'(1) The Mayor of London shall only exercise his powers under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 at meetings ("planning meetings").

(2) A planning meeting shall be open to the public except to the extent that they are excluded (whether during the whole or part of the proceedings) under subsection (3) below or by decision under subsection (5) below.

(3) The public shall be excluded from a planning meeting during an item of business whenever it is likely, in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that, if members of the public were present during that item, confidential information would be disclosed to them in breach of the obligation of confidence; and nothing in this Part shall be taken to authorise or require the disclosure of confidential information in breach of the obligation of confidence.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) above, "confidential information" means—

(a) information furnished to the council by a Government department upon terms (however expressed) which forbid the disclosure of the information to the public; and

(b) information the disclosure of which to the public is prohibited by or under any enactment or by the order of a court;

and, in either case, the reference to the obligation of confidence is to be construed accordingly.

(5) The Mayor of London may exclude the public from a meeting during an item of business whenever it is likely, in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that if members of the public were present during that item there would be disclosure to them of exempt information, as defined in section 100I of the Local Government Act 1972.

(6) A decision under subsection (5) above shall—

(a) identify the proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, to which it applies, and

(b) state the description, in terms of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972, of the exempt information giving rise to the exclusion of the public,

and where a decision is made this section does not require the meeting to be open to the public during proceedings to which the decision applies.

(7) The following provisions shall apply in relation to a meeting of a principal council—

(a) public notice of the time and place of the meeting shall be given by posting it at the offices of the Mayor of London five clear days at least before the meeting or, if the meeting is convened at shorter notice, then at the time it is convened;

(b) while the meeting is open to the public, the Mayor of London shall not have power to exclude members of the public from the meeting.

(8) Nothing in this section shall require the Mayor of London to permit the taking of photographs of any proceedings, or the use of any means to enable persons not present to see or hear any proceedings (whether at the time or later), or the making of any oral report on any proceedings as they take place.

(9) This section is without prejudice to any power of exclusion to suppress or prevent disorderly conduct or other misbehaviour at a meeting.'.— [Mrs. Lait.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New Clause 10— Planning: access to agenda and connected reports—

'(1) Copies of the agenda for a planning meeting and, subject to subsection (2) below, copies of any report for the meeting shall be open to inspection by members of the public at the offices of the Mayor of London in accordance with subsection (3) below.

(2) If the proper officer thinks fit, there may be excluded from the copies of reports provided in pursuance of subsection (1) above the whole of any report which, or any part which, relates only to items during which, in his opinion, the meeting is likely not to be open to the public.

(3) Any document which is required by subsection (1) above to be open to inspection shall be so open at least five clear days before the meeting, except that—

(a) where the meeting is convened at shorter notice, the copies of the agenda and reports shall be open to inspection from the time the meeting is convened, and

(b) where an item is added to an agenda copies of which are open to inspection by the public, copies of the item (or of the revised agenda), and the copies of any report of the meeting relating to the item, shall be open to inspection from the time the item is added to the agenda; but nothing in this subsection requires copies of any agenda, item or report to be open to inspection by the public until copies are available to the Mayor of London.

(4) An item of business may not be considered at a planning meeting unless either—

(a) a copy of the agenda including the item (or a copy of the item) is open to inspection by members of the public in pursuance of subsection (1) above for at least five clear days before the meeting or, where the meeting is convened at shorter notice, from the time the meeting is convened; or

(b) by reason of special circumstances, which shall be specified in the minutes, the Mayor of London is of the opinion that the item should be considered at the meeting as a matter of urgency.

(5) Where by virtue of subsection (2) above the whole or any part of a report for a meeting is not open to inspection by the public under subsection (1) above—

(a) every copy of the report or of the part shall be marked "Not for publication"; and

(b) there shall be stated on every copy of the whole or any part of the report the description, in terms of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972, of the exempt information by virtue of which the council are likely to exclude the public during the item to which the report relates.

(6) Where a planning meeting is required by section [Planning: access to information etc.] to be open to the public during the proceedings or any part of them, there shall be made available for the use of members of the public present at the meeting a reasonable number of copies of the agenda and, subject to subsection (8) below, of the reports for the meeting.

(7) There shall, on request and on payment of postage or other necessary charge for transmission, be supplied for the benefit of any newspaper—

(a) a copy of the agenda for a meeting of a principal council and, subject to subsection (8) below, a copy of each of the reports for the meeting;

(b) such further statements or particulars, if any, as are necessary to indicate the nature of the items included in the agenda; and

(c) if the proper officer thinks fit in the case of any item, copies of any other documents supplied to members of the council in connection with the item.

(8) Subsection (2) above applies in relation to copies of reports provided in pursuance of subsection (6) or (7) above as it applies in relation to copies of reports provided in pursuance of subsection (1) above.'.

New clause 11— Planning: inspection of minutes and other documents after planning meetings—

'(1) After a planning meeting the following documents shall be open to inspection by members of the public at the offices of the Mayor of London until the expiration of the period of six years beginning with the date of the meeting—

(a) the minutes, or a copy of the minutes, of the meeting, excluding so much of the minutes of proceedings during which the meeting was not open to the public as discloses exempt information;

(b) where applicable, a summary under subsection (2) below;

(c) a copy of the agenda for the meeting; and

(d) a copy of so much of any report for the meeting as relates to any item during which the meeting was open to the public.

(2) Where, in consequence of the exclusion of parts of the minutes which disclose exempt information, the document open to inspection under subsection (1)(a) above does not provide members of the public with a reasonably fair and coherent record of the whole or part of the proceedings, the proper officer shall make a written summary of the proceedings or the part, as the case may be, which provides such a record without disclosing the exempt information.'.

New clause 12— Planning: inspection of background papers—

'(1) Subject, in the case of section [Planning: inspection of minutes and other documents after planning meetings] (1), to subsection (2) below, if and so long as copies of the whole or part of a report for a planning meeting are required by section [Planning: access to agenda and connected reports] (1) or [Planning: inspection of minutes and other documents after planning meetings] (1) to be open to inspection by members of the public—

(a) those copies shall each include a copy of a list, compiled by the proper officer, of the background papers for the report or the part of the report, and

(b) at least one copy of each of the documents included in that list shall also be open to inspection at the offices of the Mayor of London.

(2) Subsection (1) above does not require a copy of any document included in the list to be open to inspection after the expiration of the period of four years beginning with the date of the meeting.

(3) Where a copy of any of the background papers for a report is required by subsection (1) above to be open to inspection by members of the public, the copy shall be taken for the purposes of this Part to be so open if arrangements exist for its production to members of the public as soon as is reasonably practicable after the making of a request to inspect the copy.

(4) Nothing in this section—

(a) requires any document which discloses exempt information to be included in the list referred to in subsection (1) above; or

(b) without prejudice to the generality of section [Planning: access to information etc.], requires or authorises the inclusion in the list of any document which, if open to inspection by the public, would disclose confidential information in breach of the obligation of confidence, within the meaning of that subsection.

(5) For the purposes of this section the background papers for a report are those documents relating to the subject matter of the report which—

(a) disclose any facts or matters on which, in the opinion of the proper officer, the report or an important part of the report is based, and

(b) have, in his opinion, been relied on to a material extent in preparing the report, but do not include any published works.'.

New clause 16— Determination of applications for planning permission—

'(1) Section 70 of TCPA 1990 (determination of applications: general considerations) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (2) insert—

"(2A) In respect of applications which are to be determined by the Mayor of London in accordance with a direction under section 2A of this Act, the Secretary of State may by regulations made provision about—

(a) how the Mayor should take into consideration those aspects of the application which are not relevant to the spatial development strategy but are relevant to other development plans;

(b) how the Mayor should deal with cases which require him to have regard to the spatial development strategy and another development plan, but where there are conflicts between the two.".'.

Amendment No. 3, in clause 31, page 34, line 33, at end insert—

'(1A) The Mayor of London may not make a direction under this section more than 21 days after being notified by the local planning authority of the making of the application.'.

Amendment No. 28, page 34, line 40, after 'section' insert

', or in the City of London'.

Amendment No. 18, page 35, line 3, at end insert—

'(4A) An application is not an application of potential strategic importance unless—

(a) the application raises issues which have substantial effects beyond the area of the local planning authority to which the application has been made;

(b) the grant of planning permission in respect of the application will have substantial effects on the policies contained in the spatial development strategy published under section 334 of the GLA Act 1999; and

(c) there are sound planning reasons for so treating it.

(4B) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4A), an application for development in the City of London shall not be an application of potential strategic importance unless it is for the erection of a building—

(a) with a total floor space of more than 100,000 square metres in addition to the total floor space of the development it replaces or,

(b) which is more than 150 metres high.

