'(1) The 2000 Act is amended as follows.

(2) In section 47(1), for "is guilty of an offence" there is substituted "shall be liable to a fixed monetary penalty under Schedule 19B".

(3) In section 65(3), for "commits an offence" there is substituted "shall be liable to a fixed monetary penalty under Schedule 19B".

(4) In paragraph 12(1) of Schedule 7, for "is guilty of an offence" there is substituted "shall be liable to a fixed monetary penalty under Schedule 19B".

(5) A fixed monetary penalty imposed in accordance with subsections (2), (3) and (4) may not exceed £1,000.

(6) In Schedule 20 (penalties) the following entries in the table, and the corresponding entries in column 2 are omitted—

(a) section 47(1)(b) (failure to deliver proper statement of accounts),

(b) section 65(3) (failure to deliver donation reports to Commission within time limits), and

(c) paragraph 12(1) of Schedule 7 (failure to deliver donation report to Commission within time limit).'.— (Mr. Fabian Hamilton.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new Clause 4— Independent panel to advise Electoral Commission—

'(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint an independent panel to offer guidance and a code of practice to the Electoral Commission.

(2) The panel shall advise on the proportionate use of civil penalties, financial penalty levels for offences, referral for investigation in cases of possible breaches of the criminal law and generally on the mode of operation of the Electoral Commission on penalties.

(3) The panel shall consist of the Speaker, a judicial person and an independent person.

(4) The panel shall advise the Electoral Commission on an on going basis.'.

Amendment 59, in schedule 2, page 24, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).

Amendment 60, page 24, line 8, leave out paragraph (b).

Amendment 61, page 24, line 15, leave out paragraph (b).

Amendment 62, page 24, line 22, leave out paragraph (b).

Amendment 74, page 25, line 22, leave out 'a county court' and insert 'the High Court'.

Amendment 78, page 25, line 44, leave out sub-sub-paragraph (d).

Amendment 63, page 27, line 3, leave out sub-sub-paragraph (a).

Amendment 64, page 27, leave out lines 19 and 20.

Amendment 65, page 27, line 23, leave out sub-paragraph (8).

Amendment 75, page 28, line 6, after 'shall', insert 'promptly'.

Amendment 77, page 28, line 9, leave out from 'requirement' to end of line 18 and insert

'at any point within 28 days of receipt of the notice under paragraph 6(5)'.

Amendment 66, page 28, line 34, leave out sub-sub-paragraph (b).

Amendment 67, page 29, line 8, leave out sub-sub-paragraph (b).

Amendment 82, page 29, line 28, leave out 'a county court' and insert 'the High Court'.

Government amendment 23.

Amendment 7, page 36, line 39, leave out 'from time to time' and insert 'annually'.

Government amendments 24 to 27.

Government amendment 28, page 37, leave out lines 3 to 6 and insert—

'( ) This paragraph does not require the Commission to include in a report any information that, in their opinion, it would be inappropriate to include on the ground that to do so—

(a) would or might be unlawful, or

(b) might adversely affect any current investigation or proceedings.'.

Amendment (a) to Government amendment 28, after 'their', insert 'reasonable'.

Amendment (b) to Government amendment 28, in sub-paragraph (b), leave out 'might' and insert 'would'.

Amendment 83, page 37, line 6, at end insert—

'(3) In a report the Commission will not specify the names of those persons who have been the subject of the cases specified in sub-paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) save where the amount of any penalty exceeds £5,000.'.

New clauses 3 and 4 give me an opportunity to examine some of the broader issues with which the Bill has tried to deal. I am grateful to the Government for having—as has been pointed out by Mr. Djanogly and others—amended it considerably since its initial draft in an effort to establish far greater cross-party consensus. Given, however, that in its present form it extends the power of the Electoral Commission, I think it timely to consider whether the commission has used its powers wisely in the past.

Unfortunately, its record is not all that impressive. On the one hand, it appears to have failed to ensure adequate compliance by regulated donees since 2001 when it was set up. Hundreds of late notifications—most of them honest mistakes—have been identified. Indeed, I understand that in the last six months of 2008 a total of some £750,000 was identified, accounting for more than 150 late donations. On the other hand, it appears to have been very heavy-handed and, I would argue, incompetent in dealing with certain cases, most notably that of my right hon. Friend Mr. Hain.

The Standards and Privileges Committee admitted in its conclusion that my right hon. Friend had made an "honest mistake". It seems incredible, does it not, that the Electoral Commission did not even send warning letters to him, or to other Members of Parliament and other regulated donees who notified it late of donations received. Up until the beginning of last year, no warning letters had been sent. I think the commission should have a duty to give clear guidelines and positive advice to Members who are genuinely trying to comply, but it has been quite evasive about providing full information on its performance in response to parliamentary questions, many of which I tabled myself. It appears from its answer to one of my questions that it inexplicably and, I would say, recklessly destroyed numerous original donation forms that were in its care.

There have been a great many cases of non-compliance on the part of many Members, some of whom were high-profile figures on the Opposition Benches, but on a number of occasions the commission has simply issued a press statement to the effect that no further action will be taken, or that the law has not been broken. In the early part of 2008, however, it clearly wanted to make an example of someone as part of its campaign for new and more draconian legal powers.

That is where the case of my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath comes in. He himself informed the commission as soon as he discovered that his campaign had failed to meet the commission's notification requirement, but he was asked no questions whatsoever by commission officials about the reasons for the lateness. Incredibly, when he visited the commission's offices to discuss the late notifications, officials actually lobbied him for some of the new powers that are in the Bill.

I believe that, up to now, the commission has been wholly unaccountable to Parliament and, indeed, to the general public. The present rules, fiercely defended by the commission, ensure that most staff, and indeed commissioners themselves, have no knowledge whatever of the world of politics, which seems rather bizarre when we consider the whole purpose of establishing the commission in the first place.

As we know, when the commission referred my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath to the police it destroyed his position in the Government, but it also destroyed its own credibility here in Parliament when, months later, the Crown Prosecution Service decided that there was absolutely no case to answer. It exposed the fact that the initial commission referral to the police was incompetent and, indeed, reckless, and that it was not even fully conversant with electoral law.

Under the initial Bill, the commission could be judge, jury and executioner, breaking into MPs' offices and compelling Members, their staff and anyone else to attend to them and answer questions. That was very worrying, because it exposed the fact that no one was regulating the regulator. That is why I tabled new Clause 4.

In common with, I think, all Members, I believe that the transparency of Parliament is generally a good thing, but why hitherto has there not been transparency in the Electoral Commission's operations? When asked in Parliament when it decides to refer a case to the police, a rather obscure answer was given, which was, "When the commission decided the facts of the case merited it." I do not think we would tolerate such an answer from a Minister, so my question is this: is the Electoral Commission above Parliament? Of course it is not.

I am glad that the Electoral Commission now has a new chair. I hope, however, that she is good at building bridges, because she will need to build many.

She is very handsomely paid, too.

She certainly is.

Members are generally happy to comply with reasonable requirements to register donations, even if the rules are not quite as clear as we might hope, and we had a very good debate on that earlier. The simpler the rules are, the better it is for all Members to ensure that they comply, and it is not unreasonable to expect positive support and guidance from the commission itself. If some Members refuse to comply with reasonable requests, commit serious crimes or seek to evade their responsibilities, no reasonable person would think that the commission should not have the power to act, with the appropriate checks and balances, of course.

Concern has been expressed that the Electoral Commission has in the past been biased against the party of Government. I hope that is not true, and I hope it never will be, but it will be for the new commission chair to demonstrate a number of principles that I believe will correct the imbalance and bring the commission more into public view. The principles are: the commission should devise new ways of being open and transparent to Parliament, and I hope that the new chair will ensure that is so. I also hope that it will swiftly unify procedures with the Register of Members' Interests; we need to know precisely when that will happen, and I hope the Minister will be able to tell us in his reply. Non-compliance should be decriminalised as much as possible where it is clear that mistakes have been made and there was no intent to undermine the legislation or to take in funds fraudulently and try to disguise them, and that is where new Clause 3 comes in. The use of penalties and sanctions—which the Electoral Commission has, and will be given more of—will need to be monitored externally; new clause 4 addresses that. Finally, there must be more dialogue with Members of Parliament to ensure that the commission has more genuine political support from all parts of the House; only then can it do its job, both politically and in the public's view, to a standard we would expect and the public can trust.

