I beg to move amendment No. 34, in page 28, line 1, leave out Clause 51.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 35, in page 28, line 2 [Clause 51], leave out subsection (1).

No. 54, in page 28, line 5 [Clause 51], leave out from 'terrorism' to 'and' in line 6 and insert

'where such acts amount to offences in UK law'.

No. 55, in page 28, line 8 [Clause 51], leave out from 'terrorism' to end of line 9 and insert

'where such acts amount to offences in UK law'.

No. 36, in page 28 [Clause 51], leave out lines 26 and 27.

No. 56, in page 28, line 26 [Clause 51], leave out from 'section' to end of line 27 and insert

'20 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (c. )'.

No. 26, in page 28, line 31, leave out Clause 52.

No. 37, in page 28, line 32 [Clause 52], leave out subsection (1).

No. 1, in page 28, line 35 [Clause 52], leave out 'satisfied' and insert 'sure'.

No. 38, in page 28, line 37 [Clause 52], leave out 'that Act' and insert

'the British Nationality Act 1981 (c. 61).'

No. 39, in page 29, line 4 [Clause 53], leave out subsection (1).

No. 2, in page 29, line 8 [Clause 53], leave out 'thinks' and insert 'is sure'.

No. 40, in page 29, line 8 [Clause 53], leave out from 'State' to end of line 10 and insert

'is satisfied that the person had done anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of—

(a) the United Kingdom, or

(b) a British Overseas Territory.'.

No. 41, in page 29, line 23 [Clause 53], leave out 'not'.

No. 42, in page 29, line 25 [Clause 53], leave out from 'person' to end of line and insert

'had done anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of—

(a) the United Kingdom, or

(b) a British Overseas Territory.'.

I should tell the House that, barring anything earth-shatteringly revealing being said by the Minister on these amendments, it is my intention to divide the House on amendment No. 34 and, with your leave, Madam Deputy Speaker, on amendment No. 37.

Unfortunately, time is short, and I know that other hon. Members wish to speak. I am keen to hear the words of honeyed sweet reason that I know will drip from the Minister if he is given the opportunity. So, if I may seek the indulgence of the House, I shall assume a greater degree of prior knowledge of the provisions of article 1(F)(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention than had originally been my intention.

I have chosen to focus on amendment No. 34 because it seeks the removal of clause 51. The other amendments relating to that clause seek to achieve much the same end, but by taking rather more circuitous routes. I suggest that amendment No. 34 is by some significant measure the most straightforward and, if I may venture to say so, elegant way of dealing with this issue.

I cannot think of another example in which the discretion of the courts in construing articles in a convention has been fettered in the way set out in clause 51. The clause purports to define article 1(F)(c) of the convention, which concerns exceptions based on

"acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations".

I do not understand why the clause is necessary, and that view is shared by the Immigration Law Practitioners Association.

In a briefing to me, the ILPA pointed out that the 1951 convention is an international convention in respect of which the international jurisprudence and UNHCR statements are relevant. The ILPA put it to me:

"To purport to interpret it in statute is to fail to respect this jurisprudence and to usurp the role of judges in interpreting it."

As ever, the Government seek to go much further than is necessary. The definition they want to import is much wider than is either necessary or desirable. I draw the attention of the House to clause 51(1)(b), which speaks of

"acts of encouraging or inducing others to commit, prepare or instigate terrorism".

A person may thereby be excluded from recognition as a refugee for acts that are not recognised in this country as crimes.

The UNHCR handbook, which is part of the jurisprudence to be applied in construing this measure, says that article 1F(c)

"is intended to cover in a general way such acts against the purposes and principles of the United Nations that might not be fully covered by the two preceding . . . clauses."

That refers to article 1F(a) and (b). The handbook continues:

"Taken . . . with the latter, it has to be assumed, although this is not specifically stated, that the acts covered . . . must . . . be of a criminal nature."

It is apparent from that, surely, that the definition employed by the UNHCR handbook is already very wide. The only limitation that seems to be in place is that the act complained of should constitute a crime. However, even beyond that exceptionally wide definition the Government seek to go.

That, again, is the view of the ILPA. The Minister might say, "They would say that, wouldn't they?" He might also say that if the Liberal Democrats are agreeing with the ILPA, that is equally unsurprising, but I must bring it to the attention of the House that that is the view not only of the ILPA and the Liberal Democrats, but of the UNHCR. If the House will indulge me for a few minutes, I would like to refer to a few of the objections that the UNHCR has brought to our attention.

First, the UNHCR makes the point that clause 51 interprets article 1F(c)

"out of its context, contrary to accepted rules of interpretation of a treaty under international law."

Secondly, the UNHCR says that the clause

"introduces an interpretation . . . which is incompatible with the accepted and long-standing interpretation of Article 1 F(c)."

