'In section 37 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c.60) (duties of custody officer before charge), in paragraph (a) of subsection (7) (officer's duties when he determines that there is sufficient evidence to charge), for "shall be released without charge and on bail for the purpose" there is substituted "shall be—

(a) released without charge and on bail, or

(b) kept in police detention,

for the purpose".'.— [Mr. Byrne.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 32, in page 7, line 15, leave out Clause 12.

No. 33, in page 7 [Clause 12], leave out lines 27 to 32 and insert

'with the object of punishing the offender are limited to conditions that the offender attend a specified place at specified times.

(3AA) In subsection (3A) "specified" means specified by a relevant prosecutor.'.

No. 36, in page 7 [Clause 12], leave out lines 37 and 38.

No. 34, in page 7, line 38 [Clause 12], at end insert—

'(3D) The conditions attached to a conditional caution must not include a financial penalty.'.

No. 35, in page 7 [Clause 12], leave out from beginning of line 39 to end of line 31 on page 8.

No. 37, in page 8 [Clause 12], leave out lines 12 to 14.

No. 40, in page 8 [Clause 13], leave out line 39 and insert—

(2) If a relevant prosecutor determines that a person arrested under this section has failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any of the conditions attached to the conditional caution, the person arrested may be—'.

No. 38, in page 9, line 18 [Clause 13], after 'detention', insert

'for up to 12 hours'.

No. 39, in page 9, line 31 [Clause 13], at end insert—

'(6A) A person who is released following an arrest under this section shall not be re-arrested without warrant for the same suspected failure to comply with a condition attached to a conditional caution.'.

No. 41, in page 9, line 31 [Clause 13], at end insert—

'(6B) A person arrested under this section may be released on bail (without any variation of the conditions attached to the caution) if further investigations are necessary for the purposes of determining whether he has failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any of the conditions attached to the conditional caution.'.

Government amendment No. 43.

No. 28, in page 81, line 29 [Schedule 4], at end insert—

'(3C) Subject to subsection (3A), where a trained constable releases a person on bail under subsection (1) the trained constable may impose, as conditions of the bail, such requirements as appear to the trained constable to be necessary—

(a) to secure that the person does not commit an offence while on bail,

(b) to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, whether in relation to himself or any other person, or

(c) for the person's own protection, or if the person is under the age of 17, for the person's own welfare or in the person's own interests.'.

No. 29, in page 81, line 32 [Schedule 4], at end insert—

'(4A) In this section a "trained constable" means a constable who has appropriate training and expertise to enable him to make a reasonable and informed assessment of the need for and proportionality of the conditions of bail.'.

Government amendment No. 81.

The purpose of new clause 6 is to render crystal clear the provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—PACE—pertaining to detention and bail. When a custody officer refers a case to the relevant Crown Prosecution Service lawyer, the options available to prosecutors under section 37 of the Act require the person to be either released on bail pending charge, released without charge and on bail but not for that purpose, released without charge and without bail, or charged.

A sensible reading of PACE would allow detention for a relatively short and reasonable time for a quick decision from the CPS, but PACE does not contain an explicit provision for a person to be detained while a charging decision is made. In order to avoid any confusion on the issue, new clause 6 and consequential amendment No. 81 make specific provision to allow a custody officer to detain in order to await the decision of the prosecutor.

Guidance will make it clear that such a power should be exercised only when a decision is expected from the prosecutor within a maximum of no more than three hours; that the custody officer must ensure that this period is not used simply as a means to keep a person in police detention; and that the custody officer must first consider the suitability and appropriateness of the person to be granted bail from police custody. The decision remains a matter for the custody officer.

Amendment No. 43 makes a minor technical change to clause 35. As the clause is drafted, only offenders sentenced to custody following conviction for offences under the Bail Act 1976 in the magistrates court could be awarded extra days for disciplinary offences. This provision will maintain the status quo for this group of offenders.

I shall now turn to the amendments in this group that were tabled by Lynne Featherstone, whom I am delighted to see in her place. I shall start with amendments Nos. 32 to 37. One of the key measures in the Bill is the extension of conditional cautions. They have been trialled in a number of areas, and they have been very successful in dealing with low-level offenders who admit their offence. However, under the existing scheme, conditions may be applied only in cases either where there is a clear injured party who has suffered measurable loss or where the offending behaviour is attributable to a personal problem, such as alcohol dependency. We want to extend this scheme.

