On Friday, my Department announced that we had identified a case of highly pathogenic avian influenza in birds held in quarantine. After further analysis by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency, we announced on Sunday that the virus was H5N1. We now consider that the virus was found in samples taken from two birds—one Pionus parrot and one Mesia. The closest match is a strain identified in ducks in China earlier this year.

There has been no reported occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza in the United Kingdom since 1992. The premises in which this event occurred contained two consignments of exotic birds from Surinam and Taiwan. At this stage, we cannot say for sure where the virus originated, but our working hypothesis, taking account of the identification of the strain, is that the virus is most likely to have come via Taiwan. However, it is important to keep an open mind about other possible sources and we are doing exactly that.

As the House knows, the birds in the quarantine premises were culled by officers from the local animal health office on Friday evening. All those at the premises who may have come into contact with diseased birds were given antiviral treatment to protect them against risk of infection.

Since Friday, we have been investigating the sequence of events that led to the death of the birds. As we announced on Sunday, some birds had already died in quarantine before 16 October. Thirty-two of those birds were being held in a freezer. Initial tests, which have not yet been validated, identified that H5 is present in some of those birds. We have not yet established the full circumstances of those deaths. However, our standard instructions on deaths in quarantine state:

"When birds die during quarantine, their carcases must be placed by quarantine staff in a fridge or freezer until the Local Veterinary Inspector can collect them for transmission to the Veterinary Laboratories Agency."

That is, of course, where the tests are carried out.

Our investigations will continue and we will of course bring our findings to the attention of the House as early as possible. Meanwhile, we are taking certain prudent steps to ensure that our protection against avian influenza is as secure as possible. First, I want to underline the fact that this incident has demonstrated both the threat posed by avian influenza and the controls that we have in place to meet that threat. The quarantine system provided the protection that it is intended to deliver. That is not a reason for complacency, but it is right that we should recognise the swift and effective action that was taken once the disease had been identified. It also means that our disease-free status on avian flu remains unaffected.

The incident took place against a background of increasing reported outbreaks of avian influenza in wild birds. Since July, we have seen outbreaks first in an area of Russia and then in Romania and Turkey. There have been other confirmed and suspected cases in some of those countries and in Croatia. We are taking those developments very seriously, but I should perhaps stress that they are not in themselves a cause for undue alarm. Avian flu does not at present transmit easily to humans. But there is concern about the potential for avian influenza viruses to mutate into new forms that might directly affect humans.

Such transmission has not yet happened and indeed may never happen, but there is good reason to be very vigilant against the establishment of avian flu. I stress that avian flu is a disease of birds and that we receive a number of reports of suspected cases in any normal year, and for the obvious reason that people are being particularly cautious we have received more than normal this year.

Moreover, we in the UK and more generally in the European Union have worked to establish a good level of preparedness. Our contingency plan for avian flu was laid before Parliament in July. We regularly exercise the contingency arrangements nationally and locally, and our recent experience of managing a Newcastle disease outbreak demonstrated the fundamental soundness of those arrangements for dealing with a disease outbreak in birds, but we will continue to build on that good level of preparedness.

In response to the specific incident that has occurred in quarantine, we issued instructions to the state veterinary service at the weekend that releases of birds from quarantine should now be subject to a case-by-case risk assessment. We understand that there are about 15 consignments of birds currently in quarantine. Each of those will be subjected to an individual veterinary risk assessment and referred to DEFRA headquarters before any decision to release is authorised.

At the weekend, the chief veterinary officer and I ordered that a general review of our quarantine arrangements and procedures be undertaken. Pending the outcome of that review, we have called on the European Commission to propose an immediate temporary ban on imports of live birds into the EU while we collectively assess the risk that they pose. I am pleased to say that the Commission responded very positively to that call, and a ban lasting until 30 November was agreed in the relevant EU Standing Committee yesterday.

At the same time, we are especially mindful of the potential threat posed by illegal imports. My Department already works closely with Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs on the control of illegal imports of animals and animal products, and I have asked my officials immediately to address how we can increase our vigilance against the specific issue of illegal imports of live birds. The Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my hon. Friend Jim Knight, who has responsibility for rural affairs, landscape and biodiversity, will also take up the issue of illegal trade at an EU wildlife trade enforcement event tomorrow.