All the amendments in the first group except the first two new clauses address Clause 3 and schedule 2, which introduce a range of civil sanctions for the Electoral Commission. The sanctions relate to the commission of offences and the contravention of restrictions or requirements under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, or PPERA. Together, clause 3 and schedule 2 empower the commission to impose these civil sanctions on a "person", "registered party", "recognised third party" or "permitted participant", as defined in the 2000 Act.

The Conservatives agree that the making available of enhanced civil powers and sanctions will, in certain situations, be more appropriate than the sledgehammer of criminal sanctions under the 2000 Act. The commission will have a wider range of sanctions to enable it to be a more effective and robust regulator, and that was identified by the Committee on Standards in Public Life report in January 2007, which picked up on the problems facing the commission. However, we are keen to ensure that any use of sanctions is valid—the use of powers must be proportionate, risk based and fair, and a number of aspects require further review by us today.

New clause 3 would replace a number of criminal offences in the 2000 Act with a fixed penalty of £1,000. The suggestion is interesting, but we are concerned that it could reduce the effectiveness of the Electoral Commission and weaken the strength of sanctions—there could be a lack of a proper deterrent in many cases if the commission is limited to the use of a fixed monetary penalty for the offences implicated by the new clause. We are prepared to review this conceptually in later stages, and the points made by Mr. Hamilton, particularly on the lack of guidance, were well put.

New clause 4 would create an independent panel responsible for producing a code of practice relating to the Electoral Commission's use of civil sanctions. The panel would also offer guidance to it. Although the new clause offers an interesting protection against the abuse by the commission of its powers, the 2000 Act contains an equivalent measure. Under that Act, the Parliamentary Parties Panel can make submissions to the commission on the use of sanctions, so this extra provision should be unnecessary. Again, I take the hon. Gentleman's well made point about careful monitoring, and I hope that the panel is put to its full use in that regard.

Our amendments 59 to 62 relate, respectively, to paragraphs 1(b), 2(b), 3(b) and 4(b) to schedule 2. They would remove the commission's ability to impose a fixed monetary penalty on a person, registered party, recognised third party or permitted participant for a non-offence contravention of the Act. It is important to note that the commission would still have the power to issue a fixed penalty for the commission of a prescribed offence.

The power to issue fines is one of the key new flexible powers that the commission is given by the Bill. We hope that they will enable it to deal with enforcement more flexibly and proportionately than it has been able to do in the past. Fixed penalty notices require the person, registered party, recognised third party or permitted participant to pay an amount specified in the notice to the commission. We tabled the amendments because we feel the need to err on the side of caution when dealing with non-offence infringements of the Act. Will the Minister explain the scope of what we could be dealing with here? Our concern is that, depending on the operation of future electoral commissions, things may be interpreted oppressively, resulting in large fines for relatively minor infringements. We must be sure that we clearly set out the parameters of these powers and the circumstances in which they may be used—not necessarily for the current commission, which has been privy to much of this debate, but for the commissions of the future, which may not be so rational in the use of these powers.

At the grass-roots level of political engagement in particular, this is an extremely complex and difficult area of law, and the possibility for wide interpretation and the potential for abuse are correspondingly high. This lack of clarity has potential to have a negative impact at the implementation level. We do not want individuals and smaller groups and associations to live in fear of reprisal for minor infringements. When a potentially hefty penalty is the punishment, the criteria of contravention of the prescribed restriction or requirement could be too opaque and broad.

Amendments 74 and 82 would, respectively, amend paragraphs 2(6) and 9(3) to schedule 2. The paragraphs state which court is to be used for the appeal process in relation to a fixed monetary penalty and a non-compliance penalty for failure to satisfy discretionary requirements under part 2. The amendments would change the relevant court from a county court to the High Court. We remain concerned that the expertise of the county court could be insufficient to deal with a potentially complex case under the legislation.

The length of discussion on these technical points in Committee, and the debate so far today, show how complicated the various relevant provisions can be. For that reason, we suggest that the high level of judicial scrutiny that the High Court offers is to be favoured. Furthermore, the reputation of the High Court and the scrutiny it applies will serve as a useful check on the commission. Any case that reaches the High Court would become a useful precedent, and any guidance that the High Court gives would be useful in helping to avoid future court appearances. Furthermore, the need to satisfy the demands of the High Court would also encourage the commission to be thorough, if a case were to proceed to judicial scrutiny.

I remind hon. Members that the use of such powers would be very limited. As such, relatively few cases would be expected to reach this stage and it is unlikely that this requirement would place too great a burden on the High Court. What is important is that cases are considered properly and the relevant level of scrutiny is applied. We consider Amendment 74 an important enough issue to press to a Division at the appropriate moment.

Amendment 78 looks to remove the early payment discount provisions in schedule 2.3(3)(d). As the Bill stands, that and other similar sections provide that notice of a possible penalty must include information about any early payment discounts. That implies that the commission may provide discounts for the early payment of a proposed penalty, imposed under the 2000 Act. Our amendments delete reference to early payment and thereby prevent discounts from being issued.

While we understand that the intention behind the provisions is to encourage swift settlement of penalty liabilities, we disagree that the discount mechanism currently in place is the best means of achieving the goal. A penalty is an important indication of wrongdoing. Allowing a discount for early payment could suggest that the seriousness of the offence had in some way been mitigated. That could send out the wrong message, and could trivialise the penalty regime.

Amendments 63 to 67 would serve to remove monetary penalties from the discretionary requirement regime. Amendment 63 would specifically remove sub-sub-paragraph (a), relating to monetary penalties, from sub-paragraph (8), which defines what may constitute a "discretionary requirement". It would leave two remaining powers with the commission, which would be extremely flexible and could require a subject to take such steps as the commission sees fit to remedy an offence or contravention. Amendments 64 to 67 are consequential.

The power to issue fines is one of the key new powers that the commission will be granted by the Bill. Fines can act as a crude penalty and disincentive when the 2000 Act has been breached. Conceptually, we support the penalty regime in certain circumstances, but we remain concerned at the potential for the Bill to encourage the over-zealous use of penalties when other avenues should be explored first. That is particularly so in the case of minor infringements of the legislation. The discretionary requirement regime, minus the penalty provision, is capable of remedying minor breaches, and we should not encourage a simple fine system that could fail to address the root of the problem. By removing the penalty, the commission would need to focus on imposing a discretionary requirement to take steps to stop or remedy a breach, under paragraph 5(b) and 5(c) respectively. We believe that that is a positive step, and would encourage understanding rather than retribution.

I expect that there may be concern that the commission will be seen as a light touch without the penalty regime. However, the amendments would leave in place the power to fine when an offence had been committed under the 2000 Act. Thus, in serious cases there would be no need to use the part 2 "discretionary requirements" provision unless it would be useful to do so. Furthermore—and this is a point that I would like to emphasise—if a non-penalty "discretionary requirement" is not satisfied, paragraph 9 would allows the commission to then impose a monetary penalty as a final resort. By leaving it as a final resort in non-offence and less serious cases, it would encourage the commission to help remedy the breach rather than issue a draconian penalty.

The purpose of amendment 77 is the introduction of a time limit into the Bill. It relates to the period in which an individual can respond to the relevant civil sanction imposed on them by the commission. We contend that the provisions in place could be too vague. Clarity is preferred, especially when potentially innocent subjects are seeking to respond to the commission. The simple addition of specific predefined time limits into the schedule could tackle that problem. Amendment 77 would apply a 28-day limit to the making of representations and objections against a discretionary requirement to the commission. I would point out that part 2 of the schedule provides that in relation to a discretionary requirement the period for representations or objections

"may not be less than 28 days".

