Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Cawsey.]

I am grateful for the opportunity to draw the attention of the House to the urgent need for international action to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Back in 1963, US President John F. Kennedy stated that he saw the possibility of 15, 20 or 25 nations having nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Quite a few present Members of the House will not be old enough to remember John Kennedy, but I am, and I remember the widespread appreciation at that time of the importance of preventing more and more states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Clearly, the more states that have nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that they will be used. It was in that climate that the non-proliferation treaty was conceived, negotiated and agreed—a time when there was a very real prospect of a rapid escalation in the number of states with nuclear weapons.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty—the NPT—came into force in 1970. At that time the only countries with nuclear weapons were the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom. Since then, India and Pakistan have acquired and tested nuclear weapons, Israel is believed to have a nuclear weapons capability, and North Korea has stated that it has manufactured nuclear weapons. Every new state with nuclear weapons is a blow to international security, but without the NPT the world would have become a much more dangerous place much sooner.

The Government rightly describe the NPT as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The NPT is built on three central pillars—first, preventing proliferation, by stopping new states acquiring nuclear weapons and stopping states that already have nuclear weapons acquiring more; secondly, obliging existing nuclear weapons states to disarm; and, thirdly, enabling nuclear technology to be used peacefully. The treaty is essentially a deal between those countries with nuclear weapons and those without. The non-nuclear states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, in return for which they get peaceful uses of nuclear energy, plus the promise of disarmament from the nuclear weapons states.

Nuclear technology and international politics do not stand still, so it is vital that the global regime for non-proliferation and disarmament can evolve and strengthen, in order to be fit for purpose. The NPT is therefore subject to a review conference every five years. There was such a conference in May this year, and one would have thought that if ever it was crucial that progress be made, it was at that 2005 review conference. After all, much had happened in the preceding five years.

For the first time a state, North Korea, had announced that it was withdrawing from the treaty. Two states, Libya and North Korea, had announced that they had been working on their own secret nuclear weapons programmes, and North Korea then claimed that it had manufactured nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency had found undeclared uranium-enrichment activity in Iran, and the A.Q. Khan trafficking network had been exposed.

In the meantime, non-nuclear weapons states were frustrated at the slow progress on disarmament , and the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 had thrown into alarmingly sharp relief the prospect of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Despite those developments, the review conference was a dreadful failure. The participants succumbed to wrangles over procedure and the conference concluded with no substantive agreement at all.

I raised the matter in the House in the summer Adjournment Debate in July, and I was grateful for the reply that I received from the Government by way of a letter from my hon. Friend the Minister for Trade. He wrote that

"a very small group of countries seemed determined from the outset to ensure that no substantive outcome was achieved, contrary to our wishes and to the wishes of the vast Majority of States Parties attending".

However, my hon. Friend was keen to assure me in his letter that it is not unheard of for NPT review conferences to be unsuccessful, and that there are other forums where progress could be made. He pointed to the forthcoming United Nations millennium review summit in New York in September.

Hopes were indeed high for the millennium review summit. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had published a report entitled "In Larger Freedom" for decision at the summit by the world's leaders. The Secretary-General's report made key recommendations concerning all three pillars of the NPT. The G8 at Gleneagles issued a communiqué on non-proliferation, which welcomed the attention given to non-proliferation in the Secretary-General's report, and declared themselves ready to engage actively at the summit.

The Minister responsible for international security, who I am pleased to see in his place, was quite right when he said a week before the summit that it

"presents an opportunity to reaffirm strongly the international consensus against proliferation and to reiterate our support for all elements of the non-proliferation regime, including the NPT and to move the agenda forward. We need to do so now more than ever."

The whole House should agree with that statement.

At the summit itself, the Prime Minister said in his address that

"The United Nations must strengthen its policy against non-proliferation; in particular, how to allow nations to develop civil nuclear power but not nuclear weapons."