We were already working actively with the Commission and other member states to tackle the wider threat of the introduction of avian influenza by migrating wildfowl and other routes. As a result of that work, I expect to bring before the House within the coming days sensible and measured regulations that will assist us in reducing the risk of disease and strengthening our ability to control an outbreak. Those regulations will implement the announcement that we made last week about establishing a register of all commercial poultry producers in the country. As we said then, we shall start that process of registration next month.

For non-commercial poultry keepers, we have produced a simple, clear and, I hope, effective guide to biosecurity, and we are actively distributing that guide through lobby groups, veterinary networks, hobby magazines and other available channels. We have also decided, with fellow member states, that in the present circumstances it is desirable to prohibit bird fairs, markets and shows, except where a risk assessment shows that they can be safely conducted. We are in full discussion of that proposal with potentially affected stakeholders.

Ornithological groups are also very important stakeholders for us, and earlier this month we reached an agreement with them jointly to monitor wild birds. That is, of course, in addition to our existing annual programme of monitoring domestic poultry for avian influenza that is already under way.

The regulations that we will bring before Parliament will give legal effect to the provisions in recent legislation that enable us to instruct poultry keepers to keep their birds indoors, and we are urgently discussing that provision with stakeholders.

In conclusion, I recognise that the public are rightly concerned about avian flu. I am pleased that our quarantine rules worked to identify and eradicate the immediate risk in this incident, but because we are not complacent we are taking the steps that I have indicated both to review and strengthen our protection against legal and illegal imports of captive wild birds, and in the next few days we will introduce the new regulations that I have described.

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for making available an early copy of her statement and for the technical briefing that her officials provided us with yesterday. I welcome unreservedly the ban on commercial live bird imports that she has announced today, but I have some questions about the past and some questions about the future. I shall start with the past.

First, why did the Secretary of State and her Ministers for six months strenuously resist EU proposals to impose a ban on commercial wild bird imports? Secondly, in her statement she admitted that despite press briefings over the weekend she does not currently know whether the infected bird was a parrot, whether it came from Surinam or whether it was infected by a bird from Taiwan. This is horribly reminiscent of the confusion over sheep and cattle material for which she apologised to the House in 2001. Can she explain how she and her Ministers have for many months presided over quarantine procedures so lax that birds from different continents are kept together, test samples are pooled and there is no clarity in her Department about the true implication of the tests?

Thirdly, when we surveyed poultry concerns we discovered that fewer than half could recall proactive steps by the Department or any other intermediary body to inform them fully about avian flu. Why, after months of reports about the problem, have the Secretary of State and her Ministers failed to take such proactive steps to inform the poultry sector?

I turn to the future. What will the Secretary of State do to ensure the proper separation of birds still in quarantine, to which she referred, and to provide proper polymerase chain reaction testing for poultry flocks? Can she guarantee that the compensation paid to farmers for slaughtered flocks will be sufficiently generous to give incentives for full reporting? How will controls at ports of entry be increased to prevent the smuggling of wild birds once the ban is in place? How will commercial imports be distinguished from pet imports, which are merely being restricted? Who within her Department will be accountable for ensuring that any outbreak in the poultry flock is fully and immediately contained?

In the light of past serious failures and the confusion and inactivity surrounding recent events, the House has a right to an assurance from the Secretary of State that from now on it will no longer be business as usual. We do not want to see her Department once again rendered impotent in the face of disaster and the army brought in to clear up the mess.

Well, no need to urge the public not to be hysterical.

It is not the case that for six months we strenuously resisted such a ban. I always believe in being charitable to the Opposition, so I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman may have a mistaken impression from things that he heard on the radio. The facts are that as long ago as last March a request was made to the European Commission via the Belgian Minister—not, by the way, on the grounds of anything to do with animal disease or avian flu but on the grounds of the welfare of wild birds—from those who have long and legitimately campaigned on those matters. Ministers were not unsympathetic. We sought advice, but the advice was that such a move was not justified. That was also the view of the Commission. The matter was discussed in Council. The Commission argued strongly that on welfare grounds it was a disproportionate response. I repeat that it was not a disease issue at that stage. It is not the case, as has been reported, that only the UK did not share that view. That is wholly untrue. Indeed a moment's thought would make people realise that it was untrue because if only the UK had taken that stance, it would have gone through. The Commission took the view that it was not required, and several member states, of which we were one, supported the Commission. There is thus no truth in the suggestion that we strenuously resisted such a move.