Does the Minister not agree that that inconsistency is revealing? Surely that shows that 28 days, as a minimum, should be a fair amount of time.

Amendment 75 would insert the word "promptly" into paragraph 6(5) in part 2 of schedule 2, which relates to the notice of a discretionary requirement. The Minister dismissed the use of the word "immediately" in Committee, which is why we are now back with a slightly less prescriptive term. The amendment would require the Electoral Commission to notify the subject of its final decision to impose a discretionary requirement or fixed monetary penalty promptly because, as things stand, there is no time limit for serving the notice.

Discretionary requirements, of course, are intended to provide the commission with a flexible means of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the 2000 Act. That flexibility is reflected in paragraph 5 in part 2, which states that a discretionary requirement can be

"a requirement to take such steps as the Commission may specify".

That flexibility is welcome, but there should be a compensating certainty, particularly in the delivery of the notice informing the subject of the requirement.

If prompt compliance is expected of the person, the commission should be an example of good practice in its own expediency. There is no time limit in the Bill for the service of either notice. As such, it is possible that the commission might delay in delivering the notice and delay on the part of the commission is also likely to be reciprocated by the person. Good practice should be a statutory requirement and we believe that the simple insertion of the word "promptly" will help achieve that goal.

Government amendment 23 follows up on a number of amendments tabled in Committee by me and Nick Ainger and relates to the requirement for the commission to publish guidance. In Committee on 13 November, concern was expressed about the frequency and timing of guidance published by the commission on the use of its powers. Questions were also posed regarding the content of any guidance. Our Committee amendments 61 and 62 and the Liberal Democrats' Committee amendment 136 sought to address deficiencies in that respect.

The consensus stemming from the debate was that annual guidance should be published and that it should be required to contain certain prescribed information, particularly on the use of investigatory powers. I am pleased to see that the Minister has taken those suggestions on board and we welcome Government amendment 23. It obliges the commission to publish annual information on the use of commission powers. It achieves that by attaching that requirement to the pre-existing annual financial reporting requirement contained in paragraph 20 of schedule 1 to the 2000 Act. The annual financial report will now include information in line with the newly introduced schedule 2 requirements. That seems to us a suitable way of going about that. We are pleased that the Government have included that positive amendment and we hope that the annual reporting requirement will reassure people that the commission is using its powers reasonably.

Government amendment 28 relates to a report published by the commission in accordance with paragraph 27 of the schedule. It stipulates that any report may, pursuant to the paragraph, omit certain information if, in the opinion of the commission, the publication of the information would or might be unlawful or if it might adversely affect any proceedings or investigation. In essence, it qualifies the obligation introduced by the welcome Government amendment 23.

Although we agree that some flexibility is acceptable in terms of reporting requirements, the measure could go slightly too far, we believe. There is no requirement that the commission's opinion of the lawfulness or any adverse affects of publishing certain information should be reasonable. We feel that an opinion to that end should be reasonable, and our amendment (a) to Government amendment 28 addresses the deficiency. It would ensure that the commission does not become overly defensive with regard to the information that it holds. As things stand, the commission could have a very subjective and defensive set of opinions, which could prevent full and frank disclosure in its report. That would dampen considerably the positive potential of the reporting requirement.

We also have a slight reservation about the wording of sub-paragraph (b) in Government amendment 28. The effect of sub-paragraph (b) would be that information could validly be omitted from a report if its publication

"might adversely affect any current investigation or proceedings."

That goes further than the current wording of the Bill and, again, it could lead to over-cautiousness on the part of the commission. Our second amendment to Government amendment 28—amendment (b)—changes the wording from "might" to "would". That would refocus the commission when it decided on whether the publication of information really would damage its investigation. In combination with the mere subjective opinion requirement that I have identified, schedule 2 would, if not amended, allow for a very cautious report that might not be fully informative, and that would not fully reflect the reality of the commission's work. I would appreciate the Minister's further thoughts on those points.

Finally, amendment 83 inserts a threshold test after paragraph 27(2) of schedule 2. The amendment aims to ensure that the commission excludes details of less serious offences in the reports that it is obliged to publish under paragraph 27(1). The measure would serve three purposes. First, it would excuse from further censure those who have fallen foul of the legislation to a minor extent. The threshold ensures that only the more serious offenders are named and shamed. Secondly, the removal of minor offences from the reports would mean a more intense focus on the major offenders. The threshold of £5,000—the amount is negotiable, as far as we are concerned—catches the most serious cases and ensures that they are rightly named and shamed. Thirdly, the measure would act as an additional deterrent to the commission of offences and infringements. Again, I would be interested to hear the Minister's thoughts on those proposals.

The House will be in no doubt about the importance of what we are debating. Clearly, we can talk in more detail about the investigative powers when we come to the next group of amendments, but any measure that allows a senior commission official or the police to enter premises to check on the income and expenditure of an individual or organisation should be looked into carefully. The House should be fully satisfied that the new framework that we are putting in place will serve Parliament and the country well.

To pick up briefly on our earlier debate on the motion on the guide to the rules relating to the conduct of Members, I do not think that anyone in the House is resisting transparency. One of the contributors to that debate suggested that the discussion indicated that hon. Members did not want to declare, or want their local parties to have to declare, events that raised more than £1,000. Certainly, that was not my position. The position is that we want maximum transparency, but clearly we have to have a system that can be handled properly, and that does not put an unreasonable demand on the volunteers on whom we all depend for the operation of the political system, which, of course, is dependent on the political parties.

I pay tribute to the hon. Members who were on the Public Bill Committee. The Government had a real wish to arrive at a consensus, and that is to their credit. The Minister said, perfectly fairly, that some of the Government's amendments reflect an aim on which there should be consensus. There is no doubt in my mind—I have given evidence on such matters to the Committee on Standards in Public Life—that when we try to enact legislation governing our electoral process and governing the very important issue of donations, we should do so in a way that achieves full and proper consensus.

We can, of course, go into detail on the investigatory powers later. I will not pass comment on the commission; again, that can come later. It is a new organisation. It is important that it establishes itself, in the eyes of parliamentarians and the country, as doing an excellent job.

I understand where the new clauses and amendments tabled by Mr. Hamilton and by the Conservatives are coming from, but I have one central problem with them, which is an objection to their consistency with what we in the House impose on the rest of society. I hope that hon. Members will explain further in the course of debate. We should not, as politicians, give ourselves special treatment in the regulatory regime that we do not give to other people. We should not give ourselves arbitrary exemptions from the type of rules that we impose on others.

It is clear that, in some cases, politics is special. It is clear that, for example, we as democratic representatives need some rights to be able to do our job. That is entirely in order and entirely behind the scandal of the treatment of Damian Green. But that has to do with constitutional matters—with the balance of power between different branches of government. It is not just about whether we feel that we ought to be given special treatment.

Surely the hon. Gentleman appreciates that the provisions go much further than MPs. Great concern was expressed on both sides in Committee that honourable people who give up their time on a voluntary basis for our associations, for instance, would be unfairly caught by the provisions.

I appreciate that point, but we must be careful not to make special rules for politics just because we know about politics and we do not know about other areas of activity in the economy and in social life.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the time of the police is better used trying to find real criminals who are causing crime in the community than chasing bureaucratic errors that were made honestly?

I fully support that point. I had intended to deal with the hon. Gentleman's new Clause 3 later, but I may as well speak about it now. In principle, I am fully in favour of what he says, for precisely the reason that he gives. Over the past 10 or 11 years the Government have become far too fond of creating criminal offences. They have invented more than 3,000 criminal offences, in many cases with no particular purpose in mind except to issue a press release.

