I beg to move amendment No. 350, page 9, line 15, at end insert

'situated in the Palace of Westminster'.

The Chairman of Ways and Means:

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 328, in clause 23, page 10, line 16, leave out from 'appointment' to end of line 20 and insert

'as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 329, page 10, line 26, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment No. 341, in schedule 7, page 156, line 7, leave out

'President of the Supreme Court' and insert

'senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 342, page 156, line 8, leave out

'Deputy President of the Supreme Court' and insert

'second senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 343, page 156, line 13, leave out from beginning to end of line 43 on page 158.

Amendment No. 344, page 159, line 24, leave out from first 'the' to end of line 31 and insert

'senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 345, page 159, line 33, leave out paragraph 8.

Amendment No. 346, page 160, leave out lines 6 to 19.

Amendment No. 347, page 161, leave out lines 1 to 33.

Amendment No. 330, in clause 25, page 11, line 17, leave out from beginning to 'will' in line 18 and insert

'The Commission must ensure that among them the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 331, in clause 27, page 12, line 36, leave out

'judges of the court would between' and insert

'Lords of Appeal in Ordinary would among'.

Amendment No. 333, in clause 54, page 24, line 20, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

New clause 6—Appointment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary—

'(1) Section 6 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59) (appointment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary by Her Majesty) is amended as follows.

(2) After 'unless', insert—

"(1) he has been recommended for appointment in accordance with section 23 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (selection of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary); and

(2)".'.

Amendment No. 334, in clause 62, page 27, line 9, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 335, page 27, line 20, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 336, page 27, line 31, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 337, page 28, line 5, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 365, page 28, line 5, leave out

'judge of the Supreme Court' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 338,page 28, line 7, leave out 'to the Court' and insert

'as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 368, in schedule 15, page 225, line 12, leave out from beginning to end of line 43 on page 226.

Amendment No. 340, in clause 120, page 52, line 25, leave out subsections (4) and (5).

Amendment No. 369, in title, line 2, leave out from second 'to' to 'to' in line 4 and insert

'make provision in relation to the appointment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary'.

This is a long list of amendments. They have been grouped correctly, although they deal with two separate issues. Amendment No. 350 deals with the issue of where, if there is to be supreme court, it will sit. Other amendments represent an attempt by the official Opposition to rewrite part of the Bill to retain the Law Lords while, at the same time, ensuring that there is an adequate independent commission for their appointment, as provided for in the legislation.

Amendment No. 350 would insert in clause 20, page 9, line 15 a requirement to situate the supreme court in the Palace of Westminster. Prior to the Bill's introduction, there was a great deal of discussion about the fact that a supreme court was needed, allegedly in part because the facilities in the other place were insufficient for the Law Lords. However, during the course of that debate, a strange situation arose. The Law Lords who are keenest to establish a supreme court, because they believe that there should be a separation from the House of Lords, are least enamoured of the Government's proposals to rehouse them in another location. The Government have a problem, as a sunrise clause in the Bill expressly provides that the supreme court will not come into being until suitable premises have been identified to house it. On Second Reading, the Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Leslie, said with apparent certainty, although without making an official announcement, that the Government intended to house the new supreme court, which essentially takes over the role of the Law Lords with only a small amendment to their powers, on the other side of Parliament square in Middlesex guildhall, which is currently used as a Crown court. That building has been described by Lord Bingham, the senior Law Lord, as wholly unsuitable for the use of the new supreme court.

That should come as no surprise. When we consider the way in which the Law Lords operate, it is clear that theirs is a highly informal, Committee-based system of legal reasoning, which prides itself on the simplicity of the manner in which business is conducted. Complex rules of procedure are not necessary, nor is hierarchy. The Law Lords discharge their responsibilities as a corporate body. They can decide who will sit on an individual panel to deal with cases, and they do it in a Committee Room atmosphere, to which the public have access. Moreover, they can shift Committee Rooms in the other place if there is a need to accommodate more of the public to listen to the arguments. As was also pointed out in the course of debate in the other place, the nature of the argument that takes place in front of the Law Lords tends to be of quite an academic, if not esoteric, description, and is unlikely most of the time to have huge appeal to members of the general public. It is not the sort place where one will watch people being cross-examined on evidence.

In those circumstances, it is unbelievable that it has, apparently, been pre-ordained that the Law Lords are to be moved into an old civic institution, a building that I know very well because I have practised there as a barrister on many occasions. The building is suitable as a county hall for local government administration, albeit of a rather old-fashioned kind, and suitable as a Crown court setting, but I find it astonishing that the Government should conclude that the building is suitable to house the Law Lords in the discharge of their new responsibilities, if they are to be set up as a supreme court.