So you did strenuously resist?

We did not resist at all. We said that we felt it was not justified at that time; it was not an animal disease requirement, or concern.

In September I asked my hon. Friend the Minister of State to review our contingency plan and our contingency arrangements. Following that, a decision was made to draft a letter to the Commission asking for such a ban. In fact, before the dead parrot ever hove into view over the horizon the Government had already decided to approach the Commission to ask it to reconsider the position with regard to a ban. As for the question of separation, the pooling of test samples is a standard procedure, as I said in my statement, and has been for many years. Obviously the whole question of whether birds are separated in different places and in quarantine, and of whether test samples are pooled, which are not at present addressed in the rules, will be considered in the review that we will undertake. It is, however, absolutely clear what the procedures were. We must consider two separate issues: whether the present events occurred because procedures were not followed, or whether they happened because of something to do with the procedures, which we should be refining in any event. That is the exact issue that we are considering.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about his famous survey. I understand that there are 70,000 or so keepers of poultry, who are, of course, probably the ones with relatively large numbers of birds about whom we know. He seems to be under the impression that those people should have been contacted by my Department. I thought that he was in favour of reducing the number of bureaucrats. I am not quite sure how many staff he wants the Department to have if it is to contact 70,000 poultry keepers personally. May I remind the House that it has been the case for a considerable time that poultry keepers are under an obligation to monitor their birds and report signs of illness? They must, as a condition of keeping those birds, know what to do about serious and notifiable avian diseases. These are notifiable diseases.

That is not the point.

The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that that is not the point, but with respect it is precisely the point. Poultry owners and keepers are under such an obligation, and that obligation includes operating adequate biosecurity.

As for the question of keepers of small numbers of birds—perhaps almost pet birds—the House will know that advice was issued for them a few days ago. We are doing everything that we can through advertisements and the industry associations to ensure that it is understood.

I am conscious that you do not like people at the Dispatch Box to go on for too long, Mr. Speaker, but I am also conscious that Mr. Letwin asked me at least eight questions, of which I have so far answered only three. May I just quickly—

Order. The right hon. Gentleman could get a letter from the Secretary of State.

I welcome the fact that the Government are making a statement today and urge the Secretary of State to keep the House informed about future developments. Does she agree that it is important to strike a balance between adopting sensible precautions and not unnecessarily alarming the public or damaging the farming industry? Does she thus share my disquiet about the Edwina Currie-type advice from the European Food Safety Authority on the consumption of eggs and poultry? Will she confirm that there is no greater threat from eating poultry today than there was last week, last month, or last year?

There are serious questions about the quarantine arrangements in place at both the specific establishment in Essex and more widely. The Secretary of State said in her statement that the quarantine system worked, which was true in the sense that the disease was identified while the bird was still held, but cross-contamination happened. Will she clearly state whether she believes that the regulations in place were broken, or whether they were simply inadequate? The way in which birds were kept must be addressed. Do the regulations currently allow birds of different species to be mixed, which would seem to be a totally inadequate way of dealing with biosecurity?

Has the Secretary of State seen the report in many papers that birds at the centre in question are

"kept in excrement-covered cages"?

Is there any truth in that suggestion? Does she share my disquiet that if the papers are accurate—the matter was widely reported in several national papers—such an important biosecurity centre is apparently being run by an individual who has been jailed for offences relating to the importation of wild birds? Should there not be greater controls on who is permitted to run quarantined establishments? Will she make the examination of quarantine arrangements part of her remit?

I welcome the decision to introduce an immediate ban on the wild bird trade and thus urge her, as I did her colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Mr. Bradshaw, last Thursday, to pay particular attention to the illegal trade, which will increase as a consequence. Will she especially examine trade on the internet, which causes a major problem in the wild bird trade? Will she explain why I was told that a ban on bird fairs was not necessary when I suggested it to her colleague on Thursday, although she announced today that such a ban will be introduced?

Finally, can the Secretary of State comment on suggestions in the newspapers that her Department is preparing, as a necessary precaution, for a mass cull of poultry? What will its parameters be, and could the influenza H5 vaccine be used instead?

I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the answer to some of his questions. For example, as I said a few moments ago, whether the regulations were observed and whether the rules are adequate are separate issues, and we are pursuing both of them. At present, different species can be mixed, and he is right to assume that that is exactly the kind of issue that the review of general rules will consider. As for where the birds were kept and who was keeping them, there is nothing that I can say about any individual except that the press reports include observations about individuals who are said to have committed offences, but those offences are not reported to relate to the keeping of birds per se. What have been reported are revenue offences.