However, we must be careful to apply the same principles to everybody else in society as we apply here. I would be grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Leeds, North-East in other examples when we on the Liberal Democrat Benches try to make sure that the criminal law is not used inappropriately. We do not have the opportunity to do that now, but it is important to bear in mind—and on the whole I support his new clause—that we should apply the same argument in other cases as they come up.

I am more concerned about some of the amendments tabled by the Conservatives. We should be wary of removing civil sanctions for contraventions that are short of criminal offences. Standard regulatory practice in the outside world applies that sort of idea to a range of other activities. Why, in this case, should political activity be treated differently? If we remove any sort of civil sanction for violations that fall short of criminal violations, we are left with no sanctions at all. It is pointless to pass statutory provisions that impose obligations on people and to have absolutely no sanctions to back up those obligations. The temptation for the Government will then be to make those obligations enforceable by the criminal law, so we will end up with yet more criminal offences.

That applies even more in the case of removing the variable monetary penalties. Anyone looking at the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, for example, will see that those penalties are entirely standard. That is how regulation happens in general, and I cannot see any reason to remove such regulatory devices for the activity that we are discussing. There was an opportunity to object to them when the 2008 Act was going through Parliament; perhaps some Members did object. But given the fact that such devices represent the standard way in which regulation happens, I see no reason why what we do should get special treatment.

That brings me to Amendment 74, which relates to the appeal to the High Court and on which Mr. Djanogly wants us to vote. Under the 2008 Act, the standard practice—for everybody else, in every other regulatory field—is that there is no appeal to any sort of court, only to the first level of the tribunal. In giving them an appeal to the county court, we are already giving people in the line of activity that we are discussing a degree of special treatment; they have access to the ordinary courts. To go further and give people involved in politics access to the High Court would go way beyond what we offer people in other fields of activity. The hon. Gentleman said that doing so would provide for precedent. I should say that, as a matter of technical law, one High Court cannot bind another, so the amendment would not even do that. I have yet to be convinced that amendment 74 is fair in its treatment of political activity in relation to other types of activity.

I am more sympathetic on the issue of discounts for the early payment of fines. It always seemed to me that those were a rather strange provision in the 2008 Act in the first place. Paying a fine early should not mean that people pay less; it is not a matter of civil debt, simply of when the obligation is fulfilled. However, the fact that that provision in the 2008 Act makes no sense is not a reason to give the activity that we are dealing with today special treatment with regard to it. We should be worrying about why we passed the provision in the first place.

In making all those points, the hon. Gentleman runs the risk of putting the monitoring of our electoral system in the same basket as dealing with parking tickets. There is a difference between the two, and that point applies to everything that he has just said—not least, to his last point.

The 2008 Act deals with a whole range of topics, some of them very serious. The hon. Gentleman has to show why the special characteristics of politics, party funding and all the matters with which we are dealing should lead to the specific special treatment that he wants. I am afraid that he has not done that.

I would say that most people would put the running of our electoral system in a different category from that of the monitoring of commercial affairs.

It is in a different category, but the question is about why that different category should be treated in the specifically different ways that he is talking about. My fear is that it is simply because we in the House know more about the political process—we know far more about it than about economic and commercial processes—that we think that we ought to provide differently for it. I am afraid that I do not think that that is good enough.

I put it to the hon. Gentleman that the reason is that we are here to guard our democratic system.

Precisely right. But I want the hon. Gentleman to demonstrate that the provisions that he puts forward—in Amendment 74, for example—specifically help to guard the democratic process. My central worry is that this is not to do with thinking about the function and the importance of politics but has more to do with our self-regard and our specific knowledge. That is insufficient reason to treat better an activity that we know more about than other sorts of activity that we regulate every day.

My hon. Friend Mr. Hamilton made his case powerfully, and I understand what David Howarth said about our not wanting to be seen to be putting ourselves in a different category from other citizens. However, my central point is that it is not a good thing for the police and the whole panoply of criminal law and prosecutors to invade politics—sometimes, although not in my case, for party political reasons—because they often do not want to do it. It is pretty clear, from my direct experience, that the police do not welcome this practice that has grown up. We are in danger of following the American course whereby we pollute politics with all this extraneous interference.

When fraud is being committed—when an hon. Member or a member of a political party is, say, deliberately concealing a donation or seeking to obstruct justice or in some way to hinder and block the operation of the legislation that this Government have put in place—then those people deserve to be pursued for a criminal sanction; of course they do. But where an innocent mistake has been made involving what are complex rules, as has happened to many hundreds of Members of this House—including some here this evening, not only me—it is not sensible for the police or the whole system of criminal law to come in; it is a matter for regulation either by this House or by the Electoral Commission. I think that this Bill improves the situation.

Let us look at some examples. The "loans for peerages" case was pursued as the result of a political request. It took 15 months, nothing happened at the end of it, and the police spent a great deal of money—hundreds of thousands of pounds. The question of whether there was an issue in that case needed to be addressed by the political process—the process of transparency and democratic accountability for which this Government deserve a lot of credit for introducing. We turned our back on the old system whereby a Hong Kong billionaire could give what he liked to a particular political party and nobody knew where it was coming from, who he was or what his motive was.

The other important point about the new Clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-East—whether all its specifics are satisfactory to the House is a separate matter—is that the Electoral Commission needs to be much more accountable and needs different leadership from what it has had in the first phase of its work. If I may say so—I will not go into detail—I found it to be incompetent, dysfunctional and politically unworldly. There have been some sensible changes, with commissioners with a political background coming in. I could not believe some of the things that I experienced. One of the things that I found out in the course of this story was that if one of us were taking part in an internal party election and a member of our campaign staff, perhaps a student volunteer, got us a return to Brighton that cost, let us say, £12 or £13 off-peak, and that individual had used a credit card with a credit rating of £2,000 to £3,000—in other words, more than the £1,000 that we have to declare in relation to any donations—the commission's view was that we would have to declare that. A £12 ticket counted as a donation in kind because of the credit card that happened to pay for it a couple of days before the money was reclaimed. I could quote countless examples—but I will not burden the House—about my own unhappy experience, which proved to me that the commission had very little idea of the political world that it was regulating.

This is not in any way intended to excuse or somehow sidestep the obligation to report on time, or the necessity for the law to be obeyed by regulated donees, which all of us are. I am simply saying that we need from the new leadership a more effective and competent commission, and one that will carry out the duties that the new legislation will enshrine. The changes that the Government have made to the Bill, which were in part provoked by the original amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-East and spoken to by my hon. Friends the Members for Battersea (Martin Linton) and for Carmarthen, West and South Pembrokeshire (Nick Ainger) in Committee, have made it a much better Bill. I hope that the commission's leadership will take heed of it and start to act in a proportionate and more politically worldly fashion.

In the end, we are dealing with politics, which is a voluntary activity. We all have our obligations, but we do not want, for example, to criminalise the local party treasurer because he is in his 80s and has not studied the small print of something—someone who could not be any further away from wanting to do something dishonest. We have to take the process forward in a sensible fashion, and that has not been the case before now.

I am a little puzzled by the insistence on a Division on the question of whether a final appeal under these procedures should go to the High Court rather than the county court. The question is not where the appeal ends up, but the time during which someone may be proto-criminalised while a procedure takes place. That may well result in an appeal being taken to a county court, or in the case of the final appeal, to the High Court. That was the thrust of an Amendment suggested in Committee by my hon. Friend Martin Linton, to which I contributed, on the making of a defence prior to a proceeding taking place by application to a court about the nature of an omission or act that could invoke proceedings.

The ability to obtain a certificate prior to those proceedings taking place relates to the argument about the defence of democracy, and the extent to which people undertaking acts that they consider to be part of their duties in representing the public in the political process can be criminalised by implication long before anything has been decided. As was suggested in Committee, people can end up camped outside people's doors, and a series of articles and comments can be published in the press and the media about something that has yet to be determined.

