Defence

Part of Opposition Day — [4th Allotted Day-First Part] – in the House of Commons at 3:38 pm on 1 March 2010.

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Photo of Liam Fox Liam Fox Shadow Secretary of State for Defence 3:38, 1 March 2010

I simply do not accept that point. Sensible contingency planning ought to have been taking place. It was not that the equipment was unavailable or that it could not be ordered; it was specifically not ordered because that would have sent a specific political signal. That is where the moral culpability of the Government lies.

Perhaps the Government's biggest failure in their conduct of defence is their mismanagement of the equipment programme. The defence and security of the country is increasingly being run on a wing and a prayer, and as the money has failed to materialise for the unfunded projects, they have been delayed and delayed, with the taxpayer left to foot the bill and the military left to ponder their absent capabilities. The default position should be that we spend to save, rather than that we delay to spend. Speedy procurement ultimately saves money, but the Government have too often failed to understand that.

Unfortunately, if half of what was reported in the Gray review is true, the next Government will have not only the task of balancing defence priorities between the conflict that we face today and the wars of tomorrow, but the challenge of putting the MOD's finances back on track after a decade of mismanagement and neglect. The Labour Government came to power with a promise to introduce smart procurement, which would deliver equipment faster, better and more cheaply. Nothing could be further from the truth, however.

None of us knows exactly when the election will come; there have been rumours that it could be announced today, but personally I doubt it, because if the Prime Minister were any more of a serial bottler, he could start a factory. But whenever the election comes, the Government in office after it will find themselves with a military that is overstretched, undermanned and in possession of worn-out equipment.

We know that the equipment programme is underfunded-by exactly how much is anybody's guess, but most estimates put it at billions of pounds. Bernard Gray, the Government's own analyst, placed the figure at £16 billion over the next 10 years, which equates to an unfunded liability of some £4.4 million a day. The plunging value of the pound, which we have seen again today, has left an estimated £1.3 billion black hole in Britain's defence budget.

According to the most recent figures available from the National Audit Office, the top 15 major procurement projects are £4.5 billion over budget and delayed by a total of 339 months. The A400M aircraft is £657 million over budget and will be delayed by 82 months. The Type 45 destroyer is £1.5 billion over budget and will be delayed by 38 months. The aircraft carriers are more than £1 billion over budget already, and the service entry date for the first carrier has been delayed from 2012 to 2016. The decision in 2004 to cut the helicopter budget by £1.4 billion-in the middle of two wars-was inexcusable, irresponsible and irreconcilable with the basic duty to maximise the safety of our troops while carrying out a dangerous mission. In the words of the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Ashfield, to the Chilcot inquiry,

"had that budget been spent in the way that we thought we should spend it, then those helicopters would probably be coming into service any time now."

Due to this failed procurement programme, billions of pounds have been needlessly wasted-money that could have gone into equipping our front-line troops.

The Ministry of Defence's record of waste is staggering, as £2.5 billion has been spent on external consultants, but it could not find £20 million to train the Territorial Army. Furthermore, £2.3 billion was spent refurbishing the MOD, but it could not find £4 million for officer training corps training.