Orders of the Day — Identity Cards Bill

– in the House of Commons at 2:30 pm on 28th June 2005.

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[Relevant documents: The Fourth Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session 2003–04, HC 130–1 on Identity Cards, and the Government's reply thereto.]

Order for Second Reading read.

Photo of Michael Martin Michael Martin Chair, Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission, Speaker of the House of Commons

I have selected the amendment in the names of Lynne Jones and her colleagues.


There is at least one fundamental issue of principle that has been ignored in this debate. That is that the State (which for the...

Submitted by David Brown Continue reading

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary 3:31 pm, 28th June 2005

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

I remind hon. Members that this Bill is based on the Bill that was read a Second time on 21 December 2004 and approved by this House on 10 February 2005, that the public debate started under my predecessor in 2002 and that the draft Bill was subject to six months' public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny by the Home Affairs Committee in 2004. The Bill has been well debated.

The Bill is enabling legislation to provide the statutory authority for a national identity cards system to be introduced to cover the whole of the United Kingdom, together with the national identity register to record information on holders of ID cards. It also gives legislative authority for expenditure on setting up the ID cards scheme and for charging fees.

In brief, the Bill establishes the national identity register; provides powers to issue biometric ID cards either linked to existing designated documents or as stand-alone ID cards; ensures that checks can be made against databases to confirm an applicant's identity and guard against fraud; sets out what information will be held—including biometrics—and what safeguards will be put in place; enables public and private sector organisations to verify a person's identity, with their consent; includes enabling powers, so that, in future, access to specified public services could be linked to the production of a valid card; provides a power for it to become compulsory at a future date to register and to be issued with a card, which includes civil penalties against failure to register; creates a national identity scheme commissioner to have oversight of the whole scheme; and creates new criminal offences on the possession of false ID cards.

There has been general support for ID cards, but many serious, practical concerns have been expressed on both sides of the House, and I intend to address five of those concerns on Second Reading. First, I shall address the range of concerns around the Big Brother society—it has been described in other ways. Secondly, I shall address issues of cost, which are a serious concern for many hon. Members on both sides of the House. Thirdly, I shall set out the benefits of the scheme for both individuals and society. Fourthly, I shall address the concerns about the project's size, technology and scale. Fifthly, I shall deal with safeguards and legal processes. I shall give way at various points in my speech in line with that structure.


But I've already got a British Government issued ID Card, Mr Clarke, and had one for the last 40 years!!! Complete with Royal Coat of Arms on the front and everything (including my photo and sig.) It's called a passport - and the last one I got didn't cost me £300 either, or require I hand over my fingerprints, as if I were some sort of common criminal (or worse)!

Time you came clean on this issue, Mr Clarke. It's not about ID cards at all - that's just the pretext. It's the database (National Identity Register) you're really after!

Submitted by Ray Aldridge Read 2 more annotations

Photo of Bill Cash Bill Cash Conservative, Stone

Does the Home Secretary agree with the Information Commissioner's remarks that the

"data trail of identity checks on individuals risk an unnecessary and disproportionate intrusion into individuals' privacy"?

Such identity checks are in fact and in law an intrusion into people's human rights. How can he sign off the Bill as being compatible with the European convention on human rights?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I do not agree with the Information Commissioner, and I shall begin my remarks by explaining exactly why.

We live in a society where information is held about all of us—everyone in this House and everyone in this country—on a scale unfamiliar to our predecessors even as recently as 10 years ago. A vast range of information exists in our society today, including information on the internet that one can access simply by typing in a name, financial and bank details, health and medical information, police and law enforcement-related material, travel-related documentation and information about a person's telephone communications, driving licence, national insurance and tax. That range of information cannot be uninvented, nor can the globalised world in which crime is international but impacts on every community. Those are the realities with which we have to live.

We must address only two questions in considering how we deal with this so-called Big Brother society. First, in relation to each category of information that I have just set out, what protections currently exist for authorities to access data, for the right to see data, and for the right to use a service, whether it is a cash machine or a passport? In each of those areas there is a specific legal framework that regulates the information that exists about all of us. The first point that I want to make very strongly indeed is that nothing in the Bill changes any of those protections for any of those categories of data. There are issues about each of those categories of data that people can legitimately discuss and consider, but this Bill is not about those questions.

The second question is, can we verify that the information that exists about an individual is indeed about that individual? That is where identity cards come in and where the Bill is relevant. We need to protect our society in this globalised world, for the simple reason that, in many cases, identity can be stolen, whether it is a fraudster getting money from a bank account, a people trafficker providing false documents for a trafficked person, or a smuggler pretending to be their own father to deal with data. Such identity can be stolen. In other cases, complicated processes are now needed to check identity because it is not secure—there are examples as simple as opening a bank account, getting a pass from the Criminal Records Bureau or getting a passport or driving licence.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will give way shortly.

I argue that the identity card has real benefits to the individual and society, and that it is a means of limiting abuse in our modern information society rather than a means of adding to it and creating it in a more complex way. It gives individuals the right to secure verification of their identity.


I don't think Mr Clarke has argued that particulary well, yes there are lots of companies which hold information about us and yes people do experience problems if criminals have access to their credit card or banking...

Submitted by Joe Bunting Continue reading (and 1 more annotation)

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I shall come to some particulars, but before I do so I shall take a couple of interventions.

Photo of Nick Gibb Nick Gibb Shadow Minister (Education)

Given that the identity card database will have details of everyone's fingerprints and other biometric information, what assurances can the Secretary of State give that that database will not be used routinely by the police in their normal investigation processes so that, for example, a fingerprint left on a pen in a bank will not lead to innocent people being questioned and having to explain their whereabouts on the day that that bank was robbed?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I can give the assurance that the law of the land requires that the police can operate only in accordance with the legal powers that they have at the moment. That is a very important requirement. It is right that police and security services should have powers as regards national security or serious and organised crime—whatever the issue might be. The House has agreed that it is right that they should have powers in those circumstances so that we can protect ourselves, but—I emphasise the point that I made earlier—those rights are already set out in existing law and are not changed by this legislation.

Photo of Andrew Love Andrew Love Labour, Edmonton

My understanding is that up to 51 separate categories of information will be required for the register. That seems excessive to many people. Can my right hon. Friend justify the inclusion of so many pieces of information?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

As my hon. Friend knows, the list is set out in the schedule to the Bill. I am happy, in Committee or elsewhere, to go through each of those categories and consider whether particular aspects are indeed necessary. That is a perfectly reasonable issue to address, but we need to be clear that the basic data on the database are about the identity of the citizen, including basic material about that person, and that is what the list of categories is about. I concede that, if there are areas where we could have less information, I will consider that in Committee.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

We fight all the time on all the issues that we have to tackle, including serious and organised crime and national security, to do our best to deal with the threats that our society faces. I observed that we live in an internationalised, globalised world. In all the matters for which I am responsible—serious and organised crime, immigration and asylum and counter-terrorism—we need to work internationally. We should improve our capacity to do that and that is part of the purpose of the Bill. However, it is not its whole purpose.

Photo of Andrew Mitchell Andrew Mitchell Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

Will the Home Secretary give hon. Members two pieces of information? First, what, according to his experts, is the likely number of identity checks in any day or week? Secondly, what is the highest percentage accuracy that he can expect of the scheme?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I shall deal with the second question later. The number of checks depends entirely on the extent to which and the purposes for which individuals use the identity card. If the question is about police identity checks, the number will be about the same as it is now. The police check identity in their work now.

Photo of Jim Cunningham Jim Cunningham Labour, Coventry South

Will my right hon. Friend confirm now or later that he would have to return to the House with further legislation to make the scheme compulsory?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

A further measure would have to be introduced in both the House and the other place. An affirmative resolution would need to be passed in both Houses.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I shall make some progress and then give way.

In the information society in which we live, identity cards will be a means of helping to control it rather than adding to it. I want to give full particulars, dealing with personal protection, access to private companies, the role of the police and the position of ethnic minorities. All those points have been raised with me.

I shall deal first with personal protection. I want to make it explicitly clear that, under the Data Protection Act 1998, everyone has the right, without qualification, to check the record that is held on them. Moreover, the same right to check who has accessed the database that currently exists in data protection legislation will apply to the identity database in the Bill. I know that many of my hon. Friends in particular have been worried about those aspects. I therefore take the opportunity not only to set that out clearly and openly but to state that, in Committee, I am prepared to consider amendments that might make it more explicit.

I acknowledge that people have concerns because the matter involves the Data Protection Act and they are worried about what might be perceived as a potentially secretive database. I am keen to draw that out.

Photo of Robert Marshall-Andrews Robert Marshall-Andrews Labour, Medway

One cannot obtain data under the Data Protection Act if the information refers to security or criminal matters. Under the Bill, the Home Secretary has the power to include, through secondary legislation, issues that relate to security and criminal matters. By definition, they would not be accessible under the Data Protection Act, yet they are the most important matters. Will the Home Secretary give his mind to that and let us know the answer?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I shall, but I want to reassert the point that I made a second ago. Protections under the Bill for the database for which it provides are the same as those for other databases under the Data Protection Act. As my hon. and learned Friend says, the Bill has implications for the way in which the police and security services operate, as does the Data Protection Act. However, there is no division between our proposals for the Bill and existing provisions under data protection legislation.

Photo of Mark Fisher Mark Fisher Labour, Stoke-on-Trent Central

If someone examines the data held on them and finds that they are inaccurate, what procedures exist for a fast-track tribunal system to correct that? Nothing can be more damaging for an individual than finding that there is information on the databases that can destroy one's credit rating, business and one's life. Will the Home Secretary ensure that the Government table amendments in Committee to establish a quick tribunal system to correct incorrect information?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I can certainly give my hon. Friend the assurance that he seeks. The obligation to make the information correct—to which his central point relates—is accepted, and we can include in the Bill a procedure to ensure that that is clear. I do not think that a tribunal case would be involved, because there is no interest whatsoever in putting inaccurate data on the database. If he feels that some aspects require an appellate structure, I will give thought to that, but it is in no one's interest for wrong data to be on the database. If a mistake of some kind is made—which can of course happen, as he implied—it is important to correct it, in the interests of everyone including, as he suggested, the individual, but also the system.


At the moment the Bill explicitly does not create a duty on the Secretary of State to keep the information in the Register accurate. I would be very surprised if this were to be conceded, because I understand the Home Office to believe that the absence of such a requirement will help them to conceal information about identity where such concealment is necessary, for instance in the case of under-cover police officers. This won't work, because of the use of...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading

Photo of Patrick Cormack Patrick Cormack Conservative, South Staffordshire

Given that, even for the Home Secretary, this is the beginning of a new Parliament, and given all his undertakings to provide for detailed consideration in Committee, why is the Committee timetable so congested? It requires the Bill to be out of Committee three weeks from today. Why can he not further consider my suggestion on the last Second Reading that the Bill—complex as it is, and affecting every man, woman and child in the country—should be referred to a Joint Select Committee of the Lords and the Commons for the most critical and detailed scrutiny?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I welcome the hon. Gentleman's maiden intervention, if that is the right way to describe it.

I understand, although I am open to correction, that the Committee timetable was agreed through the usual channels. If that is not the case, we can certainly discuss it again. As I said earlier, there has been substantial debate on these matters in both Houses over a considerable period. That includes pre-legislative scrutiny going back to 2002. I believe that the procedures now being followed are correct.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

Yes. May I return the Home Secretary to the Data Protection Act? The Government propose that the citizen will have to pay a large fee for the identity card. If the regime laid down by the Act is followed, he will have to pay another fee to gain access to the register to see whether the information about him is correct. Will the Home Secretary assure us that he will not charge a fee to people using the system for that purpose?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will give assurances on charging in a moment.

Various questions have been asked about whether private companies would be able to buy information from the national database. Let me make the position clear. There will be no open access to information on the register. Private companies will not be able to gain access to or buy national identity register entries. With the consent of the identity card holder—I emphasise that—banks or other approved businesses will be able to verify identity by checking an ID card against the national identity register. That would mainly involve confirming that the card is valid and has not been reported lost or stolen, and that the information shown on it is correct.

The card holder's biometric details may also—with the card holder's consent—be confirmed against those held on the register. Clause 14, however, specifically prevents fingerprints or other biometric information from being conveyed from the register to a private sector organisation, even with the consent of the individual concerned. It also does not allow administrative information not related to confirmation of identity to be given to a private sector organisation—again, even with the card holder's consent.

Photo of Michael Weir Michael Weir Shadow Spokesperson (Work and Pensions), Shadow Spokesperson (Trade and Industry)

I am concerned about that point. We have heard that private sector companies will have access to the database to check information. If the identity card is a gold-plated proof of identity, why should those companies need access to the database behind it?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I am sorry if I was not clear enough, but I just said as clearly as I could that private sector companies would not have access to the database. I also said that, with the consent of the card holder, banks or other approved businesses would be able to verify identity. That is all they would be able to do. It is not the same thing.

Photo of John Redwood John Redwood Conservative, Wokingham

Clause 15 says that the Government can demand the production of an ID card for purposes connected with the provision of a public service. Which public services have the Government in mind, and how many abuses does the Home Secretary think are currently taking place because of false identities?


I seem to recall that Ministers have previously refered to the proposed ID card as an 'entitlement' card. The implication is that access to certain public services will therefor depend...

Submitted by John Paul Glendenning Continue reading (and 1 more annotation)

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

The Bill states clearly that the ID card cannot be used as the sole means of verification of identity for the provision of any public service. It sets out a procedure whereby a public service provider—a local authority, a library, or whatever—can join the system if it wishes to do so, as it has the right to do. Linked to the point that I have just made, that can be done only with the consent of the individual identity card holder. I think that that is a perfectly reasonable system to operate.

Concerns about police powers have been widely expressed, particularly in regard to stop and search. I want to make it clear that the Bill, and the introduction of identity cards, will make no difference to the general powers of the police to stop people for no reason and demand proof of identity. The Bill will make no difference to the powers that exist under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. In fact, quicker, reliable access to confirmed identification would help to reduce the time a suspected person might spend in police custody. The effect of that would be to reduce the number of people wrongly held in police custody while their identity was being checked, which would be of benefit to the individual and to the police.

I also want to confirm that there is no requirement to carry an identity card at all times, as there have been many questions about that. In regard to the power to make regulations to require an ID card to be produced to access public services, clause 15(3) specifically prohibits any

"regulations the effect of which would be to require an individual—

. . . to carry an ID with him at all times".

I also want to address the concerns expressed by ethnic minorities. A spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain has been reported as urging the Home Office to reassure Muslims that they would not be singled out, saying that the key point would be whether the community would be "unfairly targeted". It will not be, and I can give that assurance quite specifically, for the reason that I have just given. Similarly, a spokesman for the Commission for Racial Equality asked whether there were

"adequate safeguards in place to address the potential adverse impact on particular groups in our society".

Again, I can give that assurance. The race equality impact assessment, which was published with the Bill, sets out quite clearly how this situation will be addressed. The fact is that ethnic minority communities, like other communities, have no reason to fear the ID card system, and still less reason to fear that they will be targeted in any way.


Perhaps he is unaware of the fact that people are not blind to colour in a colour conscious society. The ID card arrangements no doubt will impact groups of people differently.

Submitted by Harrow Council for Justice (HCJ) Read 1 more annotation

Photo of David Winnick David Winnick Labour, Walsall North

If we should not be at all concerned about these proposals, following all the reassurances that my right hon. Friend is giving, why would the Information Commissioner say that the ID card would be an "unnecessary and disproportionate intrusion" into our liberty? Should not we take Mr. Thomas's comments very seriously indeed? Is it not also a fact that, if we had a free vote on the Bill tonight, it would certainly be thrown out?


The information commissioner made a detailed statement outlining his concerns about the proposed legislation. It seems to me that the Minister entirely fails to address these concerns in his response - most specifically - the Information commissioner's concerns...

Submitted by John Paul Glendenning Continue reading (and 1 more annotation)

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

First, I cannot speak for the Information Commissioner. I do not think that he is right. He is a long-standing opponent of the identity card system. I think that his analysis is incorrect, for the reasons that I have already set out. An identity card will provide a means of dealing with the information that society issues that would not exist if we did not have those powers. On the question of a free vote, I simply observe that, when we voted on the Bill's Second Reading on 21 December 2004, the Opposition all voted in favour of it. Now, like sheep, they have moved in the other direction—[Interruption.] We have some good dissension going on here.


Despite saying that he ( Mr Clarke ) has already laid out reasons why he disagrees with the Information Commissioner he in fact hasn't given any reason as to why disagrees other than to say that "I do not think that he is right".

Submitted by Joe Bunting

Photo of Boris Johnson Boris Johnson Conservative, Henley

The Home Secretary obviously intends to make these things compulsory, and he has already talked about the penalties for refusing to register. Will he now let the British people know exactly what penalties they might face, in fines or imprisonment, for refusing to have anything to do with the scheme?


According to the little information I have been able to find: (regarding fines etc) - failure to attend an appointment for a scan of your fingerprints and iris would result in a fine of...

Submitted by John Paul Glendenning Continue reading (and 1 more annotation)

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I shall cover the cost aspect in a second. Were there to be compulsion—that is, after a vote had been taken in this House and in another place, some considerable time down the line—the penalties for non-registration are set out in the legislation.

Photo of Mark Pritchard Mark Pritchard Conservative, The Wrekin

Will the Secretary of State tell the House how he believes ID cards protected the people of New York on 11 September 2001? The Government talk about national security, but ID cards clearly did not help in those circumstances, or subsequently in Madrid.


Now the American government are considering dispensing with the costly biometric ID system due to its failures and horrific spiralling costs

Submitted by Alan Taylor

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will come to that matter in a second.

Photo of Diane Abbott Diane Abbott Labour, Hackney North and Stoke Newington

On the impact of ID cards—which must necessarily become compulsory in due course—on black and minority ethnic communities, the whole House accepts that the Bill does not extend the powers of the police. But it does extend the pretexts on which the police might stop people. All of us who live and work in our inner cities know what that could mean. The Home Secretary should take seriously the concerns of the Commission for Racial Equality and the Muslim Council of Britain, because the last thing that we need is legislation that will further turn the screw on community relations in our big towns.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I do take seriously the concerns of various organisations representing minority ethnic communities, and those of my hon. Friend Ms Abbott, with whom we have also discussed this point in the past. I do not accept her argument that the Bill offers a pretext for police to behave differently from how they do now. The powers are there right now for the police to act in the way that they do. The ID card does not change that regime.


In 1998 the then Sectretary of State gave firm assurances that the Crime & Disorder Act would not affect the way the police officers on truancy patrols would act - it did and still does in 2005 and it is proven time again that the police and the education authorities do not read or if so take notice of the Guidance Document which was issued instead...

Submitted by Alan Taylor Continue reading

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

The Home Secretary has just said that ethnic minorities have nothing to fear from this measure. Why, then, does the Government's own regulatory impact assessment state:

"There are also cultural problems about getting service providers to ask only certain groups for proof of identity for fear of being accused of discrimination"?

Is not that proof that there is a danger for ethnic minorities?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

Not at all. The introduction process that we have discussed links ID cards to the passport, possibly to the driving licence, and possibly to the Criminal Records Bureau. Those are all ways of introducing the card that are not linked to specific ethnic minority groups in any way. What the regulatory impact assessment means is that some people might have concerns about those matters, which is why I have sought to address that specifically in the House.


The government's own research shows that the "biometric" identification they envisage using is likely not to work very well for many members of ethnic minority groups -- in particular, the iris biometric, which is the only reasonably reliable one, does not work very well for...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

Not at this stage. I will do so later.

I argue that the ID card system is in fact a bulwark against the surveillance or Big Brother society, and not a further contribution to it. [Interruption.] This is a serious point. People must understand the nature of the society in which we now live. Today, large quantities of information exist for all of us, throughout our society. The question is how we best regulate that and deal with identity fraud.


Charles Clarke does make a serious point here about the Big Brother society. However I think he has it wrong. Firstly I think that ID cards will not necessarily stop identity fraud they are more likely to just be a battle in an ongoing war. Secondly new technology increases the amount of...

Submitted by Rupert George Continue reading

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will make some more progress at this stage.

I turn now to the second concern, which many Members across the House have raised with me: the cost of the scheme and the way in which that operates. I acknowledge that the concerns expressed by Members are genuine.

The starting point for the discussion is the biometric passport. As the House knows, the UK Government propose to introduce biometric passports to keep in line with developments in international standards through the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

Not at this stage.

The first phase of biometric passports, in line with ICAO standards, incorporating a facial image biometric, will be introduced during 2006.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will give way to a number of Members when I come to the end of this passage, as I have been doing.

In the case of Europe, facial image and fingerprint biometrics, in line with those standards, will be required in passports issued by EU states under Council Regulation 2252/2004. Facial biometrics must be introduced by August 2006, and fingerprint biometrics three years after the technical specification has been agreed. All EU member states will have to introduce the same biometrics into the EU common format residence permits and visas for nationals of non-EU states.

The United States has issued a further deadline for visa waiver programme countries to introduce facial image biometric passports from 26 October 2006. Biometric passports, or e-passports, incorporate an integrated circuit chip capable of storing the biographic information from the data page, and a digitised photograph or other biometrics. Once all those United States requirements are implemented, nationals of those countries not issuing biometric passports will require a visa to visit the United States. The current cost of a United States non-immigrant biometric visa is £100, requiring a personal visit to London or Belfast and currently taking 31 working days to make an appointment for fingerprints to be recorded, and a further three days to issue a visa.


Why on earth is Europe requiring facial biometrics when they are rather unreliable? Word to the wise, people's faces *change*. They get older, they put weight or lose weight, they grow beards or shave them off, etc, etc.

Submitted by Richard Johnson Read 3 more annotations

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

In a second.

The effect of moving to a biometric passport is to raise the cost of the passport to of the order of £65 on each occasion. Members in all parts of the House must acknowledge that that can be avoided only if the United Kingdom were to choose to stand aside from the international biometric development that I have described, which would, in turn, lead to costs for those of our citizens who wish to travel in any given way. So that £65 is a cost that we meet without any reference to the Identity Cards Bill now before the House. That is an important and critical point.

On top of that biometric passport cost, the biometric ID card would cost an additional £25 to £30. That is the unit cost published in the regulatory impact assessment. It is not the charge that the Government agreed—


A British passport presently costs £41. The Home Secretary proposes an increase of £24 to upgrade to the new biometric standard. In Australia the new biometric passport will cost only AU$19, about £8, than the existing passport. Why are we to be charged three times as much as Australians for the new passports?

Reference: http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/justiceministerHome.nsf/Page/Me...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I told you that I will give way later—[Hon. Members: "Ooh!"] My hon. Friend is very persistent and very effective in her arguments, if not always in her resolutions. I promise her that I will give way at the appropriate point. I rather liked the "Ooh!" from Members. I must try to acquire that effective tone.

As I have said, the £25 to £30 that I have described is the unit cost published in the regulatory impact assessment, but I emphasise that that is not the charge that the Government have agreed. The actual charge will be determined by the Government at the time of introduction, depending on the business plan for the card's introduction. It will include, first, the cost of producing the card following the tender process; secondly, it will include the income in respect of driving licences or the Criminal Records Bureau, for example, which we could use to deal with the costs associated with the card; thirdly, it will include the possibility of cheaper cards for poorer citizens, which many of my colleagues have argued is a necessary development; fourthly, there is the possibility of a maximum charge for the card, so that it is capped at a particular level.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will give way in a moment, but at a time of my choosing.

I intend to provide more detail on the Government's intentions before the Bill leaves this House, but as a result of that clarity, many of the concerns that people have about the cost will lessen. I want to emphasise one other point before I give way. The Bill already makes it clear, in clause 37, that once the legislation is enacted, Parliament has to approve the fees and charges for ID cards. That is done by way of the negative resolution, but I am prepared to consider changes in Committee, such as making the initial charges subject to the affirmative, rather than the negative, procedure, if that will give the House some confidence that the charging regime is being established in accordance with people's wishes.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

Of course, the Government are entirely of the view that it would be ridiculous to have an expensive card that people were in some sense forced to buy. But that is not what we will have. I give way first to my hon. Friend—my admired friend—Lynne Jones.

Photo of Lynne Jones Lynne Jones Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

I thank my right hon. Friend for his kind remarks and for giving way. What is the status of the proposed EU-wide passport with fingerprint biometrics that he mentioned earlier? Is it just a proposal or a definite agreement? Will he also address the question, raised by the Opposition, of the cost of accessing the data held on an individual, and will he say how long it would take to get that information and to make any changes to it, should the individual in question identify an error?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

On my hon. Friend's second point, I have already made it clear—I hope that she accepts that this really is the case—that individual companies and private-sector organisations simply cannot buy the database. On her first point, as far as the United States is concerned, it will do what it does irrespective of anything else. On the European Union, the regulation to which I referred is binding on the Schengen countries, although not necessarily on us. However, it is expected that all EU member states will have to introduce the same biometrics into the EU common format residence permits, and into visas for nationals of non-EU states.

I should point out to my hon. Friend and to others who are concerned about this issue that in the view of all observers, there is absolutely no doubt that the development of biometric travel documents in the ways that I have described is the future. Given that environment, we would seriously disadvantage the citizens of this country if we did not go down the biometric route.


The US appears to have delayed it's requirements for biometric passports and may abandon them altogether.

Submitted by Joe Bunting

Photo of Ian Paisley Ian Paisley Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the letter that he sent to our party on this issue, which we have found helpful. But will he confirm to this House that none of the data that we are discussing can be dispensed outside this United Kingdom? The Taoiseach has made it clear that the Irish Government are going to go for this and reference has been made to some form of cross-border arrangement. That would be very serious indeed, when the members of the security forces and others walk with the threat of the IRA on them. They would not need to gather news about threats; they would get it if Government data were available. I would like an assurance on that from the Home Secretary.


The IRA will easily be able to obtain information from the National Identity Register by coercing authorised persons, for instance police officers or civil servants working on the scheme, into supplying it. Typically members of the IRA would kidnap members of the families of such persons and threaten their lives in order to compel cooperation. This much-used tactic has been used with considerable success, for...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I am happy to give that assurance. As I said in a letter to the hon. Gentleman's colleague, the Identity Cards Bill does not allow information to be provided from the national identity register to any foreign Government. That is the position—full stop. That is the state of affairs that applies, so I can give the firm assurance that the hon. Gentleman seeks.


This is true but misleading. The Bill does not create a power to share information with any foreign government, but it does not need to: such sharing of information is permitted by the Data Protection Act (mentioned by Clarke as...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading (and 2 more annotations)

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

In that case, can the Home Secretary explain to the House how the common travel arrangements will work without any exchange of data between the two Governments?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I can certainly explain that I have had informal discussions with Ministers of the Irish Government on this matter. The right hon. Gentleman is right that issues need to be discussed to achieve it. [Interruption.] I hear Mr. Hogg shouting, "Why have we not done it already?" from a sedentary position. It is for this House and this country to decide how to proceed with the Bill, but how developments would take place in respect of the joint travel area is a matter not only for us, but for the Irish Government. Rev. Ian Paisley asked for assurances, which I have given him, because it is certainly the case that we would not release data from our databases to the Irish Government. That is the case—pure and simple.

Photo of Andrew MacKinlay Andrew MacKinlay Labour, Thurrock

May I take the Home Secretary to the day on which the scheme becomes compulsory? People from the United States, France and Mongolia will possess passports and related documents that entitle them to be in the UK, whereas my right hon. Friend and I will have identity cards. However, people who commute from Donegal to Derry or Doncaster, or from Dublin or Cork to London each week for working Monday to Friday will not possess and cannot be required to possess the identity card. Justice Minister McDowell may be pursuing biometrics for the European passport, but I am told that there is no way on God's earth that the Irish Republic Parliament will introduce compulsory identity card systems—not now and not in a decade. How, then, will it work?


"However, people who commute from Donegal to Derry or Doncaster, or from Dublin or Cork to London each week for working Monday to Friday will not possess and cannot be required to possess the identity card." -- this is not true. The Bill would create the power for the Home Secretary to compel any person or category of persons to register for an ID card, and so he could require Irish citizens working in the UK -- or any other group of people -- to register...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

My hon. Friend, with all due respect, misunderstands my point. The joint travel area system works now in a variety of different ways to ensure that the data are used in a proper way. The establishment in the UK of an identity card, which is an important element in the whole process, will help that system work even better. Full stop. That is all that needs to be said about it.


Surely Charles Clarke yet again does not explain how to a satisfactory degree, he seemingly like to revert to "Full Stop" if your question is in any way 'sticky'. So come Mr Clarke explain properly in a way everyone understands and not...

Submitted by Alan Taylor Continue reading

Photo of Martin Salter Martin Salter Labour, Reading West

May I press the Home Secretary a little further on the issue of capping the charge? One of the reasons why public support for the principle of identity cards appears to have slipped is that so much misinformation has been put into the public domain over the likely costs. Will my right hon. Friend give us an assurance that the public will not be expected to pay more than £28 or £30 at today's prices when the ID cards are introduced?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I agree with my hon. Friend that some of the fantastic figures circulating around in the media have given rise to the concern that he expressed. I am prepared to say that it is right to give an assurance about the cap, but I am not prepared to say at this stage precisely what the cap will be. Before the Bill leaves the House, however, I will give such an assurance.


A cap on the price of ID cards is simply a trick to get people to sign up to the scheme. We will pay the same price through taxation or directly. If the card is not compulsory but people are purchasing it to get the many...

Submitted by Joe Bunting Continue reading (and 3 more annotations)

Photo of Rob Marris Rob Marris Labour, Wolverhampton South West

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his customary generosity, but I would like to probe him further on the cost. He says that the cost of a biometric passport will be about £65 and the cost of an identity card between £25 and £30, which comes to about £95 top whack. May I make the Home Secretary an offer? My passport expires in December 2011. If I write him a cheque for £100 now, will he agree that if the cost is more than £100 at that time, he will meet the extra? If it is below, he can either keep the extra, courtesy of myself, or give it to charity. Will he make that deal?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I am always interested in side deals with my hon. Friend, who is a talented and skilled financial operator. I will look into seeing whether a side deal is possible, but I am not going to arrange one on the Floor of the House this afternoon.

Photo of Tony Wright Tony Wright Labour, Cannock Chase

Surely the issue of cost changes if we move to compulsion. Having a card would then cease to be a matter of convenience and become a matter of necessity. Although a state may decide properly that it wants its citizens to have an identity card, it should not then also require them to pay for it.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

That is an entirely reasonable point and would be taken into consideration when the House came to consider proposals for compulsion. My view—for what it is worth, although I give no assurances—is that the charge would be significantly less than the amounts that have been mentioned, but I agree that at the point when a decision has to be made about compulsion, the question of charging would be a legitimate aspect for discussion.

Photo of Neil Gerrard Neil Gerrard Labour, Walthamstow

The cost of course depends on the model that is adopted. We have heard much about international requirements for biometric passports. I do not have a particular problem with having a passport with a biometric element: the problem is the database that lies behind it. What international requirements are there that would lead to the construction of the sort of database that is proposed in this country? I am totally unaware of any such requirements.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

There are none. I do not make the argument for the identity card process that we propose on the basis of an international requirement that we should do it. The argument that I was making about the international environment was about biometric passports. I argued that in the context of the cost factor, because many people have confused the cost of an identity card with the cost of a biometric passport plus an identity card. There is no international requirement or, indeed, suggestion that we should move towards an ID card system as a result of some international process elsewhere. However, it is important to be aware as we take our decisions in this country of the international trends in crime and other matters, and how best we can deal with those.