(4C) Subsection (4B)(b) does not apply to an application for the erection of a building adjacent to the River Thames.'.

Amendment No. 29, page 35, line 3, at end insert—

'(4A) An application is not an application of potential strategic importance by reason only of its failure to accord with the provisions of the development plan in force in the area to which the application relates.

(4B) An application for development in the City of London shall not be an application of potential strategic importance unless it is for the erection of a building—

(a) with a total floor space of more than 100,000 square metres in addition to the total floor space of the development it replaces, or

(b) which is more than 150 metres high.

(4C) Where an order under section 2A makes provision for any application which is to be treated as being for the erection of a building adjacent to the River Thames, subsection (4B)(b) does not apply to that application.'.

Amendment No. 31, page 35, line 3, at end insert—

'(4A) An application is not an application of potential strategic importance unless—

(a) the application raises issues which have substantial effects beyond the area of the local planning authority to which the application has been made;

(b) the grant of planning permission in respect of the application will have substantial effects on the policies contained in the spatial development strategy published under section 334 of the GLA Act 1999; and

(c) there are sound planning reasons for so treating it.'.

Amendment No. 21, page 35, line 16, at end insert—

'(6A) If an order under this section provides that, in deciding whether he should give a direction under this section, the Mayor may or must take account of the extent to which the council of a London Borough is achieving or has achieved the relevant targets set out in the spatial development strategy, the order must also describe—

(a) how the Mayor is to take those achievements into account and what factors will be taken into consideration,

(b) which targets are likely to be assessed in particular circumstances,

(c) the conditions which would need to be fulfilled by a council if it is to be considered as having achieved the targets, and

(d) how the Mayor will take into account the progress of the council in achieving the targets.'.

Amendment No. 22, page 35, line 16, at end insert—

'(6A) An order under this section may not make provision requiring or enabling the Mayor to give a direction under this section if or because the applicant has requested him to do so.'.

Amendment No. 23, page 35, line 16, at end insert—

'(6A) Subsection (6C) applies to any provision of an order under this section which makes provision requiring or enabling the Mayor to give a direction under this section because the applicant has requested him to do so for the reason described in subsection (6B).

(6B) The reason mentioned in subsection (6A) is that the local planning authority has failed, within a specified period, to provide a statement of the decision the authority to propose to make in respect of the application.

(6C) In any provision to which this subsection applies the "specified period" referred to in subsection (6B) shall be such period as is reasonable to enable to the local planning authority to provide the statement and in any event shall be no less than 20 weeks commencing with the date on which the application was received by the authority.'.

Amendment No. 24, page 35, line 16, at end insert—

'(6A) If an order under this section makes provision for the definition of "application of potential strategic importance" and, in doing so, categorises applications as such by reference to the floorspace or height of any building comprised in the development in question, the order must provide that the floorspace or height so mentioned is expressed in terms of a net increase above the floorspace or height of any existing building on the site in question.'.

Amendment No. 25, page 35, line 16, at end insert—

'(6A) If an order under this section makes provision for the definition of "application of potential strategic importance" and, in doing so, categorises applications as such by reference to a minimum height of buildings comprised in the development, the order may not provide that the minimum height is less than 75 metres (except in relation to buildings adjacent to the River Thames).'.

Amendment No. 4, page 36, line 3, at end insert—

'(7A) The following persons shall be given an opportunity to be heard by the Mayor of London before he determines an application by virtue of section 2A or this section—

(a) the applicant;

(b) the local planning authority who received the application;

(c) the member of the Assembly whose Constituency covers the land subject to the application;

(d) no less than one councillor of a London borough or the Common Council whose ward covers the land subject to the application;

(e) no less than one representative of local, amenity or environmental interests as the Mayor of London considers appropriate;

(f) Transport for London;

(g) any other person, including public bodies or statutory undertakers, as the Mayor of London considers appropriate.'.

Amendment No. 19, page 36, line 6, at end insert

', including applications which are to be treated as being for the erection of buildings adjacent to the River Thames under section 2A(4C),'.

Amendment No. 30, page 36, line 6, at end insert

', including applications which are to be treated as being for the erection of buildings adjacent to the River Thames under subsection (4C) of that section,'.

Amendment No. 20, page 36, line 12, at end insert

', including the reasons which are to be taken as sound planning reasons for the purposes of section 2A(4A).'.

Amendment No. 5, page 36, leave out lines 18 to 20 and insert—

'(3) Such provision may not include functions in relation to enforcement of planning control.'.

Amendment No. 6, in clause 32, page 36, leave out lines 34 to 36.

Amendment No. 7, page 36, leave out lines 39 to 40.

For the official Opposition, this is one of the most important parts of the Bill, as it is the key point where powers are being taken away from boroughs and given to the Mayor.

I thank the Minister for Housing and Planning for making the draft statutory instrument available to me. I realise that she made it available to the Committee in the middle of January, but when I tried to look for it, due to unforeseen circumstances neither the Vote Office nor the Library had a copy. I downloaded it from her office mid-morning in a bit of a panic, so if I miss any of the finer details I am sure that my hon. Friends who took part in the Committee proceedings will help me out.

I want the House to consider the whole group of amendments and new clauses, because as I said, they relate to the crux of the Bill. We object so strongly to the taking of powers from the boroughs to give them to the Mayor that in Committee we tried to delete all the relevant provisions. Sadly, we failed, so we are returning to the charge in an attempt to constrain the powers that the Mayor is acquiring unto himself. We want the boroughs to retain as much decision-making power as they can, and we want the Mayor to know that there are significant areas in which he cannot involve himself.

Those of us with experience of the Mayor's activities over the past few years are conscious of the fact that even with his current limited powers he has intervened where many of us feel he should not. It is worth repeating a point I made on Second Reading. Broomleigh housing association—my local housing association—is part of the Affinity group, which joined the Sutton Trust to become Affinity Sutton. To make life even more complicated the association made a significant planning application for social housing in the borough of Sutton, which has nothing to do with the Sutton Trust. The Mayor intervened, which slowed down the process by at least a year, thereby making it even more difficult for people who wanted social housing to move in.

The Mayor has already stuck his nose into many areas where many of us think he should not have intervened. The powers given to him by the Government under the Bill will make his capacity for Intervention even greater, while taking significant powers away from the boroughs.

We have tabled a long list of amendments and I hope that everybody will bear with me if I go through them all, even if only briefly. First, however, I want to put into context my position on overdevelopment, because the Minister referred to it in Committee. At the time, I managed to get out of the then Minister for London the information that he had every intention of doubling housing density in the borough of Bromley.

Very helpful.

Indeed.

At least, we made the position clear, but our constituents in the borough of Bromley, especially my constituents in Beckenham, thoroughly object to the doubling of housing density because it will change the nature of the community in which they live. That is in no way, shape or form an objection to increased housing or to a wide variety of housing provision; it is an absolutely rooted objection to a level of development that will transform their surroundings—the areas in which they have chosen to live precisely because of the values and environment that the borough of Bromley has created.

We are keen on transparency in decision making, for which we have set out a framework in new clauses 9 to 12. Under the Bill, the Mayor can call in planning applications and make decisions on them behind closed doors. Despite his promise that he will be open and transparent, we think that that needs to be written into the Bill. It is absolutely crucial that the decision-making process, the papers available to the Mayor, the record of decisions and the documents should be available to the public. The minutes and background papers should be open to the public for a number of years—the number varies according to the terms of the new Clause.

Amendment No. 4 sets out the groups of people and individuals who should be heard by the Mayor in an open meeting.

As the hon. Lady knows, the Liberal Democrats very much support not only that Amendment but the others in the group. We take the same general view. Does she agree that what is completely illogical about the present system is that the Government, of all people, keep saying that the Mayor and the Greater London authority are only a local authority, yet that particular local authority can do things entirely differently from any other local authority in the whole of England?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman not only for his promise of support, but for making that point, with which I thoroughly agree. It might be appropriate to mention en passant that it is not entirely clear whether the Mayor of London is subject to the same scrutiny from the Standards Board on planning decision as other councillors. It would be useful if the Minister could resolve that issue when she replies, even though it is not covered by an Amendment in the group.

It is crucial that the terms of engagement for planning issues are set out in the Bill rather than in a statutory instrument, so that the Mayor understands that he is ruled by a statute saying that he has to be open and transparent, that the decisions and the papers involved need to be in the public domain and that decisions should not be taken behind closed doors.

I entirely endorse what my hon. Friend says. Does she not think that one of the more insidious aspects of the proposals is the very use of the word "strategic", which suggests a broad overview and could allow the Mayor or anyone else in that position to avoid transparency in respect of the release of papers, as well as permitting a complete lack of transparency in their relationship with the public at large. That is why we are particularly concerned that the provisions should be in the Bill, rather than in a statutory instrument.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point because I will be coming on to amendments that we have tabled to try to begin to define "strategic", which is crucial. Before I get to those, I shall continue logically through our other amendments.