The Minister just said that cautions had been very successful in dealing with persistent offenders. What is the reconviction rate of people who have been cautioned?

The hon. Gentleman slightly misheard what I said. I said that conditional cautions had been trialled in a number of areas, and that the results from those pilot areas had shown the trials to be successful. We want to extend the scheme to include a broader range of offenders, including those who admit drunk and disorderly offences, which damage the community, and those who have already received a fixed penalty notice for similar offences and whose offending therefore requires a tougher sanction. Furthermore, we want to include instances where direct reparation is not possible, perhaps because the damage has already been repaired. By including punishment as an explicit additional aim of the scheme, clause 12 will enable indirect reparation to be required as a condition. It therefore opens the way to community justice, which certain Liberal Democrat Members have in the past professed to welcome.

Clause 12 is a sensible and considered addition to the conditional cautions scheme. It was widely debated in Committee, and it provides the opportunity to deal fairly with offenders who are willing to admit their guilt and are ready to make amends for their behaviour. However, amendment No. 32 would do away with the clause, so we would welcome its withdrawal.

Amendments Nos. 33 and 35 seek to remove the option of imposing a financial penalty as a condition of a caution. In the view of practitioners, financial penalties are a useful option, because they ensure that reparation is made to the community, especially in cases where the community itself is the victim. Amendment No. 34 sits quite oddly with amendments Nos. 33 and 35, as it provides that in every case where a conditional caution is given a financial penalty must be included as one of the conditions. Although we believe that there are good reasons to extend the scheme to include financial penalties, we do not think that such a penalty should be compulsory in every case.

Amendments Nos. 36 and 37 seek to remove the Secretary of State's order-making powers to amend the maximum levels of attendance and financial penalties under the conditional cautioning scheme. Without these powers, it would be necessary to introduce primary legislation if, in the light of the experience of operating the extended conditional caution scheme or with the passage of time, it proved necessary to amend the maximum levels specified in the Bill.

The purpose of the order-making powers is to ensure that the conditional cautioning scheme will in practice be sufficiently flexible and that it can be updated quickly. For example, attendance at a specified place may require slightly over 20 hours. On financial limits, we propose to provide a fractional link to summary conviction penalties. The power to change the alternative minimum is needed to help us to keep the legislation up to date with any changes in summary conviction levels passed by the House.

I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green about the appropriate protection of offenders, but I hope that I can give her some comfort. The code of conditional cautioning will provide that the conditions must represent an appropriate and proportionate response to the offence. Furthermore, one of the strongest safeguards will be that a conditional caution can always be refused by an offender. For these reasons, I urge her to withdraw her amendments to clause 12.

The hon. Lady has also tabled a number of amendments to clause 13. Amendment No. 38 seeks to impose a time limit of 12 hours on the period during which an offender can be held in police detention following a suspected breach of a conditional caution. Clause 13 does not specify a maximum length for the detention period. However, as my right hon. Friend Hazel Blears made clear in Committee, the powers of arrest and detention provided for in clause 13 are intended to provide a speedier alternative to a summons for suspected breach of one or more conditions attached to a conditional caution. This power is important because, in some cases, police officers might need to make inquiries—for example, to verify information given by those arrested about possible excuses for the suspected breach. We do not want offenders spending a disproportionate length of time in custody, and we believe that 12 hours would be excessive in the overwhelming majority of cases.

In Committee, the arguments against imposing an arbitrary time limit on detention were rehearsed at some length, and I hope that I can give the hon. Lady some reassurance that there is a powerful safeguard in new section 24A(7) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as inserted by this clause, which provides that the suspect must either be charged with the original offence, or released without charge with or without bail "as soon as practicable". Police officers would be acting unlawfully if they acted in an unreasonably slow fashion in the discharge of this requirement. I do not doubt for a moment that the courts would be competent to enforce the requirement if called upon to do so by an aggrieved detainee.

In practice, the Crown Prosecution Service and police say that the length of detention would be limited, and would, for example, merely involve a phone call to check evidence. Clearly, when the CPS is not available, custody officers routinely bail people. PACE provides a safeguard, under which an offender cannot be detained without charge for more than 24 hours, subject to specified extensions. In addition, a review of offenders held in detention is carried out by an inspector after six hours and then at regular nine-hour intervals until the 24-hour deadline has been reached. As I have said, it is highly unlikely that inquiries will require the offender to be held for anything like that length of time.