Photo of John Bercow John Bercow Conservative, Buckingham

Many Opposition Members voted against the Second Reading of the previous Bill as a matter of principle and will do so again tonight. However, given that cost is a highly sensitive issue, will the Home Secretary give a categorical assurance to the House that full consideration will first be given to using the post office and Jobcentre Plus networks for the enrolment of citizens before seeking to secure substantial new premises that would inevitably greatly add to the cost of the scheme?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurance that precisely that idea is under consideration.


So no he won't say that they will not spend a stack on fancy...

Submitted by Adrian Nash Continue reading (and 1 more annotation)

Photo of Alison Seabeck Alison Seabeck Labour, Plymouth, Devonport

We have heard much this afternoon about the cost of the passport to individuals, but there will be a broader cost. I would welcome my right hon. Friend's comments on the precise impact on the wider economy of identity fraud. Some 3 to 5 per cent. of all fraud involves identity fraud and we all have constituents who have suffered the misery of that crime. How much does it cost our economy?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

My hon. Friend is right to say that identity fraud is a big issue, but I will deal with that in the next passage of my speech, if she does not mind—

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Helen Jones Helen Jones Labour, Warrington North

One can envisage a situation in which, even when identity cards are not compulsory, poor people become more and more disadvantaged—as they become more widely used—when opening bank accounts and accessing services. What steps will my right hon. Friend take to ensure that our poorer citizens are protected from that possibility and are able to access ID cards, if they wish to do so, in a way that is affordable and not too complex?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

My hon. Friend is entirely correct and that is why I made specific reference to that point earlier in my speech, when I addressed the business planning for the introduction of the card. I referred to the need to be sure that the charge, when finally set, takes account of the circumstances of less well-off citizens. My hon. Friend is right to raise that point and many other colleagues have also raised it. The assurance that I give is that when we come to look at the precise business plan for a charging regime, the particular point that she has made will be taken fully into account.

Photo of Quentin Davies Quentin Davies Conservative, Grantham and Stamford

As usual, the Home Secretary is generous in giving way and we appreciate that.

May I take the right hon. Gentleman back to the issue of the common travel area with the Republic of Ireland? He was not as explicit about that as he might have been If the House votes for the Bill, is not it the case that we are heading towards a scenario in which, in 10 years' time or so, there will be three categories of people in the UK? First, citizens of the UK will have to have the identity card. Secondly, people from outside the UK and the Republic of Ireland will have to have a passport to be in the country legally and in practice at that time it may in cases be a biometric passport. Thirdly, citizens of the Republic of Ireland will be able to enter Northern Ireland or the rest of the United Kingdom, live there and do whatever they like with no document at all. Is not that a major hole in the intended comprehensiveness of the Home Secretary's system, and is not it an anomaly and an unfairness that will be difficult for the British people to accept?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I do not think that it is a major hole. There is no doubt that the Irish Government, the Dail, will look at the issues and decide what they want to do, but it is not necessary for us to say in the House that we shall require Irish citizens coming to the UK to have the same ID card as us. That would not be an appropriate course for us to follow. Equally, as was pointed out earlier, we have no obligation whatever to give any data held under our system to any foreign Government. The hon. Gentleman is entitled to say that we should work towards a situation where the joint travel area evolves well in a good working relationship. I agree, and that is what we shall do.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will give way again later, but I want to make some progress.

The next stage of my argument relates to the benefits that the ID card will bring, because I do not think that they have yet been clearly set out. First, I shall set out the benefits to every individual who has a card. That builds on the point made about access to services by my hon. Friend Helen Jones. It will be a benefit to the individual to be able to make clear their identity in financial transactions—for example, opening bank accounts and in a wide range of other transactions—without having to produce a series of proxy documentation. In terms of obtaining public documents, I have already mentioned driving licences, passports and Criminal Records Bureau certificates. There is no doubt in my mind that the card will help individuals who need and want those documents.

For the reasons that I set out earlier, to have a card will be of major benefit in terms of international travel, whether for travel to the United States without a visa or more widely elsewhere in the world. Proof of identity in relation to law enforcement is also a benefit to the individual. Access to public services, as decided by those service providers, whether a library or any other form of public service, is another example of such a benefit.

My hon. Friend Alison Seabeck raised the issue of identity fraud. She is entirely correct. In 2004, an average of 50,000 people in the UK were victims of impersonation fraud. On average, it takes each victim 60 hours to resolve their case and clear their name. ID cards will make it more difficult to perpetrate identity theft and the high-quality verification service will reduce the time that it takes to deal with the damage. The British Bankers Association has stated that general banking losses due to identity fraud amount to £50 million. Those are substantial issues and show that the card will be of benefit to the individual.

The benefits to society include more effective crime fighting in a wide variety of ways; reducing serious and organised crime, people trafficking, money laundering and drug dealing; and reducing illegal migration and benefit fraud. Some hon. Members have been sceptical about the benefits of the card in dealing with terrorism, but I shall consider as an illustration the widely aired suggestion that ID cards did not stop the terrorist bombings in Madrid.

In fact, ID cards helped the Spanish police to identify who was responsible for the Madrid bombings, because in order to buy a mobile phone in Spain a person has to verify their identity with an ID card. According to the Spanish police, ID cards were a key element in tracking down the bombers. The cards also helped to identify the victims of the bombing so that their families could be informed.

Of course, Spanish ID cards do not contain the biometrics that we are discussing, so they can be forged more easily than the kind of card that we are describing. Our ID cards will be more successful. It is no coincidence—


Any self-respecting terrorist with half a brain would steal a phone, and have it illegally unlocked. As far as I am aware, it is not necessary to present your ID card to the person you're robbing!

But, that point aside, even if you do have a purchase record tied to an ID card, how does being able to identify a terrorist help when they've blown themselves up with the target? It is not uncommon for suicide terrorists to guide a plan through to completion (just look at September 11th, not to mention the horrific attacks in Israel).

Is the objective here going to be the prevention of terrorist attacks, or simply being able to identify an individual who probably has no obvious ties with the rest of the group, for precisely this reason. If it is the latter, you may as well not bother - the terrorists will win. In fact, by introducing ID cards, you could argue that they have already won.

Submitted by Mr Jones Read 1 more annotation

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will give way in a second, but I want to make my argument in my own way.

Jean-Louis Bruguière, France's top counter-terrorism investigator—it was reported in The Times on 1 June—claimed that identity cards would help Britain to protect itself from terrorist attacks. The head of Interpol said that in cases of terrorism multiple identities have been used by terrorists. The quantification of the benefits depends on the assumptions that we make and the programme that is established, but they are of the order of at least £0.5 billion a year. It depends on how fast the various benefits come on stream—the Criminal Records Bureau benefits and so on—but in sum, the benefits of this ID card system, first to every individual who has one, and secondly to the society, are real and substantial.

Photo of Glenda Jackson Glenda Jackson Labour, Hampstead and Highgate

My right hon. Friend has referred to banks and to libraries, and he has referred to the ability of an ID card to prevent acts of international terror, but he has failed to tell the House how. Must every library have a machine that can ensure that the ID card that is presented is accurate? How are these cards to be verified in every single aspect of national life, from banks to libraries, to police stations, to accident and emergency, to hospitals, to doctors' surgeries, and who is going to pay for the machines that can read them?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

In each case, it will be a matter for the authority providing a public service to consider whether it is in its interests to have an ID card system. For example, if Camden council decides that it is beneficial to Camden council to have a different form of ID check in its libraries from the system that currently exists to ensure that people do not steal books, it will decide to put in the readers that are necessary. We are not requiring the authorities to do it; no one says that they have to do it. They will make a decision. [Interruption.] I hear a sedentary intervention saying that we are requiring people to carry cards. That is simply untrue, as I have said before, and that is precisely the point about this whole approach. My point, and it is a very serious point when we look at the benefits, is that each organisation will make its own assessment as to whether there is a benefit in having an ID card system.


Compulsary carrying of ID cards is certainly highlighted by Mr Clarke yet again, he intends it be done by third party stealth. So when will Tesco's refuse to serve customers who do not have their loyalty card, or for a nod and a wink in business terms require customers to produce a ID card to qualify for their loyalty card by offering 1000 points for having your ID card scanned.
Be up front and honest Mr Clarke and make ID cards mandatory and FREE if they will assist as you say. Surely it is the government that really wants this scheme and not Joe Public !

Submitted by Alan Taylor

Photo of Steve McCabe Steve McCabe Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green

I am very grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way. When the Leader of the Opposition told The Daily Telegraph last December that he had taken advice from senior police officers and security chiefs regarding the security of British citizens and that he could not disregard that, was he right then, or is he right now to ask my right hon. Friend to disregard it?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

To be quite candid, I decided not to go into this type of partisan political point, first because it is obviously alien to my character and is not the kind of thing that I would want to do, and secondly because it would be unfair. John Bercow made the point earlier that he voted against his party in December 2004 and intends to continue doing so. David Davis has reversed his position.

Photo of John Bercow John Bercow Conservative, Buckingham

The party is on side now.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

From a sedentary position, the hon. Gentleman makes the position quite clear—and the embarrassed smiles of Opposition Members also make it quite clear—when he says, accurately, that the party is on side now. Mr. Howard has to explain his stewardship of the party over that period, and that really is a matter for him. I will not give in to the temptation that my hon. Friend Steve McCabe has offered me by suggesting that I deal with the matter in a particular way.

Photo of Damian Green Damian Green Conservative, Ashford

May I bring the Home Secretary back to the benefits to the citizens of this country, particularly some of the most vulnerable? The Disability Rights Commission has said that the Government's own research

"shows that 62,000 disabled people will not be able to register their biometrics in any way", and

"many hundreds of thousands of disabled people" are

"likely to experience significant barriers to enrolment".

If libraries and other public services are going to depend on access to the identity card system, some of the most vulnerable disabled people in society will be among those who will be denied the alleged benefits.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

There are two points to make in response to that. First, the organisations concerned will decide whether they want to follow that course. Forms of identity can be used other than the ID card if that is more appropriate, but they will decide. Secondly, all of this has to be compliant with the current disability legislation; that is self-evident and that is how it stands.


On this point can Charles Clarke assure us that the wording of this bill if en-acted will permit legal action to be taken against private sector whom decide that they require you to produce an ID card to gain from their services etc....

Submitted by Alan Taylor Continue reading

Photo of Geraldine Smith Geraldine Smith Labour, Morecambe and Lunesdale

On people trafficking, international terrorism and illegal immigration, if identity cards are so helpful and so essential, why is this scheme voluntary?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

We hope to make it compulsory over time; we have set that out very clearly in the Bill. We have not waved a magic wand and made it compulsory now because the process of issuing ID cards for the whole population takes a good deal of time. But if you look, Mr. Speaker, at the great tragedies of which my hon. Friend has extensive experience—that is obvious from the way that she is talking about some of the people-trafficking issues—or other events that are equally shocking, such as the tragedy of the people who died in the container going across the channel—

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will give way in a second.

If we look at the issues of people trafficking, there is absolutely no doubt: if we talk to those in any police organisation in the world, they will say that identity fraud, first, by the gangs who run such trafficking and, secondly, by the people who are being trafficked is a central weapon of their crime, and we should do everything that we can to stop that happening. My hon. Friend—I will give way to her again in a moment—effectively says "Do it faster!", and she has a powerful message. We can talk about doing it faster, but let us not draw the conclusion that we should not do it at all. Let us do better and make such things happen more quickly, rather than more slowly.

Photo of Geraldine Smith Geraldine Smith Labour, Morecambe and Lunesdale

I would also say, "Do not charge people from general taxation". On the Morecambe bay tragedy to which my right hon. Friend refers, is he aware that those Chinese illegal immigrants held permits to work and had false national insurance numbers? What would stop such people having false ID cards?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

That was a terribly tragic situation, but I am afraid that my hon. Friend makes the case that I am seeking to make. The falseness that she describes—to be honest, it arises with a number of the documents of people working in this country illegally—is possible because we do not have a substantial biometric element in the identification cards that exist. The biometric element will make a material difference to people's ability to forge those documents.


Biometrics make no difference whatever to the ability of people to forge documents. I am not sure to what confusion of thought we can ascribe Mr Clarke's repeated statements that they will. A biometric might allow it to be shown that a certain document belongs to a certain person, but...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

This is so exciting. I will give way to the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee.

Photo of Edward Leigh Edward Leigh Chair, Public Accounts Committee

The Home Secretary knows that the Home Office has a long record of difficulties with major IT projects. He well knows that evidence was given to the Home Affairs Committee by the United Kingdom Computer Research Committee, which said:

"we have deep scepticism about the Home Office's ability to specify, procure, implement a national, software intensive system on the scale that would be necessary."

Can the Home Secretary reassure the House that, in years to come, the permanent secretary of his Department will not appear before the Public Accounts Committee to defend himself against charges of massive cost overruns and massive increases in bureaucracy and difficulties with IT?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I can tell the House that the permanent secretaries of the Departments that I have been involved with always enjoyed coming to the hon. Gentleman's Committee to explain the situation, but I will come to the specific point in a moment.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I shall give way one more time, before making more progress.

Photo of Mark Fisher Mark Fisher Labour, Stoke-on-Trent Central

On the necessity of carrying a card, will the Home Secretary clarify two points? First, he cited the Spanish experience and said that the Spanish only managed to get those people because having an ID card is a requirement to get a mobile phone in Spain. Is he saying that that would be the situation in this country and that people who want a mobile phone must have an ID card? Secondly, he told the House that a card will not be necessary to gain access to public services, but clause 15(1) says precisely the opposite: someone who provides public services may make it a requirement to see an ID card. Is it his intention to delete clause 15(1) in Committee?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

First, the point that I was making about Madrid is very simple. Contrary to what some people allege, ID cards have had an impact in helping to address the issues of Madrid. I am not making any proposition about mobile phones or any other service, but I am saying that the suggestion that ID cards cannot address questions such as the appalling bombing in Madrid is not correct.

On the second point, the fact is that we are saying in the legislation—again, we can discuss this in Committee if my hon. Friend has concerns about it—that organisations are entitled to use ID cards to identify people in those circumstances after they have become compulsory, but that it will also be possible for individuals to use other material if they wish to do so. Of course, the detail of that matter can be discussed in Committee if we make progress, but that is where we are.


Arrr! So Charles Clarke now states when the ID card is compulsary it will be mandatory to always carry it on your person.
Now the truth starts to emerge, so disabled people will not be entitled recourse to law by legal action against a vendor as defined in the disabled discrimination act, come on if this bill is en-acted make it so with a clear ammendment that it is mandatory but FREE of cost to the ID card holder. You want it you pay for it, why should we.

Submitted by Alan Taylor

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I will not give way again. I am going to make progress on the point about the capacity to run major projects made by Mr. Leigh. There are a lot of easy jibes of the type that he made, and I want to begin by giving the example of the Passport and Records Agency—an organisation that has issued 6.1 million passports in the past year, that has 47 million records across the country and that, as is very well known, had major problems in 1997, which caused concern throughout the House.

Only this year, the Comparisat benchmark survey, run by FDS International, surveyed a wide range of organisations based on their customer satisfaction and what was going on. Number one on that list was the UK Passport Service, which was followed by Asda, eBay, Amazon, Virgin Mobile, Morrisons, Tesco, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, the Post Office, Boots and ScottishPower. I cite that example because it demonstrates that major public service projects, and even Home Office public service projects can, through investment in technology for massive schemes, beat the world—both the public and private sector—in the service that they offer to people. That is a tribute to what can be done.

I can cite other examples. The UK information technology industry is currently rolling out the introduction of chip and PIN in stores and shops throughout the country. The project involves 42 million consumers who hold more than 140 million credit and debit cards, 3 million retail staff in stores throughout the country and more than 250,000 bank branch and call centre staff. That massive project is being carried out well.

The Department for Work and Pensions payment modernisation system means that 22.5 million accounts are now paid by direct payment. The scheme was completed on time with less expenditure than was initially anticipated, and it will save more than £1 billion over the next five years. The same is true of NHS Direct. All those examples demonstrate that the public sector in general, and the Home Office in particular, has the capacity to undertake such major projects. Of course the projects must be well managed, and I could produce a list of private and public sector failures, but it is important to get a balance on the whole situation.


So if the same or similar disasterous start to the ID card IT system happens as did in 1997 to the passport system then every criminal in the world could easily have every British Subjects every detail. It is extremely frightening given that our current government leaders seemingly still do not listen to the grass roots of the country but only hear what their advisors decide to tell them. Most of these advisors seemingly are university qualified political researchers whom have not known the 'real' world of the British public, and many are our future politicians - gawd forbid!

Submitted by Alan Taylor

Photo of Michael Martin Michael Martin Chair, Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission, Speaker of the House of Commons

Order. I heard the Home Secretary say that he was not going to give way. I must remind the House that many hon. Members wish to speak and that interventions will eat into their time.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

I am grateful, Mr. Speaker. I shall try to make progress and to give way only once more before I finish.

Our approach on the technology is straightforward. When the Bill has passed through Parliament, we intend to conduct trials of the technology, including small-scale tests, database tests and large-scale testing during roll-out. There has been a lot of concern about biometric identity cards, especially those using iris recognition, so I draw the House's attention to a report published earlier this week by the university of Cambridge computer laboratory. Its conclusion and recommendations indicate clearly and categorically:

"Iris recognition can be reliably used on a national basis in an Identity Cards scheme, including the capability for exhaustive iris code comparisons to detect multiple identities, if the decision policy employs a threshold criteria"— it then sets out some technical details. These issues can thus be resolved.


The report to which Clarke refers is here:
Note that it had not yet been published at the time of this debate.

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Gordon Prentice Gordon Prentice Labour, Pendle

Why can my friend not tell us the failure rate of identifying biometrics that would be acceptable? The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality told me today that that is still being determined through stakeholder consultation.

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

The report that I cited indicates that with irises on the database,

"with reasonable acceptance thresholds, the false match rate is less than 1 in 200 billion."

If there is iris recognition, facial recognition and fingerprint recognition, it significantly reduces the possibility of errors arising.


This is not really relevant, because many people's iris patterns would not be recorded in the database. A recent study by the Home Office showed that it will probably not be possible to obtain an iris scan for about one in...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Geoffrey Clifton-Brown Geoffrey Clifton-Brown Opposition Deputy Chief Whip (Commons)

About 37 million people in this country aged over 16 would be liable to have an identity card over a period of time. There has been wide variation in the estimates of the cost of introducing the cards. The estimates range up to £5.5 billion, which would give a huge headline figure of about £140 per person. Whether that figure is accurate or not, will the Home Secretary undertake to produce a proper regulatory impact assessment of the costs that can be relied on before the House definitively makes up its mind on Third Reading?

Photo of Charles Clarke Charles Clarke Home Secretary

We have already set out a regulatory impact assessment that can be relied on, but I repeat the assurance that I gave earlier: before the Bill leaves the House, we will produce data in the form that the hon. Gentleman wants.

On all the grounds that I have set out, the ID card will protect individuals against the Big Brother state, rather than the opposite. I have talked about the costs, benefits and technical issues. I tell my hon. Friends who are considering voting for the reasoned amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak that accepting the amendment would be a vote against Second Reading, which would thus defeat the Bill, so I hope that they will agree not to do that. I commend the Bill to the House.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office) 4:34 pm, 28th June 2005

May I congratulate the Home Secretary on a bravura performance in which he defended the indefensible? His performance was marked more by good humour than by hard facts—a point that I shall come to in a moment.

I shall start with an observation. If, 10 years ago, I had gone on the radio and said that within a decade a Labour Government would try to do away with jury trials, remove habeas corpus, eliminate the presumption of innocence, introduce punishment without trial and put house arrest on the statute book, I suspect that I would have been locked up. The Government, however, have tried to do every one of those things in the past few years; each time, they have chipped away at the basic liberties that we hold dear and which previous generations fought to protect. Today, the party which promised the generation of 1945 welfare from cradle to grave is about to give this generation surveillance from cradle to grave. We will not be party to such a measure.

The Home Secretary's proposals represent a fundamental shift in the balance of power between the citizen and the state. They are not just excessive but expensive; they are not just illiberal but impractical; they are not just unnecessary but unworkable, which is why this debate is important. The House has a serious choice to make today. We can choose to let the Government take one more step down the road to what their own Information Commissioner called the "surveillance society", or we can draw a line in the sand and say that enough is enough. We choose to draw that line, and invite anyone in the House who believes in liberty and freedom to do the same.

More than 50 years ago, the British courts ruled that the wartime identity card had outlived its usefulness, saying that it turned "law-abiding subjects into lawbreakers". As a result, Winston Churchill's Government introduced measures to abolish the card, but not before the three original purposes of the card had grown into 39 different uses. That is a warning to us all about the way in which Governments of all persuasions will take a mile of one's freedom if one gives them an inch. The Home Secretary will say that 50 years later times have changed, and indeed they have.

Photo of Douglas Hogg Douglas Hogg Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham

My right hon. Friend has drawn attention to the way in which Governments develop their proposals. Would he care to remind the House that the National Registration Act 1915 did not originally require citizens to produce a card on demand? The Act was amended in 1918 to introduce such a requirement. Does he not think that, if the Government enacted the Bill, in due course it would be amended to make the carrying and production of cards mandatory?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

My right hon. and learned Friend has anticipated my next point. I would simply add that many of the security benefits—one can argue that there are some benefits—arise only if it is compulsory to carry a card. One must presume from the Government's approach that they have that in mind for the next decade. My right hon. and learned Friend, however, has made my point for me.

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

Does the right hon. Gentleman not accept that it is misleading to suggest that to verify a claim of identity the police require the card itself, as they can merely check the claim against a database? His suggestion is one of the many misleading statements that are being made about the Bill.


Why cannot these people deal honestly instead of looking for ways to score political points to gain favour with the Leader of the controlling party? How can a database ascertain your...

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Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

No, it is not misleading. Presumably, the police will have card readers that will make the process quicker, unless the hon. Gentleman is assuming that they will work off the biometrics. We have already heard that millions of our fellow citizens cannot provide those biometrics, so there is genuine concern that the Government will end up having to make such a requirement. I do not like to say so, but there is an intrinsic dishonesty in the way in which the Bill has been presented. The possession of a card has been presented as voluntary initially, then compulsory. This has not yet been said, but eventually it will become mandatory to carry one. We cannot otherwise achieve the benefits, including the Madrid benefits rightly raised by the Home Secretary. That is a dishonest way in which to present the Bill to the House.

I return to the more general point. The system that the Home Secretary is proposing will be far more sophisticated than that of the 1940s, the 1950s or the first war years. That makes it all the more important that what he is proposing is not open to misuse. The identity card itself is just the plastic embodiment of a much greater and potentially more pernicious thing—the new national identity register. That is what the Bill is essentially about.

The register is a massive database containing detailed personal information about every person in the country—a database that can be accessed by officials and public bodies without permission and without the person whom they are looking up ever knowing that it has happened. The Home Secretary talks about people exercising their rights under the Data Protection Act 1998. Very few people will do that, and it may be an expensive process. He did not outline any actions on the costs of that process, but if he wants to intervene, I will take a comment from him.

The individuals concerned may not know about that access, but the Government will, and they will keep a record of every time the card is used. They will know where we are and what we are doing. The Government's own Information Commissioner—remember, created and appointed by the Government, not some partisan person from outside; the person whose job it is to worry about the information handled by the Government—says that is "unnecessary". He says it is

"particularly worrying and cannot be viewed in isolation from other initiatives which serve to build a detailed picture of people's lives, such as CCTV surveillance, the use of automatic number plate recognition, recording vehicle movements for law enforcement, and the proposals to introduce satellite tracking of vehicles for road use charging".

Such a vision was originally set out by a man called Blair who changed his name to Orwell and wrote a book called "1984". It was supposed to be a warning, not a textbook.

Not long ago the Prime Minister was caught saying:

"Instead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on compulsory ID cards . . . let that money provide thousands more police officers on the beat in our local communities."

In that quote he was attacking what he called "the Tory Right". Today it is his new Labour Government who want to spend thousands of millions of pounds forcing us to sign up to be members of our own country.

As yesterday's report from the London School of Economics found—I do not want to give the Home Secretary dyspepsia—

"With the exception of Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Cyprus, no common law country in the world has ever accepted the idea of a peacetime ID card".

The Prime Minister has always been concerned about making his mark on history. That is quite a legacy to leave.

Photo of John Smith John Smith Labour, Vale of Glamorgan

On the point about countries that have chosen or not chosen to introduce the identity card, does the right hon. Gentleman think it significant that after the worst terrorist atrocity in human history, the United States of America considered the matter carefully in the 9/11 commission and rejected the case for an ID card?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

The hon. Gentleman makes an extremely good point. The reason the common law countries are unique in this respect is that they are the countries that presume that the citizen is free to do anything unless there is a law against it. That is rather different from the Napoleonic law countries. If America can get by without an identity card, it is hard to see why we cannot.

I have always made it clear that before the events of 9/11 I would never have even countenanced the concept of an identity card, but since 9/11, in my present post, I accepted that we should listen to the Government's case, just as we should consider any possible device that could make our country and our people safer. Having done so, including considering what the Home Secretary said today, I conclude that the Government's identity card will be little more than an expensive waste of time and money. It is a plastic poll tax, and it is a symbol of this Government's determination to centralise and control everything at the expense of the liberties of the British people. Longstanding freedoms cannot and should not be given away cheaply; they should only be given up on the basis of compelling and exceptional need. All Opposition Members understand that principle, but the Government's record shows that they do not.

Some months ago, I set the Home Secretary five tests, some of which he referred to today. Had he met them, we might have been persuaded to give the previous Bill a fair wind before the election, but he failed to respond adequately to any of the questions. Fortunately for us, other people have come up with the answers to those questions, but unfortunately for the Home Secretary, the answers are universally unhelpful to his case.

I asked the Home Secretary precisely what the purpose of the cards would be. ID cards were originally presented as a response to the terrorist threat after 9/11, which is why I was prepared to listen in the first place. Despite the Home Secretary's comments today, the Government no longer make that case—they know that ID cards would not take effect for many, many years and that terrorists would not be deterred by them. Furthermore, the cards will not be compulsory, so they will not have any effect. Whatever the Home Secretary has said, ID cards did not deter the bombers in Madrid, and they would not have helped in New York, either. If the technology ever becomes effective, terrorists will bypass it, and I shall return to that point.

At times, ID cards have been presented as entitlement cards to tackle benefit fraud—as an aside, the cost of benefit fraud is tiny by comparison with the cost of ID cards, even if one accepts the Government's numbers, which I do not. ID cards were also supposed to tackle illegal working, but in October last year, the previous Home Secretary was back to justifying them on the ground of welfare fraud.

The Home Secretary has said:

"Identity cards will provide a simple and secure way of verifying identity, helping us to tackle illegal working, organised crime, terrorist activity, identity theft and fraudulent access to public services."—[Hansard, 7 February 2005; Vol. 430, c. 1183.]

However, his predecessor admitted that ID cards will not tackle terrorism; the Law Society says that ID cards will not tackle illegal working; and Liberty and the Law Society say that ID cards will not tackle crime. The purpose of ID cards remains unclear, and the Government's case has been, at best, slippery.

A recent article in The Observer stated:

"The Government's motives have been obscured by the ad hoc way in which claimed advantages pile up. Our trust in the state to handle our data safely is undermined by this shifting account of the purpose of ID cards".

It is now clear that ID cards will not fight terrorism, tackle crime, control immigration or stop fraud. They have no effective purpose.

Photo of Simon Hughes Simon Hughes Shadow Attorney General

Do the right hon. Gentleman's remarks mean that it is now the Conservative party's settled opinion that ID cards are unacceptable in this country? Will he make it clear that he is taking a position that we have held for 50 years or more and that many Labour Members have held for all their political lives? The Bill will not get through this Parliament, because it will not obtain a majority in the other place. If the Government were to force it through by some device, those in favour of liberty would repeal it before it ever came into force.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

I agree absolutely with the hon. Gentleman's last point—I will let his earlier political points go—and my party and I would not be party to such a thing.

Photo of Richard Shepherd Richard Shepherd Conservative, Aldridge-Brownhills

The Home Secretary has said that the Bill will enable us to assert our right to be here. It is an extraordinary departure from who we are as a people that all hon. Members must assert their right to be here through the Home Secretary's benighted ID cards scheme.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

We have seen window taxes and poll taxes, but this is a breathing tax. The right to citizenship of this kingdom is acquired at birth and is not at the behest of the Government.

Photo of John Bercow John Bercow Conservative, Buckingham

A variation on the theme highlighted by my hon. Friend Mr. Shepherd is the argument enunciated by Mr. Blunkett as long ago as November 2003, when he said that identity cards were about tackling alienation and asserting our sense of belonging. I have met several people in my constituency who have complained that they felt alienated from the community, others who felt alienated from the Government, and a proportion who felt alienated from both, but I have yet to meet a single one who has said, "John, I'm alienated—I have an identity crisis, and I can't assert my sense of belonging until the Home Secretary gives me my identity card."

Photo of Alan Haselhurst Alan Haselhurst Chairman of Ways and Means

Before the right hon. Gentleman replies, I remind hon. Members that interventions are getting longer and there is a very long list of speakers.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for rescuing me from having to reply.

The second test is this: does the technology exist to make the system work? Again, the Home Secretary has not answered the question, but other people have. One group, which knows far more about these things than our famously technophobic Prime Minister, said:

"This will undoubtedly be a large and centralised system as currently outlined in the bill, and this type of system attracts a high risk of failure."

That was the British Computer Society, which I suspect knows rather better than others what it is talking about.

One of the most potent criticisms of the Government's plan, however, is that it will make fraud easier. This card will become a master key for fraudsters. Its intention is to give, if I can use the Home Secretary's words, "legitimacy" to someone's identity, but if that identity is fraudulent in the first place, it only makes the problem worse. One expert in this area says:

"ID cards will exacerbate the situation. The stakes are raised that much higher if the master key is cracked; it opens the door to all sorts of frauds."

It is extremely likely that this ID card system will actually make fraud easier by doing exactly that.


The expert quoted here is Dr James Backhouse of the LSE. He points out that the government's proposals risk an increase in identity fraud to American levels: "The US has a very big identity fraud problem and this is partly because the system relies on social security numbers as a universal from of identity and this is exploited by fraudsters." Elsewhere, the Australian Attorney-General has ruled out introducing ID cards and a national ID database on the grounds that doing so would increase fraud: "We haven't supported an approach where all personal information is centralised on one database and a single form of identification is used. Such an approach could actually increase the risk of identity fraud because only one document would need to be counterfeited to establish an identity." References:...

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Photo of Kali Mountford Kali Mountford Labour, Colne Valley

The right hon. Gentleman is making the case that the identity secured could be a false identity in the first place, thereby allowing for further frauds. However, what does he say about those people who continually change identity and continually try to evade justice and hide themselves by defrauding the system? Would not this system at least put a stop to that at a particular point and prevent them from continually changing their identities?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

No. In about two minutes, I will explain to the hon. Lady why that will, unfortunately, remain too easy.

Before I get to that, I want to deal with the next test, which is the question of whether the Home Office could do this. The Home Secretary showed admirable loyalty in defending his Department on that issue, but again, did not answer the question despite its being asked by the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. Other people, however, have answered that question.