Of course, we had the statement by the head of the UK delegation to the NPT review conference, Ambassador John Freeman, on 5 May, which was also the date of the British General Election. Speaking on behalf of the British Government to the diplomats in New York, he said:

"we recognise that we have particular obligations, as a Nuclear Weapon State, under Article 6 of the Treaty. We re-affirm our unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament."

But long before our Prime Minister got to his feet, it had become clear that no progress would be made. In fact, the sections of the Secretary-General's report on disarmament and non-proliferation had been removed entirely. I cannot exaggerate the disappointment that must have been felt worldwide by those who follow these issues.

For their part, the UK Government have also expressed disappointment, and in the EU statement circulated at the world summit it was claimed that

"the UK as EU Presidency was involved in the extensive efforts to broker agreement' on the key issues of non-proliferation and disarmament.

If my hon. Friend could elaborate for us on what happened at the summit, I would be most grateful. Why was no progress made? Why were the sections of the Secretary-General's report dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation removed entirely? How was it that the international community once again

"allowed posturing to get in the way of results", as Kofi Annan himself put it? I hope that my hon. Friend will take this opportunity to provide us with a full statement of what actually happened in New York last month.

This summer on 7 July we had the London suicide bombings, and earlier this evening the House gave a Second Reading to the Terrorism Bill. There is rightly a focus on terrorism. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that a nuclear weapon, even a small one, has the capacity to kill thousands of people. The growth of international terrorism makes the prospect of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons an increasingly alarming one, and that is surely a reason why Governments should be striving harder for progress.

When I had the good fortune to address the House before the summer recess, I took the opportunity to set out five proposals for progress: the universal adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol; incentives for countries to forgo fuel cycle facilities; a fissile material cut-off treaty; entry into force of the comprehensive test ban treaty, which is still not in operation, as my hon. Friend the Minister knows better than I do; and disarmament. Disarmament is one of the three pillars of the NPT, and it is essential that progress is made on the elimination of all nuclear weapons as agreed by the NPT states, including the UK, at the review conference in 2000. That is what we signed up to.

The current security climate has rightly led to calls for a tougher non-proliferation regime for non-nuclear weapons states. However, while we nuclear weapons states are perceived as disengaged from our side of the NPT deal, there is a danger that our insistence on non-proliferation will not carry adequate credibility with the non-nuclear states. In that context, I gently put it to my hon. Friend that a decision to replace Trident would further weaken the credibility of our case for stronger non-proliferation measures and would be seen as yet more evidence that the countries that had nuclear weapons at the start of the NPT are not prepared to deliver on their side of the bargain.

It is not contentious to say that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has made our world a safer place than it otherwise could have been. Equally, however, no one disputes the fact that the NPT regimes desperately need to be strengthened and urgently need to be updated. Will my hon. Friend set out as fully as he can the Government's view on why things went so badly wrong at the millennium summit as regards nuclear weapons? Will he also set out the work that the Government are doing to push matters forward in helping to get the world back on track on nuclear proliferation and disarmament?

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is also important that the Government pressurise other countries to sign the NPT, including Israel, which has nuclear weapons but has so far refused even to admit to ownership of them, never mind signing the treaty?

My hon. Friend makes a fair and valid point. We want all Governments to sign up to the treaty, and having done so to live up to the spirit and letter of it. I take his point absolutely.

I am sure that the Minister is as disappointed as I am, and indeed the whole world is, about the failure to make progress at the millennium summit. The question is: where do we go from here? For most of my life, the dominant international reality was the existence of the cold war. I well remember the build-up of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw pact and NATO. I am just old enough to remember—I was a student at the time—the genuine fear that permeated the people of this country during the Cuban missile crisis. We were very conscious of the continued, remorseless build-up of nuclear weapons on both sides. I remember the deep concern aroused by the deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe—the Soviet SS20s and the US Cruise missiles. There was a very real risk that nuclear weapons would be used, starting with the intermediate range nuclear weapons and escalating quickly to the massive intercontinental ballistic missiles. Civilisation as we knew it would have been annihilated. Thankfully, those days are well behind us.