The UNHCR essentially makes the same points as the ILPA, as well as further statements, and the UNHCR briefing says that

"bearing in mind the interrelationship between the three subsections of the provision, it is important that Article 1 F be interpreted and applied holistically. As presently drafted, Clause 51 is a piecemeal attempt to interpret one subsection of a provision which should be read as a whole and in context. UNHCR is concerned that the adoption of Clause 51 will result in a skewed and imbalanced application of the exclusion clauses in the UK. In its stead, UNHCR would recommend that the UK government consider the incorporation of Article 1 F in its entirety into domestic legislation. Such a measure would ensure that the exclusion clauses are considered in context and on a strong legal footing."

The briefing then says that

"terrorist-type acts (as defined in relevant international conventions) may qualify as excludable acts under Article 1 F if they reach an appropriate level of gravity to warrant denial of protection. This does not mean, however, that any act labelled as 'terrorist' per se should automatically trigger exclusion under article 1 F. The fact that there are serious reasons for considering that an individual has committed acts described as 'terrorist' in nature should trigger consideration of the exclusion clauses but may not in itself generally constitute sufficient evidence to justify exclusion. Each case will require individual consideration, taking into account the unique circumstances of each individual, their acts, motivation and risk on return. In this regard, UNHCR wishes to express serious concern over the current proposal in clause 51 to automatically link acts defined in the Terrorism Act 2000 with an excludable offence under Article 1 F(c) of the Refugee Convention."

I am grateful to the House for its indulgence in allowing me to read that out, which is not my normal practice. It is important, however, to get the point across. If the Minister is not minded to listen to us, to which I have become accustomed over recent months, or even to the ILPA, surely such clear and unambiguous condemnation from the UNHCR should give the Government pause for thought.

Clauses 52 and 53, which concern the deprivation of citizenship and right of abode, would, as drafted, introduce a ground that continued enjoyment of citizenship or right of abode was not conducive to the public good. That, of course, is the test applied in relation to deportation or exclusion—

Of foreign nationals.

Of foreign nationals, as my hon. Friend reminds me from a sedentary position.

In our view, that test is far too low for such a serious step. It is a quantum leap to deprive someone of their citizenship or right of abode when that person, although they have a second nationality, might never have had recourse to using it, might have no links to the country concerned and might never have lived in it. To put someone in a position of relying on a citizenship other than their British citizenship on such a low test is unacceptable. The effect of our amendment No. 37 is to retain as the test for depriving an individual of citizenship that they should be shown to have done something seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom or a British overseas territory.

The Conservative amendments Nos. 1 and 2 are interesting, particularly No. 2, which seeks to delete the provision relating to Ministers' thinking. I venture to say that if the Government are going to be required to satisfy courts that Ministers had thought about something before they did it, they might be in for a lean time as far as successful cases in court are concerned. I can think of no other instance in which "thinks" is used in such a situation. I would be interested if the Minister could point me towards a precedent. In the event of his failure to do so, it would be sensible for the Government to accept amendment No. 2.

I will be brief, given the time that is left. It is a pity that we have such a short time to debate what, I think, is one of the most important sections of the Bill, including a group of clauses that were added in Committee, have never been debated on the Floor of the House and are some of the most important changes that have been made. It is probably true that clauses 51 to 53 will affect relatively small numbers of people. For those small numbers of people, however, they will be extremely important.

I have two or three points. Mr. Carmichael asked whether clause 51 is necessary, in that the existing law provides for the exclusion of someone who is a violent terrorist from claiming asylum. I will not repeat what he said about the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In the years in which I have been in the House, however, the UNHCR has commented on a number of provisions in asylum and immigration Bills, and the comments about clause 51 are probably the strongest that I have seen from it about any such clause and its incompatibility with the 1951 convention. It made it very clear that interpretation of the convention is not what we should be doing. The provisions in the convention cannot be unilaterally modified by a state that is a contracting party to the convention. It wants states that have not already done so to incorporate not just article 1(F)(c) of the convention but (a) and (b).

Last week we debated the Terrorism Bill, which has not yet completed its passage. The definitions in clause 51 are relevant to that Bill. The definition of "encouraging terrorism" is an example. It is quite possible that before we finish considering the Terrorism Act, there will be changes. I am also not sure how Government amendments relating to extra-territorial acts of terrorism that were agreed last week should be read in the context of this Bill, or how any changes will be dealt with. One of the commitments made by the Government during last week's debate was that the Home Secretary would ask Lord Carlile to review the definition of terrorism, not just in the Terrorism Bill but in the Terrorism Act 2000. The definition in the 2000 Act is mentioned in clause 51 of this Bill. I want to be certain that the outcome of any review, including Lord Carlile's review, will be translated into this Bill, because it strikes me as inconsistent to include a definition of terrorism in one Bill that does not relate clearly to the definition in another.