Let us recount some of the computer projects that the Government have made a hash of. Last week, we saw that the tax credits system is in chaos because of IT problems. The Home Office itself is one of the worst-offending Departments when it comes to IT management. Remember the police national computer? One would think that that would be very accurate because it has biometric data associated with it, but an audit recently found that 65 per cent. of its files contained errors. Remember the asylum seeker processing system? With a budget of £80 million, the project was scrapped after it was found to be flawed. Remember the infamous Passport Agency project? Its delivery was delayed and it eventually came in £12.5 million over budget. Before the supposed good performance that the Home Secretary told us about, the failures led to more than 500,000 people waiting for passports in the early summer of 1999.

The important point to understand here is that one good year in six is not good enough for a computer that is fundamental to our security systems.

Photo of Douglas Hogg Douglas Hogg Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham

And there is another point—if these cards are a prerequisite to obtaining benefit from public services, a person who cannot get a valid card cannot get their benefit.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

My right hon. and learned Friend makes an excellent point, with which I shall deal shortly.

Of all the Departments, the Home Office is the last that one would want to put in charge of such a scheme. Identity cards are not only ineffective and open to fraud but we have no faith in the Government's ability to make them work.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

Is not the position even worse, in that the Home Office's study on whether the scheme can be realised showed extraordinarily high failure rates for the biometrics?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

The hon. Gentleman is right. It is interesting that the Home Office is relying on the cumulative effect of all the biometrics working, yet many thousands of people will, in one way or another, be cut out of public services or unable to be identified because 1 million or more people are excluded.

The most contentious issue is cost. In one respect, I agree with the Home Secretary. He told the BBC that there was an obligation on him

"to set out the figures in the clearest and most substantive way".

The trouble is that he has not done that. He recently admitted that the original figure of £93 per card was only an indicative unit cost. Once charges are added, the price will go up even more.

What is the cost? The Government appear to have no clue. We realised that when the Home Secretary was asked about local government expenditure on libraries and so on. However, fortunately for the Government—the Home Secretary will not agree—the London School of Economics has been able to provide an estimate. Unfortunately for the Government, it is much more than they let on. [Interruption.] "Think of a number, then treble it" is probably a good way of estimating Home Office cost outcomes.

The LSE states that the true cost of implementing the proposed scheme will be between £10.6 billion and £19.2 billion. That could raise the average cost of each card, without means testing, to £230 a person. That tax will fall on hard-working taxpayers and poorer pensioners on fixed incomes. It may not be much money for the Home Secretary or members of the Government, but for the poorest in our society, it is more than a month's food bill. Worse, councils will have to find a further £10 billion to cover local costs for new technology and staff training.. That is the figure that the Home Secretary could not find earlier. The cost will inevitably be passed on in higher council tax bills or higher general taxes.

Photo of Steve McCabe Steve McCabe Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green

I recognise the right hon. Gentleman's opposition to the Bill, but does he stand unequivocally by every assumption and calculation in the LSE report?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

I shall revert to that shortly. However, there are two external reports—the Kable report and the LSE report. Both estimate the cost of the scheme as approximately between £15 billion and £19 billion. That is roughly three times the figure with which the Home Office has come up. As I shall explain, the figures in the reports are more plausible than those of the Home Office. We are considering a 10-year programme and anyone who estimates the cost as being less than a few billion pounds at this stage is unwise.The Home Secretary disputes the LSE's figures, but another company has also estimated the cost to be approximately £15 billion. An expert from Belgium who advised the Government on their plans said:

"I'm afraid a lot of money will be wasted and that the real cost will be much higher than any of the figures currently being suggested".

Whom should we believe—independent organisations or the Government? The Government claimed that the criminal court computer system would cost less than £150 million but the actual cost was £400 million. The Government said that moving GCHQ's computers to another building would cost £20 million, yet it cost £450 million. Recently the Government overspent on computer projects by £2 billion. Why should we believe them?

Photo of Mark Fisher Mark Fisher Labour, Stoke-on-Trent Central

Given the importance of cost, would not it be more satisfactory for the House to proceed by inviting a Select Committee to hold an inquiry into the costs to establish whether the disparity between the LSE figures and those of the Government is credible, and to reach a figure on which the House can agree before we make a final decision on the Bill?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. He may remember that on Second Reading, and I think even on Third Reading, I offered the Government a Joint Committee. The idea had stemmed from the newest Member of the House, my hon. Friend Sir Patrick Cormack—who, of course, is not really the newest Member at all. It struck me as a sensible idea, and I put it to the Government twice. Twice the Government turned it down. I do not think we can stand by and let the Bill proceed through its stages after being turned down twice and not being given a proper response by the Government twice.

Photo of Andrew Love Andrew Love Labour, Edmonton

Does not the essential difference between the LSE's position and that of the Government lie in whether there is a 10-year or a five-year cycle for identity cards? Does not all the evidence about biometrics suggest that the cycle should be closer to five years than to 10?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

That was part of the difference, as I understand it. I do not think that the Home Secretary was right when he said that it doubled the cost; I think it adds several hundred million pounds, but I do not think it doubles the cost. As for the other point, what is the practical cycle for biometrics? One of them involves a picture of the individual's face. The Government say that 10 years is good enough, while the LSE favours five years. I have known the Home Secretary for more than 10 years, and I think he has changed a bit in that time. I would go for the five-year cycle if I were him.

Photo of Martin Linton Martin Linton Labour, Battersea

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

I think that I should finish what I have to say. We must allow some other Members to speak at some point today.

Why should people have to pay for the Prime Minister's pet project? Will they have to pay to change their names when they get married? Will they have to pay again when they change their addresses?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

Or their gender, indeed. I do not know whether that is an expression of ambition. Now I am shocking the Home Secretary.

Who will pay for the means testing? Who will carry it out—means testing, that is, not gender change? What will it cost? All those questions remain unanswered.

Photo of Kate Hoey Kate Hoey Labour, Vauxhall

Will the right hon. Gentleman give us his take on what the Home Secretary said about what I would describe as the Irish question? Did the right hon. Gentleman understand the Home Secretary to say that those who live in this country and perceive themselves to be Irish—many of my constituents have lived in this country for many years, and still consider themselves to be Irish—would need identity cards?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

According to what I understood the Home Secretary to say, the answer is no. There is a huge lacuna in this proposal.

Photo of Simon Hughes Simon Hughes Shadow Attorney General

No library books for the Irish!

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

A new Liberal Democrat policy is being founded, it seems.

The simple fact is that there is a common travel area between us and Ireland, and I understand that there is no proposal to change that. It gives citizens of each country an absolute right to travel freely in the other country. The Irish Parliament may well choose not to introduce a system like this, but if it does, such a system—contrary to what the Home Secretary said earlier—will require information exchange. It is impossible for an identity card system to work in two countries without the exchange of information between them.

Photo of Andrew MacKinlay Andrew MacKinlay Labour, Thurrock

There is no way the Irish Parliament would accept that.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

I suspect that there is no way a number of members of the Democratic Unionist party would accept it either, but that is another matter. There is a serious problem here, which cuts a huge hole in proposals for any serious security-based identification mechanism.

It is no surprise that the Government's plans have come to be seen as a plastic poll tax. They are excessive, expensive, unnecessary, unworkable and, now, unpopular. They have no clear purpose, and they are no guarantee against fraud. It is hard to escape the conclusion that they are an answer in search of a question or a solution in search of a problem.

All along, I have made it clear that I would not normally countenance ID cards, but I was prepared to give the Government a chance to make their case. In my view, however, they have failed to do so. ID cards represent a clear and present threat to the everyday freedoms and liberties of the British people. Some people question why there is such concern about a little plastic card. The answer is that there is not. There is concern about what lies behind that little plastic card.

The Government are planning to establish a massive identity database in Whitehall that will contain all sorts of personal information about people in this country. The database will have a number of access points, and there will be nothing to prevent someone from inserting a virus at any one of those access points which could render the entire database open to fraud. When I asked some of Britain's most senior police officers what could be done to stop that happening, they could not give me an answer. Even today, no one has been able to do so. The concerns remain.

Last month, the New Statesman reported a meeting with a young professional mathematician, who said that it "wouldn't be hard" to steal someone's identity under the Government's scheme. He asked:

"What's a biometric? It tells you that this card matches that iris. It doesn't tell you who I am, though. I'd just take someone else's life details . . . register those with my own biometric and name. There, I've faked an ID".

Do the Government have a solution to that problem? No. Even worse, the mathematician went on to state that

"half the members of every university maths department in Britain" could probably break the system. I know that fewer people are studying maths under this Government, but even so, that would be too many.

Photo of John Baron John Baron Shadow Minister (Health)

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, even if the biometrics were 100 per cent. foolproof, which many of us doubt, the problem with preventing terrorism would be that, under the present legislation, terrorists would still have the option to cross national boundaries using tourist visas that were not based on biometrics? This casts a great deal of doubt on the use of ID cards in relation to the prevention of terrorism.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Shadow Secretary of State (Home Office)

My hon. Friend makes a good point. We must also remember the three-month period—I almost said "exclusion zone"—allowed for people visiting from the European Union. Also, it is well known in security circles that the identity card systems of some countries on the continent are easier to get into than others. They could provide an access point, too. The gateway control in this scheme will be incredibly difficult. Huge numbers of people will be involved. The Passport Office stated today that about 4.5 million people a year would have to be interviewed in the near future. That gives us an idea of the sheer size of the problem. The system will, I am afraid, be eminently penetrable.

The database will also be open to abuse. A disgruntled Minister, official or civil servant could access information about anyone in the country, pretty much at the touch of a button. People might say that that seems like paranoia, but I remember how this Government tried to smear Pam Warren of the Paddington survivors' group, to savage the reputation of 94-year-old Rose Addis, and to rubbish the reputations of Martin Sixsmith and David Kelly.

The Home Secretary was at it again this morning. He launched a savage attack on Simon Davies of the LSE—[Interruption.] I do not know what the Home Secretary has against people called Davies. I have nothing against people called Clarke. His savage attack on this respected academic was implicitly an attack on the 14 senior professors involved in the LSE's project, but he picked out that particular man and called him "partisan" and "technically incompetent". Why? Because he disagrees with the Home Secretary. As usual, if the Government do not like the message, they shoot the messenger. We have seen this time and again; the way in which the Government treat people who disagree with them is a disgrace, and this does not make me any more inclined to support plans that would give them even more control over the public's personal information.

The Bill is a step too far. If the Government really want to tackle benefit fraud, there are better ways of doing it. If they want to tackle crime, they should put more police on the streets. If they want to tackle terrorism, they should introduce greater control and surveillance at British ports. If their plan is to tackle illegal working, they should get a grip on the shambles of the asylum system. For each and every problem that will supposedly be dealt with by ID cards, there is a better, cheaper and more cost-effective solution that does not threaten to remove the long-held and fought-for freedoms of the British people.

There was a time when Labour Governments were elected to fight poverty, but the cost of ID cards will only make people poorer. There was a time when they tried to pursue fairness, but as the GMB trade union says, ID cards will discriminate against and stigmatise minority and disabled groups. There was a time when the Labour party stood up for people's freedoms. Since 1997, it has been attacking our freedom piece by piece and bit by bit.

Today's proposals are the final straw. We should not be party to seeing them passed. We will not be thanked by today's generation for whom the extra cost will be too much to bear. We will not be thanked by future generations, who will look back to today and ask why we let this change occur. We will not be thanked by an older generation who fought to protect the very liberty that we now propose to give away. We should not countenance these plans, which are illiberal and impractical, excessive and expensive, unnecessary and unworkable. That is why we will vote against the Bill this evening.


The Simon Davies to whom Davis (and Clarke) refer is the Director General of Privacy International, not the footballer described in the Wikipedia link under his name. Reference: http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/050628_id_cards_co... Pam Warren, who was seriously injured in the 1999 Paddington train crash, became spokeswoman for the Paddington Survivors' Group. A government advisor tried to find out about the political affiliations of members of the Group -- asking, "Basically, are they Tories?" -- though he denied that this referred to Pam Warren herself. Reference: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/946408.stm Rose Addis was the subject of a 2002 controversy over treatment in Whittington Hospital in Stoke Newington. I'm not quite sure what Davis is referring to here, but perhaps the accusations of racism which were made about her. Reference: http://society.guardian.co.uk/Politics/publicservices/page/0... Martin Sixsmith, a former BBC news reader, was communications director at the Department of Transport in 2001-2. He became embroiled in a row with Jo Moore, another special advisor who infamously issued a memo after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 stating that it would be "a good day to bury bad news". He and Moore resigned after a further bad-tempered row over spin, but not before Stephen Byers, then transport minister, lied to Parliament about the timing of Sixsmith's resignation and prompted Sir Richard Mottram, permanent secretary at the Department, to state that, We're all fucked. I'm fucked. You're fucked. The whole department's fucked. It's been the biggest cock-up ever and we're all completely fucked" (though in Hansard the verb was bowdlerised to "stymied"). Sixsmith was alleged to have lied about the circumstances of his forced resignation from his post, and at the time "had been warned that Downing Street was trying to smear him by telling journalists to ask about his 'property portfolio'". References: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/02... http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1838652.stm http://slate.msn.com/id/2062517/entry/2062518/ Whatever the specifics of the cases which Davis mentions, it is certainly true that the...

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Several hon. Members:


Photo of Alan Haselhurst Alan Haselhurst Chairman of Ways and Means

Order. I remind the House that Mr. Speaker has placed a 10-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches, which comes into operation now.

Photo of David Winnick David Winnick Labour, Walsall North 5:10 pm, 28th June 2005

To get matters in perspective, perhaps we should remember that the Leader of the Opposition was an ardent supporter of ID cards, and had he got his way it is likely that a Tory Government would have introduced them. I am also pretty certain that we, the then Opposition, would have opposed them. I am not sure whether there is some consistency there.

Even were there not the many practical problems in relation to technology, the final cost and so on, I would have the utmost reservations about the reintroduction of identity cards. I do not believe that they are necessary; indeed, I believe that they are irrelevant to the many problems that we undoubtedly face. I would require compelling and coherent reasons for such cards to be brought back after more than half a century. However ably my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary put forward his case today, I simply do not believe that a real case has been made for identity cards. I said earlier—obviously, my assessment could be wrong—that were there to be a free vote tonight, this Bill would not get a Second Reading.

All the problems that have been mentioned as reasons why we should have identity cards are undoubtedly problems—no one denies that. Most EU countries have identity cards, which in some cases date back to dictatorships—although I do not question that those countries are now as much democracies as the United Kingdom—but do not those countries have problems with illegal immigration, benefit fraud and identity fraud? Are those not problems that are common to virtually all industrialised, advanced countries? It is therefore difficult to see the argument that such problems would be solved if we had identity cards, which are pretty useless unless compulsory—what purpose is a voluntary identity card?—so obviously compulsion will come in due course.

Photo of David Winnick David Winnick Labour, Walsall North

If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I will continue.

The previous Home Secretary accepted, like my right hon. Friend today, that the mass murders that took place in Istanbul and Madrid would not have been prevented by identity cards, however biometric they might be. I did hear my right hon. Friend say today, however, that it was easier for the Spanish to identify the culprits. I have doubts about that. After all, the Spanish have been faced with a long, murderous campaign by ETA, and have they been successful in identifying those responsible? Again, I have doubts.

We are told that the police consider that the cards would generally be a help. Were it left to the police, however, I wonder whether identity cards would ever have been abolished in the first place. As hon. Members know, a case brought by a police constable in 1952, which was thrown out by the court, led the Government of the day to abolish them.

As has been mentioned, all this started some three years ago as a Home Office consultation document described as being about entitlement, not identity cards. It gave all the reasons—such as fraud and so on—why it would be useful to have what was described as an entitlement card. It had nothing to do with terrorism whatsoever. Indeed, the point was made in that 2002 Home Office consultation document that in respect of identity fraud, such a card could do a disservice. It argued that too much reliance would be placed on the card and that the usual safeguards currently employed by financial institutions and others could go by the board.

I have the utmost fear that—

Photo of Douglas Hogg Douglas Hogg Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham

The implied admission by the Home Office is that identity cards can be forged.

Photo of David Winnick David Winnick Labour, Walsall North

No one would deny the obvious, which is that biometric cards would be that much more difficult to forge. We can take that for granted, but it is difficult to believe that international criminal gangs—they are very different from the round-the-corner gangs—that would have so much incentive to forge these cards would not try to do so. It is also difficult to believe that they would not prove successful in some respects. So even on the issue of forgery, we should not be too complacent.

Photo of David Winnick David Winnick Labour, Walsall North

If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I will not.

When the Home Affairs Committee took evidence, the point was made by a number of witnesses that it is not just the identity card but the database and the national identity register that should give a good deal of cause for concern. They certainly gave me, if not my colleagues on the Home Affairs Committee, cause for concern. Indeed, rather than voting for the majority report, I wrote a minority amendment to it.

If this proposal comes to fruition, even when we change address—except for the shortest possible period—we will have to notify the authorities. Some may say, "Why should we not?" I say, "Why should we?" It is argued that the authorities already hold a great deal of information on individuals via the national health service and national insurance, for example, but that is not the subject of any controversy. Indeed, Labour Members are all in favour of holding information relating to welfare benefits and so on, but that is not an argument for extending the amount of information held by the authorities; it is certainly not an argument for having the proposed database.

In fact, schedule 1 could be amended not by primary but by secondary legislation, so that the list of information that might be included on the register could be added to. That is why there is concern about function creep. It is true that such information could be added to only with the authority of both Houses. Nevertheless, more such information will be added over time, and the Government of the day—it might not be a Labour Government—will justify doing so by claiming that it is absolutely essential.

There is a particular point to which I cannot help returning. If what my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary had to say today is so reassuring, why is the Information Commissioner so concerned? He is not involved in party politics. He is not trying to make party political points. He has a job to do. In the light of the points that he has made, which have been quoted today—indeed, he made others when he gave evidence before the Home Affairs Committee—we should certainly be worried. He told the Committee that if such cards were introduced, there would be a sea change in the relationship between the state and the individual. Are we simply going to dismiss such points, saying that they are of no importance? This is why some of us continue to be so concerned about what is happening.

I do not believe that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and his Cabinet colleagues have a hidden agenda. I do not believe that they are trying to bring about the kind of society that the Opposition spokesman claimed. I have known a good number of Ministers for many years and I have no reason to doubt their integrity. In my view, they believe that they are acting in the national interest. It is not their integrity but their judgment that I question. On this issue, they are wrong. They have not considered sufficiently all the proposal's implications.

I realise that it is argued that, regardless of critics in the House of Commons and in the other place, public opinion is more or less in favour of identity cards—but public opinion can shift. One reason why public opinion has so far been in favour is the result of high expectations. It is thought that the problems of illegal immigration, asylum seekers and all the rest of it—problems that we encountered on the doorstep time and again during the election campaign—will all be resolved if only we have identity cards. However, as the cost comes to be more widely known, attitudes will change. Even if we dismiss the figures of the London School of Economics, which may have exaggerated the costs, it is pretty certain that the costs now ventured by the Government are unlikely to be the final costs. Who really believes otherwise?

I have very carefully considered—it is a matter for me as an individual, as I do not belong to any particular grouping within the parliamentary party—how I should vote. I always knew that I could not vote in favour of the Bill. Given the strong views that I have long held on this issue since the idea of ID cards was first introduced, that would be a form of political prostitution on my part. I asked myself whether I should therefore abstain because I am a supporter of the Government and I want them to do well. As a Labour Member, I obviously want the Government to be re-elected in due course. However much I tried to justify to myself the idea of abstaining, I simply could not do so. I have therefore reached the conclusion that it would be totally wrong—indeed, in some respects even dishonourable—for me to do other than vote against the Bill on Second Reading. That is what I must do.


Whatever happened to voting how his constituants wanted him to? Putting personal opinions above their wishes, thats "dishonourable" - democracy in action.

Submitted by R S Read 1 more annotation

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs 5:21 pm, 28th June 2005

As politicians, we always have to make judgments before supporting any measure. We need to be convinced in the first place that we understand and agree with the purpose of legislation; then we have to believe that the costs are not excessive either to society or the individual. Thirdly, we need to be convinced that any measure can work and be effective. Finally, and most importantly for Liberals, we need to be convinced that the impact on society and civil liberties will not be extensive. On all four counts, we believe that the Identity Cards Bill fails. I want to explore some of those issues in greater detail.

Let us first consider the Bill's purpose. The Government keep changing their minds—every time that they advance an argument and it is knocked down, they have to find a different argument in favour. They started off with terrorism, before moving to health tourism; then it was benefit fraud; then illegal working; and now, finally, they are going for ID theft. On each occasion, the argument is put forward and then defeated.

Dealing with terrorism is the first justification. Liberal Democrats never underestimated the need to put forward measures to make this country safer in respect of a terrorist attack. However, as we have already heard in the debate, the issue of whether a terrorist identity is critical is, in fact, a false argument. We know what happened in Madrid and New York, and we know from the cases of David Copeland and Richard Reed that those individuals made no attempt to disguise their identities. The Home Secretary mentioned Madrid, but I specifically went there to speak to the authorities in order to ascertain whether ID cards would have made a difference. The authorities were very clear indeed that they did not believe that having an ID card would have made any difference; it would not have helped to stop the terrorist attack. To put it bluntly, a determined suicide bomber or terrorist will not be deterred by such a card. The problem of identity is, in most cases, simply not an issue.

Photo of Tom Harris Tom Harris Labour, Glasgow South

Does the hon. Gentleman nevertheless accept what my right hon. Friend said in his statement—that even if ID cards could not have prevented the Madrid atrocities, they certainly helped the authorities to track down the culprits?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

In that particular case, that is so, but it would not necessarily require an ID card to make the link with a mobile phone. In other words, there are other ways of achieving that.

About a third of terrorists use multiple forms of identity, so the Government have claimed that ID cards would help in tracking down terrorists. Once again, that is a false and a dangerous argument. Nothing in what the Government have suggested would prevent international terrorists from coming into this country with false documents—what are known as seed documents—and registering under a different name for an ID card with their biometrics on it. Indeed, that highlights the danger of ID cards providing a false sense of security. Unless an international system is put in place, and countries such as Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia all signed up to the same form of biometrics, there is no reason to assume that individuals could be stopped from moving around with different identities in different countries.

Photo of Kali Mountford Kali Mountford Labour, Colne Valley

I shall put to the hon. Gentleman the question that I put to David Davis. I accept the argument that someone may register under a false identity in the first place, but how does that person then obtain five or six more identities in order to evade justice?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

That is what people are doing already. They will be able to move from country to country because the biometric systems will not be available in those countries. It is a fundamental flaw in the terrorist argument.

The final argument on terrorism is simple. If it is so urgent, and if the threat from terrorists in this country is so compelling, why will we have to wait 10 years for the system to become compulsory? If we need it for that reason, surely we need it now.

The next argument the Government made was on benefit fraud. The Home Office and other Departments' figures on benefit fraud show that only 5 per cent. of cases of benefit fraud relate to people pretending to be somebody else. That equates to some £50 million of fraud a year. The vast amount of benefit fraud involves individuals pretending to have something wrong with them when they do not—it does not involve issues of identity. Therefore, ID cards will do nothing to help tackle that problem.

Then the Government raised the issue of health tourism and health fraud. However, the Home Secretary did not clarify how ID cards would be used to combat that problem. What would happen? Would I have to have my iris scanned or fingerprints taken before I could see my GP? Would every post office have a reader in place to prevent benefit fraud? If someone wants to access emergency health care at an accident and emergency department, would they have to have their iris scanned? Who will manage that process? Would we ask front-line professionals in the health service to take decisions about who they scan? If the programme is not to be rolled out nationally, would the Government suggest that certain health authorities in areas with certain types of ethnic communities should be encouraged to implement that programme?

Photo of Gwyneth Dunwoody Gwyneth Dunwoody Labour, Crewe and Nantwich

During the course of taking evidence on laser surgery, it became clear to me that most consultant optometrists agreed that accurate information would not be available, even with modern techniques. They made it clear that they thought that the system would not work.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

I am grateful for that intervention and I shall deal shortly with the failure rate of iris scans in the Home Office's own studies.If the reason for ID cards is health fraud, it obviously has not been thought through and it is hard to see how any system would operate.

Photo of Martin Linton Martin Linton Labour, Battersea

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the national health service makes no checks on identity before providing emergency treatment? Does he suggest that the NHS should make no checks on entitlement to free treatment when it has such checks at its disposal?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

When the hon. Gentleman went into an accident and emergency department to have his arm treated, would he have liked it if a front-line professional had had to ask for his identity before that could be done? How would such a proposal operate in reality and how would we fund having iris scanners or other biometric equipment in every department in the health service? It is not workable.

Photo of Martin Linton Martin Linton Labour, Battersea

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that it is NHS policy not to make any identity checks when people come into accident and emergency departments, but only after the emergency has been dealt with?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

It makes no difference at what point identity is checked. The point is whether we should ask the health service to fund the checks or ask health professionals to take decisions about whether to ask for the information. I do not want to live in a society in which I have to have my fingerprints or other biometric information taken before I can be treated.

I wish to move on to the Government's next argument, which was about tackling illegal working. This is one of the Government's most disingenuous arguments. We all want to tackle illegal working, but we already have a system in place where individuals who come into this country as asylum seekers or workers have to possess a form of identification. It is possible for the police or the gangmasters who employ such people to check those working documents. What difference will it make if those individuals have to have an ID card? Will the police carry out more checks than they do at present? Will the gangmasters suddenly demand to see ID cards before they employ those people? Sadly, the kind of people who employ illegal workers will not take part in that process. The idea that ID cards will tackle illegal working can be dismissed.

What about the Government's latest suggestion that the card will deal with identity theft? Again, they have got it wrong. The Government argue that about £1.3 billion of identity theft takes place in the UK, but a vast amount occurs through the internet or with credit cards, so I fail to understand how an ID card will tackle that problem. The Association for Payment Clearing Services says that only 36 million of the 500 million cases of plastic fraud are classified as identity fraud. The association is not convinced that an ID card will help in tackling those issues, especially internet fraud. The Government have put up an argument about ID theft, but in reality the ID card will not help to tackle that issue.

Photo of Robert Marshall-Andrews Robert Marshall-Andrews Labour, Medway

On that interesting issue, the document notes that £400 million of that £1.3 billion related to money laundering. In 2001, such cases involved people going into bureaux de change with suitcases full of old, mainly Scottish, notes. That is where the money comes from, so how will the situation be improved by an identity card?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

The hon. and learned Gentleman makes my point. The Government state a figure, make out that there is a major problem and suggest that ID cards can solve it. In reality when we break down the figures we realise that the cards will not help to deal with the problem.

Even if we were to accept that all those problems could be solved by the use of ID cards, and even if we bought into the Government's arguments, from terrorism to ID theft, we would still have to consider whether we can set up such a system at a reasonable cost. That is the most complex part of the debate.

The Liberal Democrats accept the need to upgrade passports, so we are arguing not against the total cost, but against the costs that are additional to what we accept needs to be done under our international responsibilities. However, the problem is that the Government are, yet again, being disingenuous; they are suggesting a level of upgrade for passports that is not actually needed, and in doing so they are trying to hide and bring in the full cost of ID cards under a passport scheme. That is wrong both in my judgment and in that of the authors of the LSE report, who state:

"We find that the Government is unnecessarily binding the identity card scheme to internationally recognised requirements on passport documents. By doing so, the Government has failed to correctly interpret international standards, generating unnecessary costs, using untested technologies and going well beyond the measures adopted in any other country that seeks to meet international obligations."

We are gold-plating-plus what is required for the upgrading of passports, and the Government are using that to hide some of the costs of ID cards.

We do not need to look at the recent LSE report for the costings or to listen to Kable's assessment of the costs; we simply have to look at the Government's own costs to realise that they are spiralling out of control. When the House last debated the costs involved, we were told that the cost for an individual would be about £77 and that the overall cost would be £3.1 billion—yet according to the Government's figures today the cost will be £93 for an individual and the overall total has risen to £5.8 billion. In such a short time, there has been a huge increase. That is not a dodgy LSE report but the Home Office's estimate of the costs.

Photo of David Heath David Heath Shadow Leader of the House of Commons, Shadow Spokesperson (Cabinet Office)

Another cost to the individual has not been highlighted. We are told that what the Government euphemistically call enrolment centres, where people are supposed to be measured, will be no more than 45 minutes travel time. That is a fantasy in rural areas where 45 minutes would take a person no further than the bus stop outside their house, because there are no buses. For a large number of people in rural areas, there would be a huge additional cost to get to an enrolment centre to be measured. Should not those people receive a rebate if there is to be equity?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point in several regards. There will be the cost and inconvenience of travel to those large processing centres, especially in rural areas. I have visited one such centre outside Madrid; it was huge. The Government have not fully factored in the additional hidden costs of building such enormous centres all over the country.

Photo of Douglas Hogg Douglas Hogg Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham

The point goes even further than Mr. Heath suggests. People in rural areas will have to take a whole day off work, and that is an enormous cost to an individual.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

Imagine an average family with two teenage children and maybe a granny, and you can bet your bottom dollar the person will have to go to the centre four or five times a year, taking different family members each time. The public have not realised the costs and inconvenience involved. When they realise that that is what they will actually have to do—

Photo of Adam Afriyie Adam Afriyie Conservative, Windsor

Does the hon. Gentleman consider it dignified for the elderly and those with disabilities to queue to have their retinas scanned and their fingerprints taken to be processed by the Government?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

It is certainly much more intrusive than the current system, which involves going to Boots to have a photograph taken and then sending the passport off. We must recognise that the process and the way it is handled will have quite an impact on people who feel uncomfortable about having their fingerprints, face and irises scanned.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

I want to move on.

There is another issue, in relation to costs. If the Government are serious about rolling out the scheme to tackle benefit fraud, have they considered the cost of putting scanning machines in all the outlets? We are told, again from Home Office figures, that the reading equipment will cost between £250 and £750. Just putting readers in every single post office would cost £11 million. Interestingly, the Home Secretary seemed to imply that the decision whether to purchase readers would be down to individual authorities. It is interesting, is it not, that health authorities and local government may end up picking up the bill?

There is one hope in relation to costs: they may ultimately be the way in which we can defeat ID card bills. I want to ask the Minister—he may intervene on me—to clarify what the Prime Minister meant when he said:

"So you have got a process which you are only at the very beginning of now, but it stands to reason, no government is going to be introducing ID cards if the cost to the public is seen by them as unreasonable."

Is that a promise that if the figures rise, the Government will abandon the scheme, and will the Minister describe what he regards as unreasonable? I regard a scheme that costs £10 billion plus to be an unreasonable scheme.

Photo of Mark Fisher Mark Fisher Labour, Stoke-on-Trent Central

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the cost to the public will include the cost of readers, and that tens of thousands of readers for all the public services will ultimately be involved, if and when the scheme becomes compulsory? Those costs will be very considerable, and while the public may not pay directly, they will pay, because all those authorities will have to increase their charges. The cost to the public will be very high, even if it is not a direct cost.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point. My fear is simply this. Now that the Home Secretary has indicated that in Committee he is prepared to consider putting a cap on the charge, he has bound himself to say that he is going to charge only a certain amount. But we know that the Government will have to find the money somewhere, so it will go on to tax generally. People will either pay for it individually or they will pay for it through general taxation. We believe that that is wrong and that the figure is getting too large.

Even if one accepted, first, that the proposals had a purpose, and secondly, that this was the right price to pay, one would still have to make the case that the scheme could work, and that is the point at which we reach the issue of the database. There are two questions about the database. The first is whether it is workable. I am not going to rehearse all the arguments, but we know the figures in relation to Government databases; the success rate is pretty appalling. Despite the Home Office success on passports, the general assumption on Government IT schemes is that they go wrong or over budget, or most likely both.