New Clause 16 would create a conflict resolution mechanism for the Secretary of State to use if a planning application to be decided by the Mayor would impact on other developments such as a borough's development plan, a waste or transport plan, or any other strategy relevant to the planning application. This touches on the beginnings of a definition of "strategic". The Mayor has responsibility for a number of development plans and if the Bill goes through Parliament he will have responsibility for another couple. It is entirely possible that a planning application could impact on one of the development plans, so there is a need for a mechanism to deal with that. We have created one in which, unusually for us, we would give power back to the Secretary of State to be the person who could resolve any such conflict.

I come now to Amendment No. 3. I referred earlier to an area in which the Mayor has already intervened more than most of us might think he should, but the increased powers in the Bill will give him the opportunity to intervene in planning applications a great deal more. We believe that he should be able to take over an application only for a limited time after a borough has resolved to approve or refuse it, or where a borough has failed to make sufficient progress.

Amendment No. 28, in the name of my hon. Friend Mr. Field, correctly deals with the special position of the City of London, and we support it. It would bring the City, as the financial centre, into line with Thames Gateway and the Olympic site. Although I lived in the City, in the Barbican, for nearly 17 years, and much as I enjoyed my time there, I recognise that the number of residents represents a fraction of the City's value to the rest of the country compared with its financial services.

My hon. Friend will be pleased with amendments Nos. 18 to 20, because they are our attempt to define "strategic". We want to see such a definition in the Bill rather than in statutory instruments. An application should be regarded as strategic if it has an effect beyond the local planning authority, if it has an effect on the special development plan and if there are sound reasons for it. We believe that the City is a special case and that unless a very large building is proposed, as set out in our amendment on floor space and height of storeys, or the site is adjacent to the River Thames, which we think should be protected, an application should not be considered strategic. We therefore agree with amendments Nos. 28 to 30 tabled by my hon. Friend, and amendment No. 31 tabled by the Liberal Democrats, which, in essence, says much the same.

It is crucial for the good order of planning in London that everybody knows exactly when the Mayor can and cannot intervene and what is and is not strategic. After all, this goes back to the original thinking behind the Mayor and the assembly, which included the fact that the Mayor should be involved only in strategic issues. Too many of his interventions have not been of a strategic nature.

I shall now deal with the amendments to clause 31. I apologise for the fact that there are multiple references to section 6A. Not having been involved in tabling the amendments, I suspect that that is for a technical, drafting reason. The amendments try to set parameters for the Mayor's powers. Obviously, we want as many of our amendments made as possible, and we recognise that if they are made there will be a numbering change. I shall take them one by one.

Amendment No. 21 tries to ensure that if a borough is achieving its housing target there will be no need for the Mayor to call in a planning application. On many occasions the Mayor has indicated an interest in a housing application on the ground that he thinks that there is not sufficient affordable housing or that the borough is not building enough houses. We say that there is no need for the Mayor to intervene if a borough is achieving its target. That would leave the power in the hands of the borough to continue to decide on its future development in line with the wishes of those who elect the councillors. One of the key points behind all these amendments is that it is councils that are responsible to the electors and that know their community best.

Does the hon. Lady agree that if a council that is meeting its affordable housing targets has to meet an additional housing requirement, that puts a stress on the other services that it provides? We have seen that in my borough. As the Mayor does not have to fund that additional support and provision, it is irresponsible to expect him to take responsibility for making that decision.

I could not agree more. That is a concern expressed to us by many London councils. I am sure that any London Member of Parliament knows the pressure that council services are under at present. There are faults in the funding formula, we have a very mobile population and there is pressure on councils to pick up the overrun costs in the NHS. I do not think that any of us are unaware of the hon. Lady's point. We can easily envisage further problems being wished on us by a Mayor who takes a different view from local people as to the future development of their borough.

On Amendment No. 22, I am sure that all Members of Parliament who have taken up any planning issue, and certainly those in London, are aware of repeat applications from people looking to develop. An elderly gentleman in my Constituency is having to fight off his fourth or fifth application for one site. The Minister gave me a very useful answer to a parliamentary question that he has been able to wave under the noses of various people, and a few spines have been stiffened.

We are well aware that the large developments that are likely to be called in are also those where the applicant could apply directly to the Mayor for the application to be called in. The amendment proposes that there should not be the same opportunities for an applicant to go to the Mayor, and it would keep the decision at a local level. We tabled the amendment because the Bill is silent on the whole issue, but I am sure that most Members from London constituencies will have had problems with repeat applications and will know of applicants who would dearly love to go straight to the planning inspectorate and bypass the local authority.

Amendments Nos. 24 and 25 again relate to the meaning of "strategic". They define "floorspace" and "height of buildings", and they, too, include an explicit exception for buildings close to the river. Finally, I come to amendments Nos. 5 to 7, which are important. Amendment No. 5 is about—well, let me deal with amendments Nos. 6 and 7.

It is about enforcement.

Thank you.

It is always useful to have a good brief around.

Yes, as long as my hon. Friend does not charge me the usual legal fees.

Amendment No. 5 does indeed deal with enforcement; I am grateful to my hon. Friend Robert Neill, and I am sure that he will be able to expatiate on the subject at much greater length than I can. The amendment proposes that functions in relation to the enforcement of planning control be provided for, and amendments Nos. 6 and 7 deal with section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. As everybody will know, section 106 is the basis on which local councils have been able to extract some value for their local communities from planning applications, in terms of doctor's surgeries, roads, and schools. We have all experienced the benefits.

The Bill proposes that the Mayor should be able to dispose of section 106 agreements, but with the best will in the world we should just think about some of the Mayor's pet projects, including his proposal on the gateways to London. The word "hubris" comes to mind when I think of that project, but some section 106 money might even be spent on that. Conservative Members do not wish the Mayor to get any control over section 106 money. If there is such a thing as a reward for local communities that face the pressures that increased housing could put on their services, it is that money, which is a way of dealing with those extra pressures and putting something back into the community. We do not wish the Mayor to be able to take it away from the community and dispose of it as he wishes, and that is why we have tabled amendments Nos. 6 and 7.

That was a brief rundown of this large group of amendments. I look forward to listening to the other issues raised in the debate.

I intend to address the topic of the specific threshold for mayoral Intervention in planning powers. As my hon. Friend the Minister for Housing and Planning will recall, I raised that issue on Second Reading. I expressed support, in principle, for the Mayor being able to direct that approval be given in appropriate cases, in which the development is of strategic significance, and is in conformity with the London plan. I argued that it was slightly anomalous for the Mayor to have a negative power to refuse proposals that were not in conformity with the London plan, but to be unable to require approval of a scheme that was in conformity with the London plan.

I argued the case for such a power, but I also expressed real concern about the thresholds that would be used to determine whether the Mayor would have that intervention power. I did so primarily from fear of what I described as mission creep—that is, the potential for such powers to be used far more extensively than might originally have been envisaged, in order to ensure the integrity of the London plan. However, I argued that we should ensure that the Mayor is able to direct, in appropriate cases, that an authority should not reject a strategically significant development that is in conformity with the London plan.

The worry about mission creep led me to say that I would want to look closely at the statutory instrument that would define the concept of "strategic", and my hon. Friend the Minister undertook to make that order available by the time that the Bill reached Committee. It was delayed a little, but the draft order is now available, and we have had sight of it, but I am far from reassured; in fact, my concerns have been greatly heightened.

I have two major concerns. The first is that I believe that the statutory instrument confuses size with "strategic". There is an assumption that anything above a certain size threshold is automatically strategic. Having looked at those size thresholds, it is perfectly clear to me that they would embrace a number of development sites in my Constituency—and therefore sites in other parts of London—that are unquestionably of local, not strategic, significance. There has been a serious failure to consider what represents a "strategic" development. In my view, "strategic" refers to a development that is of significance more widely than in the borough in which it is situated. Its impact must be felt more widely than in one borough, and it must be likely to have a significant impact on the whole of London.

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that an overlying problem is that boroughs often want to undertake regeneration projects that involve shopping centres or other buildings that will help to regenerate local economies? Such projects may be close together, but should the Mayor have the power to decide that only one should go ahead if he thinks that if both went ahead one might not be successful? It should be up to local authorities to come up with good plans that match, and it should not be for the Mayor to interfere with those plans.