Under the existing process for considering whether an offence has been committed, there is no provision for redress while the process is undertaken. The idea of being able to prevent that process from going any further through the application for a certificate seems to provide the way forward, given several of the discussions we have had this afternoon. My right hon. Friend the Minister suggested in Committee that further examination of those ideas might be undertaken before the Bill had run its course through this House and Another place. It would be helpful to our considerations if he could indicate whether such considerations might be provided through further amendments, or other provisions, to introduce a more proportionate system before the Bill returns to this House from the other place and we make our final consideration of it.

I rise to address the new clauses tabled by my hon. Friend Mr. Hamilton and then, I am afraid, to resist the cornucopia of Opposition amendments. I shall also speak to the Government amendments.

I have a great deal of sympathy with my hon. Friend's arguments and instinct, but I ask the House to resist new clauses 3 and 4. If we want a proportionate and flexible Electoral Commission, as I believe Members of all parties do, new Clause 3 will not help. We have broad cross-party agreement that we need a strong regulatory regime, enforced by a rigorous and effective regulator. Much of the Bill is designed to make improvements in that direction. That is not to say that the commission must act harshly, and of course sometimes it should not act at all, as in the case of small-scale late reporting cases caused by an inadvertent mistake or an accident by a volunteer.

It is worth remembering that the commission has discretion and is not compelled to impose a penalty in all cases. The new clause would force the commission to issue a fixed monetary penalty in all cases of the three offences to which it relates. That runs counter to the idea of a flexible sanctions regime, which underpins much of the Bill. It might even have the unwanted side effect of suggesting that fixed monetary penalties must be imposed for all such breaches, rather than enabling the commission to take the proportionate, case-by-case approach that I believe we all want. That is important, because the Bill will allow the commission to use its expertise to exercise discretion on the use of sanctions and apply them appropriately.

The commission may view a one-off breach as a minor infringement, but it may decide, on the evidence available, that behaviour such as persistent infringements indicates more serious activity such as evasion. It might also wish to take into account the scale of the late report or the amount of time involved, in deciding what penalty is appropriate, if any. It is important that we do not limit that flexibility from the outset.

The commission has published its draft enforcement policy, and I hope that Members with an interest will contribute their views. The document sets out the commission's view that sanctions may be used in a more graduated and proportionate way under the Bill than is currently possible. As the House will know, it has said that it does not support a provision such as new clause 3, as it would

"remove our ability to use the most appropriate civil sanction to secure compliance and deter future non-compliance in any given case. This might be a variable penalty, restoration notice, compliance notice or enforcement undertaking rather than a fixed penalty, depending on the circumstances of each case and how serious the late or non-reporting was."

There may be mitigating or aggravating circumstances to take into account, and the logic of flexible sanctions is precisely that the commission does not have to use a hammer to crack a nut or, as Sir George Young put it in the earlier debate, a steamroller to flatten a molehill. Equally, the commission's hands will not be tied by sanctions that do not sufficiently match the offence. As part of the new regime, we expect it to use sanctions proportionately.

Does my right hon. Friend accept that it should be a minimum requirement that before the Electoral Commission takes action on late payment, it has reason to suspect that that late payment is caused by a desire either to withhold information or to deceive? In cases in which there is no such suspicion and no reason to believe that, should it not decline to take action?

I am grateful for that Intervention. My hon. Friend knows that we are planning to reconsider some of the issues that lie behind his remarks, and I shall revert to them in another context.

It is important to remember that the commission must apply its expertise in judging precisely how the system should operate. We are trying to ensure that it has a battery of tools that enables it to operate proportionately. I hope that that reassures my hon. Friend. We expect the commission to act proportionately and it says that it intends to do so. Although it is for the commission to determine the matter, I anticipate that offences such as late reporting may be treated less severely than what could be considered a more serious offence in most instances, but not all circumstances are the same. I have given some indications of how what may at first appear to be a minor offence might appear more serious on closer inspection and investigation. We must leave the commission the flexibility and the range of instruments that it needs to deal with each case on its merits.

The Minister almost assumes that the commission will act proportionately. That may be the case with the existing commission, but we are legislating for the long term, and many amendments that Opposition Members and Mr. Hamilton tabled, and many comments from other hon. Members, reflect concerns that the commission may not always exercise proportionality. Will the Minister deal with our anxieties?

Of course, the hon. Gentleman is right; it goes without saying that we are not legislating for the current commission but for all commissions for the foreseeable future. As he knows, we have already tackled many of his concerns. I will address each Amendment in turn, and I hope that when he considers how I have done so, he will realise that we are conscious of the need to legislate for the future—and we believe that we are doing exactly that. I hope that I have reassured my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-East sufficiently for him to feel able to ask leave to withdraw the Clause.

I understand the reason for my hon. Friend's tabling new clause 4, and I share the sentiments that lie behind it. Of course, the commission must use its powers proportionately, after carefully considering the facts of each case. He asked whether I believed that the Electoral Commission was above Parliament. Of course it is not, but we must constantly remind ourselves—David Howarth keeps reverting to the point—that the Electoral Commission must be entirely independent of Parliament. It is not for Ministers to influence or try to influence how the Electoral Commission exercises its functions, still less the way in which it makes its decisions. That is why I said that the Electoral Commission would decide on the facts of the case whether to refer anything to the police.

I am not convinced that setting up an independent panel in statute to provide guidance and a code of practice to the commission is an appropriate way forward. The Electoral Commission was established to be statutorily independent. As with other regulators of its kind, there is an arrangement whereby the electoral commissioners lead the commission's strategy and set its priorities, and the commission will consider what guidance is necessary to explain its role and the regulatory framework in which it operates. For precisely that reason—its operational independence—the commission reports directly to Parliament, including through the Speaker's Committee.

If we provided another body on top of the commission, would that result in more or less clarity of responsibility? I believe that it would result in less clarity. Who would be responsible for individual decisions—the panel or the commission? If the commission disagreed with the panel's advice, would it be bound to adhere to the advice or could it disregard it? New clause 4 would unnecessarily complicate the picture, make regulation more difficult and possibly produce perverse consequences that no hon. Member would welcome. It is not practical for the commission to be required to seek advice from the panel routinely before making decisions that relate to its investigatory powers or sanctions. That might lead to all sorts of complexities and unnecessary delays. Decisions should be for the electoral commissioners and the commission staff, who are recruited because they have experience and expertise in the field.

As hon. Members know, we have taken direct steps to assist the commission to become more aware of the political environment in which it operates. Everyone who has spoken during the various stages of the Bill's passage through Parliament has drawn attention to the need for the Electoral Commission to become more sensitised, if I may put it that way, to the democratic political environment. That is why we are introducing provisions in the Bill enabling the appointment of a minority of commissioners who have recent experience from across the political spectrum. That will be in addition to the parliamentary parties panel, which already exists for consultation with party administrators and practitioners.

The Bill already includes the requirement for the commission to publish guidance on how it intends to use its powers and sanctions, and to consult such persons as it considers appropriate before publishing or reviewing such guidance. In its evidence to the Public Bill Committee, the commission indicated that it intended to consult political parties and interested people in Parliament regarding the guidance on the use of those powers. It is open to the commission to establish and seek advice from an informal advisory group of individuals whom it believes can provide experience and guidance on any aspect of its functions. The commissioners previously established a small reference group in that way and there is no reason why they should not do so again. However, the establishment by statute of a formal panel to issue guidance or advice to which the commission would be required to have regard is something very different.

Does my right hon. Friend not accept that the motivation behind new Clause 4 was to ensure that the commission, which up to now has not been consistent in investigating various infringements, were consistent and monitored in respect of such consistency? Can he assure me and the House that what is proposed will ensure such consistency, which has been so sadly lacking?

That is precisely the intention. I have said already that I fully understand the sentiment behind my hon. Friend's new Clause 4. Indeed, I think that every Member of the House is in sympathy with that sentiment, but we have to ensure that the Bill works. With all respect to him, I do not think that new clause 4 would have the effect he wants. In fact, as I have already said, it may have perverse consequences.