The second question concerning the database is the crucial issue, which has been touched on by the shadow Home Secretary in particular. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the nervousness that Opposition Members feel about what could happen to that database and about who can access it. We might also fast-forward to what we could be doing with that database in 10 or 15 years' time. Technology already exists to use CCTV cameras to recognise faces in public. It is not beyond the reasonable bounds of possibility that one could link those CCTV cameras with the facial scan and then start to link that into the database. I am concerned about that, and I am not alone. The Information Commissioner has said that he is concerned that each development puts in place another component in the infrastructure of a "surveillance society". He is concerned about the way in which demands will grow for individuals to prove their identity; the broad purposes permit function-creep into unforeseen and perhaps unacceptable areas of private life. We must look carefully at what could be done next with the database, as technology progresses.

Photo of Diane Abbott Diane Abbott Labour, Hackney North and Stoke Newington

On the question of the database, as if the scenario that the hon. Gentleman outlines were not frightening enough, as one of the few Members who has had occasion to see their security file, I have to tell the House that it was full of duff information, and that I find the idea that duff information could be rolled forward in that way even more alarming. The proposal is bad enough if the database is accurate, but if the database contains inaccuracies, it is made much worse.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

I do not want to get into what may be inaccurate, but I certainly agree that the concerns about such misinformation suddenly becoming accessible to so many individuals are troublesome. If such a system were used in the health services in some way and, for example, a woman presented herself to a doctor about a termination, would that information be held on the database? What other organisations could gain access to it?

Photo of Andy Burnham Andy Burnham Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)

No, not at all.


It is not clear...

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Continue reading (and 1 more annotation)

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

The Minister disagrees from a sedentary position, but he must recognise that there is real concern, particularly when public services are linked to the database, about what can be held and who can gain access to that information.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

The situation is made worse by the fact that this is an enabling Bill—it is devoid of detail—so those questions cannot be answered. I do not think they can even be answered by the Government, who hope that we will shut our eyes to the difficulties that lie ahead and take the Bill on trust. That trust does not exist, either in the House or among the public, and the hon. Gentleman should highlight those concerns further.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

The hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right. We are being asked not only to sign a blank cheque for the costs involved, but to sign up to all sorts of function creep that can be added to the proposal.

I want to turn to whether or not the proposal can operate in reality. We have concerns about the database, but our latest concern, which the Government have not addressed during the debate, is whether or not the biometrics will work in the first place. The Government helpfully did their own study, and what did they find? They found that, on face verification, 33 per cent. of faces could not be recognised; on fingerprint verification, 19 per cent. could not be recognised; and, on iris verification, 2 per cent. could not be recognised. [Interruption.] I am not surprised that the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality wants to leave because there are difficult answers to be given.

The failure rates—up to a third on facial scans—imply that a lot more work is needed before the biometrics could be trusted. I am no mathematician, but even if the Government got the failure rate down to 3 or 4 per cent., with a population of 60 million, far too many people could end up being denied services or being hassled because the scheme had not operated properly.


The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality is Tony McNulty.

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot

Photo of Patrick Hall Patrick Hall Labour, Bedford

With regard to the efficacy of the iris biometrics, why is the hon. Gentleman ready to dismiss the Cambridge university report alluded to earlier this afternoon? Does he not think it premature to dismiss an examination of the iris recognition immigration system that will be introduced at Heathrow airport? Can we not learn from those initiatives? Is the hon. Gentleman not prepared to keep an open mind about that in the light of what will take place?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

The Home Secretary has been telling us all afternoon that we should listen not to the academics but to the Home Office, so I am taking his advice and listening to the Home Office's study, which shows those appalling failure rates. The system failed not in an academic study but in a live situation, with real people using the equipment.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

No, I want to push on because other hon. Members wish to speak.

I want to touch on the Bill's civil liberty implications, which have not been thought through in great detail, by picking up on an intervention that I made during the Home Secretary's speech. I have a very real concern about the fact that certain ethnic groups will regularly be asked to show their cards. That concern relates not to the police—I accept the Government's promises in the Bill that the police will not be able to ask such questions—but to access to public services.

The small print of the regulatory impact assessment makes the point:

"As pressures grow on public services, service providers will have to bring in complex procedures for checking a range of documentation as the old assumptions that if you are here you are probably here legally is no longer acceptable. There are also cultural problems about getting service providers to ask only certain groups for proof of identity for fear of being accused of discrimination."

There it is in print; it is extraordinary that the Government admit in the regulatory impact assessment that only certain groups will be asked for proof of identity. That is the proof that the Bill could have an impact on ethnic minorities.

Photo of John Denham John Denham Chair, Home Affairs Committee

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that hospital trusts currently have the legal requirement to establish whether patients are legally entitled to NHS treatment so that if they are not, they can be properly charged? That applies to visitors to this country with long-standing conditions who present for treatment. If he is opposed to asking such people whether they are entitled to NHS treatment and to charging them for that treatment, will he say so, because he would thus be arguing against the whole principle of identifying people's entitlement to services, not an ID card?

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

I am opposed to the compulsory system towards which we are heading which will, in the Government's words, put pressure on front-line public services to require certain ethnic groups to show proof of identify, despite the fact that I would not be asked to show the same proof of identity.

Photo of Lembit Ípik Lembit Ípik Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Affairs, Shadow Secretary of State for Wales, Welsh Affairs

Is my hon. Friend aware how out of kilter Labour Members are? Wales, which has a Labour-led Administration, has voted to oppose the mandatory use of identity cards for access to public services. Labour Members need to realise that other members of the party of government in other parts of the United Kingdom have already rejected the proposal.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

My hon. Friend's intervention illustrates the wisdom of the Welsh. I understand that the Scottish Executive have taken a similar position.

I want to address the question whether the scheme will be voluntary or compulsory. The Government say at this stage that the scheme will be voluntary, but surely that is slightly disingenuous. Are we not heading towards a situation in which perhaps half hon. Members in the Chamber will have to have an ID card in three or four years because their passports will be due for renewal, while I will not need an ID card because my passport is not due for renewal until 2012? There will be a compulsory element to the scheme for perhaps half the population as their passports gradually approach the time for renewal.

We are in a real mess. The system will mean that over the next few years it will be compulsory for some people to have an ID card, yet some people will not need a card because their passports will not be up for renewal and others will never have to hold a card because they do not have passports. However, at some point—we have not been told when—the whole system will become compulsory, so we will all be required to have ID cards.

Photo of Lynne Jones Lynne Jones Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

The hon. Gentleman is correct, but the Bill will allow the Secretary of State to decide that certain categories of individuals will be required to have an identity card.

Photo of Mark Oaten Mark Oaten Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Home Affairs

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We will have a two-tier society—a some-in, some-out society—in which ID cards will be compulsory for some but not others. I do not understand how the system will work in such circumstances. I accept that the police will not be able to ask individuals to show their cards straight away, but if they asked people to take their ID cards to a police station within three or four days, as they will be able to do, the individuals could simply say, "No, because I don't have a passport and I don't need an ID card," and the police would have no idea whether they were being told the truth. What would happen in those circumstances? What is the point of a scheme that one half of the population has to opt in to but the other half does not?

We need to wake up to the reality of what the country will be like when the scheme becomes compulsory. What kind of state will we live in? People will have to take their families to a processing centre miles away, including granny, who has never had a passport, so that she can be put through the humiliating process. There will be long queues at the processing centres while people's fingerprints and irises are scanned, and then a considerable cheque to pay for the whole family will have to be signed. There will also be costs every time people move house. People will have to have their faces and irises scanned when they visit their GPs. No wonder public opinion is shifting on the issue. It is no longer the case that 80 per cent. of people are in favour of the scheme. Opinion is shifting as people are finding out the details of what the Bill will do, and it will shift even more.

The public know that this £1 billion project will go over budget, that these pieces of plastic will not tackle terrorism and that the system will be neither compulsory nor voluntary. The database will make the Child Support Agency mess-up look like a tea party. People who look like an illegal worker or a terrorist will be stopped and asked to prove their identity under the scheme. People will have to turn up at centres miles away from their homes at which their irises and fingerprints will be scanned in an intrusive way.

If someone had said in 1997 that eight years later we would have a Labour Government who had tried to abolish trial by jury, who wanted to lock people up under house arrest at the say-so of a politician, who tried to remove benefits from asylum seekers and who tried to ban freedom of speech, it would have been unbelievable. Now, in about four hours' time, the Government will add to that list by trying to introduce compulsory ID cards. The scheme is illiberal, wrong and will not work, so we will vote against it.

Photo of George Howarth George Howarth Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East 5:49 pm, 28th June 2005

I am slightly puzzled by the contribution of Mr. Oaten. Either he has not read the Bill and does not know what is in it, or he has done so but has not understood it. In either event, he seemed to be talking about something entirely different from the Bill.

When members of the Conservative party cry freedom, as David Davis did earlier, we know that one of two things is under way. Either France is about to invade or there is a leadership contest. In this case, we know which test was met. [Interruption.] Perhaps both were met—I have to admit that I had not allowed for the possibility that both events were going on at the same time.

There are two things that we must determine on Second Reading. First, is an identity card scheme right in principle and, secondly, is this particular scheme, given the consequences that will follow, the right one? I believe strongly, and have done so for many years, that a national identity cards system is right, for all the reasons that have been stated. The arguments against such a system, particularly the argument about the erosion of freedom, are bogus. What is the freedom about which we are so concerned? Is it the freedom not to have to prove that one is who one says one is? One would have the freedom to pretend to be someone else, but I do not think we should defend that in the House. Alternatively, would one have the freedom to evade demonstrating who one is?

Photo of Tobias Ellwood Tobias Ellwood Opposition Whip (Commons)

The hon. Gentleman talked about freedoms and the freedom to show that one is innocent. How can it be considered free when individuals can be charged up to £100 for that liberty?

Photo of George Howarth George Howarth Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East

The hon. Gentleman is conflating two arguments, but if he is patient, I will refer to cost in a moment. I am genuinely concerned about which freedom is being taken away from whom.

Photo of George Howarth George Howarth Labour, Knowsley North and Sefton East

No, I said that would give way only once.

The issue of which freedom is being taken away from whom has not been properly addressed so far, and I have yet to understand it fully myself. The issue would be more clear-cut if from the outset it was made explicit that the scheme should be compulsory. In those circumstances, the arguments about whether someone who had to apply for a passport would face a requirement not faced by people who chose not to have passports—essentially, those arguments are about the fair treatment of different individuals—would not arise. Nevertheless, for understandable reasons, the Government have decided to do it this way, and I am prepared to accept the principle behind what they are trying to achieve.

Three issues need to be addressed as the legislation progresses. Rather than deal with them exhaustively, I shall be brief. First, the issue of cost has been repeatedly raised. It is crucial to maintain the high level of public support for the principle of ID cards. If costs at the end of the process are too high, the value of having an identity card system would have to be demonstrated or it would rapidly become unpopular and lose the public support required for its introduction. Secondly, people must be satisfied about security and the safeguards in place to protect information held on the central register. They have legitimate concerns about who will have access to sensitive information about them and for what purpose. We have not satisfied that concern entirely. Perhaps the Information Commissioner went further than he should have done, but his intervention must be addressed. The Government have to do more to convince people that all the necessary safeguards will be put in place so that such a scheme could be used only in appropriate circumstances and for appropriate reasons.

Finally, I have not had the opportunity to examine in detail all the evidence about the accuracy of any given system. If we are going to use biometric measures as the Government propose we must all be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the most accurate recognition possible of biometric data is achievable. I am encouraged by the Cambridge university study that was mentioned but, to be honest, I have not had the opportunity to read it. [Interruption.] Opposition Members seem to think that that is amusing, but they cite studies by various academic bodies with abandon, never having seen them, let alone read them. At least I am honest enough to admit that I have not read that study, and several Opposition Members would have been more honest if they had made such an admission. It is important, however, that that issue is debated thoroughly and that it is demonstrated conclusively that the recognition techniques available are adequate and accurate enough to make the project feasible.

Those are very much issues for the future. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary started to address them today, but we are not there yet. I am happy, however, to give the Bill a Second Reading in its present form. It is necessary that concerns are addressed adequately over the coming weeks and months but, subject to that caveat, I am happy to vote with the Government tonight.

Photo of Douglas Hogg Douglas Hogg Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham 5:58 pm, 28th June 2005

If the Labour Government are in office when the Bill's provisions bite on the public their reputation will suffer serious and, I hope, terminal damage. Those of us who oppose the Bill are therefore acting in a singularly disinterested manner. My right hon. Friend David Davis acknowledged that a number of benefits could flow from an identity cards scheme. I share that view, but those benefits are very much less than the scheme's proponents have argued. It is no coincidence that the advantages that they proclaim have developed while proposals, starting with an entitlement card scheme that made precious little reference to terrorism, have been under discussion. I have a very strong feeling that what we are seeing now is a project seeking a justification, rather than a policy for which there is a self-evident and clear requirement.

Let me say a word or two about the alleged benefits. I have practised criminal law off and on for many years, and of course I have read many law reports. It is extremely rare that one finds a case in which the existence of an identity card scheme would prevent or lead to the ready detection of crime. The same is true of terrorism. It is no coincidence that the Madrid bombing happened in a country where the mandatory carrying of cards is a part of policy. Let us not forget that Spain has been suffering from ETA terrorism for years and years, or that most of those who carried out the bombing of the world trade centre carried valid identification cards. When one deals with terrorism, the problem is not so much the concealment of identity as the concealment of intent, which is a wholly different matter.

The same is true also of fraud. Most fraud does not involve a false statement as to identity. It involves a false statement as to intent, or a concealment or misrepresentation of relevant facts as to entitlement. Identity cards do nothing as to that. Even if identity was a factor, I should be extraordinarily surprised if that problem could not be got around by forgery or by a change in the modus operandi.

It is ironic that the one area of policy in which identity cards might be significant is in the control of illegal immigration, but only on the basis that the mandatory carrying and production of cards is made part of the policy. That is precisely what would be excluded by the Government proposals.

Photo of Gwyneth Dunwoody Gwyneth Dunwoody Labour, Crewe and Nantwich

Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman's experience at the criminal Bar not suggested to him that the only people who will efficiently and quickly produce identity cards are the criminal classes?

Photo of Douglas Hogg Douglas Hogg Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham

Indeed. The point has been made that once an identity card scheme is set up as a gateway, all the fraudsters of Europe will be devising ways to use the key into the gateway, and they will succeed. The hon. Lady is entirely right.

To the extent that there are benefits, they have to be weighed in the balance of cost and disadvantage. As to cost, none of us can be sure what the cost will be, least of all Government Ministers, but I suspect that there are very few Members of the House not sitting on the Government Benches who would place much reliance on the Government's current projections. Almost every Government procurement project that I have ever heard of has grossly overrun its initial budget, most notably the Ministry of Defence with the technology programmes of the kind that we are now contemplating.

Built into the scheme are factors that will almost certainly escalate the cost considerably. We can be sure that there will be gold-plating on a massive scale. There will be huge staff requirements. The proposal, after all, is that everybody in the country should present themselves at an appointed place at an appointed time to give appointed particulars and answer questions. That has huge staffing implications.

The Treasury refuses to subsidise the scheme. It will be free-standing. As my right hon. Friend Mr. Lilley will remember, that was the Treasury's initial position when the community charge was introduced, and we all remember what happened to the costs in that scheme. There will be hard cases. Millions of people will assert that they cannot afford ID cards and the cost of subsidising them will fall on other card holders. Also, as Mr. Oaten pointed out, there will be renewals and changes. Every time there is a renewal or a change, there will be a charge. Built into the system there is huge pressure for increased cost.

Will the technology work to an acceptable level? Again, I doubt it. History and common sense argue otherwise. All of us can keep in mind the Child Support Agency and the problems that it has had with computer systems. Those of us who deal with the Criminal Records Bureau know how very slow and incompetent that is. The early stages of the Passport Agency were a calamity. The family tax credit scheme, which depends upon computers entirely, has proved a continuing calamity. We are entitled to say that history and common sense suggest that the technology will frequently fail.

When the technology fails, ordinary citizens will suffer considerable inconvenience because they suddenly will not be able to assert their personality and will not be able to get the kind of benefits of which the Home Secretary spoke. That is a serious prejudice. A related question is what happens if a card is lost or will not work. Again, people will have to go to an appointed centre at an appointed time with an appointed cheque and give appointed particulars. At some time in the uncertain future somebody might sent them a card. What do they do in the interim if they want access to the public services that the Home Secretary mentioned? Citizens will suffer serious prejudice, on which I hope the House will ponder.

I have two final points. First, the policy is too intrusive and therefore is wrong in principle. I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden on that point. The policy imposes obligations on the citizen and gives rights to the state, which should happen only when there is a dire and dark emergency, such as in war. I do not believe that there is a justification at this time.

Finally, I return to a point that I made to my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden about the duty to carry and to produce. I know full well that the Bill as it stands does not incorporate within it any obligation to carry at all times or to produce at all times, and Ministers have given us reassurances on that. But the reassurances of the Government are not a commodity that currently stands in very high esteem. We should not forget that the National Registration Act 1915 also did not provide for any duty to carry and produce; it was amended in 1918. This Bill will also be amended.

Down the track, when people realise that the Bill, if enacted, is not producing any significant benefits, they will say, "The only way we can make it produce significant benefits, especially in the field of immigration control, is to require people to carry identity cards and to produce them on demand." To make that policy practicable, it must be backed with a power of arrest. I want nothing to do with such a policy. It is wrong in principle. It will produce discord between the societies that we live in and the police. Above all, it will bear heavily upon the ethnic minorities.

When I first came into the House in 1979, there was a huge debate about the impact of the old sus law. It caused immense dismay among the ethnic minorities. The Bill, if it becomes an Act, will have precisely that consequence, because it will bear heavily upon the ethnic minorities. I do not often give Labour Members disinterested advice, but my strong advice on this occasion is to destroy the Bill before it destroys them.

Photo of Lynne Jones Lynne Jones Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak 6:09 pm, 28th June 2005

I beg to move, To leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:

That this House
declines to give a Second Reading to the Identity Cards Bill because the scheme proposed in the Bill will make no significant contribution to the reduction or eradication of terrorism, illegal immigration, or illegal employment;
contains no proper safeguards to limit or prescribe the information to be stored upon identity cards or the national register, or the agencies and organisations, national or international, to whom this information will be made available or will be given;
fails to identify the biometric details to be stored or to acknowledge the effectiveness of the same or the margins of, the consequences of, and the remedies for, error;
fails properly to limit or define the fees which may be levied by the Secretary of State;
and the Bill provides for the costs of the scheme to be paid on the authority of the Secretary of State without providing to Parliament any proper estimates of the vast costs likely to be incurred.

The more people understand the Bill's implications, the more they realise that what is a superficially attractive idea is not only dumb, but very dangerous. Anxiety about the Bill is growing among the labour movement, the trade union movement and, as we have seen, Labour Members.

The point of principle is not the introduction of an identity document that includes biometrics, which is inevitable, but the creation of a national registration scheme and national database. Notwithstanding the remarks of Mr. Hogg, I am not het up about the question of whether ID cards should be compulsory, because, as the Government have said, the card will be of limited use on its own.

In the Government's view, the ability to check the card against the record on the register will make the system secure. Far from providing benefits, however, the establishment of a huge database with everyone's personal details conveniently concentrated in one place could be very dangerous. It would create an ID-theft bonanza for any terrorists or criminals who penetrate the security—let us make no bones about it, they will find ways to penetrate the security. Computer experts have told us that no such database can be 100 per cent. secure, and that point has been proved in America, where the Department of Motor Vehicles database has been attacked.

Photo of Justine Greening Justine Greening Conservative, Putney

On the penetration of security, we currently have 80 million national insurance numbers in this country, but only 60 million people.


err, yeah, foreigners temporarily working in the UK can get a NI number, and so can all...

Submitted by Siegfried Sassoon Continue reading (and 2 more annotations)

Photo of Lynne Jones Lynne Jones Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

That is not particularly relevant. The Government are taking steps to remove the superfluous numbers. Multiple applications are, however, important, and I shall discuss that matter later in my speech.

A major objection to the Government's proposals is that they will not achieve their objectives, and if the scheme has any benefits, the disproportionate cost will far outweigh them. Hon. Members have already pointed out why the measures will not help in the fight against terrorism and organised crime and will be counter-productive. The Bill will also not help to stop benefit fraud, a miniscule proportion of which involves the use of false identities. The Government have not explained how their proposals will help in the fight against terrorism and organised crime.

What information will be stored on ID cards? We have been told that we will be able to access our personal information on the database, but we have not been told about additional costs beyond registration or how long it will take to access or correct information. And we have not been told explicitly whether an audit trail detailing every occasion on which the police or security services examine our information will be available. We will not know about the huge amount of information that the Government will hold on us.

Photo of Andrew Love Andrew Love Labour, Edmonton

One concern is that the ID cards commissioner will have no real powers to investigate such areas and protect the public interest.

Photo of Lynne Jones Lynne Jones Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

My hon. Friend is right, and one registration ombudsman, as it were, has already expressed his concerns about that matter.

On the accuracy of biometric testing, Mr. Oaten discussed the results of the Government's enrolment trial in which the best result, 96 per cent. accuracy, was obtained by iris recognition. If iris recognition were used as the sole identifier, however, it would raise the possibility of up to 2 million false records in a database with 50 million entries. The Government have got wise to that point, which is why they have decided to use three biometric indicators—the iris, facial biometrics and fingerprinting—to make the database more accurate. Even if we were really lucky and achieved a 99.9 per cent. success rate, which might sound fine, it would still mean a potential failure rate of 1 in 48,000, which means that someone could access several different records using their own biometrics by creating different identities. Again, such a system would be a honey pot for organised crime and terrorists.

In response, the Government say that that trial was designed not to test the biometric technology, but to see whether people find the process acceptable, and that they are working to develop acceptable performance. They should not have introduced the Bill before calculating acceptable performance levels and whether the scheme is possible. A 99.9 per cent success rate, which I have mentioned, is way beyond the realm of possibility. In addition, 31 per cent. of disabled participants in the trial found iris recording very or fairly difficult, while the failure rate for disabled people, black people and people over 59 was low. The Government cannot deal with those issues, because even if they improve the technology, there will still be a failure rate and therefore a way for people to obtain multiple identities.

The biometric information will be stored on a massive centralised database. The Government have discussed EU proposals on biometric passports and identity documents, but the European Commission has expressed doubts about the storage of such information on a database:

"The Biometric information and its link to other personal details must be stored in a secure manner. The issue of how and where Biometrics should be stored was of particular concern to the European Commission's Data Protection Working Party. Their publication Working Document on Biometrics addresses this by looking at whether biometric information should be kept on smart cards or similar devices retained by the individual or whether it was acceptable to store the information on a centralized database. The Working Party's clear preference is for the former as it believes centralized storage presents an increased risk of data misuse. It is also important to understand that any information linked to a biometric record is only as reputable as the security procedures associated with it. A 100 per cent. reliable biometric system is of little use if any associated information is inaccurate."

That is why biometric passports, which will include facial biometrics and fingerprints, but not a central database are being introduced in Germany, which is a crucial difference.

The Government's assurances on cost beggar belief. They say that 70 per cent. of the cost of introducing the identity scheme will be incurred anyway because of biometric passports, but those assurances are about as credible as those they gave us about the threat presented by Saddam Hussein.

In fact, all that is required is a card and the information to be stored on it. It is true that the current passport database is massive, with 44 million records, but all it contains is the information that one has to give when one applies for one's passport. The photographs are stored separately. There is no storage of biometric data. The current system is minuscule in comparison with what is proposed.

On cost, the Government have rubbished the estimates put forward by the London School of Economics. So far, the only reason that they have given for doing so is that the LSE assumes that the biometrics will need to be replaced every five years. Yet the Government have said that themselves. I have a parliamentary answer from the former Home Office Minister, my right hon. Friend Beverley Hughes, which says that

"in order to ensure that the cards, which incorporate technology features such as a microchip function, are reliable, it may be necessary to replace the cards after five years."—[Hansard, 10 December 2003; Vol. 415, c. 497W.]

In any case, the cost of collecting the data is minuscule in comparison with the cost of setting up and maintaining the database and trying to keep it as secure as possible.

Many of my colleagues have been beguiled into thinking that this is a good idea and were encouraged to send out dubious questionnaires urging people to support the party because of this proposal. Do they think that it will be popular? Wait until people have to enrol on to the system—they will have to travel to one of the centres, queue up, have their data taken, and be interviewed. And what happens if the scanning goes wrong?

This Bill should be killed at birth. If colleagues think that that is being disloyal to the Government, it is not—it would be doing them a service, not the reverse. It is the most serious piece of legislation that I have ever had to vote on in this House—more serious than the decision to go to war. I urge Members to think clearly about the implications when they decide how to vote.

Photo of Peter Robinson Peter Robinson DUP, Belfast East 6:22 pm, 28th June 2005

I am happy to follow Lynne Jones. Although as yet I have not reached any conclusions—I will explain why over the next few minutes—I share some of the concerns that she expressed.

My hon. Friend Rev. Ian Paisley and I, as well as my hon. Friend Dr. McCrea, are having a little difficulty in orientating ourselves this afternoon. Over the past quarter of a century and more in this House, we have spoken on this issue perhaps five or six times. On those previous occasions, we got support from the Conservatives and a large dollop of scepticism from the party now in Government. However, we have maintained a consistent position.

If the Bill was a straightforward Bill on identity cards, my support and that of my colleagues would have been automatic. Having lived through decades of terrorism in Northern Ireland, we often found ourselves being asked by police chiefs and Army leaders to have a security provision such as this brought before the House in order to give them an additional element that they could use in the battle against terrorism. My hon. Friends and I raised the issue many times, though we never succeeded in getting an ID card in Northern Ireland. All the advice that we got in those days from the security forces—the police force and the Army—was that such an initiative, while it would not in itself solve the problems that they faced, would be a valuable aid in identifying those who might require closer scrutiny and would quickly eliminate those who "checked out".

If all that we were doing, in the face of very real terrorist threats, was requiring people to have a card that proved their identity, I would not have any valid reservation about that limitation being placed on my privacy or that of my fellow citizens. I would not set such a limited curtailment of my civil liberties above the potential for safeguarding or saving lives. I appreciate that many hon. Members have genuine concerns on the basis of civil liberties issues, and I respect their views on that matter. I have to say, however, that having lived through the past 35 bloody years in Northern Ireland, I would not regard the use of a national identity card as a significant infringement of anyone's civil liberties when I consider the carnage that has been caused by terrorism. I place the value of human life far above the minor inconvenience that will come with an identity card.

At the height of the troubles in Northern Ireland, we were accustomed to being searched going into shops and having our cars stopped. That was properly seen as a necessary measure to deal with a greater danger. The same is true of identity cards. Just as going through an airport nowadays involves a minor infringement of one's liberties, we are happy to trade that off against the greater feeling of security in the air. Identity cards will of course bring other benefits that will be useful and help to reduce fraud, but the fight against crime and terrorism must take precedence.

In Northern Ireland, we have some experience of using photo ID. It may not be compulsory for everyone, but it is required if one wants to drive a car or to vote. Our driving licences in the Province contain a photograph, and the new electoral identity card is used as one of a series of photographic identifiers in order to obtain a ballot paper before one can vote in any election. In many ways a national identity card is simply an extension of that, albeit, in this case, with potentially a much greater range of information. None of the personal identifiers already used has been a matter of controversy in the Province—they are merely regarded as a sensible measure to enforce the law and to protect us from unlawful activity. A compulsory identity card would also have the advantage of providing a more secure electoral system here in Great Britain; by all accounts, that may become increasingly necessary. Incidentally, Members on both sides of the House were happy to legislate for the electoral ID card in Northern Ireland to ensure that those who claimed a ballot paper were those who received it.

If all we were doing today was passing legislation to enable the state to provide its citizens with a card that would prove their identity, how could any of us quarrel with that? It would differ little from using a passport or driving licence as evidence of who we are. In this House, as in thousands of business around the United Kingdom, we have our own ID card to identify ourselves to security personnel. If that were the beginning and end of the matter, I would not be soul searching tonight. However, this Bill is more than an ID cards Bill—it is, in its present form, an enabling Bill, and it is not yet clear quite what the end product will be. This much is already evident: it is more about building up and maintaining a national database of personal information on the citizens of this kingdom than about simply providing people with a means of identifying themselves. The scope of that information-gathering, the extent to which it can be accessed, and by whom, are but a few of my concerns.

The nature of the scheme is the first consideration, but soon after we have made that determination comes the equally relevant question, "Will it work?", followed quickly by, "How much will it cost?" There are relatively few debates in Parliament where the course of the debate, particularly the Minister's responses, can determine how Members will vote, but for me and my hon. Friends this is one such occasion. Some concerns may well be better tackled in Committee, but some fundamental matters go to the heart of whether the Bill should proceed even that far.

We have dealt with several issues in correspondence with the Home Secretary and I appreciate the detailed responses that we received. In the time available, I suspect that I can deal with only one of them: access to the database by Republic of Ireland authorities. My hon. Friend the Member for North Antrim raised the matter in an intervention on the Home Secretary, who said in his communication:

"The identity card Bill does not allow information to be provided from the National Register to any foreign Government."

I am careful about the use of the term "foreign Government" in relation to the Irish Republic, because I am aware of the terms of the Ireland Act 1949, which provides that

"the Republic of Ireland is not a foreign country for the purposes of any law in force in any part of the United Kingdom . . . by virtue of . . . any enactment . . . whether passed or made before or after the passing of this Act".

In those circumstances, it is not sufficient for the Home Secretary to say that the information would not be available to a foreign Government because, under current UK legislation, the Republic of Ireland is not considered foreign. However, the Home Secretary went a little further in his oral response to my hon. Friend when he specifically said that the data would not be made available to the Government of the Republic of Ireland. I would be happy with that undertaking if it were included in the measure. However, I have been to the House of Lords on a previous occasion and, in a three-to-two verdict against us, we were clearly informed that what a Secretary of State or Minister says at the Dispatch Box is not binding.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

The hon. Gentleman correctly says that, under our law, Ireland is not a foreign country for several purposes. However, the Republic treats us as foreign. We are not allowed to vote in that country if we live there, although we let Irish citizens vote in our country if they live here. Is the hon. Gentleman content with the Home Secretary's assurance that there will be no swapping of information? It appears to me that the system can work with a common travel area only if the Irish Republic is given access to the hon. Gentleman's personal details and those of all other UK citizens.


In the Republic of Ireland British Citizens are only prevented from voting in Presidential elections and Constitutional Referenda. Quoting from Dublin City Council's Register of Electors website: "Irish citizens are entitled to be registered for all elections and referenda. British citizens are entitled to be registered for Dail elections, European...

Submitted by Cornelius Logue Continue reading

Photo of Peter Robinson Peter Robinson DUP, Belfast East

It is because I am not content that I ask the Minister to deal with the issue when he responds. Indeed, the Home Office was unable to direct our attention to a passage in the Bill that provided that information from the national identity register would not be given to any foreign Government. It simply indicated that the scope of the Bill rules out sharing information with the Irish Government. We need further clarification on that issue, which is critical for us all.

Photo of Bill Cash Bill Cash Conservative, Stone

The Government made it clear that the Bill would be excluded from a draft regulation of the European Union because it was classified as a measure that built on the border provision of the Schengen acquis, in which the UK does not take part. Ultimately, the Government and the EU decided that we would not take part, and the hon. Gentleman is therefore right to ensure clarification in the measure.

