European Council

Part of Oral Answers to Questions — Public Accounts Commission – in the House of Commons at 3:30 pm on 25 June 2007.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Tony Blair Tony Blair Prime Minister 3:30, 25 June 2007

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement about the outcome of the European Council in Brussels on 21 and 22 June.

I congratulate the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, on concluding successfully an exceptionally difficult negotiation and on an outstanding presidency of the European Union.

Before the European Council, I made it clear that the concept of a constitutional treaty for Europe had to be abandoned and that we should agree instead a conventional amending treaty like the Nice, Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties and the Single European Act. I also made it clear that the UK had four central demands which had to be met. First, on the charter of fundamental rights, we secured a legally binding protocol, specific to the UK, and applicable both to the British courts and to the European Court of Justice. Let me read the terms. The protocol states that

"the Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice, or any court or tribunal of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that" the Charter

"reaffirms.

In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to the United Kingdom except in so far as the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law."

In respect of our criminal law system and police and judicial processes, we obtained an extension of the opt-in rights that we secured in an earlier treaty on migration, asylum and immigration issues. This means that we have the sovereign right to opt in on individual measures, where we consider it would be in the British interest to do so, but also to stay out, if we want to. It is precisely the pick and choose policy often advocated. It gives us complete freedom to protect our common law system, but it also allows us to participate in areas where co-operation advances British interests. In asylum and immigration, for example, we have opted in on measures dealing with illegal immigration, and in measures allowing us to return asylum seekers to other European countries—both unquestionably in Britain's interests. But it will be within our exclusive power to decide on a case-by-case basis, which is exactly what we wanted.

In respect of social security, we negotiated a provision which allows us to insist on unanimity in any case where we—that is, Britain—declare that any proposal from the Commission would affect important aspects of our social security system, including its scope, cost, or financial structure or balance. Our social security and benefits system is therefore completely protected.

As for the common foreign and security policy, the basis of this will now remain unchanged in a separate treaty, and a separate pillar, from the first pillar Community method. The essential features of the CFSP remain as they were. Unanimity voting is the rule. There is no sole right of initiative for the Commission. There is no role for the European Parliament in decision taking. There is no jurisdiction for the European Court of Justice, except in the particular case of safeguarding the rights of individuals subject to EU sanctions. The two jobs of Commissioner for External Relations and High Representative which, of course, exist already, will be amalgamated in a single job. But this reform does not extend the EU's substantive powers to act in foreign policy. In particular, the Union Representative, when working on common foreign and security policy issues, will operate within a policy framework set by the European Union Foreign Ministers, by unanimity.

All these guarantees not merely remain in the new treaty, but are reinforced in a new overview article that reaffirms them and has full legal force. For the avoidance of doubt, we also obtained a declaration that sets out the unanimous view of all member states about the meaning of those guarantees. That declaration, which then informs the detailed negotiation of the intergovernmental conference, states that the common and foreign security policies of the treaty, including in respect of the office of Union Representative and the external action service,

"will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries, and participation in international organisations, including a Member State's membership of the Security Council of the UN."

There was also a discussion at the Council about competition. The treaties have always made it clear that competition in the internal market should not be distorted. The now defunct constitutional treaty's objectives would have included new wording about "free and undistorted competition". When the treaty was set aside, that provision was lost, but we agreed on a new and legally binding protocol to be annexed to the treaties, which reaffirms the commitment to ensuring that competition is not distorted, and the other references to competition in the existing treaties will remain: for example, articles 4, 27, 34, 81 to 89, 96, 98, 105 and 157 from the European Community treaty. The legal position in relation to competition therefore remains unchanged.

Alongside meeting our four essential requirements, we secured a number of further improvements. The new treaty will confirm for the first time, explicitly, that national security is the sole responsibility of member states. The Union already signs international agreements, but the treaty formalises its legal personality. However, we have now agreed a declaration by all countries for this intergovernmental conference confirming that the fact of this legal personality does not authorise the Union in any way to legislate or act beyond the powers conferred on it by member states in the treaties. There are also new powers for national Parliaments to object to Commission proposals on subsidiarity grounds.

There are a number of extensions of qualified majority voting. In the most sensitive areas of QMV—justice and home affairs, and social security—we obtained the right either not to participate or to insist on unanimity. In addition, a number of other QMV measures—for example, those about rules within the eurozone, or those in justice and home affairs—do not apply to us. As for the rest, we have agreed them, because qualified majority voting is often in Britain's interest. The biggest move to qualified majority voting in Europe's history was the Single European Act, but this allowed the creation of one of Europe's greatest achievements: the single European market. More recently, we have secured reforms such as the services directive and other liberalising measures through QMV, including the lifting of the beef ban, when they would almost certainly have been blocked through unanimity. Among the QMV provisions in the treaty is one that provides a new legal base and QMV for energy market liberalisation, and another that provides QMV for decisions on emergency humanitarian aid to third countries—both of them manifestly in the UK's national interest.

The other main reform is the fixed term, two-and-a-half-year presidency of the European Council, replacing the current rotating six-monthly arrangements. This is necessary for the Union's efficiency, but does not involve any extension of presidency powers. The President of the European Council will remain the servant of the leaders of the member states.

The most important aspect of the new treaty is that it allows the European Union to move on to the issues that really matter. For too many years, we have been bogged down in a debate about institutions. With the increase from 15 to 27 member states, change is essential, but with this agreement, we can now concentrate on issues that really matter: energy security, organised crime and terrorism, globalisation, further enlargement and making Europe's voice more effective internationally.

This agenda is surely quintessentially one in Britain's interests. Over the past 10 years, Britain has moved from the margins of European debate to the centre. This is absolutely right for Britain. Whether in defence or economic reform or in energy policy or the environment, or of course most particularly in enlargement and the appointment of the new Commission President, Britain has for a decade been in a leadership position in Europe. That is exactly where we should stay. I commend this agreement to the House.