be that, considering the crisis through which the European Union is going, they believed it was not the right time for such renegotiation.

The original intention was to have a Czech protocol at the same time as the Irish protocol, but the fact that it was slightly more contentious than the Irish protocol completely stalled the process. Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that if we had tried some kind of wholesale renegotiation of our relationship with Europe, there is no way we would be discussing that issue now and the whole process would be mired in controversy for many years?

I wish my hon. Friend would have more confidence in his own great country. We are a little bigger than the Czech Republic and a little more important, even though it is a most highly esteemed country. We make a massive contribution to the European Union budget, and we should be using our power, authority and position to get for the British people what the Irish Government have got for the Irish.

Would we make an increased contribution to the European Union budget as a result of Croatian accession?

I was hoping to come to that when we discuss the point at which the Bill comes into force, and it may be best if I hold my fire until then, lest the Chair rule me out of order. I want to focus on the essence of European treaties: every European treaty, whether an accession treaty or the treaty of Lisbon, has exactly the same legal standing. Anything that is added to it has the proper force of an agreement across the European Union and validity in European law. We should never again lose the opportunity to renegotiate the repatriation of powers to this country when a treaty is going through the European Union. There are any number of powers that we wish to recapture—working time directives are a mere start—and we should do that because if Ireland can, so could we.

I often agree with the hon. Gentleman, but I do not today. These protocols are Euro-fudge and what the Irish Government received through the protocol was not really threatened. His argument seems to be that the European Union in its present shape can be reformed by treaty negotiation, which could be done with any treaty. I simply do not believe that is possible and I would be interested to hear his reflections on that.

I am extremely sympathetic to what the hon. Gentleman says and I may be too optimistic about what can be done. There is, however, a disjuncture between what the protocols say and what it is said that they say. The Bill’s explanatory notes state:

“The Irish Protocol clarifies, but does not change”,

but if it does not change anything at all, why on earth was there need for a protocol? Was it a question of bullying Ireland to vote a second time? If it was, that is deeply disgraceful and shows something very rotten at the heart of a European Union that holds democracy in such contempt that when it gets a result it does not like it says, “Well, you must do this again and we will bully you until you give the answer that we, the panjandrums of the European Union, want.”

For once, I am being charitable to the European Union and assuming that when a protocol is agreed, it means something genuine and is a real protection in areas of competence-creep within the European Union. It might be strictly accurate to say that the things for which for which Ireland has been given its protocol are not currently covered by detailed regulations of the EU or by detailed parts of the Lisbon treaty. The protocol, however, gives Ireland further security. If judgments of the ECJ begin to expand the competences of the treaties, which they have done in the past—as we would understand it, the ECJ is an essentially political rather than legalistic court—Ireland can revert to the protocol.

The symbolic importance of the protocol is great. It shows that a country can push a little bit of a wedge underneath the collapsing portcullis of the EU—once a country is under it, it cannot get back out. The protocol has given Ireland a measure of release from, and clarification on, the Lisbon treaty. The UK could do more because we are a stronger player within Europe and contribute a substantial part of the budget, as I said to my hon. Friend Martin Horwood. We ought to use our negotiating heft to try to get back powers that, as most hon. Members recognise, the British people want. We should begin a serious renegotiation and say to the EU, “Look, when the next treaty comes through, we want more than Ireland had. We want something that is powerful and strong, and that allows us—the British people—to make our Laws for ourselves via Parliament rather than constantly doing so via Europe.” This is a great opportunity for the Government to build on that precedent to the advantage of our country.

I want to reiterate what I said on Second Reading about the Opposition’s support for the Irish protocol, which the Labour Government helped to negotiate. As the hon. Member for North East Somerset

(Jacob Rees-Mogg) said, the protocol clarifies but does not amend the Lisbon treaty. It contains assurances that Ireland retains decision-making rights on the right to life, on family and education, on taxation, and on Irish neutrality. It was the Labour Government’s judgment at the time and it is the Opposition’s judgment now that the Irish people have rightly been offered those assurances on the application of the Lisbon treaty.

Finally, I agree with my hon. Friend Graham Stringer. The protocol does not reform the EU and is not a renegotiation of the EU-Ireland relationship. It also does not repatriate power from the EU to Ireland.

Clause 2 provides parliamentary approval for the purposes of section 2 of the European Union Act 2011 for a proposed protocol to be annexed to the treaty on the EU and the treaty on the functioning of the EU following the concerns of the Irish people in relation to the treaty of Lisbon; that has become known in shorthand as the Irish protocol. The clause also confirms, as required by section 2(3) of the 2011 Act, that no referendum is required under that act for the Irish protocol to be ratified by the UK.

In June 2009, the Heads of State and Government of the 27 EU member states adopted a formal decision on the concerns of the Irish people about the treaty of Lisbon. The decision gave a legal guarantee, binding in international law, that certain matters of concern to the Irish people would be unaffected by the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon. As my hon. Friend Jacob Rees-Mogg said, those matters included taxation policy, policy on the right to life, policies on education and the family, and Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality. It was noted in the June 2009 European Council conclusions that the content of the decision is fully compatible with the treaty of Lisbon and does not necessitate any re-ratification of the treaty.

The Heads of State and Government also agreed in June 2009 that, at the time of the conclusion of the next accession treaty, the provisions of the decision would be set out in a protocol to be attached to the EU treaties. The effect is to ensure that the guarantees given to the Irish during the Lisbon ratification process will have full treaty status and be binding in EU law.

Although it is true that the Irish protocol clarifies and does not change either the content or application of the Lisbon treaty, and in no way alters the relationship between the EU and its member states, it has a positive effect, as my hon. Friend has pointed out. The consequence of all member states ratifying the protocol is that it will have full treaty status. In effect, it is added, as a protocol, to the list of EU treaties and is binding in EU law. Although it is declaratory and clarificatory in purpose, the declaration and clarification take the form of something that can be justiciable in future litigation at the European Court of Justice, as my hon. Friend said.

Will the Minister therefore help me? If two cases appear before the ECJ—one for the UK; one for Ireland—is it open to the ECJ to rule differently because the protocol applies to Ireland but not to the UK? Does the clarification limit the ECJ’s jurisdiction over Ireland but not over the UK?

No, the treaties apply equally to every member state unless an explicit derogation or opt-out is laid down in a protocol or in the body of a treaty—that is the case with the UK’s and Denmark’s right not to join the euro. In this case, the Irish protocol does not provide an opt-out or derogation. Instead, it serves as a formal justiciable clarification of certain provisions of the treaty that apply equally to all member states of the EU. In the hypothetical case that my hon. Friend describes, it would be for the UK or any other member state to cite the protocol in support of its arguments.

The Minister is a mind reader—that was exactly the point I was about to ask him about. Does the protocol therefore effectively apply to all member states and not just to Ireland?

Yes, that clarification is of benefit to every member state, should such litigation be necessary in future.

The protocol was adopted at an intergovernmental conference in Brussels on 16 May 2012 and signed by all 27 member states. It must now be ratified by them before it can formally enter into force. As I have said, I believe that the clarifications that are provided square with the UK’s interpretation of the treaties; I support what my hon. Friend has said on this. The protocol is therefore helpful to us, and I commend it and Clause 2 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill .

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.