Photo of Peter Robinson Peter Robinson DUP, Belfast East

I appreciate my hon. Friend's contribution. His comments are relevant and we shall take them into account.

I want to comment briefly not only on the potential access of another Government but on that of individuals to the information. There is a natural anxiety that the enabling powers allow the Secretary of State to add to the information that may be stored in the database, and that others may get possession of it. It is essential that we know the levels of security that will be placed on the information that might be stored. I am worried that the enabling power would allow the Home Secretary to add further identifiers through secondary legislation.

Secondary legislation would be most unsatisfactory for dealing with changes in such an important measure. It does not give the House the ability to amend; we would simply be asked to accept, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, any package that the Home Secretary might introduce.

The Government could just about get away with charging for a voluntary identity card but none of us would accept having to pay for a compulsory card. If the Government expect the card to do everything that they hope it will do, that will not happen with a voluntary card. The Government must have a compulsory identity card if they expect it to have the range of impacts that they outlined. If it is compulsory, it must be free to the end user.

Photo of John Denham John Denham Chair, Home Affairs Committee 6:35 pm, 28th June 2005

I believe that the country needs an identity card system and a national identity register and I will vote for the Bill. I want to spend most of my limited time on the way in which the Government may find a way forward after tonight's vote, so I do not want to rehearse all the arguments for the principle of an identity card scheme.

However, the critics of the scheme overstate the amount of intrusion that it implies. The register will carry less information than private companies. For example, the amount of information held on those who have a Nectar card is far greater.


The, obvious, difference between ID Cards and Nectar cards is that I can choose to have a Nectar if I think I will gain some benefit from it whereas I will have no choice with ID cards and be forced to buy one even though I can see no benefit at all in having one.

Submitted by Joe Bunting Read 1 more annotation

Photo of John Denham John Denham Chair, Home Affairs Committee

Not at the moment.

The cost or risk of failure has been overstated even if something went wrong with the system. Too much of the argument has concentrated on the view that, because the scheme will not solve problems absolutely, it is not worth doing. Many opponents, especially Mr. Oaten, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, simply fail to understand the extent to which many public and private systems in our society depend on proof of identity and are weakened because we do not have an adequate system of proving identity.

All the pressures that have led the Government to introduce the Bill will be more intense in 10 years. There will be more movement in and out of the country and greater pressure to secure the integrity of expensive public services. There will be increased opportunities for identity fraud and more entrenched international terrorism. If the Bill fails in the months ahead, I honestly believe that our successors will rue our lack of nerve and principle.

The Government are clearly in a spot of bother over the Bill, however. It saddens me to say that the problems were not only predictable but predicted—in the report of the Select Committee on Home Affairs last year. The Government's case is not helped by continually switching their argument for the scheme every time a new spin doctor enters the fray.

We should admit that the scheme is a state project and there should be no shame in saying so. The state proposes to introduce the scheme because citizens expect it to be able to tackle illegal immigration, crime, terrorism and identity fraud, and to secure the public services. The state needs the co-operation of citizens in that enterprise. The citizen will benefit in many ways but presenting the scheme simply as a benign act of Government to help us to sort out our problems if someone goes through our wheelie bin and steals our identity is disingenuous. The Bill is not about that. Perhaps it could have been, but it is not.

The Select Committee was in favour, by a majority, of an identity card scheme, the register and the then draft Bill. However, we made several sharp criticisms of the management of the project, procurement and the Bill. Although the Government have responded to some criticisms, they have not responded to many. I believe that they should have done.

We cannot expect every dot and comma to be spelled out at this stage, but we should be able to have confidence that all the major decisions about the scheme will be subject to proper public scrutiny and debate before they are made irrevocably. I am not yet sure that we can have that confidence.

Much attention has been paid to the LSE report. I am not inclined to give it huge weight. One of those most closely associated with it gave evidence against ID cards to our inquiry. Hon. Members can read the transcript of his evidence and judge the extent to which his views could be described as independent.

On the other hand, the Select Committee said of the Government's confidential assumptions on costings:

"We are not convinced that the level of confidentiality applied is justified".

We went on to say:

"We are concerned about the closed nature of the procurement process which allows little public or technical discussion of the design of the system or the costings involved."

The Government, unfortunately, have opted for a closed procurement. The LSE report may well be wrong, but it is the Government—my Government—who created circumstances in which anyone's guess is as good as anyone else's when it comes to the cost.

Public confidence in the scheme and its costings is critical. I can tell the Minister that we will find it hard to generate that confidence without switching quickly to a much more open procurement process on the basis of section-by-section discussion of every part of the system. That is true of many aspects of the system. The decision on what type of card should be used is a decision of the same order as the decision on the architecture of the database. It will have consequences for issues such as how the card will be used, the number of readers and the infrastructure needed. We warned that

"the Home Office appears to be taking these key decisions without any external reference, technical assessment or public debate".

I am afraid that that is still true, that the process is still wrong, and that the Home Office needs to change its approach.

The same is true of card readers and verification. It is no good saying, as the regulatory impact assessment says, that the Bill imposes few if any costs on the private sector. That is true, but unless use of the system by the private and public sectors achieves critical mass it will not operate effectively as a system to verify identities. The Government must say when they will produce their assessment of use by both sectors. I say that as a fervent supporter of the ID card scheme, and one who does not want it to fail because of the way in which the Government have gone about procuring it.

Photo of Lynne Jones Lynne Jones Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

On the radio this morning, the Home Secretary said that he would consider committing the Bill to a Special Standing Committee. Does my right hon. Friend share my concern about the programme motion, which allows for only three weeks of Committee deliberation? How will he vote on the motion?

Photo of John Denham John Denham Chair, Home Affairs Committee

I hope that the Minister will imply some flexibility. The present timetable is unfortunate, because of the time being taken to establish Select Committees. The Commons Committee stage will have been completed before any Select Committees, including the Home Affairs Committee, have been formed and can carry out further scrutiny. I think that further scrutiny of the Bill would be useful.

The Government need to do something about what still appears to be the lack of a cross-Government approach. Rightly or wrongly, we are left with the impression that the Bill is a Home Office project that the rest of Government has agreed not to block, rather than a project taken on enthusiastically by Government as a whole. One of the symptoms is a failure to grasp the opportunity, identified by the Home Affairs Committee, to use the ID card as a way of joining up and simplifying access to public services. That leaves us with the risk of inefficient use of the investment in the system and later, perhaps, the rather expensive job of adjusting what is now being done to provide what many citizens would like—a card providing easy access to a number of public services.

Photo of Mark Fisher Mark Fisher Labour, Stoke-on-Trent Central

I am listening to my right hon. Friend particularly closely, because he chaired the former Home Affairs Committee that produced an excellent fourth report containing a huge amount of expert data. It worries me all the more that he has referred to the use that the private sector would make of the system. I understood the Home Secretary to say clearly that the private sector would have no access to the register, but my right hon. Friend seems to suggest that it would.

Photo of John Denham John Denham Chair, Home Affairs Committee

It is quite straightforward. The private sector will not be able to get its hands on the national identity register. However, at present when people ask a solicitor to do their conveyancing, they must go through a sheaf of documents to prove their identity under the money-laundering legislation. In future, they will be able to use their identity cards, and it will be possible for their identity to be verified against the register. I think that wholly acceptable, and a great convenience to citizens. It is entirely different from making the register available to private sector companies.

I have expressed concern about the procurement process and cross-Government commitment. My third concern relates to the Bill itself. I have not yet managed to obtain a copy of the criticisms made by the Information Commissioner, so I am relying considerably on media coverage and the commissioner's evidence to the Select Committee last year. I think that if his full critique were taken on board, it would be impossible to have an ID card scheme at all. It cannot just be a way of making individuals prove their identity. There are occasions when the state needs to identify the individual. There are security arguments in favour of an audit trail of access to the register, as well as arguments against it. Nevertheless, as well as radically changing their approach to the procurement of the scheme, the Government could make changes to the Bill that would address many of the points made by the commissioner and others.

The purpose of the scheme could be much more tightly defined. There need be no requirement for an ID card for use of a public service; public services merely need to be permitted to use the card for that purpose, which would leave much more power in the hands of the individual. Access for the police and other services to the information for crime-fighting purposes could be more tightly circumscribed. Under clauses 19 and 23 in their current form, the Home Secretary could personally authorise all access to the audit trail, as is now the case with telephone-tapping. They could also be used to give that power to any individual police constable. It should be possible to amend them to raise the threshold and establish proper safeguards. Oversight could be strengthened, and brought under a single, publicly accountable commissioner rather than being unhappily spread between two.

I presume, at the moment, that the Government will win the debate and the vote this evening. I certainly hope that they will. Our present circumstances, however, bear some similarity to a situation that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will recognise from a year or so ago, when the Government's discussion of tuition fees began. At that stage, the Government's proposals were not at all bad in principle, but they needed a fair bit of work in the House to be pushed into an acceptable form, which I think we finally achieved. I believe that the ID card scheme is in a similar state. The Government need to make changes both in the way in which they plan to deal with the legislation—there have been welcome indications today that it is open to amendment—and, fundamentally, in the way in which they are attempting to procure the project. There must be proper, independent, technical public debate.

Finally, let me say something about the scope of the Bill. We hear a good deal of talk about "function creep". That will result largely not from the desires of an overbearing state, but from the desire of members of the public to use the information to fight crime. I think it would be more prudent for the Government to recognise that, and not to leave powers in the Bill that might be handy at some point in the future but to limit the powers tightly, confident that the Bill can return to the House of Commons in the future if public arguments favour broader legislation.

Photo of Adam Holloway Adam Holloway Conservative, Gravesham 6:48 pm, 28th June 2005

I know that it is conventional to say nice things about one's predecessor, but even if it were not, I would want to say them about Chris Pond. He was the Member for Gravesham from 1997 until 2005, and from 2003 onwards he was a Minister at the Department for Work and Pensions. I first came across him when I was making a series of programmes about homelessness in London. I know that he spent nearly three decades of his life lobbying for the low paid and that he was the driving force behind the Low Pay Unit. Many of us think that that was an extremely positive way for him to spend those decades, and I pay tribute to him for it.

In Gravesham, Chris Pond was a good constituency Member. At the general election, a number of people told me that he had quietly gone to spend time in the local hospice with their relatives during the last few days of their lives. I should also like to thank him and his wife, Lorraine, for their kindness to me over the past couple of years.

I also want to pay tribute to Jacques Arnold, who was the Member for Gravesham from 1987 until 1997 and is still remembered on the doorsteps for going the extra mile for his constituents. I should also like to register my appreciation to him for all his advice to me. I am grateful to those former Members.

Gravesham is about 20 miles down the Thames if one turns left at the Terrace. The two main towns in the constituency are Northfleet and Gravesend. Pocahontas is buried in a churchyard in Gravesend, and Conrad is rumoured to have written some of "Heart of Darkness" while stranded on the tide near the town. Underneath those towns we have the A2 and the channel tunnel rail link. Beneath that, we have the villages of Higham, Meopham, Cobham, Shorne, Istead Rise, Luddesdown, Vigo and Culverstone. Over the past few decades, traditional industry in Gravesham has declined, most recently with the closure of the AEI factory. There are new jobs, however, and a great deal of new development. There is also a great deal of optimism.

Gravesham is a model of successful racial integration and tolerance. Ten per cent. of the population are Sikhs, and that community is building the biggest Sikh temple in Europe. This involves ordinary families paying about £30 a month by direct debit towards the building and mass volunteering to do manual labour at the weekends. We already have two gurdwaras, a Muslim cultural centre and a Buddhist temple, complete with monks, in a semi in a cul-de-sac. We also have about 30 Christian churches.

Regrettably, however, there is more involved than just building things. Crime and antisocial behaviour are putting a huge strain on communities in my constituency. While 99.9 per cent. of my constituents are trying to get on with their lives, bring up their families and enjoy their old age, about 0.1 per cent. are persecuting the rest and making their lives an absolute misery. For example, last year Rev. Jim Field and his wife Marleen came home to find that the rectory had been burned down. So, after 30 years of marriage, they departed with their possessions in two black bin liners. The 12-year-old who was alleged—and, indeed, seen—to have done it is still wandering around the same street where the incident occurred. Since I have been in Gravesham, I have never seen a walking police officer in a residential area.

Last Sunday, Gwen Ostheimer was shot at with an air pistol, 40 windows were smashed at Shears Green school, and Stuart Hubbard had his windows smashed at 3.30 in the morning because he told a group of youngsters where to go. Mohinder is too terrified to leave his house because of the abuse that he gets on the streets. My friend the Lib Dem candidate was left for dead while walking his niece home at Christmas, and it is still possible to see the marks left by people stamping on his head.

Part of the problem is that the perpetrators of those crimes have no idea of the consequences, either to themselves—in terms of punishment or of their future—or to their victims. Over the past few months, I have been wandering around talking to some of these kids, who are aged between about nine and 14. I have asked them what they thought the consequence would be if they turned over some bins, threw golf balls at an old man's head—I have seen that happen—smashed someone's front windows or set upon people in gangs. The answer from those kids is nil. That is not just bravado; it is true in most circumstances. There are rarely prosecutions or any other kind of follow-up, so the kids cannot envisage any consequences, either to themselves or to their victims, as a result of what they do. I cannot see the point of using ID cards to identify people when no one is even looking for the perpetrators of those offences.

I should like to illustrate my opposition to ID cards with a couple of anecdotes. The first relates to organised crime and illegal immigration. In 2001, I made a documentary for ITV in which I pretended to be an asylum seeker/economic migrant. We went first to Istanbul, where we made contact with a number of criminal gangs. Istanbul is a kind of staging post, and according to the Turkish authorities gangs such as these bring about 700,000 people into the European Union each year. Those people are charged between $7,000 and $10,000. We ended up in the Sangatte camp outside Calais, which was still open at the time—the problem still exists today, however. The camp was full of people smugglers who, for a price, would take great hordes of people down the road—I have done this—to break into the Eurostar terminal and try to get on to a train to England.

During that time, I made friends with a guy whom I will call Malik. Needless to say he, like everybody else, got into England. Two weeks ago I ran into him in Soho. He is now called Mike and he is a builder running a small construction company. He told me that since he came to the UK four years ago, he had had no contact with any form of British authority—not the police, not the tax authorities, not even Westminster council. What would ID cards do about the huge, unknown quantity of people like Mike, some of whom are perhaps not as productive as he is? I am not convinced that they would help.

My second anecdote involves terrorism. In 2003, I found myself in northern Iraq. At that time, there was an area right up on the Iranian border that was controlled by Ansar al-Islam, an organisation affiliated to al-Qaeda. I believe that there was considerable swapping of personnel between the two organisations; some would argue that they are one and the same. One night, its mountain complex was bombed. We heard the bombs going off and we wandered up the valley early the next morning. A few local Kurds had already arrived and started going through the bodies of the people who had been dispersing from the buildings when the bombing started. There were a number of passports there—these guys were from the Maghreb as well as from the more obvious parts of the middle east. The passports contained visas and entry and exit stamps from European Union countries and from the United States dating from after September 2001. So we could all be carrying our ID cards, yet guys like these could be walking around London with tourist visas.

In summary, I would vote for ID cards if I did not think that they were some kind of red herring. They are a red herring in regard to the urgent priorities of my constituents—for whom they will, in effect, represent another tax—and I do not believe that they will do the slightest good in tackling organised crime or terrorism.


Mr. Adam Holloway is right in his speach all the way through and i think we still need more police in gravesham, strict anti-social behaviour orders for yobs

Submitted by dalawer bagha

Photo of Frank Dobson Frank Dobson Labour, Holborn and St Pancras 6:57 pm, 28th June 2005

I congratulate Mr. Holloway on his maiden speech, which was delivered with the confidence that we associate with people who make television programmes. I am glad that he paid tribute to my former hon. Friend, Chris Pond. I only hope that it was not my visit to Gravesham during the election campaign that resulted in the hon. Gentleman being elected.

My first inclination about ID cards is that I am sort of in favour of them. In principle, I do not see them as a major intrusion on our civil liberties, although some of the claims that have been made for them seem somewhat exaggerated, including those relating to the constraints that the cards might place on terrorists or on organised crime. At the very most, they might represent an inconvenience, and probably only a minor one. I cannot see what impact they would have at all unless they were compulsory.

One of my other concerns is about compulsion. We have been told that the cards cannot be made compulsory unless there is a vote in favour in both Houses. However, as I read the Bill we could be asked by the Government to vote to make it compulsory for certain categories of people to carry an ID card, but not for others. As a believer in equality before the law, I could not support a law that would oblige some people, but not others, to carry the card. That would be quite unacceptable.

Similarly, as I read the Bill—I might be wrong—it would be possible for a public body to make a rule that one had to produce a card to receive its service. Therefore, whatever the national theory might be, people at the local hospital or library would be able to say, "Well, it's compulsory round here." Again, that seems unacceptable.

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Photo of Frank Dobson Frank Dobson Labour, Holborn and St Pancras

No, I need to make progress and other Members want to speak.

It is not the issues of principle that are a problem but the practicalities and costs. Sadly, as I have listened to Ministers talk about the Bill I have become less convinced about the practicalities and the costs, whether the system would work, and the security and safety of the database on which the system would run. Perhaps it is my Yorkshire background, but my principle concern is about costs. We must aim to get value for money and we must remember that whatever is spent on the ID card system cannot be spent on anything else. The cards will be paid for either by the taxpayer from general taxation or by what amounts to a special tax levied on those who want to be card holders. That is just the cost of the card.

The costs of the rest of the system—the verification process, the scanners and readers, and the hordes of people who go round installing them, following up, mending them and running the system—will undoubtedly have to be met by the taxpayer, either local or national. What would be the costs of all that? Estimates are, to say the least, many and varied. I do not challenge the integrity of Ministers and their advisers who have come up with the lowest estimates, as it was obviously a position of integrity to say that the estimate used to be £3 billion and now it is approaching £6 billion. Equally, I do not doubt the integrity of the opponents of ID cards, who have come up with the highest estimates. With respect to all those who have come up with estimates, however, they are not estimates but guesses, and even the lowest guess is an awful lot of money.

It is a major function of a freely elected Parliament and its Members to control the raising and spending of taxpayers' money and to see that it is well spent. Information technology is an area of grotesque failures, delays and overspends. That is not confined to the Home Office, this Government or the public sector—there has been scandal after scandal across the board, probably because all concerned in making the original estimates are reduced to being dependent on such serial fantasists and failure-mongers as EDS, Siemens and others who have messed it up.

It might be that £6 billion—the latest official estimate—would be well spent, but is the ID card system the best way of spending the marginal £6 billion of Home Office money? If it is spent on that, it will be £6 billion less spent on more police or improving the immigration service. At £6 billion it might be a bargain, but if it is in excess of that there will be less and less value for taxpayers' money. Any excess has a double cost—it is not just the extra money spent on the ID cards and system, but that there is then less to spend on other things. If the excess is to be met from the Home Office budget, the currently intended investment in the police, immigration services and so on will be reduced. If it comes from the overall Government budget, we will have to face all sorts of cuts as a result of reductions in intended spending. That will mean taking away money from hospitals, clinics, schools, transport, environmental improvements, overseas development or making sure that our troops are properly equipped.

I could not support the Bill tonight unless it contained a provision for the Government to come back to the House—which is responsible for the raising and spending of tax—every six months to give us an up-to-date estimate of the costs. There should not be any problem if things are going well, and if things are going badly we would have the opportunity to say, "Cut the losses, we are not going to spend any more on this project." Were that to happen, we would have the opportunity to stop throwing good money after bad. Therefore, I cannot support the Bill tonight.

Photo of Peter Lilley Peter Lilley Conservative, Hitchin and Harpenden 7:05 pm, 28th June 2005

It is a pleasure to follow Frank Dobson who has made a cogent case against many of the practical aspects of the Bill.

One thing that is clear is that the Identity Cards Bill is not, as the Home Secretary would have us believe, a gleaming, new Labour modernising measure. I make no apology for reminding the House that it is a shop-soiled, tired old measure that had been hawked round Whitehall for many years before the Government even came to power—proposals for a compulsory, all-singing, all-dancing identity card with biometrics. It was then, and is now, a solution looking for a problem. When we tried to examine how effective it would be at solving the potential problems, we found that the police said that they rarely had any problem in identifying suspects, only in proving that they were guilty. We also found that terrorists normally conceal their intentions rather than their identities, that benefit fraudsters normally misrepresent their circumstances, and that less than 2 per cent. of benefit fraud is due to identity fraud. Furthermore, all illegal immigrants can—most do once they come into contact with the authorities—apply for asylum, at which point they must have an identity card at present, complete with fingerprints on it. At that point, of course, they become exempt from deportation until their asylum claim has been resolved—if ever.

Therefore, the identity card would not help with any of the problems that it is put forward to help unless, possibly, it were made compulsory for everyone to have one and the police were empowered in particular to stop people who they thought looked or sounded foreign to identify whether they had identity cards or were possibly in the country illegally.

The Government say that things have changed since those days, and that they now have support from officials in Departments, the police and unnamed figures in the security services. That should be no surprise—Government employees are paid to support Government policy, and it is particularly of no surprise that the Government found people in the security forces who will say that the proposal is a good thing, as they were the people who told us that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Indeed, when I tabled questions trying to identify which of the agencies and who in the agencies endorsed Government policies, I found that the Government were very reluctant to give the identities of the people who are so keen to have us reveal our identities to them—I suspect, of course, that the person is John Scarlett, but that is in the privacy of this Chamber.

The real test of whether Departments find the identity card useful is whether they are prepared to contribute from their budget to funding the proposal for a compulsory identity card system. Clearly, none is prepared to contribute, which is why the entire cost is to be borne by the ordinary citizen and user, who will eventually be compelled to have it, and certainly required to have it if they want a passport. We also know that the costs will rise. They have already risen, and the one thing that I learnt in Government is that the projects that are most vulnerable to running into difficulties and overrunning on cost are those with more than one user and client Department. This one has at least half a dozen user and client Departments. We know that the Government abandoned a project that I initiated—the pathway project for a benefit payment card. After saying for two years that it was going splendidly, they finally said that they had to abandon it because they could not reconcile the conflicting demands of Post Office Counters and the Department for Work and Pensions, which were jointly responsible for it. If they could not reconcile the demands of those two bodies, how will they reconcile the demands that will arise when half a dozen different Departments seek to make the system work for their needs?

Let me give another concrete example. In America four years ago, Congress mandated the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security to reconcile their different systems for collecting and computerising fingerprints. Four years and $40 million-worth of expenditure later, they can transfer the fingerprints of only 2 per cent. of people entering the United States so that they can be compared with and checked against the FBI register. It still takes a month for a new terrorist suspect identified by the FBI to be fed across so that they can have their fingerprints taken and be checked against anyone entering the country. So we know that these systems are very difficult and costly to get right. If America cannot get them right, even with its huge expenditure, there is no reason to suppose that we will find it easy to do so. This card has been said by some to be a plastic poll card, but it could be Labour's modern-day ground nut scheme. Either way, it will cost a lot of money and will probably achieve very little.

In addition to the involvement of a multiplicity of Departments, the Government have moved from prime reason to prime reason as to why they are introducing this measure. Before the election, the prime reason was combating terrorism. Incidentally, when the Government introduced their proposed entitlement card—as it was then called—and listed the 10 uses to which it would be put, they did not include combating terrorism. That was not thought a practical and useful thing to do. But if this card were really going help in combating terrorism, would we wait until 2013 to make it compulsory? We would surely want to do so now, just as ID cards were introduced immediately in the second world war. If this card were really going to help in identifying and checking out potential terrorists, would we not include within its provisions the 24 million people who come here every year on a visa for business purposes or as tourists for a short-term stay—at least, that is what they say when they enter the country—rather than excluding them from any requirement to have one?

It is true that some years ago, when considering the terrorist problem in Ulster, I suggested that identity cards might be helpful, but I was persuaded by the powerful argument of the security forces to the effect that—contrary to what Mr. Robinson said—any benefits that they would derive in terms of combating IRA terrorism would be greatly offset by the problems they would face in enforcing compliance were a minority of the community to resist the use of ID cards. That is a problem that we may well face if we try to introduce this measure, particularly given that—as we now know, and as the Government acknowledge—its principal purpose is to deal with unlawful terrorism. That is certainly the principal demand of the public.

The general public mistakenly believe that most members of ethnic minorities are immigrants, which is not true—of course, most of them were born here and have British nationality—and that most immigrants came here illegally, which is not true either: most came here legally. The general public therefore believe that the police need to have the power to compel people to have these cards about their person at all times, and to have the right to stop and question anyone who looks or sounds foreign, in order to get them to justify their presence in this country. I find that abhorrent, and I am astonished that that there is any Member in this House who does not find it abhorrent that our fellow citizens, just because they are a different colour or have a different accent, could be constantly required by the police—and will be, ineluctably, if this measure is on the statute book—to justify their presence in this country, simply to satisfy the mistaken belief on the part of many people that such a requirement will help to control illegal immigration, which it will not.

This is a fundamental change in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a change has only ever been introduced in countries that had authoritarian, fascist or communist Governments. It has never been introduced in a country with a common-law system, and I hope that we will not set the appalling example of adopting that system here today.

Photo of Austin Mitchell Austin Mitchell Labour, Great Grimsby 7:14 pm, 28th June 2005

Many Members who have spoken today have expressed concern about the civil liberties aspect of the Bill. I propose to ignore that and to deal with what concerns me, as a practical Yorkshireman—namely, the practical and political issues. This Bill is unnecessary. It sets up a system that will not work, will not achieve its stated objectives and will cost us a fortune. Apart from that, there is nothing much wrong with it.

What I am concerned about is the Bill's impact, which is beautifully timed. Its provisions, along with their damaging consequences, will be introduced just as the Labour Government—the force for progress in this country—go into the next and the subsequent elections. The compulsory element will be introduced at the subsequent election, but in reality, it will be introduced before that. Anyone who wants to renew a passport or a driving licence, or anyone who the Secretary of State deems shall be compelled to have an identity card, will have to have such a card. So although the scheme is said to be voluntary, it is in fact already compulsory. The Bill is like "super dome". It involves massive expenditure that is timed to ruin the election prospects of a Labour Government whom we want to carry on so that they can continue with their programme of social reform.

Like the dome, identity cards seemed like a good idea at the time, but the dome has proved to be disastrous. I suppose that that is how things work in a presidential system. The source of such ideas is Downing street, where the Prime Minister is surrounded by a heavenly nimbus of cherub geniuses, fluttering in the blue skies that always hover over Downing street. Up comes an idea, lights flash, thunder rolls and the idea is unveiled to an excited world. "I know", they say, "Let's have identity cards. It's a big measure that shows that the Government are active. It will appeal to the police and the Home Office." Of course, the police and the Home Office are obsessed with people control. Indeed, they would implant all children with chips at birth if they could.

Such ideas appeal to Home Secretaries, who have a career to think of, after all, and who want to be promoted out of being Home Secretary so that they do not have to face such issues any more. Now that we have the idea, all that we need is a problem for it to solve. That is where the doubts begin.

Photo of Andrew Love Andrew Love Labour, Edmonton

Does my hon. Friend agree that the combination of escalating costs and compulsion is likely to cause public support for identity cards, and perhaps for the Government, to evaporate?

Photo of Austin Mitchell Austin Mitchell Labour, Great Grimsby

I agree entirely. The Government are now attempting to keep down the estimated costs so as not to frighten people. Each time the estimate increases, public support for the Bill falls. When the true costs are revealed, support will vanish entirely and turn into a negative.

As I said, it is when we have to search for a problem for this ingenious little measure to solve that the doubts begin to appear. The Government are not now saying that it is intended to deal with terrorism. It certainly did not do so in Spain or in the US. If people can come here for three months without being required to have an ID card, that will be the time to commit any acts of terrorism. ID cards will not deal with questions of entitlement, because only a small part of benefit fraud involves stealing someone's identity. I note that, interestingly, there is no difference between the crime rates and benefit fraud rates of the four European countries that do not have ID cards, and of the rest, which do. That suggests that ID cards are a minor matter in that respect.

ID cards will not even deal with identity fraud, which is trumpeted as their main purpose. We are told—shock horror!—that £1.3 billion-worth of identity fraud is committed each year, and that there are enormous difficulties in terms of clean-up. In fact, that is a myth. The Government have lumped together the figures for stolen credit cards, stolen cheques, money laundering and various other crimes that have nothing to do with identity fraud in order to produce that figure. The Gilligan article in last week's Evening Standard put the true cost of identity fraud at £150 million, not £1.3 billion.

We are told that introducing ID cards is an international obligation, but it is not. We shall have to change our passports to comply with European and American decisions, but there is no international obligation to impose an identity card. In any case, it seems to me that if we are following an international trend, which we are not, the sensible course would be to let other countries go ahead, watch their mistakes and implement our own system to avoid them. That is not necessary, however, because no one else is doing it.

The purposes are unreal, but the damage that will be inflicted is very real indeed. The costs will be enormous. The Government estimates keep going up and will go up again. The current estimates are going up even before anything has happened, and they are bound to increase further. The LSE estimate of the costs, which varies between £10.6 billion and £19.2 billion, with a median of £14.5 billion, seems to me to be far more accurate.

Photo of Douglas Hogg Douglas Hogg Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham

Is there not an additional element in the cost, which has not been taken into account? Other parties have made it plain that they will not implement the scheme. That being the case, either the contractors will impose a very high penalty cost in the contract or there will be a very high premium—neither of which have been allowed for by Government Front Benchers.

Photo of Austin Mitchell Austin Mitchell Labour, Great Grimsby

That is absolutely true, and I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for putting that point, which he omitted from his own speech. I entirely agree with him, and each escalation of costs will mean increasing loss of support for the whole scheme.

Several speakers have pointed to the dilemma between "must have" and "must carry". There is no point in having "must have" without having "must carry". One will surely follow the other as night follows day, but the Government are now telling us that they will not have a "must carry" rule because it will affront middle-class opinion. There are some who want identity cards for other people but not for themselves, just as we all want discipline imposed on other people's children but not necessarily on our own, and there is a danger that that section of opinion will be affronted.

Of course the cards will be made compulsory to carry. What is the point of having an ID system that allows people to respond to police requests to produce the card by saying, "I am sorry, but I do not have the card with me"? It sometimes happens to me when I forget my pass and I am sometimes asked to report to the police station tomorrow morning, and I disappear into the night—or, in the case of Grimsby, into the sea. The one will follow the other.

Photo of Austin Mitchell Austin Mitchell Labour, Great Grimsby

About 20 per cent. of the population do not have passports. They prefer to take their holidays in Yorkshire—very sensibly, as it is the most beautiful part of the whole world—and they do not have passports. What are we going to do for them? Are they to be forced to have a passport that they do not want and an identity card with it, and are they to be charged for them?

What about the huge underclass of people who sleep rough, people who move house and flit around, people who are just not traceable, people who stay out of the way of authority? What will happen to them? Are we going to employ bounty hunters to go out and hunt those people down in order to force them to have a passport? If we make the ID card free for such people, it will increase the charge levied on other people enormously. It will be a very expensive operation gathering all those people together in a shuttered van, so they do not know where they are going, and taking them to a treatment centre to force them to be fingerprinted, to have a retina scan and to accept all the joys that the rest of us will already have faced. It is just not conceivable that everyone can be forced into this scheme.

The scheme in any case has huge holes in it. It certainly runs against EU free movement directives and it will not apply to Irish citizens. I could also mention the risk of technical failure. People will lose their cards, just as I keep losing credit cards. I have even had passports stolen from my car. What will happen when people lose their ID cards? How will they be replaced and at what cost? About 40 per cent. of the London population changes address every single year, which is incredible. No one particularly wants to leave Grimsby, but I can understand why people want to move out of London. Massive numbers of cards would have to be changed on that basis.