The hon. Lady also tabled amendments Nos. 39 to 41. The intention behind them is to introduce safeguards to protect the offender from misuse of powers. Amendment No. 39 would place a bar on re-arrest for the same suspected breach of a conditional caution. However, that could be problematic if, for example, on an earlier occasion, the offender gave a false explanation that was accepted in good faith by a custody officer who then released the offender. The purpose of the new power of arrest—to ensure quick and effective enforcement—would be severely undermined if a further arrest in the light of fresh evidence required an application to the court for a warrant. For that reason, I oppose the amendment.

Amendment No. 40 seeks to ensure that any decision to charge, release on bail or release with no further action should be taken by the CPS prosecutor rather than the police. I should make it absolutely clear that once an offender has been arrested by a police officer, a prosecutor would determine whether the offender had failed to comply with the conditions attached to the caution. It would be the decision of the prosecutor to charge the offender for the original offence. That is beyond question, and is made clear in the existing provisions in the Criminal Justice Act and in the conditional caution code of practice. The amendment is therefore not required to secure that aim.

Amendment No. 41 makes explicit provision to ensure that a person arrested for suspected breach of a conditional caution may be released on bail pending further investigation into the suspected breach. Again, the amendment is unnecessary, as the power is already available under new section 24A(2)(b) inserted by clause 13. That includes an option for a person to be

"released without charge and on bail to enable a decision to be made as to whether he should be charged with the offence".

I hope that that will be enough to persuade the hon. Lady to withdraw her amendments to clause 13.

Finally, in relation to the hon. Lady's s amendments Nos. 28 and 29, the use of a "trained constable" is a precursor to all activities carried out by a police officer. The amendments refer to an officer who

"has appropriate training and expertise to enable him to make a reasonable and informed assessment of the need for and proportionality of the conditions of bail".

However, discretion and proportionality apply to everything that a constable does. It would be unique to indicate that a trained officer can only deal specifically with bail conditions. Instead, there is a more general requirement that a constable must be able and competent to deal with the powers and responsibilities attached to the office of constable. As the then Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford, indicated in Committee, guidance accompanying the commencement of those provisions will make clear the need for supervisory management to monitor the use of conditions attached to street bail and to ensure that its application is not subject to any stereotyped images or inappropriate generalisations. Those are important safeguards, which provide scrutiny and monitoring of the actions of a constable, and should serve to highlight any additional training requirements. I therefore hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw her amendments to schedule 4.

I want to make it clear that we are not against sanctions such as street bail; we believe that they can be beneficial when used constructively. However, we are concerned about the extension of summary justice without adequate checks and balances. I have listened to the Minister's comments, and as well as apologising for my lateness in attending the debate, I welcome him to his new post.

The Bill allows further powers. It effectively allows the police and prosecution services, as opposed to judicial oversight, to administer punishment before a guilty charge has been proven. It places no limits on the period for which such conditions can be imposed, for a wide range of reasons, on street bail. There are no restrictions on the category of officer who can impose conditions. There is nothing to stop those powers being used as long-term alternatives to criminal investigation. We discussed that in Committee, and although the proposition is unlikely—and I am sure that it would be noticed if an officer prolonged the period—the point of law is to have safeguards in place that cannot be abused. Independent judicial oversight plays a vital role in a democratic legal system.

Cautions are not always issued on low-level crimes. The Magistrates Association says that the offences for which a caution can be administered include actual bodily harm, affray, criminal damage, possession of class A or B drugs, having a bladed article in public, carrying an offensive weapon, burglary—non-commercial and non-residential—and theft. Those do not appear to be minor or low-level offences. If those are dealt with outside the court there is no public knowledge—and the level of offences involved is not as low as the Minister says.

As for the amendments, our first preference was to leave out clause 12, which would be the effect of amendment No. 32. Clause 12 enables conditions to be imposed on cautions whose object is punishment. At present, conditions can be imposed only for purposes of reparation or rehabilitation. As the Minister suggested, the Liberal Democrats would support the proposal wholeheartedly if it involved reparation or rehabilitation, but I am not sure that that applies to a monetary fine. The clause would allow the police and the criminal prosecution service to act as investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury, removing the courts and judicial oversight. It could also produce a two-tier criminal justice system.

My understanding is that a person must accept the caution, and that if they are not happy to do so, the case will go through the judicial system. Is that not correct?

The hon. Lady is right to an extent, but a person who was rich and able to pay might well accept a condition that imposed a financial penalty. It would be a way of committing a crime and getting away with it. A two-level system of punishment would be created, in which those who could not afford to accept a conditional caution would have to go through the criminal justice system, while those who could afford it might say, "OK, I'll pay. It was worth it."