I am glad to join debate with the hon. Gentleman again. I, too, have practised in Middlesex guildhall in my previous life and I have formed an entirely different view. The building is entirely adaptable. There are several courts and other rooms, it is over the road from Parliament and, most important, it is a distinct building—a distinct institution—so making the point that I thought the hon. Gentleman supported: that there should be a clear separation between Parliament and the legislature, and the courts. That is the obvious way to achieve it.

I shall not be drawn into a discussion at this stage about the separation of powers, in which, as I indicated previously, I do not believe. I accept that we have a serious disagreement about the need to set up a supreme court at all. However, I want to make it clear—which is why I tried to split this argument from the argument on amendment No. 328 and amendments consequential upon it—that my arguments on amendment No. 350 are based on the premise that we are setting up a supreme court. I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. I do not believe that Middlesex guildhall, without major adaptation, is a suitable environment.

Before my hon. Friend completely destroys the image of Middlesex guildhall, will he keep in mind that it acts as a symbol of something very important—historic Middlesex? Although its county council was abolished and the guildhall is therefore no longer required, Middlesex still exists. Middlesex guildhall is important and needs to keep that name, to keep the history alive.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend, who represents a seat which historically formed part of Middlesex and still does. If one goes into the building, one notices that it is redolent with civic pride relating to the county of Middlesex. There are coats of arms associated with the county and a host of carving that highlights the traditions of the county, all of which have been easily adapted to the environment of a Crown court. Historically, many Crown courts have sat in shire halls in the same way as takes place in Middlesex guildhall. It is a perfect environment for a Crown court, but we are setting up the supreme court of the United Kingdom. Either we must take out the stained glass, remove the carving and alter the interiors so that they correspond to the idea that the new members of the supreme court who are enthusiastic about it have about their functions, or we are putting them into a building that is the very opposite of what they wanted.

It is a matter of slight speculation, but one can draw some inferences from what Lord Bingham said as to what those Law Lords who are in favour of turning themselves into a supreme court want. My impression is that they want a building that is distinguished in appearance, probably modern if it could be found—[Interruption.] Well, a number of buildings have been floated as proposals ranging from Somerset house to Middlesex guildhall, and in each case, I have detected objections, both from public utterances and from what I have picked up in other circumstances, to the effect that none of them quite reflects the image of the court that they want to put forward. I have some sympathy with that. It is clear that they want the Committee Room-appearance of the courtroom, with the judges not on the dais but down at the same level as the practitioners, to be preserved. In an ideal world, they would want some facilities for the public so that the place is user-friendly to those coming in and to suggest something accessible, informal and modern, and even some sort of interpretation centre—I do not mean that in any way pejoratively—to give people an impression of what the new court will do. I have great difficulty imagining all those things in the context of the setting of Middlesex guildhall, and so does Lord Bingham.

Unlike my hon. Friend Simon Hughes, I have no legal background, but I have some architectural background, and my ancestor, Sir William Chambers, designed Somerset house, which I have been all over. I can give the hon. Gentleman an absolute guarantee that English Heritage would never permit the sort of changes that he is suggesting. If he is saying, as he was a few moments ago, that members of the supreme court might seek a modern environment, is he really suggesting that the other end of this place provides that?

I shall come on to that in a moment. One thing on which I agree with the hon. Gentleman is the problems relating to any changes to Somerset house. I am perfectly aware of that, and am familiar with Somerset house, which is a magnificent piece of architecture. As I understand it, Somerset house was unsuitable for that reason. The Minister will correct me if I have it wrong, and he may take the opportunity of this debate to enlarge on the Government's approach, as Parliament is entitled to know a little about their background reasoning and the options rather than just hearing it at third hand through the press.

Any changes to Middlesex guildhall will also pose problems with English Heritage. We may have the opportunity to hear more from the Minister as we discuss the matter in Committee, but my understanding is that any alteration poses considerable difficulties, and from my knowledge of the building, I have no problem in understanding why. It would need substantial adaptation, including the moving of the woodwork and many internal fittings, which remain an integral part of its structure and have adapted well to its role both as a Crown court, and in the past, as a shire hall. The Government have not addressed those genuine problems.

I smile at the idea that the Conservative party is resisting a change of use to Middlesex guildhall when I seem to remember that it was responsible for a change of use to County hall over the river into something far further removed from civic pride than is being suggested for the guildhall. There may be good reasons for suggesting the guildhall. If the hon. Gentleman does not want it to be the guildhall, but if we are to have a supreme court outside the Palace, will he tell us where he suggests that it should go?