What of the failure of verification? We read from Home Office reports that verification proved successful in dealing with 96 per cent. of Irish scams, 69 per cent. of facial verification cases and 81 per cent. of fingerprint frauds. It is a cumulative process, but there are bound to be people for whom the system will not work. The LSE report estimates that new cards will be necessary every five years—the Home Office estimates every 10 years, as people's irises change with age and as the fingerprints of people who do heavy manual work change. People like me will be subject to regular requirements to have a new scan.

It is all very well saying that technology will improve and eliminate all those problems. If the technology changes, the whole database will have to be changed because wholly new records will be required for the new technological system.

Many hon. Members have already alluded to another obvious difficulty—the possibility of cock-ups. This will be the biggest such technical project in the world, involving listing, registering and recording three basic elements of our personality, plus a photograph. Just think of the potential for the sort of cock-ups that we have already seen in the child benefit system, the national health computer system and so forth. What a feast the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee will have after the contract is implemented.

Another problem that annoys and upsets many people is the problem of jumped-up authority. There are always people who think that, because they wear a uniform, they have a right to harass and make life difficult for people by hovering over them, demanding information and putting questions to them. I recall the problem with the sus laws, which produced very angry feelings among ethnic communities, but this will be far worse. Who will be harassed? It will be the rough sleepers, the deprived, anyone who looks odd, anyone who looks doddery, like me coming down Victoria street, anyone who is black, anyone who is coloured, anyone who looks foreign. The potential for all those people being harassed is enormously increased.

When Roy Jenkins was Home Secretary in a previous Labour Government, he was faced with an incursion of people, which was causing public reactions, so he looked into the idea of having a national identity card scheme. He decided that it offered few benefits and that it offered them at a disproportionate cost. We should take exactly the same view.


Presumably, read "iris scans" for "Irish scams" -- I assume this is an error in transcription by the Hansard reporters.

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot

Photo of Geoffrey Cox Geoffrey Cox Conservative, Torridge and West Devon 7:27 pm, 28th June 2005

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for calling me to speak in the House for the first time. I have the considerable honour and great good fortune to have been elected to represent Torridge and West Devon. [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear".]

It is an easy task to praise my predecessor, John Burnett. He was well liked in the House; he did not parrot party dogma; he did not blindly follow the party line. In fact, he proved that the expression "a Eurosceptic Liberal Democrat" was not just an oxymoron. He and his wife Billie worked indefatigably for the interests of my constituents. She supported him loyally and ably throughout the eight years in which he represented my constituency. I have noticed, in listening to maiden speeches in the House, how it is a curious trick of new Members to refer to their predecessors as passed away or gone to another world, but John and Billie Burnett are very much with us and they are regarded, and will continue to be regarded, on both sides of the party divide in my constituency with real affection, gratitude and respect.

My constituency is said to be the second largest in England. It encompasses a large stretch of the north Devonshire coast line, from the little white town of Bideford, via towns and villages such as Appledore, Westward Ho!—the only town in England with an exclamation mark in its title—Clovelly and Hartland all the way to Hartland point. It runs on its western boundary all the way down the Tamar river from the north to the south coast of the peninsula. Eastward is the scene of scattered villages and fine market towns: Holsworthy, Hatherleigh, Tavistock, Chagford, Great Torrington and Okehampton, each with their own historic and unique character.

If I paint a sylvan and utopian scene, as my constituency may present itself to the tourist's eye, I must say that it is not wholly true. Listening to the debate this evening, I have been struck between a real incongruity between the priorities of my constituents and this Bill. My constituency faces grave problems and the communities of which I have spoken are under serious pressure.

My constituency was the epicentre of foot and mouth, and the effect of the pyres still hangs over it. Livestock agriculture, which is the backbone of the rural economy in the area I represent, has suffered blow after blow. Dairy farmers have to manage on an average wage of £2.50 an hour. Job opportunities are dwindling, house prices are spiralling, and council taxes are soaring because—I shall risk being controversial—the Government fail to understand through their local government funding formula that the delivery of services to isolated communities costs more. But incomes are low. A disproportionate number of my constituents are on fixed incomes and they can ill afford to bear the soaring costs of the council tax and water charges, which are the highest in the country, because 3 per cent. of the population have to pay for 30 per cent. of that wonderful coastline. Bovine tuberculosis is another issue that weighs heavily on the farmers whom I represent.

As I contemplated the real and genuine concerns of my constituents, I was struck by the fact that not a single letter of the between 100 and 200 letters I have received since having the honour of being elected has said that the answer to their problems lies in the introduction of identity cards. I have spent 22 years on the front line in the battle between the state and the individual. Like Mr. Marshall-Andrews, I have appeared in cases before the courts where the state's hand has been raised and the finger of accusation pointed at an individual in the dock. I can say, after those 22 years, that the state does not always behave well and we who represent our constituents' interests should jealously guard their freedom and autonomy. It is only if a compelling case has been made for an invasion of that freedom that we should contemplate for a moment any surrender of any portion of it.

This Bill represents a vast expansion of the potential for control by the state over the individual. There has not been a time in peacetime when the state has been able to require an individual to notify the state authority of a change of address or to come to a specific place at a specific time, unless he was subject to criminal process and on bail. We should pause and reflect on that fact. Why should free citizens of this great country be subjected to the direction of the state merely in order to exist in our society?

I agree with hon. Members on both sides of the House who have told us that there are practical arguments against the Bill. But even if those arguments were not so strong, I say that the arguments of principle are decisive and unanswerable. That is why, on behalf of those constituents whose real problems I hope to articulate in the coming months, I shall vote against the Bill tonight.

Photo of Tom Harris Tom Harris Labour, Glasgow South 7:35 pm, 28th June 2005

I congratulate Mr. Cox on his maiden speech. We could be forgiven for not realising that it was a maiden speech, so confident was his delivery. I am sure that he will have no problem in articulating the concerns of his constituents in years to come, and I wish him every success in doing so.

I have some concerns about the debate so far. Some of the arguments against ID cards, especially those from Opposition Members, have not been as measured as we could have hoped. For example, Mr. Hogg, who is unfortunately not in his place, did a fantastic and articulate job of opposing all manner of measures that are not to be found in the Bill. On several occasions, we have heard from Conservative and Liberal Members about the threat to rights that we have held for hundreds of years, but that is not what the debate is about, as seen from outside the House. I am concerned that those watching the debate will recognise the synthetic indignation of Opposition Members for the cynical manipulation that it is intended to be, or might find that their own fears and suspicions are simply being encouraged.

ID cards are not a panacea and never will be. They will not provide foolproof defence against terrorism, identity theft and other crime, or health tourism. However, they represent a sensible and moderate proposal and will be one of a range of tools at the disposal of the Government to deal with all those matters.

David Davis mentioned that "1984" was a warning, not a textbook. As I have said, some of the contributions from Opposition Members were cynical and inaccurate. They are cynical because there is a danger of playing on the existing cynicism that the public feel toward those who govern and those who seek to govern. I make no apologies for holding the unpopular view that government is a good thing and politicians are good people. We should encourage members of the public to trust the Government. [Interruption.] Well, that is a proposal that will not gain currency even in this House, let alone in the country.

It is dangerous to the art of politics for us continually to encourage people to feel so cynical and sceptical of the motives of political parties, especially the two main parties that aspire to government. I do not include the Liberal Democrats in that particular criticism.

The right hon. Gentleman said, on the one hand, that ID cards would not be effective and on the other, that the Government were promising surveillance from the cradle to the grave. What is the Conservatives' main reason for opposing the Bill? Is it because ID cards will work or because they will not work? It is always a cheap political trick to raise the spectre of Orwell in comparison with Britain today. People who say that Britain is turning into Orwell's "1984" are usually those who have not read the book.

We live in a different and dangerous era, compared with any other time in our history. However, the right hon. Gentleman seems to live in an Ealing-comedy world, where we all have a cheery word for each other and the biggest threat to society comes from a plot to rob banks and turn gold bullion into ornamental Eiffel towers. I will break it gently to the Opposition: we do not live in that world. We live in a world where terrorists attempt to kill innocent people by strapping dynamite to themselves. We live in a world where criminals prey on members of the public and seek to steal their very identity.

The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden said that if he had predicted 10 years ago that a Labour Government would abolish habeas corpus and trial by jury and introduce house arrest and ID cards, he would have been locked up. Perhaps that is true, but if he had suggested 10 years ago that four planes would be hijacked in America and piloted into the twin towers and the Pentagon he would presumably have suffered similar treatment.

Photo of Tim Loughton Tim Loughton Shadow Minister (Children)

I do not want to appear cynical, but can the hon. Gentleman explain how providing surveillance of 99.9 per cent. of the population from the cradle to the grave will do anything to avoid the terrorism or fraud by a small minority to which he is referring?

Photo of Tom Harris Tom Harris Labour, Glasgow South

The hon. Gentleman is falling into the same trap as Opposition Front-Bench Members. The Government have absolutely no intention of providing surveillance from the cradle to the grave. That is exactly the type of allegation that finds its way into the public domain. Members of the public end up believing that kind of nonsense instead of concentrating on the content of the Bill.

Photo of Diane Abbott Diane Abbott Labour, Hackney North and Stoke Newington

The views of Opposition Front-Bench Members are a matter for them, but what does my hon. Friend have to say about the comments of the Information Commissioner, who is not a member of the Conservative and Unionist party? Recently, he warned that ID cards would bring about a growing surveillance society.

Photo of Tom Harris Tom Harris Labour, Glasgow South

I reserve the right to disagree with the Information Commissioner. The House has the right and the duty to make its own judgments, and not simply to take advice and act on information from outside. Going slightly off the point, there was a similar argument last year about information handed down to us from on high by the Electoral Commission. Do we do exactly what the commission tells us or do we make our own judgments as democratically elected politicians? We should do the latter.

We live in a world where the old certainties and securities of years gone by no longer exist. Three years ago in Glasgow, asylum seekers who had identity cards that included biometric details were hunted by the police, because they were suspected of involvement in a serious assault on a bouncer in a Glasgow club. The police could not track them down initially but they were finally apprehended at Stranraer as they tried to board a ferry for Northern Ireland using fake passports. They had disposed of their ID cards, but because they had had to give their fingerprint details when they applied for asylum, their identities were confirmed within four minutes and they were arrested on suspicion of attempted murder. As I said earlier, I do not believe that ID cards are a panacea in the fight against crime, organised crime or terrorism but we should be able to see past our party affiliations to understand that given a fair wind, the Bill will, take us some way towards beating criminal organisations.

In June 2001, 15 minutes before I took my seat in the House, I received word that a credit card and cheque book that my wife had sent me from Glasgow had gone missing in the post, and I discovered that more than £400 had been taken from my accounts in various forms. That was extremely distressing and may be why I did not enjoy the re-election of the Speaker as much as I would have in other circumstances. It was an extremely distressing and emotional experience to know that someone was pretending to be me—using my name and spending my money, although I managed to claim it back. What can be wrong with giving people a foolproof way of proving their identity? Some people have asked why we should have to prove our identity.


How on earth would ID cards have prevented Mr Harris's cheque book and credit card being stolen in the post?

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot

Photo of Martin Horwood Martin Horwood Liberal Democrat, Cheltenham

One of the problems with the Bill is not the use to which it would be put by a reasonable Government—I assume that the hon. Gentleman thinks that his Government are reasonable—but the uses to which it might be put by an unreasonable Government—[Hon. Members: "We have one".] I was thinking more of the party to my right. Is not half the problem that there is no guarantee or safeguard that once data have been collected it would not be abused by a future Government?

Photo of Tom Harris Tom Harris Labour, Glasgow South

I shall not submit to that nonsense—that a dictatorship is waiting to be elected to the government of the UK. The Executive is held to account by the House and I am confident that the country can rely on that safeguard. The British public can see through the hysterical paranoia that concludes that ID cards represent some major surrender of civil liberties. They can see through the claim that issuing ID cards will mean the end of civilisation as we know it, any more than driving licences with photos or the installation of closed circuit television in our streets did.

The Government have a responsibility to deliver an affordable scheme and I know that my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench are aware of the public's concerns about costs. It is telling that 80 per cent. of the public were in favour of the Government's proposed ID scheme and that figure went down not when the civil liberties arguments were aired but only because of concern about costs. I can understand why some parts of the press, the Conservative party and the Liberals want to pretend that the costs are going through the roof. That is fair game politically, but they should understand that members of the public support the scheme—their only opposition is on cost. The public understand that there is no threat to British civil liberties in the issuing of ID cards and the establishment of a central database.

On 5 May, I was elected on a Labour party manifesto that supported an identity card scheme. I urge all Labour Members who were elected on the same basis to support the Bill.

Photo of Tim Farron Tim Farron Shadow Spokesperson (Children, Schools and Families) 7:47 pm, 28th June 2005

The opening sentence in the Library briefing on the Bill states:

"Identity cards existed in the United Kingdom during the two world wars, but there has been no national scheme since."

That innocently sums up why the Bill must not go further in its passage through the House. ID card schemes, if they are to exist at all, are features of times of war and national crisis. This is not a time of war, no matter how much the Government may tell us otherwise.

In February 2002, the then Home Secretary said in this place that the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 gave impetus to the ID scheme. However, the current Home Secretary concedes that that does not stack up, as the 9/11 hijackers used their own names and the Madrid bombers all held legitimate ID cards. Of course, it is plausible that the terrorist attacks in the US and in Spain could have been avoided if there had been greater investment in the security services of those countries: for instance, on additional policing. The lesson that a more security-conscious Government might have learned is that additional resources are required for those matters rather than spending a fortune on a dangerous piece of gesture politics.

Last week, in Kendal in my constituency, I met senior police officers who told me that at times they have insufficient resources to tackle antisocial behaviour and serious disorder problems. I merely juxtapose that state of affairs with the Government's commitment to waste billions of pounds on a flawed ID card scheme so as to indulge their authoritarian instincts. The Government are prepared therefore, to coin a phase, to be soft on yobs and put at risk the safety of hard-working families in order wilfully to take their eye off the ball and indulge their authoritarian instincts, as I have said.

The ID system would fundamentally and irrevocably change the traditional British model of policing from a community-based approach to a data-driven approach. The ability of the police to win trust from communities, especially minority communities, would be undermined severely. The effectiveness of on-the-ground policing would be damaged in return for no benefit whatsoever.

This unjustified and dangerous shift in culture is acknowledged at the highest level. We have already heard the comments that the Information Commissioner has made about the national identity register, but he also commented a little earlier that

"the introduction of such a register marks a sea change in the relationship between the state and the individual."

In the same article in which he made that warning, he made additional warnings about function creep, which is a sore point for the Government, and they keep reassuring us that function creep will not occur. At this point I remind Members of the House that the last ID card scheme, scrapped in 1952, was set up with the stated intention of providing identity checks with regard to no more than two functions of the state, and despite those assurances, and during peacetime, by the time the ID card was abolished the number of functions had expanded to 39—under a Labour Government.

We are told, I am sure sincerely, that the ID card scheme would not allow for records to be kept on details of religious belief, political affiliation, sexuality, trade union membership, racial origin or other such inappropriate information, but do I really have to remind the House that Parliament cannot bind its successors, as my hon. Friend Mr. Horwood just pointed out? What we are being asked to agree to in the Bill is the not-so-thin end of an authoritarian wedge.

Let us for a moment envisage a Government more authoritarian, intrusive and control-freakish than this one, and let us imagine what they might do with a ready-made ID card scheme. I am not talking about some unlikely, nightmarish totalitarian regime. Labour MPs might just care to contemplate the ways in which the democratically elected Conservative Government of the 1980s might have used an ID card system to police the enforcement of the poll tax, or in reaction to the coldest period of the cold war, or indeed—most chilling of all, perhaps—how they might have dealt with the "enemy within" throughout the year-long miners' strike. That exercise should fill genuine Labour Members with dread and send a shiver down their spine, and yet here we are, with Labour MPs currently prepared to sleepwalk into an attack on traditional British values and liberties.

It is entirely appropriate to question the Government's authority and democratic legitimacy in introducing the Bill in the face of mounting evidence of the scheme's ineffectiveness, expense and threats to traditional freedoms. The Government must acknowledge, however uncomfortable it makes them feel, that, manifesto pledge or not, 64 per cent. of the British people voted against the present Government, and whether they like it or not, to impose this vast change to our civil culture is at best dubious in the light of that; so to take this illiberal and transparently populist step at all is bad enough, but to do so despite mounting costs and mounting evidence of the impotence of ID card schemes is at best downright sinister.

The Government have spent the past two days investing their energies in rubbishing university academics. No doubt the Home Secretary wishes that the national identity register was already in place, so that he could simply rub out the professorial ranks of the London School of Economics—people who are clearly enemies of the state, and who had the audacity to conduct this most impressive and comprehensive body of research on the ID card scheme and its likely costs, efficacy and impact.

The recent LSE study shows, as we have heard, that the reality of the calculation of the costs of the scheme is in excess of £10 billion and anything up to £19 billion. We have heard no credible rebuttal of that calculation from anyone on the Labour side. The Government are nevertheless, to give them credit, adamant that the LSE is wrong and that others—such as the IT consultants Kable, who put the likely costs at about £15 billion—are equally wrong, but the Government cannot come up with a fixed figure themselves. The official cost to individuals of £93 per head is, we are told, "merely indicative".

The irony is that at the same time as the Government are attempting to attack the credibility of the independent LSE research, they are confidently telling us, on the basis of the flimsiest of evidence, that the economy loses £1.3 billion a year on ID fraud. That is just one of the many reasons that they are giving to explain the need for an ID card system.

The official rationale for the ID card scheme may change week by week, but as we have just heard from Mr. Harris, the underlying theme of that rationale remains the same in each case. That rationale is one of fear—the propagation and incitement of fear. The politicians with authoritarian instincts need to sow and cultivate fear amongst the public in order to contrive public acquiescence in or consent to their authoritarian schemes. And yet we have already heard that even George Bush, Junior, who followed the 9/11 bombings with some of the most outrageous attacks on the fundamental personal freedoms of United States citizens, was persuaded that an ID card scheme was a reactionary step too far.

We have already heard about the flaws in biometric testing, and we heard earlier about Cambridge university academics who apparently backed the Government. Well, I can quote one: Professor Ross Anderson of Cambridge university, who clearly does not. He stated:

"I am afraid that iris scanners like fingerprint scanners are liable to be defeated by sophisticated attack".

A system where it is possible to identify innocent people incorrectly or it is possible for persons of malign intent to get around the scheme is worse from a security point of view than having no scheme at all.

Perhaps the Secretary of State will be so good as to inform the House of the current percentage of citizens in this country who do not register on the electoral roll. He will no doubt agree with me that the enormous majority of those people omit themselves from the register for no nefarious reason whatever—not through any attempt to defraud or attack anyone, but for a range of legitimate explanations. Included in that group are people fleeing domestic violence, people with transient lifestyles, people with frequently changing personal information, and people suffering mental illness or addictions, all of whom may fear, or simply never get round to, disclosing their information. The same groups will approach the ID card scheme with even greater anxiety. Many will rightly or wrongly simply not register and will disappear, incapable then of accessing basic public services, removing themselves from civil society.

In closing, I wish to appeal to right hon. and hon. Members' concerns about traditional British freedoms, their concerns about excessive costs, their concerns about the integrity and the reliability of the technology, and their concerns about the effectiveness of ID card systems based on all the available evidence. But if that does not work, I seek to appeal to naked self-interest. Based even on the Government's own understated account of the costs of the scheme, we could have 12,000 additional police officers for the price that we are being asked to pay for ID cards. A quick breakdown of the figures shows that 50 of those new police officers would be in my constituency of Westmorland and Lonsdale. Those new officers would be able to provide enhanced protection to Ministers when they make occasional visits to their Lake district second homes.

Photo of Glenda Jackson Glenda Jackson Labour, Hampstead and Highgate 7:57 pm, 28th June 2005

I rise to support the amendment that stands in the name of my hon. Friend Lynne Jones, myself and other honourable colleagues. The hon. Member for Westmorland and—

Photo of Glenda Jackson Glenda Jackson Labour, Hampstead and Highgate

Thank you. Tim Farron mentioned the last time that identity cards were required in this country; that was during the second world war. One of the first calls that my office received this morning was from a constituent, urging me to vote against the Second Reading of the Bill and telling me that one of the happiest days of her life was when she tore up her identity card, when it was no longer obligatory to carry such a card in this country.

Reference was made earlier in this debate by, I think, the shadow Home Secretary, to the bravura performance at the Dispatch Box of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, and I would not argue in any way with that assessment. It did, however, bring to my mind one of those archetypal characters that used to feature regularly in American western films. I am not referring to John Wayne. I am referring to the character that would usually arrive in a small town in a covered wagon, covered with illuminations and pots and pans. There was almost invariably a ukelele accompaniment to this character's arrival on the scene.

Photo of Glenda Jackson Glenda Jackson Labour, Hampstead and Highgate

My hon. Friend is giving the name of the individual—probably the actor, not the character. I am not prepared to argue with him on that point. However, the character would emerge from the back of his covered wagon and proceed to entertain the town, with the basic premise that he had something to sell them, and what he had to sell would cure all their ills. It would take many guises, but it became known as snake oil. I am not in any way imputing to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary one atom of the huckster spirit that was so true of that archetypal character, but enormous claims have been made for the efficacy and the absolute necessity of the introduction of ID cards in this country. They will apparently reduce, if not obliterate, crime, acts of terrorism and benefit fraud, but no one—either from the Dispatch Box, or one of my hon. colleagues who have shown that they support the Bill—has been able to tell us how.

I do not mean to rehearse the arguments that have been put about the excessive cost that it is imagined the introduction and maintenance of such a scheme would involve. Neither side of the argument has proved its case. Most markedly, the Government have not proved their case on the costs. My concern about the Bill is what it has always been: it seems to carry the potential for the most disruptive introduction of a scheme that could have the most desperate effects on our society.

The Home Secretary when he was at the Dispatch Box was somewhat sanguine when the issue was raised about who would be most markedly targeted when, if the scheme is ever introduced, it inevitably becomes compulsory to carry an identity card. He dismissed the allegations that certain sections of our society would be over-targeted in that way. He referred to the old sus laws, but they were discredited for the simple reason that a group in our society was consistently targeted. It was made up of those in the Afro-Caribbean society in my part of the country. They tended to be young men below a certain age.

One of the most recent reports after the changing of the old sus laws to the new sus laws, which caused the Home Office no small disquiet in itself, showed that about 18 per cent. of young Muslim men were being over-targeted in that way. The Home Office's own racial assessment of the introduction of the Bill caused disquiet, particularly among the Afro-Caribbean group of people who were part of that consultation exercise, and concerns were expressed by those in the Muslim community who were also part of that consultation exercise.

If, indeed, the Bill comes into force, and it is deemed that a certain section of our society must carry ID cards—as my right hon. Friend Frank Dobson put it so succinctly—it will create in this country, which I thought believed in equality under the law, a group of our fellow citizens who will be, in effect, second-class citizens.

I am also concerned about another issue that has been raised during the debate: the issue of opting to carry an ID card, the expense of doing so and how that will impact so deleteriously on some of the poorest in our society. The Home Secretary gave no clear definition of what concessions—if concessions there will be—would enable the poorest in our society to carry an ID card if they wish to do so. My concern is not only that people will be excluded from doing so on the grounds of finance, but that they will be excluded by the purveyors of services.

We all know of service providers who do not want certain people as customers, and it will be all too easy for those providers to turn to someone and say, "No, I'm very sorry. We cannot possibly allow you to open this account"—or to borrow money, or to buy this, that or the other—"unless you can produce an ID card." So already, even before the cards become compulsory, we are beginning to see sections of our society being divided off—in that instance, probably based on what is believed to be their economic validity. My hon. Friend Mr. Mitchell mentioned rough sleepers, who have only just been allowed to vote without needing a settled address. They were excluded from the democratic process. There will be other kinds of exclusion.

It is undoubtedly the case in my opinion, Madam Deputy Speaker[Interruption.] Oh, I do apologise, Mr. Deputy Speaker. You enter with such quietness. It is inevitable, unless the Bill is kicked out, that ID cards will become compulsory. Hon. Members have touched on the issue of ID cards being used to guarantee the provision of services. The national health service has been mentioned, and it was pooh-poohed that anyone in an A and E department would refuse to treat an emergency case because they could not produce an ID card. I entirely agree with that view. It would be anathema to anyone who worked in the health service to refuse to treat someone in an emergency because they could not produce an ID card, but are we seriously accepting that there would not be some jobsworth or someone in that A and E department who was waiting to be treated who would not comment on the fact that an individual had a different coloured skin, spoke in a language that the other person did not regard as being English, or was in some way different? I can hear them now saying to the doctor or the nurse, "Does that person have an ID card? If they don't, you should not treat them before you treat me." [Interruption.] An hon. Member from a sedentary position said "rubbish", I think. I am afraid that hon. Member ignores the realities of human nature.

If it is presented to the people of this country that the greatest dangers come from outside, from people who are different and from people we do not know, we build on that essential part of human nature that is perfectly prepared to point the finger at any kind of difference and say, "Not them first, but me." There are real dangers for the breakdown of social cohesion.

It seems to me that we in this country, up to this point, have a pretty proud record in the way that we have managed to absorb, to adapt to, to welcome and even to celebrate our differences. The Bill will absolutely begin the erosion of that. It will do nothing to improve our security, either internationally or nationally, or to reduce home-grown crime. It will most certainly give breathing space to those who have always wanted, and will always want, to create social difference. It will break down many of the things that this country should value and that we as a country in an increasingly competitive world will need to support even more in the future.

Photo of Douglas Carswell Douglas Carswell Conservative, Harwich 8:07 pm, 28th June 2005

I begin my maiden speech by honouring those who preceded me as Member of Parliament for Harwich and Clacton: the late Sir Julian Ridsdale, who sat for the constituency for many years with his wife, Paddy. I say "with his wife, Paddy" because, as hon. Members who remember Sir Julian will know, Lady Ridsdale was part of everything that he did. Julian and Paddy could not have been kinder or more encouraging to me as a newly selected candidate.

Ian Sproat, who came after Sir Julian, was also wise and generous with his advice. Ivan Henderson, who represented the seat until the last general election, was perhaps less generous with his advice about how I could win the seat, but he was generous in his commitment to the people of Harwich. Hon. Members on both sides of the House will recognise that he was a very diligent, good and committed Member of Parliament for his constituency.

Today, my constituency is a mixture of seaward settlements and their Essex hinterland: the port of Harwich; the lovely town of Frinton-on-Sea; Walton-on-the-Naze; Jaywick; Dovercourt; my home town of Clacton-on-Sea; and the villages of Thorpe-le-Soken, Kirby-le-Soken and Holland-on-Sea—a corner of England that is fiercely English. Never in my life have I felt as proud and as honoured as I do now, speaking for the people whom I represent in the House.

I rise to make my maiden speech in this debate today because my constituents are deeply worried—I am sure that many hon. Members' constituents are, too—about the rise in crime, in violence, in the yob culture and the rise in what one might term uncivil society, and because we are told so often that ID cards are the answer. As this is my maiden speech, I shall leave it to others to question whether they are the answer. I leave it to others to question whether they will make us more secure and whether the high cost of the scheme might mean that they are a plastic poll tax. Instead, I wish to make a broader observation: if the House is today debating the merits of a scheme that will make the citizen more accountable to the police and the agencies of the state, one day I hope that it will also debate measures to make the police and the state more accountable to the citizen.

Over the past generation or so, under Governments of both parties, crime and disorder have risen. ID cards are not the answer to reversing that trend because making people more answerable to the police is not the solution. Perhaps part of the answer lies in making the police more locally accountable to communities such as Harwich and Clacton.

Having been out on the beat with the local police in my constituency, I have been impressed by their professionalism and dedication, yet all too often they are upwardly accountable to a distant bureaucracy. They are all too often unable to take effective action against crime and the yob culture because they answer to a remote and unaccountable elite. Remote elites set the police's priorities, local people take the rap and no one is accountable—that is how our local communities are policed today. In the place of more upward accountability—identity cards—we should have a policy based on the principles of downward accountability; decentralisation and localism; and direct democracy—not identity cards. We should let local people elect their police chiefs and let local police chiefs set their police priorities. Why stop at policing? Let us localise control of, and accountability for, a range of public services. We should take power over key public services from central quangos and put it in the hands of local people.

I am surely not alone in having detected during the recent election a sense of frustration—alienation, even—on the doorstep. Hon. Members on both sides of the House must have come across the same thing. On doorstep after doorstep, people felt that elections did not matter any more. They thought that no party could clean up their hospital, get their child into a preferred school, or stop mobile phone masts being built in their neighbourhood. That should worry us all. Turnout remains low because people are increasingly giving up on the democratic process. If we want to be respected in this House, we should make elections matter again.

Local communities should be able to determine their priorities for policing, planning and education. My constituents should be able to determine the future of the local library and the Leas school in Clacton, the location of mobile phone masts on the seafront and the number of GP surgeries in Holland-on-Sea. No less importantly, those who make decisions should be directly vulnerable at the ballot box. Elected representatives have lost ground to unelected officials at every level and, if I am honest, that has happened under both Labour and Conservative Governments. A consequence of that process is that elections are becoming increasingly perfunctory.

Powers have steadily leaked from the House: sideways to the judges, downwards to the regional assemblies and agencies and upwards to Europe. At every level, the elected politician who is accountable to the electorate has lost ground to the unelected functionary, but that must stop. My constituents have had enough of being told what to do by remote elites. They want to make their own decisions. They want those who run their local policing, primary care trust and schooling to be more, not less, accountable to them. They want local decisions to be in the hands of local people.

I shall do my best to articulate those concerns and desires in the House. I am here to argue for the devolution of powers outwards and downwards. We need to reverse the flow of powers that has taken place over the past 30 years from town halls to Whitehall and from the citizen to the state. We should take powers away from the greatest quango of them all, namely, the European Commission.

I shall spend my time speaking and voting in the House for a wholesale decentralisation of powers from the remote elites to the people—from the unelected and unaccountable to local communities such as Harwich and Clacton. I shall speak up for an independent Britain trading with Europe and beyond, yet governing ourselves once again, living under our own Parliament, making our own laws. It is a privilege to have the opportunity to begin that today.

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe 8:15 pm, 28th June 2005

I congratulate Mr. Carswell on his eloquent speech. I am sure that we will hear a great deal more from him in the months and years to come. I think that we all appreciated his kind remarks about his predecessor, whom we all remember with affection.

My hon. Friend Mr. Mitchell, who is temporarily out of the Chamber, suggested that the concept of ID cards came from No. 10 Downing street and he compared it with the millennium dome. I did two things soon after my election in 1997, when I was as new a Member as the hon. Member for Harwich: first, I urged the Government to drop their support for the Conservative dome project—that did wonders for my career, I must say—and secondly, I introduced a Bill to provide for identity cards. I am happy to say that that Bill had the unqualified support of the Liberal Democrat spokesman, Mr. Oaten, so I am sorry that he has temporarily changed his mind.

We have had an interesting debate because, if I understood it correctly, both the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats gave a commitment to repeal the scheme if they were to win the next election, regardless of the money spent by that point and the benefits still to come. The hon. Member for Winchester demanded an assurance from the Conservatives that they would stop the scheme and I understood that the shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, gave such an assurance, so we look forward to returning to that point.