Amendment No. 33 retains the current legal position whereby the only conditions that may be applied to cautions are those intended to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender, and to ensure that the offender makes reparation for the offence. The Bill proposes to allow conditions to be imposed on cautions when the object of the caution is punishment. That is not a small change. In Committee the former Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety, Hazel Blears, acknowledged that the proposal was an "innovative and radical departure" from the current law. It will affect a great many people—an estimated 30,000 or so a year, according to the former Minister in Committee. This is not a matter of a few people in connection with virtually nothing; it will affect quite a lot of people, and a whole range of possibilities. The amendments would remove the proposed power to impose a fine as a condition of a caution, which would deal with the two-tier system that I described to Ms Johnson.

In amendments Nos. 36 and 37, we seek to restrict the punitive conditions that could be imposed on a caution to those specified in the Bill. We also seek to prevent the Secretary of State from increasing by means of secondary legislation the maximum hours of attendance and the maximum fine that could be imposed. As the magistrates' briefing suggests, the scope of the powers that the Secretary of State would assume under clause 12 opens up the possibility that more serious offences will be involved. I think that everyone assumes that the clause relates to extremely low-level offences, but that may not be so rigorously enforced.

In Committee the former Minister sought to assure us that the provision would not be used in the context of more serious crime, citing guidance from the Director of Public Prosecutions on conditional cautions. I have looked at that guidance, and it does not contain an assurance that punitive conditional cautions will not be used to deal with more serious offences. As the former Minister herself has said, the most realistic safeguards against the use of the procedure to deal with serious offences are the restrictions on the severity of the conditions that may be imposed. That is why we propose that the Bill should prevent secondary legislation from being used to allow the imposition of more serious penalties.

Amendment No. 38 seeks to place a 12-hour limit on the length of time for which a person arrested on the suspicion that he or she has breached a conditional caution can be held in custody. It would also prevent a person from being rearrested for the same suspected breach of a condition. The Minister said something about a falsehood being presented and an officer listening kindly to it. The Bill gives the police power to arrest someone suspected of breaching a conditional caution, and to detain that person indefinitely until they feel able to decide whether to charge or release him or her.

Given the restricted purpose of the detention and the Government's confidence that conditional cautions are to be used only for low-level offences, it seems entirely disproportionate for the police to be given an indefinite power of detention in such cases. That distinct disproportionality is highlighted when we consider that in the case of pre-charge detention when a person is suspected of having committed a criminal offence, the suspect can be detained for only up to 24 hours initially, with extensions of up to four days. For police gathering evidence within that time frame, deciding whether to charge the person is surely a harder task than deciding whether a condition of bail has been breached.

Our concern is that the Government are trying to give the police the power to keep those suspected of breaching a conditional caution in custody for longer than those suspected of committing a criminal offence, which seems disproportionate. However, our amendment No. 38 acknowledges that some flexibility is required. and that it would be unworkable to impose a limit of one or two hours. We consider a 12-hour limit more than adequate, and a reasonable amount of time, given the low-level nature of the crimes that the Government say will fall within the framework of these conditional cautions.

Our amendments Nos. 40 and 41 clarify the various options specified in proposed new sections 24A to 24C of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, making it clear that they would be available only when a prosecutor had decided that a condition of the caution had been breached without reasonable excuse. A person could therefore be released on bail before it had been determined whether they had breached the condition of their caution. We do not dispute the use of powers listed in proposed new section 24A(2) where such a breach has been established; however, our worry is that that section does not limit the use of the powers in that way, but enables them to be exercised purely by virtue of the fact that a person has been arrested on suspicion of a breach.

Where a person accepts a conditional caution instead of prosecution, they enter into an agreement—a contract, of sorts—with the state. So it would be unnatural and unfair for the state then to change the terms of that agreement and to charge them with the original offence, without having established that the condition of the caution had been breached, and the offender had therefore broken their side of the deal. The same argument applies—

Surely people who are cautioned are jolly lucky that they are not being charged with an offence in the first place. Is not the real unfairness the fact that many people are being let off with a slap on the wrist and a requirement to sign a piece of paper, instead of being charged with offences that they have admitted committing?

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, but that is a completely different discussion.