The way in which the Electoral Commission has conducted itself and the evidence that it has given show that it shares that sentiment and wants to improve its performance. Everyone wants to see that happen, and that is the direction in which the Bill is designed to move us. However, whatever we do in trying to provide the commission with the tools to improve its performance, we must not do it in a way that seeks, or could be seen to seek, to interfere unduly with the discharge of its regulatory functions.

The hon. Member for Cambridge has said on many occasions—every time he has said it, I have agreed with him—that if we are to depart from the regulatory framework that we have already set up, possibly on the basis that, as Mr. Djanogly said, regulating democratic politics is perhaps categorically different from regulating other areas of public life, we must do so only if there are truly compelling grounds. We will return to that point again and again in our discussions, but in the meantime, I hope that my hon. Friend will not press his new clause 4, as I will have to oppose it, sympathetic as I am to its intent.

Let me make it clear that I do not want to do anything that might appear to diminish the commission's independence. New clause 4 might have that effect. I certainly believe that it would hamper the commission's operational effectiveness and make it less efficient in the discharge of its duties. New clause 4 would muddy the waters by making the lines of responsibility for decisions less clear, which is profoundly unwelcome and also unnecessary, given the steps that we have already taken to equip the commission better to understand the field that it regulates and to explain its actions to those whom it regulates.

The Minister said that we were talking about differentiating the commission's activities from other aspects of public life, but the legislation to which Mr. Hamilton referred probably deals mainly with commercial life.

I was including commercial life in the phrase "public life"—or, if I can be precise, "matters that affect the general public". I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman. Anyway, I hope that I have said enough to persuade my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-East not to press his new Clause 4.

My hon. Friend asked about dual reporting and when section 59 of the Electoral Administration Act 2006 would be commenced. Those Members who were present earlier will have seen that the Committee on Standards and Privileges report was approved after a somewhat lengthier discussion than some of us had envisaged. The Electoral Commission has indicated that it will move swiftly to notify the Justice Secretary that it is content that it will receive all the information that it needs. Once that notification is received—as has been discussed today, that is a prerequisite for commencement—the Justice Secretary will commence the provision at the earliest opportunity. The right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire suggested that administrative changes to House procedures should enable commencement by June at the latest.

Let me turn to Opposition amendments 59 to 62. I suppose that I should compliment the hon. Member for Huntingdon on his persistence, because pretty well identical amendments were tabled in Committee which he said were probing amendments. They were not put to a vote, but I am happy to try to persuade him not to press them once again. Practically, amendments 59 to 62 would have the effect of preventing the Electoral Commission from applying a fixed monetary penalty to any of the regulated entities concerned for the contravention of a prescribed restriction or requirement. Amendments 59 to 62 go against the flexibility of the system that we are seeking to introduce.

It is worth putting it on record again that the Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended that civil sanctions should be made available in instances that could be considered more minor and where it said that administrative penalties would be more appropriate. Accepting amendments 59 to 62 would mean that this lightest-touch penalty, which is generally available to the commission under the relevant schedule, would not be available in those sorts of cases where it may be particularly appropriate. That would be illogical if we are serious about adopting a proportionate approach.

Finally, amendments 59 to 62 fail to take account of the existing provisions in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. Acceptance of them would remove the commission's limited ability to impose civil penalties in relation to certain breaches of the 2000 Act. The fixed monetary penalties in schedule 2 of the Bill replicate the present system in section 147 of the 2000 Act. For example, where a party fails to inform the commission of a change of treasurer, as required by section 31(4), the Electoral Commission can currently impose a civil penalty. Should amendments 59 to 62 be accepted, the commission would still be able to apply a fixed monetary penalty, but only when a prescribed offence had been committed. In addition, the other civil sanctions would continue to be available in respect of prescribed restrictions and requirements, which would add inconsistency.

By preventing the application of those new sanctions to prescribed restrictions and requirements, we would be in danger of binding the commission's hands. We believe that it must be for the independent Electoral Commission to determine when a fixed monetary penalty or any other appropriate civil sanction should be used where a prescribed restriction or requirement has been contravened. The commission must be allowed to use its expertise to determine what mitigating or aggravating factors might be taken into account. That is proportionate and allows each case to be approached on its merits. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Huntingdon will not press amendments 59 to 62.

I would appreciate it if the Minister addressed the concerns that many people have expressed about the possibility of imposing a large penalty for a minor civil offence.

I can only refer the hon. Gentleman again to what the Electoral Commission has said. It has made it absolutely clear that it will approach each case on its merits and proportionately. The dictionary definitions in respect of what he has just described are that it is not proportionate. We have to accept what the Electoral Commission says and be extremely careful about binding its hands. I refer him back to what I have just said: what he is suggesting in amendments 59 to 62 may have the perverse consequence of producing the opposite result to that which he is seeking.

Amendment 78 deals with early payment discounts and late payment penalties. It is similar to amendments tabled by the Opposition in the Public Bill Committee, and I am delighted to discuss these matters again, and to set out our thinking on them and explain why we must again resist the proposals. As the hon. Member for Cambridge has pointed out, the provisions for early payment discounts and late payment penalties replicate the equivalent provisions in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, on which the civil sanctions regime is based.

I believe it is right to encourage prompt payment of sanctions, and to reflect the procedural savings to the regulator—in this case, the Electoral Commission. Of course, the commission's role is not purely administrative, but there are those, including the hon. Member for Huntingdon, who have argued that the measures will turn the commission's role into that of a traffic warden issuing fixed penalty notices. With respect to him, however, that is not the point. These sanctions provisions are only part of a range of potential sanctions, and the whole point is that there should be flexibility in how they are applied. We are seeking to provide such a flexible approach to sanctions in line with other regulators who have benefited from the provisions in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, on which these provisions are modelled.

In providing for the possibility of early payment discounts and late payment penalties, the commission will have the option to offer the provisions if it deems that appropriate. I shall set that out in the final version of its guidance on enforcement. However, it may decide to offer the options in some instances and not in others. For example, it may decide that providing for an early payment discount is appropriate in some instances, and that a fixed monetary penalty might be appropriate for a relatively small breach and when speeding up the regulatory process is in the interests of the regulator and of the individual concerned. The commission may also decide that it is not appropriate to provide these discounts or penalties in some cases—for example, when the individual is a serial offender or when the offence is of a more serious nature. I hope that that addresses the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Cambridge.

Will the Minister give the House one example of when an early payment discount would be likely to apply? These powers are not likely to be used frequently, and as he has said, in many people's minds, such practices are more relevant to parking tickets than to electoral offences.

Just to correct the hon. Gentleman, let me say that that was not my analogy. I was quoting him, and I am not sure that I share his view. The point is that it will be for the commission to determine the circumstances, and we have to allow it flexibility as a regulator.

To return to the point made by the hon. Member for Cambridge, when we depart from the regulatory framework that the House agreed to in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, we must have a compelling reason for doing so, and I do not see any such reason here. I am sorry to pray in aid the hon. Member for Cambridge again, but as he said, we must be careful about suggesting to the people whom we all serve that we are somehow immune from the kind of sanctions and regulatory frameworks that apply to other people in public life. I hope that I have now said enough to convince the hon. Member for Huntingdon to ask leave to withdraw his Amendment.

Amendments 64, 65, 66 and 67 are all consequential on amendment 63, and they would remove variable monetary penalties from the range of discretionary requirements proposed for the commission by the Bill. Again, I am going to ask the House to resist those amendments if they are pressed to a vote, because to accept them would be to remove an important part of the Commission's range of civil sanctions and take away some of the flexibility that we believe to be desirable.

The sanction of variable monetary penalties is closely modelled on those contained in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. The provisions are intended to allow the regulator to ensure that the financial penalty is appropriate to the offence. I come back to the fundamental point that, unless there is a compelling reason to do so, we should not depart from the principle that politicians should not be treated differently from those in the other regulated fields.