The years in which we live now arguably provide a window, when we should be able to make genuine progress to avoid nuclear proliferation, to reduce nuclear stockpiles and the number of countries with nuclear weapons, and, ultimately, to abolish nuclear weapons. In that context, the events of the past few months are deeply regrettable. If the world's leaders do not effectively grasp the issue and make genuine progress, a future generation, if not this one, could pay a heavy price.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend Dr. Strang on securing the debate. Before addressing the specific issues that he raised, I thank him for highlighting the continuing value of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. His excellent analysis shows why the non-proliferation treaty continues to be the cornerstone of United Kingdom counter-proliferation policy. He also demonstrated the regime's overall success in averting the future that President Kennedy envisaged in 1963. I, too, remember the Cuban crisis. I remember thinking that it was not fair—I had just got into my stride and Aberdare was about to be obliterated. It was not a promising scenario.

As my right hon. Friend reminded us, it is an important moment to reflect on the significance of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Iran is restarting its nuclear conversion programme, with the threat of restarting the nuclear enrichment programme. There can be only one reason for that. It has nothing to do with civil nuclear power and everything to do with creating a nuclear bomb. As my right hon. Friend said, there are already enough of those around without adding to the number of nations that possess those lethal weapons.

That said, the non-proliferation and disarmament regime continues to face genuine and pressing challenges. In response, the Government have consistently sought to work with our international partners to strengthen all three pillars of the treaty. In 2005, the highest-profile, but by no means the only forum for pursuing that effort was the review conference in May. As my right hon. Friend knows, it was thrown off course by procedural wrangling, and, as a result, there was no agreement on substance. As he hinted, a small group of countries at the review conference—the revcon, as it is known—seemed determined from the outset to ensure that was the case. In a multilateral format, which relies on consensus, the tactic can win the day even when the Majority of states present seek to achieve genuine advances. That was the case in New York in May.

I know that the Minister has had a tiring day, so I am grateful to him for giving way. Does not he agree that it would greatly help the non-proliferation cause if Britain did not announce the redevelopment of the Trident submarine system or some replacement for it, but said that we adhered to the NPT and the goal of eventual nuclear disarmament by all states?

My hon. Friend has been in this place long enough to know that I will not answer that one.

Come on.

I say to him that the Government take the question seriously. Considering what we should do about the continuation and possession of a nuclear deterrent is a serious matter, which we shall tackle seriously. However, in this evening's debate, I should like to try to answer some of the questions posed by my right hon. Friend.

My right hon. Friend asked whether the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, had edited or altered the form of words that might originally have been agreed for his speech. I am informed that the language of the treaty had been clear for some days, if not weeks, before Kofi Annan made his speech. It was Mr. Kofi Annan, no one else, who altered his speech, and there were no indications that he was under any pressure to do so. As far as I know, that is a very authoritative account of the procedure that occurred at that time, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will accept it. I have met Mr. Annan on several occasions, and he is certainly not someone who can easily be swayed when it comes to saying what he intends to say. He is a fine diplomat who is known for his integrity.

While the review conference did not conclude with a substantive final document, there is general agreement that there was a lot of good, detailed discussion of ways in which the treaty could be strengthened. We hope that these ideas will be taken up actively in other forums. I take my right hon. Friend's point about the hopes that we had for the millennium summit as the most important of those forums, and I understand his disappointment with the review conference that preceded it and with the failure to agree a form of words.

However, I am trying to answer my right hon. Friend's most important question, which is: where do we go from here? I would say to him that we must use whatever forum is available to take forward this hugely important problem. He told us that no single problem was more important than this one, and I am sure that we would all agree. How can we imagine a world in which people were trying to live after a nuclear holocaust? There would not be one. This is a problem that we have lived with all our lives, and I want my right hon. Friend to know that we intend to try to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in whatever way we can, using whatever venue we can to pursue that aim.

There were proposals at the review conference on measures to discourage withdrawal from the treaty. These drew widespread support, including from the European Union. The EU also played its part in setting out a progressive non-proliferation agenda through its agreement on and promotion of a forward-leaning common position on the non-proliferation treaty.