The hon. Gentleman asked me about international trade. Of course, we are looking at that in the review and, indeed, the issue of bird fairs. He asked me about the premises that have been reported. I understand that published descriptions of various places do not relate to quarantine facilities. It is perfectly legitimate to make comments and, indeed, adverse comments if that is how people feel about the standard of facilities where birds are housed, but such comments do not, as far as I am aware, relate to quarantine facilities. I accept, however, that the impression is sometimes given that they do.

The hon. Gentleman asked about a mass cull and vaccination. We are looking at the issue of having to cull a number of birds, as we did in July to achieve the speedy eradication of Newcastle disease. We are also looking at the question of whether there is a potential for vaccine, but no authorised vaccine is available at present. If a suitable vaccine were used, birds would have to be vaccinated twice with a minimum three-week separation period. Poultry would be dead by then anyway, because there is a seven-week lifespan. Of course, we will look again at vaccination, but it is not the immediate remedy that people may hope for.

The whole House should welcome my right hon. Friend's statement, including her confirmation that consideration is being given to a requirement that commercial poultry production take place indoors. Such a policy would require premature slaughter, would involve significant commercial and public cost, and would doubtless be based on the best veterinary and medical advice available to the Government. However, if we have to go down that road, does she agree that it would make sense for the Republic of Ireland to do so as well? If the position has to be decided at European level, it may be best to do so. Which EU member states have already implemented such a policy?

I cannot give my right hon. Friend a great deal of information, because the position is changing. It is for member states to make a risk assessment, not merely in their country but in its regions. Yesterday, or perhaps this morning, France advised poultry keepers in coastal areas and another area in the eastern region of France to take their poultry indoors, but that does not apply to the whole country. The issue of whether or not there are circumstances in the UK in which we would advise people to take such a step is something that we keep under review, as does every member state. As I said, member states that are closer to the wildfowl outbreaks that have been reported have taken action in some parts of their territory.

Unless I have been seriously misled, the outbreak occurred in my Constituency, and there are lessons to be learned from the way in which it was handled. The right hon. Lady is rightly cautious about the company involved and the conviction for a serious fraud that resulted in a custodial sentence. However, one of my constituents put it to me that quarantine is our first line of defence. My constituents need to be able put their trust in people who are handling that quarantine, and they need to be confident that those individuals will obey the law. Health authorities have issued helpful guidance, but my own primary care trust was not told that the outbreak was less than five miles from its headquarters. We do not have anything to fear from disclosure, and the easiest way to avoid panic is to tell people the truth as quickly as possible.

The hon. Gentleman makes some important points. Frankly, I do not have any idea whether the facility is within his Constituency because I do not know where his constituency boundaries are. Nevertheless, in whatever constituency such an event occurs, he makes a valid and legitimate point and his constituents' questions are relevant. When people wish to set up a quarantine facility it is inspected in advance to check that it is adequate. When there are animals in the facility, there are regular inspections and monitoring by local veterinary inspectors and so on. The hon. Gentleman's constituents can be assured that such precautions are in place. They can also be assured that the review will look at whether those precautions are adequate and whether, for example, we should continue to permit the mixing of birds from different continents. I cannot comment on the position of his local primary care trust, but I repeat that the case was detected in a secure facility. Although there is proper concern about the long-term implications for human health of the avian virus we are not in circumstances where its feared consequences are apparent.

May I welcome the Secretary of State's statement on initiatives and interventions, as well as her Department's readiness to make a further response? Has the Department duly engaged with the relevant devolved Administrations and the not-so-devolved Administration in Northern Ireland? Will she assure us that the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Northern Ireland and its Minister will not be restricted or restrained from taking more stringent or specific action, particularly if they wish to do so in concert with the authorities in the Irish Republic?

I certainly assure the hon. Gentleman that we are in contact with the devolved Administrations, who have offered helpful co-operation. They will consider whether there is any further contribution that they wish to make to the assessment and handling of such cases.

The Secretary of State has just announced a review of the quarantine procedures, yet in her statement she said that measures to deal with avian influenza were fundamentally sound. If that was the case according to the original analysis, why, following the first testing of the system, does it have to be reviewed? As for scenario-playing, how many times has she played the scenario of what to do, and what lessons has she learned from that exercise?