It is clear that it might sometimes be necessary to release someone on bail while the decision is being taken on whether they breached the conditional caution. In fact, that might be a more proportionate measure than detention in custody. It is also clear that if investigations into the suspected breach have not been concluded within 12 hours—the time limit for detention—it might be necessary to release the person on bail, to ensure their attendance at a police station for further questioning at a later date. The last amendment in the group would retain the power to release on bail in such circumstances.

We are concerned about the training provided for constables who administer summary justice. If the police are to be able to impose punishments, they need a particular level of training. Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 would require constables to have appropriate training before they imposed bail conditions, to ensure that the suspect did not commit an offence on bail, interfere with witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. All constables would be able to impose such conditions as they considered necessary to ensure that the suspect surrendered to custody.

The granting of bail in a police station is the responsibility of the custody sergeant, who is a figure independent of the investigation; it is not the arresting officer—the policeman on the beat—who imposes bail. A custody sergeant has specialist training and expertise in order to perform a semi-judicial role in deciding whether bail conditions are justified. We want such training to be transferred to those who will administer conditions. Clearly, the custody officer will not be present when street bail is given. Instead, the officer responsible for deciding on the conditions to be imposed will be the investigating officer, who is not impartial and would not have the training and experience of a custody officer.

The proposal that would require constables to make decisions about conditions needed to ensure that a suspect did not offend when on bail is not viable either. A decision involving street bail places on the arresting constable the responsibility of achieving a balance between the aims of the conditions of bail and the rights of the suspect. The constable would also have to make judgments about the suspect's likely future behaviour. That is a very grey area. We believe that constables should have the requisite training and expertise before they can impose conditions on street bail for purposes broader than ensuring attendance at a police station.

In Committee, the previous Minister accepted those arguments and said:

"Of course, we will expect officers exercising such powers to be properly trained. We expect that with any powers that the police are given. They have extensive training, and we will expect them to be properly trained in those powers."—[ Official Report, Standing Committee D, 21 March 2006; c. 134-5.]

In the light of that statement, we can see no reason why the Government should reject the proposal to include the requirements in the amendments in the Bill. We could then write the expectations of the previous Minister in Committee, and our proposals today, into the legislation.

I wish to lend my party's support to some of the concerns that underlie the amendments, if not the amendments specifically. We believe that limits on conditional cautions should be taken seriously. The Government favour what appears to be a considerable extension of summary power, and just before the local elections they slipped into the press—it was obviously intended to be a much bigger story, but was drowned by the events that engulfed the Government at the time—a further extension of the ability of police officers to issue on-the-spot fines for a range of offences. We look forward to hearing more about those proposals when they are properly announced to the House, and not by way of newspaper articles just before local elections.

The common denominator in the extension of summary power is that the courts are being taken out of the equation. Fixed penalties and conditional cautions are both alternatives to prosecution and have generally related to minor matters. My party supported the introduction of conditional cautions when they were introduced, but if punishment is involved it should, in principle, be a matter for some form of court involvement. The punishment becomes a form of sentence and the Magistrates Association has expressed great concern about the fact that it is being entirely removed from oversight of the operation of conditional cautions, which will be a matter for prosecutors.

When Lord Justice Auld, in his 2001 review of criminal courts, supported the introduction of a more general, formalised and conditional cautioning system, he also said:

"Any such scheme should, save for the most minor offences, be the responsibility of the CPS and subject to the approval of the court. Without the protection of the court's approval, its use could be used or perceived as a 'cop-out' by the prosecution to avoid prosecuting cases that should be prosecuted, or of innocent criminals being at risk of pressure to accept onerous compromises to avoid prosecution, or of the rich being able to buy their way out of prosecution when the poor could not."

The Magistrates Association points out that judges and magistrates take an oath, receive training, operate in public and have to announce the reasons for a sentence in open court—including any departure from sentencing guidelines—but the same does not apply to prosecutors. Where will the public accountability be for the operation of the conditional cautions?

This direction of policy is described as the extension of summary power, but magistrates courts are summary courts. That is where summary justice should be administered. The proper response to the Prime Minister's concern that the operation of justice has not been fast enough, which we share, would be to look at the operation of the court system and the Crown Prosecution Service. The recent NAO report pointed out that between 150,000 and 180,000 ineffective hearings every year were caused by the prosecution, the police and the CPS.

We will not oppose the extension proposals in the Bill, although we have reservations about the sort of offences that will be involved. As Lynne Featherstone said, some of them will be quite serious, and we will watch this policy development with some concern. We need reassurance about the proposals flagged up in the media for a further extension of summary justice. We need to know the extent to which magistrates courts are being closed out of the sentencing process simply for the sake of more rapid justice.