As well as that matter of principle, there is also a positive reason for including variable monetary penalties in the suite of powers that the Bill gives to the commission. They will provide greater flexibility, and enable the commission to adapt the penalty specifically to the facts of each case. The draft enforcement guidance issued by the commission indicates that it intends to use variable monetary penalties for the graver breaches of the Act, and to use fixed monetary penalties in cases of more minor, technical, breaches, where a penalty is still appropriate but where the breach is less grave or more routine.

Having said that, variable monetary penalties, while flexible, must still be imposed proportionately and, in summary cases, they may not exceed the level of a fine available to a criminal court dealing with the same sort of breach. Currently, that is £5,000 where a case would otherwise be tried in a magistrates court. In other words, the word "variable" does not mean "unlimited". Factors that could be taken into account—I am not saying that they would be, but they could be—include the history of compliance of the individual or organisation concerned and also the gravity of the failure. The commission's draft enforcement policy—to which I am sure that the commission would welcome contributions from all hon. Members—draws this distinction, stating that fixed monetary penalties are likely to be used for

"low level non-compliance such as the late delivery of statutory information", and that variable monetary penalties will be used for

"more serious breaches than fixed penalties where a fine can be set at a level to reflect the gravity of the offence and remove any financial benefit resulting from non-compliance".

In this sense, variable monetary penalties are an important part of a graduated suite of powers and of the proportionate approach to regulation that all hon. Members want to see.

As the commission states in its latest briefing on the Bill, removing these sanctions

"would significantly reduce our ability to apply the appropriate sanction in a proportionate way".

If there are still concerns about safeguards, I would draw the House's attention to the fact that discretionary requirements may only be imposed by the commission when it is satisfied "beyond reasonable doubt" that an offence or breach has occurred. That is a high threshold. It is the criminal standard of proof, and it ensures that the commission must act responsibly in the use of these powers. The Bill proposes to ensure that regulations are properly enforced by an effective regulator, not to lower the required standard of evidence. The Bill also proposes an appeal mechanism against the imposition of a variable monetary penalty. Moreover, it also proposes to allow a person to make representations before the imposition of a variable monetary penalty. There is, therefore, a suite of safeguards. Amendments 64, 65, 66 and 67 are consequential, and I hope that the arguments I have already outlined against amendment 63 will also stand against those consequential amendments. I hope that I have said enough, therefore, to persuade the hon. Member for Huntingdon to withdraw his amendments.

I am sorry that, even before the hon. Gentleman had heard my reasons why amendments 74 and 82 were a bad idea, he said that he would press them to a vote. However, I hope that I can still persuade him to change his mind, although he said that they were very important to him. They provide that appeals against the imposition of fixed monetary penalties and non-compliance penalties should be heard by the High Court, rather than a county court as the Bill currently provides.

The Government believe that county courts are a more appropriate forum for appeal. The precedent for appeals in electoral law is to a county court, which will therefore have the appropriate expertise. Raising appeal to the High Court would inevitably place an unnecessary strain on the resources of the High Court, when the county court already provides an appropriate opportunity for appeal. It would also risk slowing down the appeals process, which could have a seriously negative impact on the person or organisation whose appeal was under consideration.

I do not subscribe to the logic that the hon. Member for Huntingdon put forward, at least in Committee, that the Electoral Commission might act with more restraint, should an appeal against the imposition of a civil penalty be to the High Court, rather than the county court. Under all circumstances, the Electoral Commission is under a duty to act reasonably and it is required, as I have just said, to meet the criminal standard of proof for the imposition of most of its new civil sanctions. Cases must be—and they will be, I am sure—judged on the facts of the case, not on the processes.

First, the Minister will appreciate that House procedures meant that I had to suggest that we would vote on the matter rather than wait until a later date. More particularly, does he not appreciate that the average county court judge is not very used to dealing with the legality of electoral matters? That is why they should go to the High Court.

I stand corrected on the procedures for voting and I am happy to accept the hon. Gentleman's point about that. As to the county court, appeals on electoral law cases are currently heard there, and we believe that that is appropriate. More expertise exists in the county court than currently in the High Court and the point remains about the burden that the Amendment would place on High Court resources. The hon. Gentleman's proposal is unnecessary because we do not believe that, because the appeal would go to the High Court rather than a county court, the Electoral Commission would adapt its approach. It should not do so, and I do not think that it will do so. If we are to provide for an appeal to go to the High Court, I am afraid that we require a more convincing case for such a change, which would break with existing precedent and indeed with the precedent of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008.

I support the Minister's general case on this issue, but is there not another important point in that Amendment 74 is about appeals for fixed penalty notices? Wasting the High Court's time on fixed penalty notices seems rather bizarre. There might, however, be a serious point—there might be, so I merely ask the Minister to reflect on it—when it comes to appeals about stop notices, which might have an effect on an election that is under way. That might be a different case, but amendment 74 seems to provide no case at all.

As always, I am happy to consider the argument; we can return to it at some future point. As I have said, I understand the instincts behind Amendment 74 and I understand the importance that the hon. Member for Huntingdon attaches to it. I am sympathetic to the argument, but I just think that in this particular case, it would not be effective: it would be a break from precedents and it would not necessarily help in the way the hon. Gentleman imagines—possibly because of the delays and the attendant impact on those subject to appeals.

There is no precedent, because we are setting up a new system.

With all respect to the hon. Gentleman, there is a precedent in respect of electoral law and there is certainly a break from the precedent established by the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. Of course what is proposed is not identical, because as the hon. Gentleman says, we are dealing with new law, but in so far as there are precedents, the Amendment would constitute a break from them. I hope that I have convinced the hon. Gentleman not to press amendment 74 to the vote and to withdraw it.

I am afraid that I am also going to have to resist amendment 77, which introduces a time period for appeals against discretionary requirements. As I said when we debated similar amendments in Committee, such a provision would reduce the clarity of the Bill for those regulated by the commission. The amendment would introduce a time period for appeals, but it is already in provisions devoted to appeals and representations procedures; that is the proper place for such a time period, where it sits most obviously with other provisions relating to appeals. I think that the amendment is an unhelpful step, which would not aid comprehension of the provisions, so I oppose it on that ground alone.

In the course of his remarks, the hon. Member for Huntingdon asked whether there was an inconsistency between references to 28 days for appealing against fixed monetary penalties and those for variable monetary penalties. The precise point is that the maximum period for making representations for fixed monetary penalties is 28 days, which reflects the fact that the breach being punished is less likely to be serious. Representations against the decision to impose such a penalty will need less time. Variable monetary penalties are, as I have already said, likely to be higher and will be imposed in more complex cases, so it is right that longer time be given to object. That is why there is a minimum period of 28 days in that case. Both the time scales are based on the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, from which we should depart only if there is a compelling reason to do so. In this case, we do not think that there is.

The aim of amendment 75 is, I understand, to encourage the commission to demonstrate good practice to those it regulates by acting quickly. We do not believe that the amendment, particularly in the way it is structured, is desirable. As I explained to the hon. Member for Huntingdon when a very similar amendment was tabled in Committee, we do not want unnecessarily to limit the commission in its application of the new civil sanctions regime. We do not want to depart from the framework set up by the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. I have already said that many times already this afternoon and I suspect that I will need to say it many times again before we are through today.

Whatever the circumstances of the case, we expect the commission to act as promptly as it is able to do—a point that will be covered in the final guidance on enforcement. We believe that the commission is well aware of the need for working in a timely fashion. Indeed, in its draft guidance, the commission notes in words that I hope will reassure the hon. Member for Huntingdon:

"We recognise that it is important to conclude investigations as quickly as possible, in the public interest and in the interests of natural justice for those involved", which balances with

"our first priority... to conduct a fair and thorough investigation".