I agree that local authorities should be in the driving seat when it comes to local regeneration schemes, but certain very large regeneration schemes could well have a significance that is felt more widely than in the borough. In circumstances in which the development's significance is truly London-wide, or when a development is significant to more than one borough, I would be perfectly prepared to grant that the Mayor should have a power to intervene, in appropriate circumstances. However, I would not be happy with a definition that would make it possible for the Mayor to use the power in relation to developments that are not strategic or, given the size criteria that are to be adopted, are not even very large.

Let us consider some of the proposed size thresholds. One relates to developments by the river. Paragraph 1(a) of category 1C in the draft order says:

"the building is more than 25 metres high and is adjacent to the River Thames".

My Constituency has a long Thames frontage, running all the way from Deptford to Thamesmead, and it has been subject to many developments. I cannot think of a single one in which a building of more than 25 m is not proposed, because of the strategic nature of the site, in the sense that it is on the river. I stress that "strategic" relates to the river; I do not mean that the site is "strategic" as far as London is concerned. The views across the river to Canary Wharf are such that it would be surprising if two or three-storey terraced, or semi-detached, properties were proposed. Almost invariably in such development proposals, there is at least one significant building that is taller than 25 m, but if the criteria as set out in the order were agreed, every single proposal would contain developments of that size. The developers would automatically put one in to ensure that the development met the criteria that allowed the Mayor to intervene, because the Mayor is known to be sympathetic to tall buildings, whereas not all boroughs are.

I say to the Minister that the criteria are a perverse incentive that will result in particular development decisions being distorted by developers, who will seek to get their development into the size thresholds that allow the Mayor to call in the application. That is very bad policy making indeed.

I have not seen the details of the order, but in the borough of Richmond upon Thames developments by the river are low and open because of nearby features such as Kew gardens. Could not the Mayor force through a developer's application for a tall building that was entirely out of keeping with Richmond palace, Kew gardens, and the open nature of that stretch of the river?

I shall not look at hypothetical examples or areas with which I am not familiar. I know the Thames reasonably well, but I do not know the full circumstances in the hon. Lady's Constituency. However, in my own patch, the overwhelming Majority of riverside developments already include buildings that are over the threshold, so there is an incentive for developers, as the hon. Lady suggested, to ensure that their buildings meet the threshold.

Does the right hon. Gentleman think that his concerns about the order are addressed by the amendments tabled by the official Opposition and by the Liberal Democrats, including Amendment No. 18, which deals with applications that

"have substantial effects beyond the area of the local planning application to which the application has been made" and that

"have substantial effects on the policies contained in the spatial development strategy"?

I shall come on to ways of addressing the problem, but the hon. Gentleman has suggested part of the solution. First, however, I wish to explain why the draft order is fundamentally flawed and should not be pursued in its present form.

Paragraph 1(a) of category 3A deals with development which is likely to

"result in the loss of more than 200 houses, flats, or houses and flats (irrespective of whether the development would entail also the provision of new houses or flats".

In our area, we have several unsatisfactory council estates dating back to the 1960s and '70s that are being cleared and replaced. A significant number of them would fall within the criteria, particularly the Ferrier estate in Kidbrooke, the Connaught estate in Woolwich, the Morris Walk estate in Woolwich and others. We are not talking about one or two large developments of London-wide significance but about a number of cases in a particular area that are only of local significance. Ironically, as part of the council's regeneration policy, some of those estates will be replaced by developments containing more properties than the number removed. However, those properties are part of a mixed development, so there will no longer be a mono-tenure estate of council housing but a development in which people have opportunities to buy as well as to rent.

In making that point, my right hon. Friend has partly demolished his argument. There is a similar situation on the South Acton estate in my Constituency, which is a large estate subject to demolition. A doubling of housing density and a complete change of tenure have been proposed. Although it is contained entirely within Acton, that issue could be used to attack the London housing strategy for which the Mayor is responsible. It is a good example of something that is local having strategic importance.

There is absolutely no reason why that should apply, because the question of the tenure mix has been addressed. The provisions of the London plan set out criteria on the mix of affordable and social housing in developments that boroughs are expected to follow. The Mayor has perfectly adequate powers to exercise his influence in that respect, but I am arguing that such developments, certainly in the London borough of Greenwich, are of local significance and not of London-wide or strategic significance. There would be a serious breach of the principle that the Mayor should have strategic powers if the statutory instrument were introduced in its present form, but local service delivery should rest with the boroughs. I stressed in our earlier debate on waste the importance of maintaining the distinction between a strategic role for the Mayor and a local role for boroughs, and I emphasise that distinction again.

Why was that formulation used for the statutory instrument? I think that the answer is idleness. That may appear to be a perverse comment, but the measure is based almost entirely on the existing order, which allows the Mayor to refuse permission in certain cases. A moment ago, I discussed the example of a building that is more than 25 m high and is adjacent to the river. A developer who is worried that their application will be refused will not submit a proposal that falls within the criteria, as it would be much more unlikely to receive permission. Conversely, if the Mayor has a positive power to intervene, there is a perverse incentive to increase the height of developments. The officials who drafted the proposal have taken the easy course of using existing powers, without considering the contradictions raised by different uses. They simply propose that the existing definition should be extended to cases where the Mayor has the power to require approval.

The measure is not appropriate, and it requires rethinking. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to take another look at it, because if the criteria were adopted there is no question but that the problem of mission creep will arise, as I have suggested. We will break the fundamental principle, on which the GLA legislation was based, that the Mayor should have a strategic role, and should not have powers to trample all over the boroughs in matters subject to local decision.

That leads me on to the way in which the statutory instrument should be changed. I hesitate to raise the issue, because it is not the subject of the Bill, and I do not wish to be called to order. However, it is only right that I should give my thoughts on the right way forward. First, to pick up the point made by Tom Brake, there should be an attempt to define strategic impact as an effect covering an area wider than one particular borough. It should include, too, issues of genuine strategic impact, and should not simply be a matter of scale.

Secondly, the criteria in the draft statutory instrument must be reconsidered with a view to catching only large developments that have a big impact. "Large" can be strategic, but it is not necessarily strategic, and we must distinguish between the two. A definition of "strategic" and a revision of the criteria to raise the threshold and avoid the circumstances that I have described are therefore essential, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister can provide the House with an undertaking to look at the criteria again. If so, I would be happy to support the statutory instrument as and when it is introduced, but it must achieve the objective that the Government want to achieve, and give the Mayor an appropriate power of Intervention to match the existing negative power. He should exercise that power in cases where it is justified to do so, because the development has a strategic impact across London. If that objective is met, I, for one, will be entirely happy, but I am afraid that I could not possibly support the statutory instrument in its draft form.

I do not know whether it is possible to have two cruxes of the matter but, if so, we have come to the second one: planning. We debated the first earlier, before we divided on new Clause 8 and the Mayor's budget.

I cannot do better than Mr. Raynsford—who is the architect of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and, indeed, had ministerial responsibility for London—in setting out concerns about the planning aspects of the Bill. I hope that the Minister will deal with the point about whether the order was simply a cut and paste exercise, or perhaps a search and replace one, which officials are beginning to regret following such trenchant criticism from the right hon. Gentleman, who knows better than anyone in the House the implications of the Government's proposals.

In Committee, various planning matters were debated, including planning applications that give rise to strategic issues, thresholds, planning obligations and the issue of enforcement. Members will know that planning is the most controversial local issue in many, if not all, constituencies. In my own patch, current concerns include back-garden development—and I urge the Minister to change the classification of brownfield sites to exclude back gardens—and a proposal for a new secondary school in the borough. The choice of the site for that school is a hugely controversial issue locally, with the local authority having identified three sites: the existing site, an allotment site and the site of an NHS facility that is soon to be vacated.

Planning issues are highly controversial. Members can imagine how much more so they will become if the Mayor starts to get involved in matters that are not of a strategic nature. We already have many examples of that. I have previously quoted the example of the Mayor getting involved in a regeneration project in my Constituency whereby 150 to 200 flats were to be rebuilt. His Intervention in connection with the provision of cycle facilities stalled the project for nine months. If he can already do that under the current arrangements, we can only imagine how much more tempted he will be to get involved if the proposals go through.

New clause 9 seeks to ensure open planning meetings. In her response, the Minister may say that it is not appropriate for a single person executive to hold open planning meetings, but we can argue that it is even more appropriate for a single person executive to do that. I understand that in Lewisham and Watford, where there are executive mayors, they do indeed hold development control committee meetings that those of us with a local council background would understand.

Although I recognise that the current Mayor is not the fount of all sagacity, is it not important to note that he is keen to be able to sit in public and act in a transparent fashion, partly because of the risks of placing so much power in the hands of one elected official?

Indeed. The Mayor will no doubt be grateful for the Amendment tabled by the Conservatives, which we will support tonight. It may pre-empt a scenario described to me by my noble Friend Baroness Hamwee, who will lead on these matters in Another place—the "here's what came to me in the shower this morning" scenario, where the present or future Mayor dreams something up from we know not where, which has not been subject to any scrutiny.