I wish we had had more time to debate such a critical part of the Bill, but I shall end my speech now, because the Minister will want to speak during the few minutes that are left.

I shall be brief, because I know that the Minister wants to speak.

Let me repeat what I said in Committee. When the Minister introduced the new clause relating to deprivation of citizenship, he spoke with great courtesy and authority. I repeat that my party stands united behind the Government's attempts to combat the surge of terrorism. Indeed, the whole House is united on that. I should have like to question the Minister on a number of matters, but time is against us and I believe that they will be raised in another place. Deprivation of citizenship will, I think, be used rarely—it has been used rarely so far—and I know that the Government will retain a right of appeal. I also know that the Government will do their best to strike a balance between civil liberties and the defence of the realm. We are with them 100 per cent. on that, and I believe that any further matters that I might raise with the Minister will be raised in another place.

I am glad that we have at least some time left.

Let me rebut the point made by my hon. Friend Mr. Gerrard. He knows the context in which these clauses were introduced as well as I do. Although not all Members, including members of the Committee, were not party to the gestation period when the clauses were discussed, they were discussed on an all-party basis throughout and beyond the summer. The other place will be aware of that. I do not accept the terms in which my hon. Friend described the genesis of the clauses or, indeed, the final discussions.

I hope that the House will forgive me if I dwell on amendment No. 34, for reasons of time rather than for any other reason. The UNHCR considerations are serious, although in part they challenge and condemn many past UN discussions and resolutions.

I received a very nice letter from Bemma Donkoh, the UNHCR's representative in London, which laid all these things out and said, "Best wishes, see you again soon, lots of love Bemma". We have a strong and not always unduly non-critical relationship. It is a good one.

It is right and proper that, with all the cross-party deliberations about terrorism, these clauses sit in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill, rather than in some omnibus terrorism Bill. I thank everyone on the Committee for setting a full day aside to deliberate these clauses and for the discussion that was held, which was interesting, informed and moved things on in some regard. Mr. Malins, as he has reminded me twice now, made a very good speech, although he seemed surprised that he had done so—there was shock in his voice when he said "I made a very good speech that day".

The UNHCR points are serious and need to be considered with the seriousness that they deserve. The charge is that clause 51 is not compatible with the refugee convention, but part of the justification for clause 51 in all its glory is that it reflects the relevant Security Council resolutions that refer to the guiding principles of the UN. UN Security Council resolution 1373 states that

"knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts" as well as the commission of such acts constitute acts

"contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

UN Security Council resolution 1377 is broadly in the same terms. I said in Committee that, as and when—fortunately, the progress of Bills through Parliament favours this—there needs to be read-across between the Terrorism Bill and any changes made to the constituent parts of that, and this Bill, we will seek to reflect those changes in this Bill. That makes perfect sense. I cannot pre-empt what the other place will do with the Terrorism Bill, but we stand ready to cross-reference the two Bills in the appropriate place.

I think that, given the state of this Bill and the state of the Terrorism Bill, little needs to happen, not least because Lord Carlile will conduct a substantive review of the definition of terrorism over the year. Much of the debate about read-across refers to the definitions that are included in the Terrorism Bill.

We believe that the UNHCR's points about the definition of terrorism in the 2000 Act are unfair. The definition is compatible with article 1(F)(c) of the refugee convention, as is the 2005 Terrorism Bill. We do not consider it to be at odds with UN Security Council resolutions that were drawn up reflecting the principles of the UN.

We are exhorted by UNHCR to take a holistic approach to exclusion clauses. We argue that we have done so, and they are reflected in this Bill. Clause 51 is not piecemeal. Our approach to the application of article 1(F) is holistic and we contest the points made by UNHCR in that regard.

We take the same attitude to the points made about positions of power. The UNHCR London paper suggests that in principle only persons who have been in power or a state-like entity would be capable of committing such acts, given that articles 1 and 2 of the UN charter set out the fundamental principles that states must uphold in mutual relations. A slew of Asylum and Immigration Tribunal case law and Security Council resolutions themselves contend that very position. Although I take UNHCR's points very seriously and take into account the points made by my hon. Friends and other colleagues that these are serious clauses in the Bill, I do not accept UNHCR's point that, of themselves and in their own terms, they are incompatible with the overall thrust of what is in the UN charter. They are very serious clauses that are a consequence of what we are trying to achieve in the broader sense in counter-terrorism and I—

It being Six o'clock, Madam Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [5 July].

The House divided: Ayes 64, Noes 275.

Question accordingly negatived.

Madam Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.