Both in this debate and in the wider debate outside Parliament, there have been amazing examples of misleading or misunderstood information, so I would like to nail a few of the myths that we have heard. Mr. Lilley said that no country had introduced identity cards unless it had a communist or fascist regime. I hope that when he leaves the House he will write a book about the communist regime in Switzerland or the fascist regime in Switzerland—that would be quite a revelation.

This week, The Sunday Telegraph devoted an entire editorial to the Government's proposition to make it compulsory to carry an ID card, but that is simply not the case. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, in his restful speech, suggested that it was necessary to make it compulsory to carry a card if identity was to be checked. He appeared to be unaware of the fact that the police can check fingerprints against the central database, regardless of whether the card is carried. In fact, that is the main point of the database, which can be used to check someone's identity, irrespective of whether the card is carried.

Photo of John Hemming John Hemming Liberal Democrat, Birmingham, Yardley

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the police national computer already records biometric data? Mr. Harris referred to the current situation, in which someone's identity can be verified using biometric data on that computer.

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

That is right, but at the moment it applies only to people who have previously come into contact with the police. Under the Bill, however, if I tell the police that I am the hon. Member for Broxtowe they should be able to verify immediately whether that is the case or whether I am fibbing. Making that possible is in my interest, and it is also in the interests of the police and society.

The hon. Member for Winchester said that people who were authorised to verify identity could see whether the person whose identity was being verified had had an abortion. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden even suggested that a virus could be introduced into the system. Both Members envisaged a programmable personal computer but, as someone who has worked in IT for most of my life, I would like to see the fingerprint reader that enables someone to introduce a virus. They do not understand how the system will work in practice.

My right hon. Friend Frank Dobson was genuinely concerned that free public services would pre-empt the vote on compulsion. He suggested that even though we are unlikely to decide to make the scheme compulsory until the next Parliament—obviously, we will do so only if the scheme has been successful—schools, clinics and other public services such as benefit offices could require the production of an identity card or proof connected to the identity register before agreeing to offer their services. He said, very reasonably, that it would become compulsory for people using those services to have an ID card, even if we do not vote on such a measure in this Parliament. Clause 15, however, states that public services can require such checks only on people who have been specified under clause 6 following votes in the Commons and the other place. An affirmative vote is needed in both Houses before any group can be required by any public service compulsorily to produce an ID card to confirm their identity.

The purpose of the card is simple—it is to verify that we are the person we claim to be—no more, no less. It is proposed to store data that are already recorded in passport and other databases and link them to biometric data so that we can see that that information relates to ourselves, and not to someone else. I have campaigned for that for a number of years, ever since I first introduced the proposal in Parliament. I have rarely met constituents who do not regard it as a good idea in principle. They do not see a problem in using basic information already stored about us to verify that we are who we claim to be.


"Both Members envisaged a programmable personal computer but, as someone who has worked in IT for most of my life, I would like to see the fingerprint reader that enables someone to introduce a virus." -- typical commercial fingerprint readers are peripherals which are connected to industry-standard PCs. Those PCs are, of course, be susceptible to viruses and many other security vulnerabilities.

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot Read 1 more annotation

Photo of Andrew Love Andrew Love Labour, Edmonton

When I talk to my constituents about the issue, they think that it is generally a good idea. When I mention that it will cost them, however, they rapidly go off it.

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

I agree with my hon. Friend. That summarises public opinion at the moment. Most people think that it is a good scheme that makes sense. They do not have much patience with the civil liberties argument, but they do not want to spend a lot of money. I am glad that the Home Secretary said that before the Bill leaves the House we will get firm figures on the likely maximum cost, as the public need to see those figures.

Photo of John Bercow John Bercow Conservative, Buckingham

The hon. Gentleman seemed quizzical about, not to say astonished by, the idea that the Opposition parties might commit themselves to scrapping the scheme, even though the Government would have spent a substantial sum of money on it. Given rising costs, flawed technology and our perception of the erosion of civil liberties, why is he surprised by the idea that we might commit to abolish it? The reduction ad absurdum of his argument is that no successor Administration should contemplate changing anything because their predecessors have spent a lot of money wastefully and ineffectively. To me, that is where his argument breaks down.

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

John Bercow, with his customary acuity, detected my quizzical look. That had nothing to do with the principle that he suggested. It was purely because I have observed the random movements of Conservative policy on the issue over recent months and I am sceptical whether, if the scheme is seen to be reasonably successful, the Conservatives would go into the next election pledged to scrap it. I do not believe it, but we shall see.

The Criminal Records Bureau checks are a good example of what we are trying to achieve. At present, if I wish to teach in a school in Nottinghamshire, I have to apply to the CRB for evidence that I do not have a criminal record relating to offences with children and that I really am who I claim to be. That check generally takes about a month at present, although in the past it took longer. If I, as a supply teacher, then decide that I want to teach in Derbyshire, I have to do the same thing again and the CRB goes through the hoops again to verify whether I am who I claim to be. I am reliably informed that the CRB reckons that if identity cards were available it could process the application in a tenth of the time. Most of the time taken up by that check is to check whether I am who I say I am and whether I have an alias under which I might have a criminal record.

The introduction of ID cards is not some sort of revolutionary step. It is not a dictatorial step. It is merely a way of making life easier for the potential teacher, for the school that wishes to employ the teacher, and for society.

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

I am awfully sorry. I am running short of time. I apologise, as my hon. Friend offered to give way to me.

I want to be careful not to make exaggerated claims. Hon. Members have argued that ID cards would fail because they did not prevent the Madrid bombing. I do not claim that they are some sort of magical device that detects evil impulses in people's brains and alerts the police. ID cards are a practical tool that helps to identify the victims and the perpetrators, as they did in Spain. I do not claim that the police will never again make a mistake in identification. I say only that it makes sense to make that very much rarer than it is now. If one has been accused of something that someone else has done, it will be very much easier to demonstrate that one is not the person involved. That could save many hours at the police station.

I am also not saying the proposals are perfect. For example, the key issue for society is not the card, but the database. As we are not requiring people to carry the card, we can reasonably make it optional to take it, thereby reducing the cost and the perceived intrusion. Let us say that people must register, but whether they have the card is up to them.

The proposal is not a solution to everything. It is, however, a sensible, practical idea to make our society simpler and safer. It is also a manifesto commitment on which we were elected less than two months ago. Let us do it.

Photo of Stewart Hosie Stewart Hosie Shadow Spokesperson (Women), Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Spokesperson (Treasury) 8:28 pm, 28th June 2005

I have listened to the whole debate. I listened particularly carefully to the Home Secretary. He laid out five sections in his speech, including Big Brother society, the costs, the benefits, and the success or otherwise of IT projects. What he failed to do, other than in passing in the section on benefits, was to address the justifications in the Bill—national security, the prevention and detection of crime, the enforcement of immigration controls, unauthorised working, the provision of public services and so on. As was said by Glenda Jackson, who is not in her place, the Home Secretary failed to explain how identity cards or the register would assist in any of the stated reasons for the introduction of the measure.

On national security and terrorism, several hon. Members have made the point that most terrorists use their own identities. Most of the bombers on 9/11 used their own identities, and some of those responsible for the attack in Madrid had the requisite residential documentation, while others simply used tourist visas. There is no intention—at least not in the short term—to butcher the UK tourist industry by requiring all visitors to have biometric visas. Intelligence gathered both here and abroad will identify terrorists and stop terrorism, not ID cards.

The ID card system would make terrorists who want to come here from abroad more dangerous. If people have forged, fake or stolen papers that are sufficiently robust to allow them entry to the UK, their papers are likely to be sufficiently robust to allow them entry in the future. In that case, issuing an ID card would turn an illegal, fake or false identity into a real, legal one, which might allow terrorists to operate with impunity and to move unhindered because they can prove to the authorities that they are who they claim to be. Far from tackling terrorism and offering more security, ID cards offer a false sense of security and much more complacency.

On the prevention of crime generally, including identity theft, the Government have made no convincing argument about how ID cards will stop crime, catch criminals or prove cases, unless a criminal leaves their ID card propped up on the mantelpiece after they have stolen the DVD player. ID cards will not deter a single criminal, unless the Government envisage allowing the police to stop people who they believe are acting suspiciously or engaged in a crime and request to see their ID card, which would, of course, require the card to be mandatory. There are two flaws in that argument: first, the police presence on the ground would be the deterrent, not the request to see the ID card; secondly, if the police have reasonable suspicion that someone is about to commit a crime, they already have the powers to stop and question them. If the Government were serious about tackling crime, they could take the £500 million for ID cards in Scotland, which is a conservative estimate, and employ 1,500 police officers on the beat for the next 10 years.

On identity theft, The Economist reported on 2 June that the cost of fraudulent applications for bank accounts and cards, the hijacking of bank accounts and other such crimes is £36.9 million. Earlier today, we heard that benefit fraud related to identity theft costs some £50 million, which, as Mr. Mitchell has said, is a long way away from the £1.3 billion that the Government have previously quoted. The Economist stated that the Government's figure includes

"the cost of dealing with immigrants who arrive in Britain with false documents."

ID cards would not stop one single person arriving in the UK with false papers or reduce the cost of addressing the issue by a single penny.

Photo of John Hemming John Hemming Liberal Democrat, Birmingham, Yardley

There are 73 million live national insurance records, but only 46.5 million people in this country are entitled to have a national insurance record, and the Government have confirmed in a written answer that they have no idea how many fraudulent records are in the register. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that evidence indicates that we cannot trust the Government to run an identity database?

Photo of Stewart Hosie Stewart Hosie Shadow Spokesperson (Women), Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Spokesperson (Treasury)

A number of IT projects and databases need to be cleaned up. I am not sure about the figures—Lynne Jones has said that the national insurance issue is being addressed—but the evidence does not suggest that the central data register for ID cards will be more accurate than the national insurance register.

I have mentioned people entering the country with false papers, which leads me to the Government's third stated justification for ID cards—the enforcement of immigration controls. It is worth noting that immigration into the UK is a managed process. I fear that this is not about immigration at all, and that the real concern is about asylum seekers, refugees and those who may not be here legally. The Government may wish to tell people fleeing oppression and seeking sanctuary that the UK is a less charitable and a harder place in which to seek protection and help. The introduction of ID cards may force such people, some of whom understandably arrive here afraid of authority, officialdom and Government, further into the recesses of society, working in the illegal economy, living in unregistered and overcrowded housing, and away from the people whose services they most require.

Most worryingly of all, as several right hon. and hon. Members have suggested, this might be about finding people who should not be here by searching out those who do not have an identity card. I am not suggesting that this Government would do that, but a future Government might, and we should look at unintended consequences. In such circumstances, I suspect that white MPs will not be stopped and asked for their identity cards, nor will New Zealand students working in bars in Islington, but the black and Asian populations of our towns and cities may be stopped and have their identity cards requested time after time. The sus laws have already been mentioned. This legislation has the potential to set race relations back by decades.

The fourth justification for identity cards is that they will prohibit unauthorised working or employment. The gangmasters who employ casual labour on a cash-only basis do not ask for national insurance numbers, pay through the pay-as-you-earn system or issue P60s, and they will not do biometric tests based on identity cards. Indeed, the idea that every building site, cockle beach or berry field will be equipped with a portable biometric reader is laughable. This is an unenforceable law. It will place additional costs and burdens on businesses that already comply, and do precisely nothing to stop the unscrupulous who already breach, break or ignore every employment law.

The final justification for the introduction of ID cards relates to the efficient and effective provision of public services. Having listened carefully to what was said throughout the debate, it appears to me that this is not about the efficient and effective provision of public services but about the restriction of access to public services for those who are not entitled to them. That may not be an unreasonable thing for the Government to do, but how can it be more efficient or effective to ask for an identity card—with the accompanying cost of a biometric reader in every hospital ward, doctor's surgery, dentist's surgery or well woman clinic—than simply to request the national health service number with which we are all issued at present?

I know that time is short, so I will come to my summary. SNP and Plaid Cymru Members believe that the Bill is flawed and will not work. It will provide no extra security—indeed, it may lead to a false sense of security, with fake identities becoming real and legal ones. It will not stop one single terrorist; intelligence, not identity cards, will stop terrorists and terrorist acts. It will not stop a single criminal or a single crime; it would require more police, not plastic cards, to do that. It is a disproportionate response to identity theft, and will do absolutely nothing to reduce the cost of those arriving in the UK with false papers. It risks forcing refugees, asylum seekers and other vulnerable people into the darkest corners of society and away from those whose help they need most, and it risks setting back race relations in this country by decades. It is an unenforceable law as regards bad and illegal employers who exploit their workers and ignore the law, and it is not about providing efficient and effective public services but about restricting access to them.

In short, we believe that this is a bad Bill that would make bad and unenforceable law. It has the potential to be 18 Greenwich domes or a giant poll tax. When it goes belly up, it risks pulling the Government down with it. I do not want to be partisan because there are honourable men and women on other Benches who may join us in the Lobby.

The Bill risks being an expensive folly—a white elephant, which, at £5 billion, £10 billion, £15 billion or £18 billion might bleed the taxpayer dry. There is passionate opposition to the proposals in all parties. I say to the Government: withdraw them and think again. It is a bad Bill, which will be bad law.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Michael Lord Michael Lord Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means

As many hon. Members are still seeking to catch my eye, in accordance with the Order of the House of 26 October 2004 on shorter speeches, it has been decided that, between 8.40 pm and 9.40 pm, the limit on speeches will be reduced to five minutes.

Photo of Neil Gerrard Neil Gerrard Labour, Walthamstow 8:40 pm, 28th June 2005

The more I consider the Bill, the more I am convinced that the problem is not the identity card but the database that lies behind it. It is inevitable that registration on the database will become compulsory. There is no prospect of that not happening. Once that has happened, it is again inevitable that it will become compulsory to produce the card, at least for specific processes, such as access to some public services. We are then likely to reach the point when it is compulsory to carry the card. If that happens—I believe that it will, in those stages—it will fundamentally change the relationship between the individual citizen and the state. If is futile to pretend otherwise.

We are being asked to approve the specification, commissioning and construction of probably one of the most complex databases that has ever been built. There is no international experience of building such databases. The system will involve three biometrics and a large population database, which will be used for a multiplicity of purposes. Hon. Members who spoke both in favour of and against the proposals have missed some of the points about what the construction of such a database means.

The database will be different from those with which we have already had to deal. Many of the databases that exist now do not have to cope with the problem of people who do not want to be on them or who fail to register for them. Some people will not wish to register on the proposed database on principle. Others, such as those with chaotic lifestyles, will fail to register. As we have heard, that also applies to people with some disabilities.

Millions of non-British citizens will be on the database. It must be permanently accessible from a wide range of public and private locations for it to perform any of the functions that are claimed for it. It is simply not comparable with existing systems.

If I were asked to propose an organisation to produce such a structure, the Home Office would not be high on my list. There has been no proper explanation of the construction of the database. If we are to have a clean database, which will be the gold standard, I want to hear how the information will be validated and verified. I have not heard that. I want to know how the enrolment centres will conduct the process. If faulty data appear from the beginning, the database cannot work from day one.

The Bill is a recipe for disaster. Some of the myths of what it is supposed to achieve have already been discussed this evening and I shall not repeat them, because of lack of time. They include tackling terrorism, benefit fraud and identity theft, which is not clearly defined. Claiming that the answer to identity theft is an identity card is a non-sequitur unless one specifies what identity theft involves and how it is carried out.

We are told that the police want identity cards. I do not believe that they do. They want a national database, which will become a national biometric register. That will allow them to check up not only on those who have been involved with crime previously but on anyone on whom they wish to make any sort of check. These are ill-thought-out proposals.

I have no objection to passports and biometrics, but I want the database to disappear. I cannot support the proposals otherwise. It would be possible to produce an ID smartcard that would perform a good many of the required functions and would also be much more secure. Any IT expert will tell us that putting all our eggs in one basket will not work.

The Government have said that they want to listen and want to talk to us. The programme motion does not convince me of that. If we are really to have a debate about the evidence and the detail of that evidence, we cannot do so in three weeks.

There is no way I can vote for the Bill, and I will certainly vote against the programme motion, because it will kill the possibility of the genuine debate that we ought to have.

Photo of Damian Green Damian Green Conservative, Ashford 8:45 pm, 28th June 2005

Last year, in the last Parliament, I voted against the Bill content in the knowledge that I was doing the right thing, but a little unsettled in the knowledge that I was rebelling against the party line. Tonight I will vote against the Bill, still content that I am doing the right thing and delighted that I am supporting my party, since wisdom has settled on our Front Bench.

Some Members have objected to the Bill on principle, others on practical grounds. In the short time available to me, I want to begin with the principled objections. The longer we consider this proposal, the less attractive it becomes.

As a Conservative, I regard the defence of individual freedom as a core part of my political beliefs. As a lover of freedom, however, I am genuinely delighted that a distaste for state intervention is also present on the Government Benches. I hope that the rebels on those Benches keep their nerve. I encourage them to do so not from our partisan viewpoint, but from their long-term partisan viewpoint. Let me take them back to the 1980s. The phrase "poll tax" has been used frequently this evening. It would certainly have been embarrassing for Lady Thatcher's Government in the short term had the Conservative rebels succeeded in voting down the poll tax then, but it would have been a great deal less embarrassing than what happened to that Government after they failed to vote it down. I urge potential Labour rebels to hold their nerve. Not only will they be doing the right thing; they will be doing their party a favour in the long term.

Mr. Howarth said that he could not understand what freedoms were being lost by the Bill. The main principle at stake is the basic relationship between the citizen and the state. Democracy makes the state answerable to the citizen; compulsory identity cards do the exact opposite. The freedom that is lost is the fundamental freedom to have a private life, because of the national identity register. It is not necessary to be a criminal to want some privacy. I agree with Liberty, which says

"the Identity Card Bill . . . represents a fundamental shift in the state's attitude to individual privacy."

Liberty believes that we are moving away from a position where information is not given to Government and shared among Departments unless that is necessary

"towards one where it will be shared unless there is a reason not to".

That is indeed a fundamental shift, which I think breaks a fundamental principle.

It has been said that no other common-law country has an identity card scheme. That is extremely important. With a written constitution and a code specifying what is legal and what is not, it is possible to protect privacy. Under a common-law system, once it is assumed that it is a Government's right to have private information about citizens, we have lost an essential protection that all citizens of a democracy deserve.

It is clear that in practical terms the Government cannot be confident that all the problems that they say the identity card will solve will indeed be solved, but we need only look at the history to see that Ministers have for ever been adept at providing ridiculous reasons for why identity cards are necessary. The House of Commons Library note tells us that, in the 1950s, just before identity cards were abolished, Ministers argued that one of the main reasons for retaining them was the prevention of bigamous marriages. I am not aware that the 1950s saw a huge upsurge in bigamy as a result of the abolition of identity cards, and some of the scares being put forward by Ministers today are about as valid as that one.

The final word should go to Mr. Harry Willcock who, in 1951, challenged the police and took his case to court. He argued that he should not have to carry an identity card, and he won. The Lord Chief Justice said that compulsory identity cards would

"tend to make people resentful of the acts of the police and incline them to obstruct the police instead of assisting them."

Those words showed great wisdom. We should also reflect that the last word of Harry Willcock—a difficult man who liked to argue—was "freedom". That should be our final word when debating this wretched proposal.

Photo of Mark Todd Mark Todd Labour, South Derbyshire 8:50 pm, 28th June 2005

I do not intend to debate the principles of this proposal. ID cards are commonly used in democratic countries, and the Bill will give the Government no more access to personal data than they already hold through items such as passports and driving licences, and significantly less than most of us freely give to banks, supermarkets and insurance companies.

Several hon. Members:


Photo of Mark Todd Mark Todd Labour, South Derbyshire

No, I shall not give way.

My interest is in two aspects of the Bill. The first is whether the benefits of the project have been set out with sufficient clarity and quantified in such a way as to justify its progress. The second is how Parliament is to scrutinise the commissioning, delivery and management of a complex, high-risk, IT-enabled change in the way in which we relate to our Government and the services that are sold to us.

In a project of this scale, I would certainly expect to see a business case published that identified the gains to be achieved—quantified and valued where possible—and showed how they would be committed to and delivered. I have yet to see such a document. We have seen that various parts of our public service endorse the concept of ID cards, but that is insufficient in itself. They must own and sign up to the process changes, improved outcomes and efficiencies that they say can be delivered. We have noted, for example, that the Criminal Records Bureau will apparently greatly increase its efficiency following the introduction of ID cards. That could readily be quantified and valued, but we have yet to see it done. There have also been statements about the reduction in identity fraud. Again, it should be possible to quantify the potential gains and to analyse whether they relate to the costs and scale of the project. Those gains must then be assessed against the project's apparent costs and disbenefits, and a mechanism needs to be set out that will allow us to measure whether we are achieving those goals, and to monitor them in the future.

I would also expect to see an objective risk analysis of the project. I accept that the technologies used, and the process changes that are likely to be made, are achievable in themselves. However, delivering all of them within one project carries huge, multiplying risks. The Office of Government Commerce's gateway process has been far from perfect in preventing flawed projects from proceeding, yet it is probably the best mechanism available to date. I would strongly suggest that the OGC's reports be made public through this process, so that we can examine for ourselves whether the project is likely to be deliverable.

Associated with that is the recognition that any project of this scale and complexity should have defined boundaries in terms of cost, budget and functionality. It is all too easy to persist with a stricken project, rather than risk criticism by taking the correct course of cancellation. I would expect to see a definition of how the inevitable problems of this project will be appraised, and of how they will be assessed against reasonable criteria of success and failure.

Finally, I would expect a robust management strategy to be defined, both at political and project management level. Fatal to most projects, and certainly to this one, would be a creeping specification, involving changes part-way through. Politicians tend to wish to please, and we cannot predict what will be asked for in the future. Projects of this scale, however, need to be run with narrow-minded dogmatism to ensure that they are delivered at all. I see a huge contradiction between that and the likely longevity and complexity of this project. I would therefore like to see a public recognition in Government of the discipline required to achieve anything at all.

Some of my expectations might be met through changes in the Bill. There are strong arguments for an affirmative vote prior to the commissioning of the project based on a far clearer understanding of what is being attempted than has been offered up to now. I would urge an amendment on those principles. I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench can produce a more resilient and fact-based case during the Bill's passage. I thus reserve my support on the future stages of the Bill. Tonight's vote, however, is on the principle of the Bill, and it will have my support then.

Photo of Bill Cash Bill Cash Conservative, Stone 8:55 pm, 28th June 2005

Mr. Todd referred to principles. Let me give him a principle as expressed by Abraham Lincoln:

"Those who deny freedom to others, deserve it not for themselves."

When the Bill was debated in the previous Parliament, I, my hon. Friend Damian Green and about nine others marched through the Lobby with clear conviction and certainty to ensure that we registered our protest against the principle of the Bill. Second Reading, of course, is about the principle behind the reasons for producing it. On the previous Second Reading, I produced a copy of a book by George Orwell called "Nineteen Eighty-Four", and directed it to the attention of the Home Secretary. It refers to the "Ministry of Truth", in which, George Orwell says, "Freedom is slavery". That is what lies at the heart of these proposals. [Interruption.] I hear the Minister of State say "Rubbish" from a sedentary position. I heard him generating a certain amount of hot air and rubbish on the subject on the "Today" programme this morning or perhaps yesterday—it was in the past 48 hours.

The fact remains that the Information Commissioner has stated that the Bill has within it the seeds of a surveillance society. In the previous debate, I referred to the fact that he said that it represented a sea change in the relationship between the individual and the state. I have heard the Home Secretary rubbishing the Information Commissioner today. I heard another Labour Member talking about hysterical paranoia. I would like to call their attention to the fact that the Information Commissioner holds a status by Act of Parliament that is no less than that of the Clerk of the House of Commons, in that he cannot be removed from office unless there is an address by both Houses of Parliament. That is a very high status. Those such as the Home Secretary who are wont to describe the measured remarks of the Information Commissioner in such terms seem to be getting dangerously close to fulfilling the axiom of Abraham Lincoln's to which I just referred.

Over the past year or so, we have also noticed that this new Labour Government, in contradiction to what the Prime Minister used to say, have moved increasingly down the route of greater inhibitions on individual freedom. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is a good example, as it contained a provision that would enable the Government to repeal any Act of Parliament if they declared an emergency. In 1995, when the Prime Minister was in opposition, he said:

"Instead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on compulsory ID cards as the Tory right demand, let that money provide thousands more police officers on the beat in our local communities."

He stands condemned by his own statement.

The ingredients of this Bill include the making of statutory instruments, so when we pass the principle but do not provide for the enabling provisions, we do not know what we are letting ourselves in for. This Bill, despite the perambulations of my party on this subject—I am glad that they have now been resolved in the direction in which we originally put the case—should be condemned. No other common-law country of any note has such a provision, including the United States. This Bill is a disgrace, and it is Big Brother coming back again.

Photo of Robert Marshall-Andrews Robert Marshall-Andrews Labour, Medway 9:01 pm, 28th June 2005

In view of the time, I have torn up the civil liberties peroration with which I was hoping to entertain the House. I will limit that aspect of my speech to pointing out the undoubted fact that the bite of this Bill lies in its secondary, not its primary legislation. It would be as well if Members understood—I am sure that they do—that under the Bill's secondary legislation, it is possible for the Secretary of State to extend the information put on the register in respect of any individual to include any matters relating to security and crime. If he does so, people will not be able to access it, because the Data Protection Act 1998 will not allow them to do so. That is all that I have to say on civil liberties, apart from endorsing in general terms the rather florid comments of Mr. Cash, whom I have the honour to follow.

I shall attempt to give the House the benefit of my research into one of the few things about which I know a little: crime. I was entertained—indeed, I was exercised—by the claim, which has been made on many occasions, that so-called identity theft costs the nation £1.3 billion a year. I thought it would be interesting to find out how that figure was arrived at, and I want to give the House the benefit of my research in the very short time available.

I first went to the Government document that accompanies the Bill. It does not deal with this issue in detail, but it does contain the following short passage:

"A few items stolen from a rubbish bin such as utility bills . . . can lead to huge financial losses as well as distress and inconvenience for victims in putting their records straight."

It continues—without providing a source—by pointing out that

"On average victims can spend 60 hours restoring their records."

I find that difficult to believe. I know that British Telecom and British Gas, for example, can be tiresome when people try to get their records put right, and that one can spend a lot of time listening to music on hold. But I found the claim that one can spend two weeks, on continental time, trying to put one's records right as a result of documents being removed from one's dustbin an unconvincing start to my research.

However, things got worse when I finally found the document on which this figure is based—a Cabinet Office document called "Identity Fraud: A Study". It deals with various aspects of crime that, it is said, cost £1.3 billion. The overwhelming majority of that figure is said to come from the following types of crime: VAT fraud, which accounts for £215 million; credit card theft—of course, that cannot be affected by this legislation—which accounts for £215 million; and money laundering, which accounts for some £400 million.

I am delighted to say that I know a little about the form of money laundering to which that study refers. It involves people going into bureaux de change in order to launder money. All such crimes referred to in that study—£400 million-worth—are actually a limited number that were committed in 2001. Generally speaking, what happens is that somebody goes into a bureau de change bearing a rucksack or haversack, in which is contained approximately £1 million in old notes, mainly Scottish. That person then offers them to the owner of the bureau de change, saying, "Please may I have new guilders?" He is then given the guilders in exchange for the notes.

That is the crime that it is hoped will be completely laid to rest by identity cards. I invite hon. Members, in the short period I have left to speak, to speculate and contemplate what happens when Jock or Bill arrives with his million quid. The owner of the bureau de change—Chinese, probably—says to him, "I see you are back here again with another million pounds of Scottish notes for which you want guilders". He will then say, "Any chance of an identity card?" No? Well, it would be all right with an ID card, but if the person in question said no, I invite the House to say that that would not be the end of that particular transaction.

Of course, it gets worse when we contemplate serious blue-collar crime. It is envisaged that the scheme will do something to prevent armed robbery. Well, I can contemplate the cashier who has the misfortune of looking at a balaclava and a shorn-off shotgun. I dare say that some would have the sang-froid at that moment to say, "Please may I see your identity card?". I have known some very stupid criminals in my time, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but very few who could be prevailed upon to give themselves away as a result of this legislation, which I greatly hope we will not pass tonight.

Photo of Ben Wallace Ben Wallace Conservative, Lancaster and Wyre 9:06 pm, 28th June 2005

I do not intend in the short time allocated to discuss the ideology behind the ID card, but rather to bring some of my experience to the debate. I worked a number of years in the field of counter-terrorism, both in the armed forces and alongside some civilian agencies. I am well aware of the issues that people face in fighting terrorism on the ground. Until recently, I was the director of the Government's own organisation, Qinetiq—the Defence Evaluation and Research Authority, as it used to be known—specialising in the area of security and ID. That organisation is one of the biggest research bodies in Europe, so it knows a thing or two about technology. It is currently working on a number of projects in the Home Office.

There are a number of flaws, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in the proposals, the first being the idea that this ID scheme will help deal with terrorism. In my experience, we never caught any terrorists on account of ID cards. We caught them as a result of surveillance, human intelligence, intercepts and perhaps the good use made of knowledge about the community in which the terrorists lived.

One real problem that the Home Office seems not to recognise is that terrorists adapt to weakness in the system, and this system is weak in a range of areas—tourist visas, for example. Last year, 24.7 million tourists visited the UK. For a terrorist organisation, the weakness is obvious: no longer need they use citizens of the UK as their operatives to attack the UK, as they can import them from outside. That is precisely what they have already done across the world. There are 850,000 Irish citizens resident in the UK and we have already heard that the scheme has nothing to do with them.

Failures overseas are relevant. According to a Labour Member earlier, ID cards helped to catch the culprits after the suicide bombing in Madrid. In fact, they did not: it was mobile phone intercepts that caught them and helped the Spanish follow up what happened. The Home Office also needs to be aware that a suicide bomber is a one-time weapon. It was first seen in train attacks in Chechnya, which is where al-Qaeda's specialty originated from. [Interruption.] Perhaps Home Office Ministers should do their homework before shouting from a sedentary position. Terrorists adapt to weaknesses in the system: that is the issue, and the proposed ID card will not solve the problem.

About 50 per cent. of terrorists currently identified or languishing in jails in Northern Ireland have no previous record whatever. They have never had any trace to terrorism, so they will be able to use their new ID cards with impunity. Clearly, 50 per cent. of the people who have been involved in terrorist attacks will have free rein and the Bill will not solve the problem.

The second flaw relates to the prevention of identity theft. It is true that the database will allow an identity to be stolen only once, but the system needs to be set up and 48 million people will have to join the queue to get an identity card. So when the Under-Secretary presents himself and the database says, "I'm sorry, but a Mr. Burnham is already on here. Here are his biometrics and birth certificate, and a passport has been issued"—incidentally, the birth certificate is the real flaw in the identity system—the Under-Secretary will say, "Well, I'm Mr. Burnham. I'm the genuine article." The fundamental change is that the onus will then be put on the genuine Mr. Burnham—the innocent individual—to prove to the state that he is the real thing, not the person who stole his identity the year before.

People will be able to steal others' identities under the proposals, and I can all but guarantee that in the next 10 to 15 years a terrorist attack will be perpetrated by someone with a new identity card. When that happens, the Government's scheme will be exposed as an expensive, flawed scheme that has also taken away many liberties.

The issue of privacy is also important. What the Government have not said is that the database will log every question put to it. The pattern of questions put to it will indicate exactly who someone's doctor or dentist is.