I understand that the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor consult advisers, but what goes on in those meetings we do not know. A Liberal Democrat member of the GLA does not know what discussions take place in those meetings and what decisions are made. I do not know whether Members present who also serve on the GLA have a better understanding of what goes on in the meetings between the Mayor, his advisers and other interested parties. We would like to see that out in the open and fully documented, in the way that would be the norm for a local authority.

The hon. Gentleman is right. He will know that the London Assembly's planning scrutiny committee, of which I was for a time the chair and Baroness Hamwee the deputy chair, produced a report criticising the Mayor's behaviour on those very matters. Does he agree that although the Mayor has, in response to questions in the Assembly, rather belatedly conceded that he would hold planning meetings in public if he got the positive power to do so, it is not satisfactory for that to depend purely on the assurance of one individual, who might change after an election, and that it is crucial that a safeguard is written into the Bill to ensure that planning meetings are held in public? That should not be dependent on the Mayor's personal concession. It should be in the primary legislation.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his helpful Intervention underlining the fact that whatever commitment is given by the present Mayor, a future Mayor could renege on it. I hope that whether they are given the powers or not, current and future Mayors will welcome more openness in the way that matters are handled, and not rely on future legislation to change the way in which they operate.

Amendment No. 4 lists the people who will be given an opportunity to appear in front of the Mayor before an application of strategic importance is determined by him. We support that, with one caveat. Perhaps inadvertently, paragraph (c) gives special status to Constituency members of the GLA. We would want all GLA members to have the same degree of responsibility and access to the Mayor and to appear when matters of strategic importance are debated.

We are happy to support the official Opposition on amendment No. 5, which deletes the provision for the Mayor to carry out planning enforcement. We are a little less certain about amendment No. 18, which seeks to give the City special status in the handling of its applications. The right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich pointed out that special circumstances apply in all boroughs, so it is not obvious to me why the City should have special attention. However, as other aspects of the amendment are in keeping with our views, we will support it.

The Liberal Democrat amendment No. 31, which Mrs. Lait kindly described as very similar to one of the Conservative amendments, was plagiarised and is identical. There are no differences, except that we lopped off a few of the provisions to sharpen the focus on planning applications of potential strategic importance. I do not see a need to reinvent the wheel if it functions effectively. As we have seen, there is substantial co-operation between Opposition Members displaying Liberal Democrat tendencies.

We fully support this group of amendments. They underline the need for a much more open planning process and a much tighter definition in the Bill of applications of potential strategic importance. Even if the Minister is not inclined to respond to the representations that the official Opposition and I have made, I hope she will listen to the former Minister for London, the architect of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, who knows the implications of the Government's proposals. I hope she will take on board his concerns, as well as ours.

I fear that those in the Chamber have become the victims of group hypnosis, which has led them to believe that the Bill removes planning powers from local authorities and gives them wholesale to the Mayor of London. That is a travesty. It seems to have slightly affected my right hon. Friend Mr. Raynsford, as well as the more susceptible Opposition Members. [Interruption.] I have known the Mayor of London for many years, and there is nothing of which I would not suspect him, but I am referring to what appears in black and white in the Bill.

Planning powers relate to the London plan, not to the individual development plans of the boroughs. It seems entirely logical that the Mayor should have a call-in power and should be able to enforce the London plan, otherwise it is a bogus and almost worthless document.

Things are not quite as simple as that, as the hon. Gentleman will realise if he reflects carefully. At this very minute, the Mayor has made an objection to the final draft of the Southwark unitary development plan, even though it has gone through all its processes, in order to try to influence it in a way that is against all the local views. Although he will argue that it is a London plan justification, it has a unitary development plan implication.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman—but my advice to him would be not to worry. Obviously I am not an expert on Southwark, but I am an expert on Hammersmith and Fulham, and I can say that it has decided to ignore its unitary development plan entirely at local level, giving the reason that it is entirely out of date—and as the plan is nearly two years old, I suppose that it might well say that. As a result, on housing and planning policies generally, exactly the opposite of what is said in the UDP is being done. Local boroughs have a great deal of leeway in that respect. The essence of the point remains: that what is guiding the Mayor is the London plan. Yes, there will be some conflicts, and they can be resolved, but we are still talking about matters of a strategic nature.

One of the most controversial parts of the draft order will possibly be the proviso, which mirrors what was in previous policy, that the Mayor can intervene on developments larger than 500 units of residential accommodation. That must be right. I doubt that there could be such a development in London that would not have some strategic impact.

In my borough, two big housing redevelopments are on the drawing board—one at Elephant and Castle, on the Heygate estate, and one slightly further south on the Aylesbury estate. They are both entirely contained within the borough boundary and are replacements of old housing stock by a better development. They have a key Southwark strategic impact, but certainly one, and probably both, have no major London strategic impact, although they comprise at least 1,000 dwellings each.

The hon. Gentleman may be falling into the same error that he accused me of a few moments ago. Often what appears to be a like-for-like replacement involves a significant change to the type, quality or tenure of the accommodation being provided. We are all now familiar, because of their notoriety, with the way in which Conservative local authorities in London, in particular, have endeavoured over the years to build the minimum amount of social affordable housing, principally through the abuse of large developments, and we know what they have allowed large developers to get away with. Those developments may be wholly within one borough—some of those in outer London are very large constructs covering very large areas—but may nevertheless have a strategic impact across the whole of London. I am not arguing for a lower figure than 500, which seems in all ways appropriate.

With the greatest respect, the hon. Gentleman did not deal with the previous point that was made. I have Europe's largest council estate in my Constituency—the Alton estate in Roehampton. Any regeneration that happens on that estate will necessarily be large, purely because of the estate's size. It is therefore unacceptable for him to say that anything over 500 units is strategic by definition. That is not a workable proposition in reality.

The hon. Lady represents a Constituency in the borough of Wandsworth, which possibly has the worst housing record in London, and where, in the last year for which figures are available, only nine affordable rented homes were built, and total output in terms of affordable housing is running at about 21 per cent. That is a shocking record. She illustrates the point that I am trying to make. Unless the Mayor has the power to intervene on large schemes, the affordable housing targets that he is rightly seeking to ensure are met across London will not be met.

We have already started a consultation on the regeneration of the Alton estate. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that if the people there have a particular overall viewpoint about how they feel it should be regenerated, and that does not correspond with what the Mayor happens to want, now or in future, he should overrule local people on that estate, who know it better than he ever will?

With respect to the hon. Lady, I was talking about the London borough of Wandsworth, not about people on the Alton estate, who no doubt get the level of care for which Wandsworth council is notorious. However, I am glad that she intervened, because she allows me to correct the mistake that I made when I credited Wandsworth with building 21 per cent. affordable housing over the past three years—in fact, the figure is 12 per cent. That is a truly shocking record on the part of her Conservative authority, and I am surprised that she wishes to draw attention to it.

As far as I am aware, nobody has disputed that the overwhelming Majority—about 99 per cent.—of planning decisions will remain with the boroughs. The Bill is about strategic importance—not only in housing, although that is a key area at the moment because of the neglect by certain boroughs. That is what is being lost in this debate. There is a clever attempt by the Opposition parties to portray this as a power grab by the Mayor, in relation to a Bill that should be relatively uncontroversial, given that purportedly all main parties support the success of the GLA and the Mayor since they were introduced by a Labour Government. This is an attempt to smear part of the Bill with the idea that this is a power grab from the boroughs by the Mayor.

On transparent decision making, some Members have conceded that the Mayor has now set out a clear chain of decision making that will be transparent and open to scrutiny. I remind Opposition Members that several boroughs, which are all Conservative—Hammersmith, Kensington, Westminster—do not allow representations to be made. Only an hour ago, I was talking to a social housing developer who last week was refused permission to put forward representations at a Hammersmith planning committee. It is an act of pure hypocrisy for the Opposition parties to accuse the Mayor of a lack of transparency when the practices that are being followed in some of the leading Conservative boroughs in London are far less democratic and open.

I will concentrate my remarks on the two amendments in my name—amendments Nos. 28 and 29—which would affect the City of London Corporation. They would put the area covered by the City of London in the same position as the areas covered by the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation and the Olympic Delivery Authority, as land exempted from the Mayor's new powers of Intervention. The areas to be covered by Thames Gateway and the Olympics are in a sense very special areas, but their general features are probably much more characteristic of London as a whole than is the City of London.

In Committee the Minister said that the land within the Thames Gateway and the ODA area were not excluded because there is no need to include them. Later, she said:

"the Olympics and the ODA refer to specific sites", whereas the policies to be dealt with by the Mayor

"apply across London as a whole".——[ Official Report, Greater London Authority Public Bill Committee, 16 January 2007; c. 222.]