That raises some interesting questions—[Interruption.] Well, my simple answer to the hon. Gentleman is that I have not the slightest idea. While I can see that if the Government were prepared to fork out £250 million a suitable site could be found on which to erect a building that would correspond to the idea held by those Law Lords who wish to move, the Government have not suggested that they will fork out that sum, although I have a funny suspicion that by the time this process is finished we will be moving rapidly in that direction.

I want to compare Middlesex guildhall, which is the offer on the table—not the other ideas, which might be costly but have some validity—with what is available down the Corridor. It is a fairly remarkable set-up. It is within the Palace at the other end, and has succeeded over the past hundred and something years in accommodating the Law Lords. First, it has provided them with their own rooms, which most of them find agreeable, as they have said, and private rooms in which to work. Secondly, it has provided them with a Committee Room, which I have been in and sat in for work purposes as well as seen in the context of being a Member of the House. That Room is entirely suitable, pleasant and at the same time quite an informal environment. Thirdly, it has succeeded in various offices in providing all the necessary support services for the Law Lords. There is a fantastic library of national quality and standard, which also provides the House of Lords with its Library, sensibly avoiding a duplication of resources. There is an amazing office at the bottom of the Victoria Tower, where judgments can be produced and distributed, and which, once one knows where it is, is a hive of activity and industry. There appear to be motivated staff who are happy to work in the building.

Overall, those facilities are provided for the princely sum, on which the Minister will correct me if it is wrong, of £168,000, leaving out the judicial salaries—[Interruption.] Indeed, there are no overheads because of the duplication of the function that the building must already perform as a House of Parliament. That seems to me a jolly sensible use of public money. The Minister will have to persuade me, before I return to my constituents in Beaconsfield, that there really is some purpose in spending between £30 million and £50 million, with running costs of between £5 million and £8 million—it is not quite clear—to set up a separate structure to deliver exactly the same service.

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has had similar experience to my own when I held accommodation responsibilities—that there is considerable pressure from the existing membership of the House of Lords for offices and other accommodation at the other end of the building. Were the change to take place, which Liberal Democrat Members support, it would release some of the pressure at that end, and might make it more possible for more parts of that House and its support staff to be within this building, which would clearly be to the advantage of Parliament. Has he taken that into account?

Yes, I have. The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly valid point: if the Law Lords were to leave the House of Lords and move into a supreme court, some accommodation would be freed up. I have to say that it is minimal in comparison with the costs of setting up the new supreme court elsewhere. I suppose that the key issue, on which I am sure that he will agree, would be whether it would enable Millbank to be given up, or something of that sort. I have a question mark over that, because I need only compare what is available at Millbank with the amount of space that the Law Lords take up to make me think that that is improbable. The Minister may be able to help us in the course of today's debate. I see him smiling, and I think that the answer is that it is improbable. I wait with interest to hear how Millbank can be squeezed into the pint pot that is available down at the other end of this building.

Another fact to consider is that this building has a long and historic association with the dispensing of justice, which has nothing to do with the Law Lords being Members of the House of Lords. There have been courts in this building or on this site for almost 1,000 years. Justice was dispensed at Westminster under the Saxon kings—certainly by the time that William Rufus had built Westminster Hall in the 1090s—and that practice continued until the 1860s. There really is a long association, and it is sensible to preserve that if possible.

I suspect that the real reason for getting the Law Lords out of the building is to assert the separation of powers. I do not believe in the separation of powers—I believe in judicial independence—but, if I concede to the Minister for the purposes of this debate that we should have a supreme court, I am puzzled as to why it cannot be in the same building as that in which Parliament sits, while maintaining its separateness. The United States Supreme Court managed to sit in the Congress building, almost directly underneath one of the meeting chambers—one can still go there—for a very long time without anybody asserting that it interfered with the separation of powers. When the facilities proved insufficient, it moved to a large, very fine building opposite. If we wanted to put up such a grand building to give sufficient authority to a supreme court, the thick end of £1 billion would probably just about cover it.

But we have available a much cheaper option—a building owned on behalf of the public that could provide the benefits of a court that was somewhere else but nearby, and independent and perceived to be independent, but without the costs, other than those of internal refurbishment.