Although our primary focus from a disarmament and non-proliferation perspective this year was, rightly, the NPT review conference, the disappointing outcome gave us added incentive to make strenuous efforts to remedy this at the UN world summit in September. That was why my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary agreed to take part in the initiative, promoted by his then Norwegian colleague, designed to generate broad support for a forward-looking non-proliferation agenda.

Indeed, in the second week of the UN conference, I attended a meeting of the Norwegian group, and a great deal of passion was generated in the attempts of all the countries represented there to break through the dam of unwillingness to make progress on the language of the non-proliferation statement. I agree with my right hon. Friend that it was a great shame that we were unable to make progress there, despite the strength of that group. During our presidency of the European Union, we have also worked hard to secure European support for strong and meaningful commitments on non-proliferation and disarmament.

Although it was again disappointing that the summit was unable to agree on commitments to disarmament and non-proliferation, I cannot entirely concur with my right hon. Friend's assessment that the summit was therefore a failure. The Norwegian initiative, in which we participated, obtained the support of more than 80 countries—more than was achieved by any other means. So I hope that my right hon. Friend does not feel entirely gloomy about this. There is a great feeling that we can take this issue forward. He will know, as I do, that there is a great deal of work to be done, especially with the non-aligned members, some of whom were very intransigent on the question of the language. There is room there to celebrate success for the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has commented, if the reforms and commitments agreed at the summit are fully implemented, it will represent a major advance for the UN and the international community. The lack of an outcome on non-proliferation, regrettable though it is, should not detract from those real gains. Achieving full agreement on all the reforms put forward was always going to be very difficult. Rather than posturing getting in the way of results, that reflected the ambitious agenda and divergence of views between UN member states on many issues. The UK, in our presidency of the EU, worked to achieve the most extensive set of reforms possible, and we will continue to do so. Sadly, however, despite hard work by the UK in both its national and EU presidency capacities, pre-summit negotiations on non-proliferation issues proved very difficult.

As my right hon. Friend said, that outcome was certainly a disappointment. But we should not be misled into believing that it heralds the collapse of the NPT—I do not believe that my right hon. Friend believes that, and I certainly do not. Nor does it mean the collapse of the non-proliferation regime more widely. We believe that the challenges to the regime have served to bolster support for it rather than to undermine it. We share that commitment with the overwhelming Majority of states and we will continue to use all available international forums to build consensus to strengthen the regime.

My right hon. Friend drew our attention to a number of valuable initiatives in this regard, many of which the UK wholeheartedly supports. For example, we are taking every opportunity to encourage all states to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol, and are actively working with others to formulate appropriate incentives for countries to forgo fuel cycle facilities. Both have formed part of the activity of the G8 during the United Kingdom's presidency. While we fully recognise the right of states that are in compliance with their obligations under the NPT to use and benefit from nuclear technology, as set out in article 4, it is clear that the nuclear fuel cycle presents particularly acute proliferation risks, which is why we have been promoting controls on the transfer of sensitive technology to be implemented in an objective and non-discriminatory manner.

There are some very interesting proposals for fuel supply assurances, to establish either "real" or "virtual" banks of nuclear fuel, with some element of international involvement. I know that my right hon. Friend is very interested in some of those possibilities. It is far from straightforward, however, as one can see from the fact that Governments and experts have been trying to find a solution to this for some years. A number of complicated technical and political issues remain to be resolved, but I believe that there is now increasing international political will to reach an agreement on the way forward.

The IAEA general conference last month demonstrated a particularly good spirit of co-operation and determination among states to strengthen non-proliferation and address other issues such as the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Those are very important building blocks. The UN First Committee, which is currently in session, the UN Security Council resolution 1540 committee and the G8 global partnership are all forums in which we are actively participating. I hope that my right hon. Friend will allow me to reassure him sincerely—

The motion having been made after Seven o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Deputy Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at four minutes past Eight o'clock.