On those grounds there would seem to be good grounds to exempt the area covered by the City of London as well.

The City is certainly a very specific and atypical area, and the policies applied there are not the same as in the rest of London. [Interruption.] I am slightly worried as I see in his place Jeremy Corbyn, who, together with John McDonnell, has fought various battles about the electoral system that takes place within the City of London.

There are, of course, other fundamental differences. For example, the existing order under the mayoral involvement is triggered on planning applications that make different height and size requirements in the City as against Greater London as a whole. It is very difficult to see how the areas covered by the Olympics and the Thames Gateway would therefore be more distinctive. It is not as though the Mayor does not already have some involvement. The City's own planning regime has to be in general conformity with mayoral policies under existing legislation. Neither does the fact that the Mayor has taken on a role in supporting the Olympics and the Thames Gateway make the argument for treating them differently from the City.

If a role as a cheerleader has ruled him out from considering applications, the Mayor would equally be disbarred from deciding applications in the City of London, as many of them concern tall buildings, as Mr. Raynsford pointed out in his powerful contribution earlier. That is a policy that the Mayor has said very firmly that he supports. I hope that the Minister will reflect on the case for the area of the City of London to be treated differently from the other areas to which we have referred—and therefore exempted.

I would like to speak briefly to Amendment No. 29. In July 2005, the Mayor produced for the consultation of the London assembly draft alterations to the London plan, which included a 10-year target for the City of some 1,700 units—in other words, roughly 170 units a year. In October that year, he published further alterations to the London plan, which included a lower target of 90 a year. The alterations were then subject to public consultation and, after an examination in public, were finally adopted as recently as December 2006.

In the 18 months between the publication and adoption, the City argued strenuously that the figure of 170 units a year anticipated by the Mayor would actually be too high. With a 10-year cycle and assuming an average two-person household, it would have the effect of increasing the City's resident population by about 3,000 people—in fact, by more than a third in that 10-year cycle. I have to say that the City's population has been reduced year on year since the very first census of 1801—with the exception of the last 10 years, when it started very gradually to move up again. None the less, increasing it by a third over a decade would, in my view, be wholly unrealistic. As a result of sensible negotiation the figure was reduced to some 90 units a year, and the fact that it was accepted demonstrates that the original figure was rather too high. I hope that, under amendment No. 29, an application will not be regarded as being "of potential strategic importance" simply because it fails to comply with any policies in the development plans.

I would like to associate myself with the earlier comments of my hon. Friend Mrs. Lait. She made her case firmly, explaining why we believe that this is a step too far and would like to avoid having strategic planning powers passed on to the Mayor, particularly when the definition of "strategic" has been left so open.

I entirely endorse the observations of my hon. Friend Mr. Field. I hope that he will appreciate why I will not follow through his points specifically, but they were well made and they stand very much on their own.

The debate operates at two levels. First, there is an argument of principle and philosophy as to whether the Mayor should have positive planning powers. There is a disagreement between the two sides of the House about that. We have rehearsed the arguments at some length and I do not intend to go into further detail. I believe that the Government are, for all the reasons that have been rehearsed in the past, making an error, but I want to move on to the second level of the debate.

If we go down that route, it is absolutely crucial to do so with care in ways that are workable and also to maintain public confidence. When it comes to giving the Mayor those powers, there is the strong principal objection of remoteness, but there is also the question of confidence, which links the two levels. Concentrating planning powers in a one-man elected Executive has to be handled carefully because of questions of remoteness and probity.

I hasten to add that to say that is to cast no aspersion at all on the current incumbent of the office; it is a fact of life that extra care has to be taken. That is why, as my hon. Friend Mrs. Lait said, it is crucial to write directly into the Bill the transparency in the process of handling planning applications. I explained why that was important when I intervened on Tom Brake, but I will not waste time in restating that at length. The key test is that if the public are to have any confidence in the process, they must be sure that it cannot be changed at the whim of any individual Mayor. There must be clarity and certainty about how to go through the process.

That same principle applies to the conflict resolution procedure, as highlighted by many leading academics, such as Tony Travers, who has been quoted a number of times both in Committee and on Second Reading. He understands a great deal about this matter and he rightly highlighted the issue of conflict between the two tiers as something going right back to the days of the Greater London Council. It was one of the things that has undermined the good working of London governance. Planning is the one area above all others where there is a risk of conflict, so spelling out precisely how it is to be resolved is crucial.

That leads, in turn, to the third strand, which is the question of the definition of "strategic"—the most likely area in which conflict will arise. I have always enjoyed my sparring in various venues with Mr. Raynsford. I particularly appreciated his contribution tonight. It is significant that there have been only two contributions from the Government Back Benches. One, at any rate, really added something to this debate. I say nothing of the other. The fact is that, even though I disagree with him at times, the right hon. Gentleman is widely respected on both sides of the House as someone who understands London government and its workings. I agree in broad measure with his successor's tribute to him earlier.

Let me say in all sincerity that if the Government take anything away from this debate, they should take the comments of the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich about the definition of "strategic". Even if they reject everything that my hon. Friends and I have proposed, I hope that they will take that on board. It was as effective a forensic demolition of a statutory instrument as I have ever encountered—a hugely powerful and immensely persuasive piece of work. The right hon. Gentleman has rightly ripped a flawed statutory instrument apart, and it would be no shame on the Government—it would be a proper part of our process—if they said that they would go away and change that statutory instrument, even if they did nothing else that has been urged upon them. If we are going to have this system, we must make sure that it works.

For whatever reason, the current statutory instrument will not deliver the purpose, nor will it achieve the Minister's objective. I take her at her word, as she said in Committee that it was her desire and intention that only a small handful of cases should be considered by the Mayor. For all the reasons adequately and eloquently advanced by the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, the current draft order will not achieve that. The mission creep point is all the more important if we are to achieve the Minister's own desired and stated objective. I cannot emphasise that too strongly.

The other elements of mission creep are set out in our endeavours to define some parameters. We have done that, but it is always a problem when someone of the extraordinary mental agility of my hon. Friend Michael Gove is not here, because he can carry these things in his brain, while lesser mortals like some of my hon. Friends and me have to work it out on a piece of paper. We sought to construct a number of alternatives that would set out a scheme to define in a workable fashion what was meant by "strategic". That could also be done by order, but we want to press our argument that the definition should be included in the Bill. The issue is so fundamental, and the risk of conflict so great, that at least the parameters of what "strategic" means should be in the Bill.

My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham dealt with many of the early new clauses and amendments, and I shall not repeat her arguments. I want to pick up on the last three of the amendments in the group, however—amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7. Amendment No. 5 deals with enforcement. This relates to an odd provision in the Bill, which runs the risk of damaging the architecture to which the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich referred, because this is an area in which the Mayor could become involved in service delivery.

The Bill, as drafted, will enable a statutory instrument to make provision for the Mayor to undertake planning enforcement. I see absolutely no need for that, even if we buy the basic principle of the Government's argument. Even if it were thought appropriate for the Mayor to have the power to call in and decide on certain applications, there is no reason why he should also be responsible for the planning enforcement that would follow. It is perfectly logical that, as a strategic authority, he should determine such questions, but the service delivery element—the planning enforcement—should be carried out by the London borough in which the development would be situated.

I do not relish the idea of any Mayor of London having a planning enforcement Division with a lot of enforcement officers. That is clearly undesirable, and a recipe for bureaucracy. The Government would be sensible to think again about this provision, without damaging the overall scheme of the Bill. It seems anomalous that it should be there.

Amendments Nos. 6 and 7 touch on the other hugely sensitive issues of planning gain and section 106 agreements, which are often the elephant in the corner in these discussions. It is inconsistent with a devolutionary argument to say that because a development is classed as strategic, the Mayor should be able to appropriate the planning gain from it. There has been a lot of controversy in the history of planning gain and section 106 agreements. Some of us are old enough to remember section 51 agreements. I see the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich smiling in mutual recollection of such distant times—

A bygone era.

Indeed. The fact is that these arrangements have been around for a long time, as have the discussions about them. Of course there is a legitimate argument for ensuring that there is a community benefit from any development. In the case of large-scale developments, some of that will relate to matters that could be characterised as strategic. However, other elements of the planning gain have always been recognised—we might as well be honest about this—as being something put back into the local community to make a development acceptable, when without it, it might not be acceptable. There is an element of trade-off involved, as there frequently is in planning matters. The fact that the community can get something back from a development is sometimes important in ensuring that the development is accepted and can be linked effectively in with the community. Even years ago, such arrangements were hinting at a move towards what would be known in modern parlance as a more sustainable form of community.