This issue was discussed in some detail in Committee, so I shall be brief. However, I shall begin by welcoming the three new Ministers to their Front-Bench responsibilities. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Joan Ryan, used to be a Whip, so I am pleased that her promotion allows her to speak on Home Office matters.

The direction of policy in respect of summary justice has brought conditional cautions into closer focus. The obvious change that the Bill introduces is that the conditions attached to cautions are intended to punish the offender. That is the aspect of the Bill that has caused most disquiet when it comes to the intended operation of the cautions, and the comments of John Thornhill, the chairman of the Magistrates Association's judicial policy and practice committee, are interesting in that regard. He said:

"We consider it contrary to the principles of justice for prosecutors and police to be able to impose punishment without the involvement of the judiciary. A democratic legal system ensures that an independent tribunal—the judiciary—should sentence and impose punishment, thus preventing bias from prosecutorial authorities."

Is it right for the police or prosecutorial authorities to extend their jurisdiction much further? If so, how far do we go? That is the substance of the debate on these amendments. However, if conditions that in essence are sentences or punishments are to be imposed, is a person from the police or the CPS the right person to impose them? Two possibilities arise. First, a person might accept a caution with conditions less stringent than would be the case if the matter were referred to the magistrates court or some other judicial body. Secondly, and alternatively, a person might be advised or required to accept a caution without realising that the conditions are more draconian than those that a court would impose.

Other amendments in the group apply to police bail, to which a similar quasi-judicial approach should be adopted. The Magistrates Association believes that bail conditions must be examined very carefully, and that as much information as possible be obtained when the conditions are set. Sufficient training must be given to officers, and the proper safeguards put in place, to ensure that the conditions that are attached are appropriate. In that way, the people on the street who use street bail can do so in a way that is both effective and fitting.

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a wider concern? As the Carter review recommends restricting the involvement of solicitors to a fixed-fee basis, solicitors could be reluctant to give the quality of advice about police bail and conditional cautions that the interests of justice demand. There is concern that justice will not be done if we move from a system of summary justice with effective representation to a system of police representation with a squeeze on solicitors' budgets.

My hon. Friend speaks from his practical experience as a criminal solicitor before he entered the House and he makes an important point. If the use of conditional cautions is increased while legal advice on whether to accept them is restricted, it is a cause for concern, so I hope that the Minister will take that on board and monitor the issue to ensure that unfairness does not result, and that the playing field is not skewed. Sentencing and punishment and the conditions for street bail and cautions must be applied appropriately, proportionately and effectively. The prosecuting authorities must not become judge, jury and executioner or even judge, jury and punisher.

There are valid concerns about the general policy approach. We must ensure that the process is robust and that the whole procedure is used appropriately.

With your permission, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I shall make one or two concluding remarks.

Many years ago I read my Maitland—"The Constitutional History of England"—and I can still remember that flexibility has characterised the English system of law for the past 1,000 years. I am not a lawyer, however, so I hope that my historical reading is right, because that debate is at the heart of the issue we have been discussing.

Lynne Featherstone expressed concern about two-tier justice. Too many of our communities already experience two-tier justice when offenders go unpunished and cause havoc in their communities. That is exactly why the extension that we propose in conditional cautioning and street bail is so important. It is also important to note that it is for the Crown Prosecution Service and the police to decide whether to issue a caution or press the matter to court. We often hear from both sides of the House that we should put great trust in the judgment of front-line professionals, and that is a useful reminder in this case.

I can advise the hon. Lady that the conditions attached to cautions must, according to the code on conditional cautioning, be appropriate and proportionate. Secondly, it is certainly not the case that unlimited detention is envisaged for breach of the conditions. Under the relevant guidance, custody officers must release individuals, or release them on bail, as soon as practicable. There is additional back-up in the protection offered by PACE—the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. On the hon. Lady's final point about appropriate training, it is a prerequisite that a constable is fit to execute his or her responsibilities.

James Brokenshire expressed concern about the attaching of punitive conditions. That is an important issue. One of the great virtues of being a by-election winner is that I can share experience of my community with the many Members on both sides of the House who visited it in 2004. For many people in the area that I was elected to serve, the possibility offered by indirect reparation is extremely significant as we go about rebuilding a community of which we are proud.

I commend the Government proposals to the House and urge Opposition Members to withdraw their amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.