I entirely disagree. To begin with, there will be knock-on costs because the courts that currently sit in Middlesex guildhall will have to be found alternative accommodation. They are very busy Crown courts, and have been ever since they were set up. My fundamental point is that although Middlesex guildhall is a lovely building, there is no comparison, in terms of status, between it and this building. The only similarity lies in its Gothic revival historicity. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Nevertheless, it would be clear to anyone entering it that the Law Lords are occupying an old shire hall—albeit rather tastefully designed—of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. That is not adequate for a supreme court. I would much prefer to leave the Law Lords down at the other end of the Corridor. Anybody who sees the unusually informal way in which they operate there would be completely comfortable with the idea of their continuing to do so. We are going to waste money on something that will be unnecessary even if a supreme court is set up.

Amendment No. 328 and the long list of consequential amendments that flow from it would radically alter the Bill. They return to a lengthy debate in the other place about whether we need a supreme court at all and whether it would be possible to preserve the existing structure of the Law Lords. The Law Lords themselves appear to be fairly evenly divided. Given the pressure for this move that the Government have exercised in the public sphere, it is remarkable that they have not succeeded in securing more than 50 per cent. support for it from the Law Lords. The truth is that the Law Lords function very well, as the Government repeatedly acknowledge, and that the Government's desire to get rid of the Appellate Committee is a piece of theoretical mumbo-jumbo that is completely unnecessary in practical terms.

We are told that a separation of powers is required to send out this great signal that the judiciary is free of the Executive and Parliament. However, I worry much more about the signs of frequent interference in the independence of the judiciary by the previous Home Secretary than about where they sit and whether they are Members of the House of Lords. Judges have to exercise self-restraint in everything they do, to the extent of their private conversations at dinner parties, because in an age of mass publicity something that they have said, or has been said about them, could be seen to undermine the impartiality with which they discharge their office. They have succeeded in doing that, year in, year out—it has been impossible to find examples of where they have not. Where there has been any statement by a Law Lord or any other judge that might interfere with their ability to deal with a case, the general rule has been that they have not sat on it. The one exception is that of Lord Hoffman's involvement in the Pinochet case. However, the exception proves the rule, and that might equally well have applied had there been a supreme court. The fact that they are Law Lords makes no difference at all.

The Government seem to think that Law Lords are put into a peculiarly delicate position because they should not be able to listen to, participate in and vote on debates in the House of Lords. There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, in terms of voting they are extremely circumspect, virtually to the point of self-denying ordinance. Convention absolutely underpins the quality of our administration in this country. One of the things that worries me most about this Government is their absolute hatred of convention. They showed long ago that they could not be trusted to respect any convention in the book whatsoever. We had enough difficulty in persuading them to observe the convention of taking this Bill on the Floor of the House.

The Government want to create a whole series of mechanistic structures that are designed to ensure the Law Lords' apparent independence but will not make a blind bit of difference to the way in which the public perceive their work. I believe that we will lose out in two ways. First, their participation in the legislature is rather a good thing. The opportunity for them to express, as they always do in a very careful and moderated way, any doubt or anxiety that they have about a piece of legislation that might, for instance, undermine the rule of law, sends a powerful signal to the Government that they should think very carefully about what they are doing. That is an intensely useful structure in a parliamentary democracy.

Secondly, the Law Lords have an opportunity to be receptive to what other people are saying. I do not want to suggest that judges are isolated, because they are not. The majority of the judiciary, outside of the Law Lords, operate in a world where they come into frequent contact with large numbers of people. For instance, the lives of those in the High Court are centred around the law courts in the Strand, which gives them a continuing connection with members of their own profession that they tend to find very useful. However, the Law Lords, by virtue of being here, have never had that contact in the same way. My impression, from conversations, is that they value working in a building with other people whose sole focus is not the law. They value the opportunities that that provides for gaining understanding from, for example, attending meetings about issues of public concern. That gives them an important focus, which helps them in their judicial work.

Yet all that will be blown away, first by getting rid of their status as Law Lords and secondly, by moving them out of the building. Some of the ethos could probably be preserved by creating the supreme court but leaving its members in the building to enjoy its facilities. Again, that would be cheap but we would lose something by removing their right to sit and debate. There is a way round that. I agree that we need an appointments mechanism for the supreme court. The majority of the amendments that the Opposition tabled try to preserve the structure while enabling the Law Lords to remain in the House of Lords.

The second issue that we need to consider is the position in respect of Law Lords being made life peers. New clause 7 is a probing amendment on that. At what stage would that happen? Would they be made life peers when they cease to sit as members of the supreme court? Could they be made life peers while they are sitting? Could the president, but not the other members, be made a life peer? We need some clarification from the Government about those matters.