It is hugely important that the local community in which a development takes place has the assurance that it will get some of the planning gain back, however it is characterised. Effectively regionalising the planning gain by passing it over to the Mayor is not the way to do that. The only thing that would be worse is the idea, which has sometimes been floated, of establishing a national planning gain supplement, so that the Treasury could nationalise it and take it over. I am sure that the Minister would not be privy to the thinking of Treasury Ministers on that matter, but such a proposal would be of even greater concern to us. I do not want to set a precedent in London for such a move by enabling the Mayor to seize all the planning gain.

It might be argued that because of their strategic size, some developments will have implications for strategic infrastructure, in which the Mayor has an interest. I accept that, but the present procedures already enable Transport for London, for example, to be a statutory consultee in relation to such projects. TFL has every reason, and every ability, to get its demands heard in such negotiations.

I do not have a problem with the Mayor and his agencies taking part in the negotiations on what happens to the planning gain. I object, however, to their being the owners of the planning gain in such cases. I would far rather have the process driven by the boroughs, for the local people, and the Mayor could negotiate the arrangements and get out a chunk of what he wanted. That would be more in accordance with our localist tradition, and much more likely to command support.

The thought that a large-scale development could be imposed on a community against its will by the Mayor and that all the planning gain could then be taken by the Mayor, and spent not in that borough at all but somewhere else, is hardly likely to engender confidence in the planning system in London. It is potentially another one of those perverse incentives that were referred to earlier in the debate, whereby loosely drafted legislation can have damaging consequences that were not foreseen.

Does my hon. Friend accept that there is already a precedent for that very problem in relation to the congestion charge? The raison d'être of the congestion charge in so far as it ever makes any money, is that that money will be utilised for a very small area—for the rest of London, with its transport policies. There is little doubt that if the strategic policy goes ahead, the planning gain will be used on a London-wide basis, and therefore have little nexus with the community involved.

My hon. Friend makes a fair and valid point. A lot of us have seen the Mayor's behaviour in areas other than planning, and that fills us with some concern about the way in which he would exercise any enhanced planning powers.

Does my hon. Friend agree with my constituents, who are concerned because there is already pressure on infrastructure through population increase, and in many cases, over-dense development? If the section 106 money is taken away and not spent in the local area, that will increase the pressure exponentially.

That is absolutely right; that is why I am concerned. It is regrettable that the discussion about section 106 comes towards the end of a time-limited debate, because it is a hugely important issue and probably deserves more time on its own. That is another reason why we should think again about this matter, and why I hope that we will press the Amendment. There are ways in which we can make sensible and constructive use of planning gain. There is no doubt about that. There are ways in which the strategic authority can have a legitimate role, but we believe that the current proposal in the Bill is altogether too blunt to achieve that, and that our amendment provides a much more coherent way forward.

I have a real sense of déjà vu, having been present at the Second Reading debate, when many of the same concerns, about this part of the Bill in particular, were mentioned. Another thing that has contributed to my sense of déjà vu is how few Members on the Government Benches have spoken in favour of the legislation. That balance of opinion should be reflected in the Government's actions. They should take on board some of the amendments that have been tabled this evening.

I agreed with a lot of what Mr. Raynsford said. He eloquently set out some of the pitfalls that the Bill and the statutory instrument that underpins it might present to local residents if the provisions are passed in their current form. There is no doubt that, out of all the processes that happen at a local level, planning is the one that people understand and will engage with. Many of us, as Constituency MPs, will have had experience of planning applications, often from mobile phone operators, that are subsequently overturned by the planning inspectorate. They are the applications that annoy local people most. There is plenty of evidence that when local decision making is overridden by a higher Government body, that is not taken well. We need to be careful that we do not remove decision-making powers from local boroughs unnecessarily.

Ultimately, we want strategic projects and regeneration to be successful and often the input of local residents into the plans is the reason why they are successful. As my hon. Friend Robert Neill noted, whoever the Mayor is, it is almost impossible that they will have that level of local knowledge and that sense of what will work in the local community. They will never have quite the same level of local knowledge as local people and councillors do. The unwitting impact of the Bill and the statutory instrument could be that strategic projects and regeneration are less successful.

The issue is important to me as a constituency MP, because I have at least two big regeneration projects taking place in my constituency. The first is in Roehampton, on the Alton estate, which is the most deprived part of my constituency, and the second is in the middle of Wandsworth, which cuts across all three constituencies in the borough—Battersea and Tooting, as well as Putney. I think that all local people want to be part of those regeneration projects. They want their views heard on how such projects should be tailored to local needs. It concerns me that the Government still intend to push forward with legislation that will fundamentally take away the ability of local people to have their voice heard on some of most important planning projects that residents in the area are likely to see in their lifetime. I shall leave it at that.

When the Minister for Housing and Planning responds to the overwhelming concerns of Members who are present, I hope that she will have something constructive to say, that she will give some assurances and, ideally, that she will take on board the proposals tabled by Conservative Members.

I shall be brief, but I have exactly the same strength of view as has been expressed by many on the Opposition Benches and by Mr. Raynsford.

As my hon. Friend Tom Brake made clear, the objection is to Clause 31 as drafted. It gives a new power, which we have not had before, to allow an application made to the local planning authority to be the subject of a direction by the Mayor that he will be the planning authority—he will take that on. The criteria are defined in general terms in the Bill. One of the qualifications is that the application has to be

"an application of potential strategic importance."

We are then meant to look at the secondary legislation, which is in draft, as the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich and others have mentioned, to see how that is defined. That is the thin end of a very dangerous wedge.

I believe that many of us will have received a letter from the Mayor in advance of this debate. It is extremely disingenuous in certain respects, as hon. Members would expect. It states:

"Boroughs will still continue to determine over 99 per cent. of all applications."

That may be true, but if anyone were to think that it refers to 99 per cent. of all their housing or of all the space taken up, it would not be true. We are talking about mansard roof extensions being in the same league as the redevelopments of the Heygate estate, the Aylesbury estate, the Greenwich riverside and the St. Helier estate in Sutton or as a development along the riverside in Richmond or Kingston.

Page 7 of the letter contains an extraordinarily disingenuous prayer in aid:

"Contrary to some claims, there is considerable support for the planning changes. A recent Ipsos MORI poll showed that Londoners support the proposals for the Mayor to approve major planning applications. Sixty-four per cent. of those polled reported that they would support the Mayor's involvement in applications for a new recycling plant to reduce the amount of waste sent to landfill sites in London".

What that meant was that two thirds of people wanted less landfill and that they wanted to recycle. It was not about wanting the Mayor to have the power to do that.

The letter continued:

"A huge 83 per cent. supported the Mayor's target that 50 per cent. of all new homes should be affordable for people on low and moderate incomes."

Well, there is a surprise. Of course people want a high target on affordable housing—I do for my Constituency. I have always argued for a figure of 50 per cent. to apply in Southwark, as have my colleagues. As an aside, they were defeated during the previous administration, when we were the minority, by a Labour-Tory coalition that regrettably voted down a 50 per cent. proposal.

I shall reinforce the argument as to why the current proposals are not only flawed, but wrong. They undermine democracy and will, if the Government sustain them, in all likelihood, be defeated when the Bill goes to the other place. I am sure that those proposals will not get through because they offer a power to the Mayor to grab the decisions on matters that are not of strategic importance to London. I want to give two examples in that regard.

The first concerns a debate that is going on in my borough about whether, in a small development by Barratt Homes in Surrey docks, there should be a larger or smaller development. Barratt wanted a larger development, but the local authority said no. There was an appeal and the matter went to a public inquiry. The inspector said no, so it went to the Secretary of State, who said yes. Why has the Secretary of State said yes? Because that is the implication of what the Mayor wants; he wants that bit of Surrey docks to be designated as urban, not as suburban, even though it is woodland and is meant to be laid out in a suburban way. That is the reason why the Mayor is objecting to the unitary development plan. The development has no strategic importance for London. Southwark, which is doing well at meeting its housing targets and wants to do more, wishes to replace the big Heygate estate with new housing, including more social housing, and to replace the Aylesbury estate with a development involving at least as much social housing as at present, as well as other housing.

There is, of course, a debate about how to achieve the amount of housing that we need in London. There should be a dialogue and agreement between the Mayor and the local authority, and the local authority must then be free to decide where to put the housing and how to build it. It should be able to decide whether it wants a tall development, a big estate, or lots of little developments. Such decisions should be taken by local authorities, so it is not for the Mayor to say, "You will have this great big development in the middle of your borough, whether or not you think it is appropriate."