The right hon. Gentleman asks about the scenarios. We had what one might call a live scenario involving Newcastle disease in the summer, as I mentioned earlier. He asks why the review. The position is changing. The procedures are basically sound—they worked in eradicating the outbreak of Newcastle disease at the beginning—but with regard to avian flu, it is a moving picture. We are seeing developments in what is thought to be the epidemiological understanding of the spread of that virus in wild birds, so we thought it right to reassess what we believe to be potentially a new situation, and certainly an evolving situation. He and his Committee, as well as the House, would be critical of us if we were not saying that, in the light of the event that has occurred, we should reassess not only the event itself, but whether there are issues about our quarantine rules that we ought to reconsider, because it is a changing situation.

My right hon. Friend will agree that there have been some astonishing scare stories and headlines in the press about avian influenza. She would probably also agree that, as a result, there has been widespread fear and public confusion, in about equal measure, about these issues. Does she agree that, although such scare stories might sell newspapers, it is vital that her Department undertake a concerted and vigorous public education effort to increase public understanding of avian influenza and to draw clear distinctions between that and potential pandemic influenza among humans—related but very different issues? The public need to understand both those relationships and those differences.

My hon. Friend is right. It is important that the public get a clearer idea of the significance of avian flu and the distinction. We are making information available in the House for all Members—I hope it is already here, but if not, it soon will be—with an indication of all the steps we are taking. I will not bore the House with all of it, but guidance on biosecurity and surveillance has gone out to a range of organisations and to vets. Advertisements have been placed in trade publications and so on, and there is the leaflet that we issued a few days ago for individual poultry keepers. I take my hon. Friend's point that all these measures are aimed at those who have a particular interest in the trade or those who are poultry keepers. It is important for all of us to do everything we can to get across information to the general public.

I was a little alarmed at an exchange that I heard a few days ago, in which the prime question that seemed to spring to the mind of the questioner was, "Is there someone who is to blame for this?" Let us bear it in mind that the situation is of concern and the Government are taking steps to deal with it, but it is important that the public understand that what we are seeing is something of a development in avian influenza that we do not in any sense take lightly and are considering very seriously, but which is more of a risk to birds than it is to people.

The Minister will appreciate that the poultry industry right across the United Kingdom has grown dramatically over the past five to 10 years, so can she assure the House that she will ensure that there is adequate veterinary supervision not only at the rearing stage but in the production and manufacturing process, and that if something were to happen, the Government are prepared with extra veterinary staff?

I can certainly tell the hon. Gentleman that it is part of our overall contingency plan, which he will find on my Department's website and which we published in the House in July, that there are arrangements, should they be required—let us hope they never are—to supplement the veterinary facilities that are available now with other outside help.

The proposed ban on live poultry sales is prudent and understandable, but will cause a great deal of difficulty for the poultry industry at this critical time of the year. What advice will her Department give to the commercial poultry trade about movement of poultry, which will become critical if, as she suggests, it may be necessary to move all poultry indoors? Many producers do not have the accommodation that they require. On a different matter, what help is being given to those eastern European and central Asian countries where bird flu is more endemic and where the problem originates?

I cannot tell the hon. Gentleman what advice will be given, as that is a matter not for me but for the veterinary and scientific experts. I can assure him that we are in touch with people who are engaged in wild bird fairs and so on, and with the poultry industry. He made a valuable point about the scale of the facilities available. That is exactly the kind of thing that is being discussed. I assure him that my Department and our officials will do everything we can to maintain the balance of proper protection and proper security precautions with understanding for the commercial necessity. I can also tell him that there is a great deal of contact with, as he rightly says, countries where disease is more endemic. I believe I am right in saying that various expert scientific advisers, not from my Department but more independently and outside, are in contact with such countries and there is discussion with them to try to help them deal with some of the issues.

Can the Secretary of State assure the House that, should a cull be required, we are adequately prepared for the disposal of carcases? This is not a party political or polemical point. The experience in rural and remote north-west Wales relating to the introduction of the fallen stock scheme does not inspire confidence within the agricultural industry.

I can reassure the House that that is one of the issues that is part of our contingency plan. I take the hon. Gentleman's point about some of the early handling of the fallen stock scheme, because some concern was expressed. Although we may be talking about large numbers if a commercial flock, for example, were affected, we are not talking about animals or birds of quite the same size.