Photo of Kali Mountford Kali Mountford Labour, Colne Valley 9:11 pm, 28th June 2005

I have a copy of the "LSE Identity Project Report", and I found in it part of a sentence with which I agree. It states:

"The success of a national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and cooperative approach involving all key stakeholder groups".

I have found little else in the report with which to agree, so I shall examine that proposition.

First, the approach must be "sensitive". Some people may believe that the scheme may be prejudiced in its operation and that their identities will be sought unnecessarily and unfairly, because of either their ethnic origin or something else different about them. However, we hear such points from the Conservatives who, even after the Stephen Lawrence report, refused to accept that there was institutional racism in the police. The best way to deal with institutional racism that would lead to people being identified because of their race, religion or other difference is to address the problems in the police force, not to deny people the opportunity of identifying themselves properly and having proper protection before the law.

Secondly, the approach must be "cautious". Well, the Bill is extremely cautious. The cautious, incremental approach to introducing the measures means that some hon. Members are running away with the most imaginative ideas we have seen for some time. Indeed, their suggestions are matched only by the imagination of my constituents who want to extend the Bill ever further to include even more situations in which their identity should be protected or produced. For example, people in my constituency want medical records to be included in the database. I do not think that that is a good idea, and it is not covered in the Bill. It is important that when somebody requires medical treatment, they receive it on presentation before a doctor and are not asked questions at that point, especially in an emergency. However, it is proper and appropriate that people should pay for the services if they are not entitled to them.

While my constituents let their imaginations run away with them, so do several hon. Members. Some of the suggestions I have heard today are extraordinary descriptions of the powers in the Bill. The power to protect us from the things that hon. Members have mentioned are included in other legislation that the House has already accepted. Moreover, the protection that we seek in being able to have our identities checked already exists, irrespective of the Bill.

Thirdly, the approach must be co-operative. Many of the surveys that have been conducted show that many people would be most co-operative with the legislation, because they desperately want to see it introduced. The co-operation must be between the service providers and the recipients, and that would be improved if both could be certain that they were receiving what they were entitled to. That co-operation must be built up, and we must use secondary legislation, which some people disparage, at appropriate stages to ensure that if we extend the powers of the Bill to other services, we provide the type of entitlement card that we envisaged originally.

The next point was about key stakeholders, and for me, they must be my constituents. They have told me loudly and clearly, in numbers, that they support the principle of an ID card—more than 90 per cent. of them responded to a survey. They also told me to exercise caution, as there are some cost issues that they do not like. They want certainty about the costs and, especially, that people who cannot afford a card will be properly protected. I ask Ministers to ensure that the provisions of the Bill will allow for exemptions and exceptions to payment. We should do that carefully and considerately and look at how we can reduce or discount payments for people who cannot afford them. If we do that, we shall build up the safeguards and give my key stakeholders the protection they want.


As one of the right honourable member for Colne Valley's constituents, I would like to provide a perspective that she seems to have ignored when telling the house that "(her) constituents...want to extend the bill ever further".

I wrote to her as a life long Labour voter before the election citing this bill as one of the reasons I was seriously considering withdrawing my support over (in the end I held my nose and voted Labour, fearing the Tories would unravel the hard-won ground toward greater social justice in the UK).

The social justice that I consider is the bedrock of labour values lies at the heart of my objection to this bill. Centralised 'command and control' systems cannot, and will never, breed the trust and honesty that we need, and that assumes the huge leap of faith that an effective one can be implemented.

Returning to my original objection though, could the right hon member at least have the decency to say that SOME of her constituents have expressed a wish to live in a police state, not all of us!

Submitted by mark young

Photo of Lynne Featherstone Lynne Featherstone Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs) 9:15 pm, 28th June 2005

There are so many reasons to oppose the Bill that unfortunately I do not have time to go through them all. However, I have almost complete confidence that the costs will spiral out of control so I put my faith in that. Watching the Prime Minister equivocate about the costs yesterday was our best practical hope, because with spiralling costs comes unpopularity and the Government are sensitive to unpopularity.

We know of the Government's record on IT failure, but I warn hon. Members that IT success brings equal challenges. We have only to consider the congestion charge. I have been dealing with hon. Members' complaints about that, and a simple glitch in the congestion charge is enough to tie anyone up in correspondence for months trying to get it sorted out.

I want to talk about the disproportionate discrimination that will be wrought by the Bill on ethnic minorities. After five years as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, and chairing the stop and search implementation panel, I have seen that disproportionality at close range—the stops under section 4. Under other legislation, DNA can be taken from innocent people and four times as many black people as white people have their DNA held. That is how legislation that starts innocently ends up.

I have seen what happens when there is a voluntary principle in legislation; for example, when the police are looking for a criminal whose DNA has typed them as a member of an ethnic minority. In south London, 1,000 voluntary DNA samples were wanted for a horrendous crime, but when 125 people refused to give DNA they received a letter telling them that their reasons for refusing would be investigated by a senior police officer. When five of them continued to refuse, they were arrested and the police were able to take their DNA, which was kept even though all five were released. That is how the voluntary principle works.

The dog whistle for me is civil liberties. The measure is a monumental raid on everything that I have grown up believing in; it is a real shift in power between the state and the individual. I am free. I want to be able to walk out of my front door as an innocent person if I am doing no one any harm. No one has the right to hold any information about me and I should not need a licence to walk out of my house.

The ID card system is quite different from border control. Yesterday, the Prime Minister seemed to be offering us "buy one, get one free", when he mixed up biometrics and the advances in technology that can secure our border controls with ID cards, but his arguments were spurious; the two things are completely different. Passports are purpose-driven, as are driving licences. If I choose to exchange information about myself for a facility that I want to use, that is fair game, but I do not want all my information in one basket; that is a charter for criminals. It is bad enough at the moment with one piece or another being subject to raids by sale. Recently there was a case of a bank member of staff selling private information. I do not think that the Government can guarantee our safety on this.

For all those reasons, I shall vote against Second Reading tonight. I urge Labour Members, particularly those Members who want a free vote and would vote against the Bill if such a vote were allowed tonight, to remember what it felt like to vote for the war and then have to face the electorate when their heart was not in it.

Photo of Alan Simpson Alan Simpson Labour, Nottingham South 9:20 pm, 28th June 2005

I do not have any problems with identity cards. I have several of them. I have a passport, a driving licence, a bank card, a credit card, a supermarket loyalty card, an NHS card and probably several others that I have forgotten about. None of these is perfect and secure and we all have our horror stories about what happens when they get stolen, go missing or get misused. But we continue to use them, for two reasons: one, because it is our choice to use them, and two, because there is an assumption that we have reasonably, or tolerably, secure firewalls between them. When I go on holiday, I present my passport but I am not asked to present the shopping list from my last visit to the supermarket. When I go to renew my driving licence, I am not asked whether my credit card can stand it. When I go to the bank, they do not ask when I last went to the doctor. The dangers in the Bill are that by putting all those information systems into one card, it creates something that is an invitation to criminals and hackers. It is a honeypot for crime. And we have yet to convince ourselves, let alone the public or even the experts, that we have the technology that would withstand that.

I will try to confine my speech to my worries about three things. A number of claims made in the Bill are unproven or just not true. In terms of the effects—in terms of tackling terrorism, crime or drug trafficking—I am very grateful to a retired scientist who took the trouble to undertake a European comparison of crime statistics on four parameters. He broke the EU 15 down into the eight that had voluntary ID cards, the four that had statutory compulsory ID cards and the three that had no ID cards. The figures are interesting. Over the past five years, the group that had the highest level of terrorist incidents and the highest rate of homicides were those that had compulsory cards. They also happened to have the greatest increases in drug trafficking and in crime. By contrast, those without cards had the lowest rate of terrorist incidents and the lowest rate of homicides, and had the most success against drug trafficking and in crime reduction.

What does that prove? Nothing. It does not make a case for or against ID cards; it just says that they are not relevant or central to tackling those challenges. In the countries that have ID cards, they have them because they are popular with their citizens. But by and large, they have their own firewalls in them. As my hon. Friend Lynne Jones said when she was moving her reasoned amendment, the key to this is that there is separation of data storage in those systems. We could have the same ID card system here, but it would require us to undertake a commitment that the responsibility and control was going to be placed in the hands of the citizen, not the hands of the state, and that is fundamentally at the heart of my objections to the Bill as currently drafted.

I worry about the scope for what people refer to as function creep. The best example of this that I came across was in the United States, where I understand that the Bush Administration wants to introduce radio frequency ID chips to the passports of all foreign nationals. It is a great idea for the CIA; it will allow it to remotely monitor those who are there on lobbies and on demonstrations and who hold beliefs or convictions that the Administration disagree with, and it is a reflection of the sort of paranoid society and Administration that one finds on the other side of the Atlantic. It is an American thing but not a UK thing.

I thought I had better check that with the Home Office, however. I got a reply today from the Minister, who pointed out that in the UK

"The International Civil Aviation Organisation initiated feasibility studies evaluating the acceptability and implementation options for biometrics and the storage of electronic data on passports including the use of radio frequency identification chips . . . The United Kingdom Passport Service . . . has played a significant role in the development of the options and subsequent standards. The UKPS has adopted these standards within the technical design of the biometric passport.

No final decisions have been taken yet on the chip technology for ID cards."—[Hansard, 27 June 2005; Vol. 435, c. 1242W.]

That is the power of stop-and-search without the hassle of the stop. If we do that, we fundamentally declare war on our own citizens. With the presumptions of criminality and the right to spy, we move from the open society to the surveillance society in an insignificant, unrecognised sweep because none of these proposals has to come back to the House for primary legislation. That is why we must oppose the Bill.

Photo of John Penrose John Penrose Conservative, Weston-Super-Mare 9:25 pm, 28th June 2005

Much has been said this evening about the likelihood of cost overruns with a large and complicated Government IT project. My constituents are of the same opinion and are deeply concerned about the possible cost and time overruns. But I also want to speak about a more fundamental principle: civil liberties. There are two pillars that underpin our civil liberties in this country. One of them is made up of the legal brakes on the Government's use of information and on their behaviour—things such as the Data Protection Act 1998 and habeas corpus—but the other pillar that upholds our civil liberties is largely forgotten. It is the simple, practical difficulty of marshalling information about the citizens of this country.

The information that the Government hold on any one of us is scattered and incomplete at present. The simple, practical difficulty of collecting all the information together and using it for any nefarious purpose is a fundamental guarantor of the civil liberties of each and every one of us. It is no accident that, if we compare what happens in this country with what happened in East Germany, for example, before the Berlin wall came down, we would see that there were thousands and thousands of detailed files on each of their citizens. It is a facet of totalitarian regimes to hold large quantities of data on their citizens that is not shared by freedom-loving democracies, such as Britain.

So while we are right to be concerned about the possible cost overruns and the difficulties of managing a complicated Government IT project such as the ID card database, we should also be concerned about the dangers of what happens if the IT database is successful. It would, for the first time, allow Governments and other people in this country to see a unified picture of the information that is collected on each citizen. That is a dangerous precedent to set. If we had had both those two pillars underpinning and upholding our civil liberties in this country yesterday, and we choose to support the Bill today, tomorrow one of them will be knocked away. That is dangerous. It is why the Bill is unsafe, why it deserves to be opposed and why I shall vote against it this evening.


Couldn't agree with Mr. Penrose more, a first time for everything

Submitted by bryan mcgrath Read 1 more annotation

Photo of Diane Abbott Diane Abbott Labour, Hackney North and Stoke Newington 9:28 pm, 28th June 2005

I am grateful to the House for allowing me to take part in this important debate. There are many reasons, both of principle and of pragmatism, to vote against the Bill, but I intend to touch on only three: the politics of the Bill, its implication on issues of race and what is says for the future.

First, let me remind my Labour colleagues that it is barely two months since we won an historic third term, and we are now embarked on squandering political capital on this doomed Bill. [Interruption.] Even the Almighty agrees with me. It is a doomed Bill because even if thunder and lightening cannot stop it, and even if the House cannot stop it dead in its tracks tonight, we know for sure that it is doomed to overrun its budget and to spiral in costs. The scheme will experience IT failure and the Bill will not achieve any of the claims that the Government make for it. We also know that the scheme will become especially unpopular at exactly the wrong point of the political cycle. There will come a time when not one Labour MP will want to be reminded that they voted for the Bill.

I have consistently raised worries about race with Ministers and colleagues, so it is no coincidence that the Muslim Council of Britain, the Commission for Racial Equality and other organisations representing ethnic minorities have expressed their concerns about the Bill. A recent poll showed that 77 per cent. of ethnic minority people believed that they would be discriminated against under the Bill. There can be no doubt that the Bill will lead to the compulsory carrying of ID cards—and that from there it must lead to the compulsory presentation of ID cards. We know from the French experience that if we move to such a system, the number of stops and searches on black, Asian and Muslim people will rise, which will be detrimental to community relations.

One of the first issues on which I ever campaigned—without the help of the Almighty, when I was a younger and even more radical woman—was the sus laws. If Ministers understood the strength of feeling among people in ethnic minority communities about the prospect of being randomly stopped and asked to present their ID, they would think twice about the Bill. I know that the Bill will not provide for the compulsory carrying of ID cards, but that must come.

As the evening has worn on, the Government Whips have subjected several of my colleagues to their usual rough-hew methods of persuasion. However, I say to colleagues in the closing minutes of the debate that voting against the Bill would be far from betraying our Government or going against Labour principles, because we would be doing the Government a great service. The more the public hear of the Bill, the less they like it, so the sooner it is stopped in its tracks, the better.

Photo of Tobias Ellwood Tobias Ellwood Opposition Whip (Commons) 9:32 pm, 28th June 2005

I am delighted to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, as we reach the conclusion of an important debate that hinges on the relationship between the citizen and the state and the borderline of the civil liberties that we feel able to concede so that we can live in a safe and secure world.

Many believe that the concept of ID cards should be supported because if we have nothing to hide, we have nothing to fear. Alan Simpson talked about the contents of his wallet and said that it contained several ID cards, such as library cards. However, each of the databases to which he referred is separate, isolated and low-cost and there would be limited damage if details were lost or stolen.

The Bill has the commendable aim of tackling ID fraud, benefit fraud, illegal immigration and terrorism. However, the nation becomes more sceptical as we hear more about it. We do not know the definitive cost of the scheme, so we should ask ourselves whether we will get value for money. It has been said that the police support the Bill, but we should turn the question around: if the police were given £5 billion or £10 billion—whatever the cost of the scheme will be—what would they spend it on? In Bournemouth, the money certainly would not be spent on ID cards, but on CCTV and to pay for more people to work in benefits and Inland Revenue offices because those people could combat fraud.

Hon. Members on both sides of the House have expressed concerns about the technology. The Government's trials—not the Cambridge study—show that iris scans have only a 96 per cent. success rate and that fingerprint scans have an 81 per cent. success rate. If I cut my finger or suffered a paper cut I could no longer be tracked on the system.

Photo of John Hemming John Hemming Liberal Democrat, Birmingham, Yardley

Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern about the impact of clause 6? If someone cut their finger and did not tell the Government they would be liable to a civil penalty of £1,000. Indeed, a stealth tax on shaving would be imposed on hon. Members who shaved off their beards, as they would have to pay a fine of £1,000 if they did not tell the Government.

Photo of Tobias Ellwood Tobias Ellwood Opposition Whip (Commons)

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point and shows how important it is to scrutinise those provisions in Committee.

Setting aside the costs of technology, how will the Bill help us to tackle crime and benefit fraud and, indeed, to fight terrorism? I shall focus on acts of terrorism. A number of people have mentioned 9/11 and the Madrid bombings. I take a personal interest in such matters because, sadly, I lost my brother in the Bali bombing. When my brother was killed he was carrying his passport. It was destroyed, so it would not have been of any use to anyone. The terrorists who killed him were miles away—the people who did the damage blew themselves up, so ID cards would not have helped in that situation. May I respectfully urge caution when we talk about terrorism in the House and how the Bill will help us to tackle it? I am not sure how ID cards would have helped in my situation and, indeed, in 9/11.

Dr. Palmer mentioned a number of European countries that have identity cards systems. The average price of those cards, however, is not £1,900 but, in the case of Sweden, €15 or £20. The price is low because the system is extremely simple. The middle east is the only place to have more advanced systems, which aim to track people coming in and out of the area. That is the problem with the Bill—as long as we have porous borders we cannot take full advantage of the operation of ID cards.

Time is short, so I shall conclude. The Government's proposal is a costly exercise that will hamper society, not help it. They said that they would drop the scheme if it became too expensive, but what price is the Home Secretary willing to pay before he decides to pull the plug and not proceed with the proposals? The Bill is dangerous and open-ended. It does not have a clear timetable, it is based on technology that does not work, uses questionable costings and is out of touch with the people. I therefore encourage hon. Members to vote against it.

Photo of Roberta Blackman-Woods Roberta Blackman-Woods Labour, City of Durham 9:37 pm, 28th June 2005

I broadly support the Bill. Identity cards could assist with the prevention and detection of crime, the enforcement of controls on immigration and on illegal working and the fight against identity fraud. They could help to deliver more efficient and effective public services. Members who oppose the Bill have failed to base their argument on matters of fact and have succumbed to conjecture or hysteria. In the light of the debate, it would be useful to consider what the Bill will introduce: the establishment of the national identity register, powers to issue biometric identity cards, enabling public and private sector organisations to verify identity subject to the person's consent—[Interruption.]

Photo of Michael Martin Michael Martin Chair, Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission, Speaker of the House of Commons

Order. The hon. Lady has waited all night to address the House. It is bad manners to be in loud conversation.

Photo of Roberta Blackman-Woods Roberta Blackman-Woods Labour, City of Durham

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

The Bill would give a national identity scheme commissioner oversight of the scheme and it would create the criminal offence of possessing false identity documents. We carried out a consultation on the Bill in my constituency. About 80 per cent. of respondents were in favour of it, but a sizeable proportion thought that the scheme would have public support only if certain safeguards were in place. I therefore urge my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to do all that he can to ensure that civil liberties issues are addressed. People have reasonable concerns about the protection of civil liberties, so Government reassurance is necessary.

Primarily, these concerns relate to the amount of information held centrally, the security of the system, who will have access to it and for what purpose. Everything must be done to assure people that they will get an opportunity to check their own data and correct it, that private sector organisations will be able to access information only with consent, that use by public services conforms to the regulations prescribed in the Bill, that ID cards are cost-effective and that the scheme conforms to the European convention on human rights.

Citizens Advice has set out its concerns that function creep and unauthorised disclosure should not happen; that IT systems can support the project, particularly before it is compulsory; that attention should be paid to hard-to-reach groups, described by Citizens Advice as itinerant counter-culture, those with chaotic lifestyles and those with mental health and mental capacity problems who will be affected by the legislation; that all will be treated equally; that the Act will not be used in a discriminatory way; and that there will be safeguards to ensure that it will be compatible with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. I am sure my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and his ministerial team will be able to address those concerns.

In conclusion, ID cards could present a sensible and practical way forward and be an added tool in the fight against criminal activity. One almost has to sympathise with the Tories on the issue. They are for ID cards, then against. Their leader supports ID cards; another possible leader does not. However, the Liberals take the biscuit for uncertainty and indecisiveness. It may be worth reminding the House that the Lib Dem Home Affairs spokesman used to be in favour of ID cards, before changing his mind when it came to the crunch.

The Lib Dems' case that fraud will increase if ID cards are introduced is not proven. It is much more likely that ID cards will help to tackle identity fraud. The Lib Dems propose to spend any money saved by not introducing ID cards on providing extra police. As the public are paying for the cards, the Government cannot spend money that they do not have. It is the Lib Dems, not the Government, who have a problem with the costing. It is necessary to have a reasoned debate on the matter so that concerns can be addressed and reassurance given to the public. That is a better way forward than the scaremongering from the Opposition parties.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs) 9:42 pm, 28th June 2005

We have had 33 contributors to the debate and they have broadly been divided into two camps—surprise, surprise. Twenty-four have spoken against the Bill. Eight managed to speak for the Bill. One of them was the Home Secretary, whose speech, I regret to say, was characterised more by bluster than by evidence. The support of other speakers was, to say the least, qualified—I am thinking of Mr. Howarth, Mr. Denham and Mr. Todd.

Dr. Blackman-Woods has just made a career-making speech and I wish her well. Kali Mountford also made a deeply loyal speech in favour of the ID cards scheme proposed by the Bill. Dr. Palmer produced one of his unfathomable speeches, which none the less was listened to with great care. The Home Secretary produced some sparkling remarks in the course of his speech, to which I shall return if I have a moment.

Before analysing some of the points, I turn to the three maiden speakers—my hon. Friends the Members for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway), for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Cox) and for Harwich (Mr. Carswell). Unfortunately, I was not able to listen to the speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich but reports tell me that it was a powerful speech, in which he paid proper respect to his immediate predecessor, Mr. Ivan Henderson, whom I knew well as a member of the Anglo-Netherlands parliamentary group, and to Iain Sproat and the Ridsdales—Sir Julian Ridsdale represented the seat before Iain Sproat. My hon. Friend said that ID cards will not reverse crime and also spoke passionately about the need for greater localisation, on which I support him.

My hon. Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon made a booming and powerful speech, in which he carefully described the beauties of his constituency. He was very kind, and properly so, to his immediate predecessor, John Burnett, and to his wife. He, too, said that this ID card scheme is not the answer to his constituents' prayers.

My hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham also made a powerful speech. He spoke about his constituency with care and concern and said some very kind things, which both sides of the House shared and enjoyed, about his predecessor, Chris Pond. Like the other two maiden speakers, he made it clear that this ID scheme is not the answer to his constituents' concerns.

Far too many speeches have been made for me to deal with them individually, but 24 hon. Members were deeply concerned about the Bill. This is the Government's broad case: ID cards will prevent terrorism; ID cards will prevent identity theft; ID cards will prevent and detect crime; ID cards have overwhelming public support; there is an international obligation to fingerprint or iris scan the population; the technology is available to fulfil the Bill's requirements; the implications for race relations have been exaggerated by Conservative Members and those Labour Members who disagree with the Government's case; and the costs are manageable, bearable and assessable.

The Government's final argument is to rubbish the point about the common travel area, which was raised by Mr. Robinson and which they have not yet satisfactorily addressed. I have one gentle piece of advice for Democratic Unionist Members—be very careful about doing deals with a Government who singularly fail to deliver on their promises. I urge all hon. Members to consider the principles behind the Bill: are we sure that the Irish Republican Government will not have access to information in the north and in Great Britain?

A number of my hon. Friends, including the shadow Home Secretary, have pointed out that the Bill was born in error, that it will die in error and that the sooner it dies, the better. The scheme is voluntary now, but it will become first compulsory, and then mandatory, in which case we will all be obliged to carry the card—we need to worry not about the card, but about the database that underlies it. The Government do not want us to realise that the Bill will not only expose every citizen's private life and private information to them and their machine, but require us to carry in our pockets not only a plastic poll tax machine, but a policeman. We do not need policemen in our pockets—we need policemen on our streets. The Government refuse to accept that point and to commit resources to deal with terrorism, crime and the many other problems raised by hon. Members on both sides of the House.

We heard from my right hon. and learned Friend Mr. Hogg, my right hon. Friend Mr. Lilley, Frank Dobson and the hon. Members for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick), for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones), for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) and for Hampstead and Highgate (Glenda Jackson). They all made, in their own separate ways, broadly the same point—that the Bill will not deliver the panacea that is suggested, will not deal with identity theft, and will not prevent and detect crime. More to the point, it will exacerbate bad race relations and encourage an underclass to feel yet further alienated from the haves, while the Government try to glide over all this with a collection of truisms and platitudes.

Mr. Marshall-Andrews, the hon. Members for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) and for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson), my hon. Friend John Penrose, Ms Abbott, my hon. Friends Mr. Ellwood, for Stone (Mr. Cash), and for Ashford (Damian Green), and Mr. Gerrard ripped the Bill apart, as it deserves to be. The Bill is indefensible. Indeed, it has not been adequately defended by the Home Secretary who, in our submission, has no belief whatsoever in either the principle or the facts that are necessary to sustain the argument.

I look forward to listening to bluster not only from the Home Secretary but from the Minister of State. We are used to them blustering—they are both happy little fellows—but neither has an argument on which to stand a case. I look forward to many Members joining the official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and others in the Lobby in defeating the Bill.

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office 9:50 pm, 28th June 2005

I agree with Mr. Garnier that there were 33 speeches; his sort of made 34. May I also say that we can now, with some degree of confidence, rule him out of the forthcoming leadership election?

There were a range of speeches, which were in the main well tempered and good-humoured. I am grateful to the House for a debate in which Members expressed a range of views about details in the Bill and details that are yet to be subject to parliamentary discussion. I make no apology for repeating that this is enabling legislation. There is much still to be done in terms of detail, regulations and all the other elements.

I congratulate my hon. Friend Mr. Winnick on his consistency, at least, in being opposed to ID cards; I have no difficulty with his position.

Mr. Oaten needs to be slightly more careful in what he says, because some of the points that he made raised obtuseness to a fine art. The notion that, even if we got to the stage where cards were used for public service entitlements, a woman who chose to have a termination would be in fear of that data being on the database is ludicrous in the extreme and unbecoming of the hon. Gentleman. His point about e-documents shows no understanding of what we are doing in terms of e-borders and the legislation that will be implemented in full by 2008.

My hon. Friend Mr. Howarth said that the project is feasible. I agree, of course, that there are further issues to be addressed; that was a theme throughout.

Mr. Hogg said that the provision is intrusive and that he disagrees with it. He made more or less the same speech as he has made for the past four years, to no avail.

My hon. Friend Lynne Jones made a very impressive speech on costs and technology suggesting that the items that we have put forward do not stack up. I simply do not agree with her in that regard, but we can have more debate on that matter.

Mr. Robinson made a measured and tempered speech. The Bill does not refer in any way to foreigners or foreign Governments, but the answer to his real concern is that the Bill does not permit information to be disclosed except in the specific circumstances clearly set out in the Bill. The relevant authorities include the police, security services and UK Government Departments. Other UK public authorities may be added by order, but only public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998—that is, only UK authorities. The Bill allows information to be passed to law enforcement authorities overseas, but only in the case of serious crime. That is not a new power but a replication of powers that are already in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.

There is no power in the Bill to provide information to other Governments, including the Government of the Republic of Ireland. The measure contains no power to add other Governments by Order.

I congratulate the three maiden speakers. I am sad that time does not allow me to go into more detail about what they said, but all three spoke eloquently, and with a good deal of generosity about their predecessors, for which I am grateful.

I am sorry that my hon. Friend Mr. Harris was a victim of identity fraud but he showed clearly how the application registration card—ARC—for asylum seekers can be used well.

I am pleased that my hon. Friend Glenda Jackson does not regard the Home Secretary as a snake oil salesman or a huckster. I am grateful for those comments. She is right that, in the past, there has been a great deal of overselling of the case for the card and all it can do. It can help and supplement but it cannot deal with terrorism in the way in which it was suggested the Government claimed—[Interruption.]


"The notion that, [...] a woman who chooses to have a termination will be in fear of that data being on the database is ludicrous in the extreme and unbecoming of the hon. Gentleman." -- in fact, this is a perfectly reasonable concern, as I have stated above:

"There is no power in the Bill to provide information to other Governments, including the Government of the Republic of Ireland. The measure contains no power to add other Governments by Order." -- as stated above, no such power would be required for data sharing to take place. There is no prohibition on such sharing in the Bill, either, and we should take it that it would take place if it were felt to be convenient by a future government.

"My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) was wrong in his supposition that there will be an open book for adding data to the database. Clauses 1, 3 and 43 and schedule 1 make that clearr. To suggest that DNA, health records, criminal records or other medical records can be included is plumb wrong." -- this is misleading. The Home Secretary would be able at any time to add to the list of things to be recorded in each registered person's entry in the Register by statutory instrument.

Submitted by Chris Lightfoot

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office

My hon. Friend Mr. Gerrard, in his wisdom, made a telling contribution. I am sure that we shall discuss his comments in full subsequently.

Damian Green made a speech.

My hon. Friend Mr. Todd made a fair speech, which was rooted in detail and dealt with some aspects of the benefits, to which we shall revert.

Mr. Cash mentioned Orwell and Lincoln—those were the highlights of his contribution.

I fear that my hon. Friend Dr. Palmer managed to support the hon. Member for Winchester on identity cards.

My hon. and learned Friend Mr. Marshall-Andrews was wrong in his supposition that there will be an open book for adding data to the database. Clauses 1, 3 and 43 and schedule 1 make that clear. To suggest that DNA, health records, criminal records or other medical records can be included is plumb wrong.

Mr. Wallace probably condemned himself to the Committee given his experience.

One of the most irresponsible contributions was made by Lynne Featherstone. She spoke about DNA—she was wrong. She spoke about the impact on ethic minorities—she was wrong. The Bill is rooted in existing legislation on race relations, race discrimination and other matters.

I say in all candour to my right hon. Friend Mr. Denham that, despite the agreement, if the prevailing wisdom of the usual channels is that there should be more time in Committee to scrutinise the Bill, let us have that discussion. The Government will be generous in their response. The deal was done, but if more time is required, let us talk about it. I have no problem with that.

My hon. Friend Ms Abbott is right that an election took place only two months ago. We stood collectively on a manifesto that stated:

"We will introduce ID cards, including biometric data like fingerprints, backed up by a national register and rolling out initially on a voluntary basis as people renew their passports."

That is at the heart of the Bill.

I say again to my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen that we are already involved in some pre-procurement discussions. If that needs to be more open and if we can make it more open before we go through the EU process, I will try to ensure that that happens.

My hon. Friend Kali Mountford made a point about concessions. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said that we would reconsider the fee structure, concessions and other assorted elements.

The Bill is an enabling measure. Its purpose is to protect the individual's identity, not suppress the individual. It does not propose a plastic poll tax and is not tantamount to an attack on civil liberties. There is much to be done and I commend the Bill to the House.

Photo of Lynne Jones Lynne Jones Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. I shall be voting against Second Reading instead.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the Bill be now read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 314, Noes 283.

Division number 20

See full list of votes (From The Public Whip)

Question accordingly agreed to.

Photo of David Heath David Heath Shadow Leader of the House of Commons, Shadow Spokesperson (Cabinet Office)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You and the whole House will have heard the Home Secretary, in response to an intervention from Sir Patrick Cormack—the Minister of State repeated the point later in his peroration—say that the Government would consider the Bill's committal to either a Special Standing Committee or a Joint Committee. Would it be in order for the Government to withdraw their programme motion, and am I correct in saying that under Standing Order No. 63, it would be perfectly in order to put down an alternative motion of committal, without notice, this evening? Has there been any indication that that will take place?

Photo of Michael Martin Michael Martin Chair, Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission, Speaker of the House of Commons

What I am doing tonight is inviting the Government to move the motion.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 83A(6) (Programme motions):

That the following provisions shall apply to the Identity Cards Bill:


1. The Bill shall be committed to a Standing Committee.

Proceedings in Standing Committee

2. Proceedings in the Standing Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 19th July 2005.

3. The Standing Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Consideration and Third Reading

4. Proceedings on consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.

5. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

6. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on consideration and Third Reading.

Programming of proceedings

7. Any other proceedings on the Bill (including any proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments or on any further messages from the Lords) may be programmed.—[Mr. Alan Campbell.]

The House divided: Ayes 313, Noes 286.

Division number 21

See full list of votes (From The Public Whip)

Question accordingly agreed to.