There will be a huge danger if a development becomes strategic just because it is regarded as being big—a development with more than 500 dwellings, to cite Mr. Slaughter. The two biggest developments in my borough are strategic for Southwark, but not for London. They are replacements for existing developments. They will involve more social housing, although sadly they cannot be made up of council housing in whole or part because the Government do not make such an option available. There is a great danger that if the Mayor and the Government—if they are in cahoots—suddenly decide to define something as strategic, that will determine the interpretation.

Like my hon. Friend Susan Kramer and the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, I have a huge amount of riverside in my constituency all the way from the Oxo tower to Deptford creek. It would be absolutely possible for a Mayor to say that every single development on that river is strategic. Of course, there is a site of huge strategic importance by Tower bridge and City hall on Potters Fields—it is strategic because it involves a world heritage site—but that is not the same as a little site in which a development could be squeezed down in Rotherhithe, Surrey docks, or the Deptford borders.

We are absolutely right to oppose these dangerous proposals. I am keen for the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments to be put to the vote. If they are defeated, I am as sure as anyone can be that this will not be the last that people will hear of the matter. I ask the Minister, in all seriousness, to back down. This is not local government, but a creep towards regional and central Government making decisions that should be taken by local councillors. Why will people stand for local elections and participate in the process if, at the end of the day, someone else takes the decisions?

The amendments have been tabled to address the fundamental flaw in the Bill: it takes powers away from local communities and the boroughs. The Bill gives the Mayor power over strategic developments, but the elasticity of the term "strategic" could give him significant new powers to overturn local decisions. The local community is much more likely than the Mayor to be able to respond to local concerns and to be aware of local problems regarding infrastructure. The enhanced powers that the Bill will give the Mayor over section 106 agreements could undermine the already limited capability of the section 106 system to address the necessary extra infrastructure that is needed to support developments.

People in my Constituency are deeply worried about over-dense development, but the Bill will serve only to enhance the concerns of the people of Chipping Barnet, who feel strongly that over-development can significantly undermine the quality of life in our suburban areas. It is vital that we recognise the importance of the suburbs in our social fabric. They are not only extremely successful, but pleasant places in which to live. All hon. Members know that insensitive planning decisions can destroy communities and thus destroy the unique character of the suburbs and ensure that they are no longer places in which people want to live. We are considering extremely important decisions that should be taken by local people after they have taken account of local concerns. Those people are best equipped to protect the suburbs, which, in Barnet and throughout our country, do much to make this country a good place in which to live.

I congratulate Mrs. Lait on getting her head around the order extremely rapidly and for refraining from using any footballing metaphor, which was a relief to me at least. I also join her in wishing Michael Gove a speedy recovery. I imagine that he, of all people, would suffer from not having his voice. He certainly ensured that debates in Committee were always amiable and cheery, and we have had a good debate today too.

Hon. Members have raised a series of issues and tabled a series of amendments on the planning measures that are part of the GLA Bill. In the limited time that remains, I will try to address as many of those as possible. I will begin by addressing some of the points made by my right hon. Friend Mr. Raynsford, and then deal with some of the points made about specific amendments by Opposition Members.

The approach set out in the draft order does not use size as the only test of strategic importance. It does set thresholds, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich is right that the thresholds are modelled around those for the negative powers. A policy test is also set out in paragraph 8 of the order to ensure that the development to which the application relates must be of such a nature or scale that there would be a significant impact on the implementation of the London plan.

The thresholds were modelled around the negative criteria because many of the stakeholders had asked for some simplicity and clarity in the operation of the process. In particular, London First, which represents major business development in the capital, argued for the same thresholds to apply for the negative and positive criteria, to ensure some simplicity and clarity for people making applications. We are not talking about increases in the number of cases that need to be referred to the Mayor, except on issues such as waste. We are, however, talking about giving the Mayor a positive power, not simply an anti-development power.

As for how the current criteria operate, until September last year about 300—0.3 per cent.—of the 90,000 applications were referred to the Mayor, and he used his power of direction in about three or 0.003 per cent. of those applications. Obviously, those are the largest of the applications, because that is exactly the specification in relation to strategic importance. We expect the Mayor to be similarly sparing in the use of the positive power, which is why we have set out proposals in the order. There are areas in which the negative criteria, applied in the same way as the positive criteria, do not work. That has been raised in discussions and consultation with stakeholders on the order, and particularly in relation to paragraph 3, I think, of the schedule. I have already asked officials to look again at those matters, because, otherwise, there is a risk that there will be perverse incentives for developers and decision making in that area.

We need to recognise the difference between the way in which the thresholds and policy tests work. We are currently consulting on that, and we will consult formally on the final version of the order. We thought that it was important, however, to debate the order as part of the Bill.

In Committee, I said that there are arguments in favour of a geographic test, which the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich raised, and which is specified in some of the amendments now being considered. We consulted at an earlier stage on a possible geographic test. Again, London First was among those who argued that it would lead to a lack of clarity and greater complexity. For that reason, it was not appropriate to include it in the draft order, but we will continue to listen to views on that in the consultation, as, clearly, there are some arguments in favour of such a test.

Amendments Nos. 6 and 7 deal with issues relating to planning obligations. They would remove the Mayor's ability to negotiate and agree planning obligations relating to the planning applications that he is responsible for deciding. That would be unworkable in practice. Planning obligations play an important role in planning applications, and can be about either mitigating the adverse impact of development or the importance of affordable housing as part of that development. It is unworkable to expect the Mayor to take decisions on a planning application but not to be engaged in the planning obligations that make those applications possible.

Similar arguments apply to enforcement and the need to be able to ensure that the decisions that are taken are properly enforced. It would of course be far more sensible in practice for the boroughs to take the lead on those enforcement decisions, but it is not right to rule out the possibility of the Mayor also being able to take enforcement action where necessary. Planning guidance circular 05/2005 governs planning obligations and is clear that the Mayor cannot simply take section 106 moneys for his own schemes and ignore local issues. There is already clear guidance to ensure that where the boroughs have issues that section 106 needs to fund, that must happen, to ensure that the application can go ahead and that infrastructure considerations are properly taken into account.

New clauses 9, 10, 11 and 12 seek to apply the provisions of part 5A of the Local Government Act 1972 to the Mayor and to address the need for transparency and a proper process. I have a lot of sympathy for those new clauses, which raise some important issues. As part of the order, we have set out some requirements relating to transparency and process. However, were we to redraft the 1972 Act now, I am not sure that there would be the same appetite for setting out those requirements in primary legislation rather than in secondary legislation. Many of those issues are dealt with far better through secondary legislation. I am happy to look again at what should be in primary legislation rather than in secondary legislation, but my presumption is that such procedural issues are best dealt with through secondary legislation. However, we are sympathetic to the idea of ensuring that the representations from local authorities and others should be heard in public meetings, rather than ensuring simply that they take place. We covered that point in Committee, although we shall certainly consider it further. However, there are advantages to ensuring that such issues are covered through secondary legislation as far as possible, in order to have the flexibility to respond to new problems that arise.

We have ensured in the order that the Mayor should give at least 14 days notice of any hearing, and publish agendas and relevant reports at least seven days ahead of the meeting, which goes further than the proposals in new Clause 10. On Amendment No. 3, there is a need to place a time limit on the Mayor's decision. However, our proposal is that the Mayor should decide within 14 days of being notified of the borough's proposed decision, not within 21 days of being notified of the application. Amendment No. 3 would have a perverse effect, which is not supported by the boroughs, the Mayor or London First, in that it would involve the Mayor taking a decision much earlier, and potentially even taking over more applications than he would need to. London Councils were strongly against that approach in its representations to us, which is why we have not taken it forward.

Amendments Nos. 18 and 31 set out alternative definitions of "strategic importance". I have dealt with the geographic test and said that we are happy to consider that further. We also think that there are some benefits to the wording in those amendments, in ensuring that there are "sound planning reasons" for so acting. A series of respondents have put that proposal forward, which might be a helpful addition to the order.

Mr. Field raised the specific circumstances that the City of London faces, which we recognise. It has a much higher proportion of commercial developments as opposed to residential developments, and faces particular circumstances, given its role in the economy. We have therefore already set higher thresholds for the City of London, and we are prepared to consider the issue further as part of the consultation.

Members raised a range of issues and tabled various amendments in this group; however, I am running out of time. The debate on the order is the appropriate place to discuss this level of detail. We should have the opportunity to review the performance of this provision, and we will debate it further. However, we do not think it right to put all such measures into primary legislation and to try, in effect, to remove the Mayor from all consideration of housing matters. There are important strategic housing issues across London—

It being Nine o'clock, Mr. Deputy Speaker put the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [12 December 2006].

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House proceeded to a Division.

I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the No Lobby.

The House having divided: Ayes 186, Noes 289.

Question accordingly negatived.

Mr. Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.