Are not the Government in danger of being seen as gravely complacent on the matter, given that from that very Dispatch Box yesterday we heard Ministers say that they would commit £17 million of taxpayers' money to promote electoral reform, yet all we have heard about today is a few leaflets being sent out? Is the Secretary of State not in danger of sending out a very weak message when the country needs a strong one?

No. Of course there is always a danger in life and in government of being accused, particularly by people who want to make the accusation whether or not it is valid, of being complacent or of not doing enough, but I do not think that the hon. Gentleman will find that those who are affected by the precautions on which my Department is insisting feel that that is the case.

I am sure the Minister will agree that fears, especially unfounded fears, need to be allayed and that openness is what we need in the matter. I welcome her statement today, as far as it goes. Have orders been issued in the civil service that jabs should be taken by all civil servants? My information is that in Northern Ireland that has happened, which has led people to ask whether there will be favouritism if we are faced with a pandemic. That fear needs to be allayed.

No, there is no recommendation that all civil servants should be vaccinated. Indeed, we do not have an appropriate vaccine at present, because nobody knows what vaccine would be needed, since we do not know what virus we might be dealing with. It is certainly the case, however, that we have advised those who are poultry keepers that they should consider both their own biosecurity and their own precautions. That is important. The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about openness, reminding me that I did not address that when Mr. Pickles raised it. We must keep a balance between what will help us to maintain proper precautions and biosecurity, and clarity of information. It has never been the practice of my Department to be explicit about precisely where a disease outbreak might have taken place, because one does not want a lot of people tramping over a potential disease site.

May I press the Minister on the question of a vaccine, particularly for those working in the poultry industry? I appreciate that there is some uncertainty because of the science around a vaccine, but can she be clearer about under what circumstances a vaccine would be made available to employees in the poultry industry, and what steps she is taking to ensure that, were that deemed necessary and appropriate, it is readily available.

It is part of our contingency plan that, if there were an outbreak, consideration would have to be given to that and whether there is an appropriate vaccine in all the circumstances is kept under review. One of the first things that we did when we heard about the event in secure quarantine was to ensure that the work force dealing with that facility was advised to take antiviral measures.

With other hon. Members, I am concerned about the management of the quarantine centre in Essex and general quarantine practice, particularly that birds that died during the quarantine period were put into cold storage, waiting for a convenient time for a veterinary investigation to take place. Birds could have been released from quarantine, showing no symptoms but incubating the disease that they caught from the birds that died. Surely birds that die during quarantine should be investigated immediately.

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, so let me try to make matters as clear as possible. I take his point about the investigation on the birds being carried out straight away, but it is standard procedure, and has been for many years, that they should be frozen until examination. However, there has been some misinformation on the point. If, as happened in the quarantine facility that we are discussing, one set of birds is in quarantine and another set of birds is brought in, the quarantine period for the whole lot restarts when the second set arrives, and no birds are released until that quarantine period has expired. In addition, apart from that extended quarantine period, if there are any outstanding tests—tests are carried out on birds that die in quarantine—the birds are still not released until the results of those outstanding tests are confirmed. All of that, and whether it is a good thing to pool the samples and so on, will be considered in our review of how our quarantine facilities operate. It is understandable because it is not always easy to follow matters through, but there has been quite a lot of reporting about the birds having been released early. No, they were not near the end of their quarantine period, and while tests were outstanding—which there would be if there were dead birds—they would not have been released until the test results were known.

The Secretary of State said that bird shows will be banned until further notice, but she knows that we are fortunate in having a large number of bird sanctuaries, zoos and bird exhibits in botanical gardens. How will such organisations be affected by the ban and can she assure me that, in the event of an outbreak or a decision to close the exhibits, any compensation scheme would cover those organisations and the loss of revenue to them?

It is my understanding that, at present, birds in zoos and so on are not affected, but we are in discussion with stakeholders from a range of facilities with a range of concerns and the hon. Lady has identified a new one. I am grateful to her for raising the issue of compensation because her right hon. Friend Mr. Letwin asked about that and I did not get round to the answer. Compensation is not available in the circumstances that she describes. With regard to an incident of disease where some birds die but others are not affected, compensation is available only for birds that do not have the disease. That is an incentive to keep birds healthy and to have strong biosecurity, because there would not be compensation for birds that get a disease and have to be culled.