If I may paraphrase, it is precisely those concerns with natural justice and the public interest that lie behind the amendment, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be reassured. This is an important point. I understand that the amendment seeks to protect those subject to investigations, but it is precisely the references to natural justice and the public interest that should reassure the hon. Gentleman. In those circumstances, it is best not to put the commission under a legal obligation to act promptly; instead, of course, performance should be monitored and recorded in the annual report to ensure that decisions are taken expeditiously and on all the right evidence. I thus hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 83 would provide that the Electoral Commission, in its reports on sanctions, is able to publish the names only of those on whom it has imposed a monetary penalty in excess of £5,000. Following the Government amendment on annual reporting of sanctions, the reports referred to will be included in the commission's annual report.

Amendment 83 goes against the core principle of transparency. I believe that it is right for the receipt of a civil penalty to be public, which is an important part of the deterrent effect of the civil sanctions regime. The amendment would exclude a significant range of the potential sanctions available—and most likely the Majority—from being reported publicly. For instance, for offences that are triable only in a magistrates court, fines are capped at £5,000, so should this amendment be agreed, the commission's civil sanctions would not be reported.

Failing to report the imposition of such sanctions is also inconsistent with the requirements of article 6 of the European convention on human rights, by which the commission, as a public authority, will be bound. Article 6, as the hon. Member for Huntingdon will know, requires decisions to impose civil or criminal penalties to be made public. I should also say that the commission will be bound by data protection legislation in all circumstances.

Is the Minister asserting that any fine, no matter how small—very small fines could be imposed for short periods of late fining—should go into the annual report?

As I have already said, transparency is absolutely crucial and our approach mirrors the position with criminal prosecutions where a person has been convicted of an offence. That fact is normally known. I remind the hon. Gentleman that an imposition of a civil penalty in this case might, after all, be an alternative to criminal prosecution.

In all circumstances, the commission is required to be satisfied that the criminal standard of proof has been met before it can impose most of its new civil penalties. I understand the hon. Gentleman's concerns, but it is also worth saying that the commission will not report on investigations that have not resulted in an imposition of a penalty or that are still continuing, although it has said that it will provide information in response to specific requests.

It is a fundamental common law principle, underpinning our legal system, that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. I do not think that anyone, including the commission, would want the publication of such a formal report to risk intruding upon that. Nothing in this proposal would require the commission to include such detail. I have no reason to think that it would be necessary to do so, although I should say that what the commission ultimately decides to include is a matter for the commission.

I put it to the Minister that if a company files its report and accounts late it will now be fined. So far as I know, however, such companies do not get listed in an annual report. Why should association officers be treated differently?

The hon. Gentleman has already answered his own question in his responses to David Howarth. He said—I hope I am paraphrasing him correctly, but forgive me if I am not—that most people would agree that regulating the democratic process is different from regulating, for example, commercial life. If that is the case, it is an important principle of transparency—as I have said, it is anyway a fundamental principle that when penalties are imposed they should be made public—that the fact that people have gone through the process, which contains a lot of safeguards as I have just described, and been fined for an offence should be known and made available to the public, whom we serve.

May I suggest that it is the Minister who has turned the argument on its head? He was arguing that everyone should be treated equally. Now he is saying that they should be treated differently. The more I hear of this, the more I think it is something that we shall have to return to.

No. I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman is paraphrasing me incorrectly. If he had listened carefully to what I said, he would know that I said that we should follow the framework set down by the 2008 Act, unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. I have been extremely careful to say that on every occasion that I have made that statement. I hope that that clarifies his confusion.

I hope, too, that we can all agree that full transparency, as far as is possible, ought to be a goal for us in relation to everything we do, and certainly in relation to the subject matter of the Bill. I hope that that can be common ground between us. If someone has been found guilty of an offence or a breach and has gone through the process, with all the safeguards embedded in it, and that process has reached an end, in our view it is right that that should be a matter of public record and the public, whom we serve, should be aware of it. The hon. Gentleman might disagree, but I think that that is the right way to go about it.

In a final effort to convince the hon. Gentleman of my point of view, I shall make one last point: such publicity and going on the public record might serve—in my view, it will—as a deterrent to behaviour of the sort that none of us wants to see. I hope that he will see fit not to press his amendments.

I want now to speak to Government amendments 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. This is a substantial group of amendments and I shall try to move through them in a logical order. The Government amendments will essentially result in a requirement for the Electoral Commission to include in its annual report details of its use of sanctions. Government Amendment 23 will require the commission to include in its annual report details of its use of new civil sanctions. The Bill already contains the requirement for the commission to report on its use of sanctions from "time to time". The amendment confirms that the report must be annual, in response to the constructive debate on the issue that we had in Committee.

The details that must be included in the report are cases where fixed monetary penalties, discretionary requirements or stop notices have been imposed, unless they have been overturned on appeal; cases where fixed monetary penalties have been paid and, therefore, liability accepted; and cases where enforcement undertakings are accepted.

During consideration in the Public Bill Committee, I accepted that annual reporting was acceptable in principle. I have since consulted the commission to confirm that it is content with that approach. It has stated in its latest briefing note on the Bill that it supports the amendment, saying that it recognises that transparency is an important part of regulation.

That approach mirrors that which we have already taken in requiring the commission's annual report to contain details on its use of investigatory powers. The commission is already required by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to lay an annual report before the House and in the other place. The amendment will result in information relating to the exercise of the new civil sanctions being included in that report. I hope that that additional scrutiny and openness will be welcomed.

Amendments 24, 25, 26 and 27 are all consequential and simply update the language of paragraph 27(1) of schedule 2 to bring it in line with that of paragraph 15(1), which also requires information on the use of investigatory powers to be included in the annual report.

Amendment 28 will ensure that the commission is not required to include in its report information on sanctions where it believes that it would be unlawful to include that information or where to do so would adversely affect any continuing investigation or proceedings. This is complex, so, if I may, I will explain in some detail its effects.

The first part of the provision is intended to cover circumstances where publication of the commission's interest in a particular individual might breach that person's rights under the Data Protection Act 1998 or the Human Rights Act 1998. For example, that could apply to an individual who had been under investigation but had not ultimately been given a civil sanction. The commission has already indicated in its draft enforcement guidance that it will not publish details in those circumstances, stating:

"We do not think it would be reasonable to identify regulated entities that are not sanctioned following an investigation in our reports of investigatory activity."

However, we must be clear about the fact that where a sanction has been imposed, and the periods for representations and appeals have ended, it is consistent with article 6 of the European convention on human rights to make that public. Access to that information is also an important principle of transparent regulation.

That does not mean that the commission is required to publish full details of individuals. Indeed, it has indicated that it intends to publish only information that is essential for transparent regulation. That may be a name and the details of the sanction. The commission's draft guidance invites views on the extent to which information should identify regulated bodies or individuals, and I am sure that it will take on board the views expressed by hon. Members in this debate and elsewhere.

The second part of the provision is designed to ensure that publication of the commission's interest in a person does not jeopardise that person's right to a fair determination of any proceedings that the commission might wish to bring against him or her. It should also help to prevent the commission from being obliged to publish details of an investigation in such a way that would risk undermining operational secrecy of the sort that is often necessary for an investigation to be effective.

Indeed, the commission's draft guidance on enforcement helpfully indicates that it does not intend to identify individuals or organisations subject to continuing investigations, although it is the commission's current policy to respond to questions directly in relation to investigations that are under way.

I hope that the House will welcome those amendments.

With the leave of the House, I am grateful to the Minister for his responses to my new clauses 3 and 4. The Government have gone a long way towards meeting some of the criticisms held by me and by many other Members of the House, which were expressed in Committee by various hon. Members.

I have two points to make. First, as I said in an Intervention, police time could be better used to pursue criminals in the community, rather than people who have made an unintended breach of this legislation.

Secondly, will the Minister strengthen the safeguards against the use of sanctions on unintended errors in reporting in the context about which he has said so much this afternoon—the flexibility that the Electoral Commission must have, and the proportionality that it must exercise in dealing with such errors?

On the basis of what the Minister has said and with the permission of the House, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

C lause, by leave, withdrawn.