As I understand it, it is not intended that the Lord Chief Justice should cease to be a peer but perhaps the Government intend that to happen. That must follow if we are moving towards a total separation of powers. I hope that we can engage with that in debate. [Interruption.] I hear the Under-Secretary saying, "suspended". That highlights the Government's approach: one can be a life peer but one cannot sit while serving as a judge. That is bizarre. What if someone who has been a life peer is appointed as a judge? That person will have engaged in public debate, yet is viewed as suitable to act as a judge. That underlines why the Government's attempt to produce clarity creates nothing but a silly mess.

I wish that the Government would reconsider their obsession with the separation of powers, which, as I have often said, derives from poor old Montesquieu's failure to understand how the English judiciary worked in the 18th century. The discovery that the judiciary was not an arm of the Executive amazed him with delight when he came to England. However, he built that up into the separation of powers, which is different from judicial independence.

I have outlined the reasons for the amendments and I hope that we will have an opportunity to consider the two issues carefully. I want to emphasise again that they are distinct. The issue of where the court should sit would apply if there were a supreme court. One could continue with the Law Lords and move them into another building—there is no reason why one could not do that. Amendment No. 350 therefore concentrates on location. I am anxious about the possibility that we may wait a long time before the sunrise clause comes into operation, unless the Government have made a clear decision about the Middlesex guildhall. The Under-Secretary will help us with that.

The wider issue is the Government's monumental waste of public money, in which they specialise. The first example of that is the dome. It is interesting to note that the Lord Chancellor was associated with that, although he treated it as a rather difficult client for whom he had no personal responsibility. The second example is the Scottish Parliament building, which was started before the powers had been transferred to Edinburgh. I suspect that we are moving towards more major Government expenditure to achieve a result that could be obtained by continuing to spend overheads of £168,000 per annum. I do not understand where good government lies in that and I look forward to the Under-Secretary's response.

Mr. Grieve began with the location of the court. He rightly said that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords currently operates in a seminar style. I have appeared before the House on several occasions and my experience is of academic, to quote the hon. Gentleman, discussion. It is the sort of discussion that needs close interaction and a dialogue between counsel and the members of the Judicial Committee. There is nothing inconsistent between that style of judicial decision making and a new location.

To broaden the perspective, if one considers the operation of comparable courts such as the supreme courts of Canada or Australia, one see that style in a separate supreme court building or its equivalent. The Law Lords who support the change and the Government's proposals do not believe that the current style of decision making is inconsistent with having a different location.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned Westminster guildhall. I have sat there several times as a recorder and there is no doubt that structural changes must occur if the seminar style is to continue. That will require substantial expenditure. However, that is a consequence of the principle. That court has built up good relations with other parts of the criminal justice system in central London and I should like assurances from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary that everything will be done to facilitate transition for the judges and staff of that court and for the continuation of the good relations. I therefore have no problem with a move to a separate building or with Westminster guildhall. Situated on Parliament square, it is an appropriate place for a supreme court.

The more substantial point is the creation of the supreme court. As I said on Second Reading, I was initially sceptical about the proposal. There is no doubt that the House of Lords is an outstanding body. The judges are of the highest integrity and standing not only in common law but more generally in the international legal world. When one hears from judges such as Lord Nicholls, who opposes the change, that gives one pause for thought. We heard evidence before the Constitutional Affairs Committee from Lord Hope, the former Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland and now a member of the Judicial Committee, who said that he appreciated the opportunity to sit in the House of Lords in its legislative capacity, listen to debates and hear the issues of the day discussed. He believed that that was beneficial in the performance of his judicial functions. It gave him a wider perspective. There is no doubt that judges at that level need a wider perspective because they make decisions that have profound social consequences. However, as I also said on Second Reading, I am persuaded that the case for a supreme court has been made. I mentioned other jurisdictions. No other jurisdiction has our arrangement. Although that is not necessarily conclusive, it is a persuasive argument for change.

I mentioned the supreme courts of Canada and Australia in the common law world. The Indian supreme court is also an eminent judicial body. Across the North sea in Germany, arrangements at the highest levels are different, in that there are supreme courts in functional areas such as tax, labour and administration. However, in Karlsruhe, we find the Bundesfassungsgericht—the German constitutional court—and the supreme court of justice, the Bundesgerichtshof. We have only to read the judgments of those courts to see why the Bundesfassungsgericht is so highly regarded as a constitutional court. Those are examples using comparisons. Other countries have supreme courts, so why do not we?

The argument relating to the rule of law is strong. It is not an argument about the separation of powers, but, as Lord Bingham has said, judges are judges. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked why we needed a supreme court. Bagehot talked about the effective parts of the constitution, but he also talked about its symbolic aspects. Sometimes, as in this case, symbols are important. Here we would have a separate supreme court illustrating the fact that judges are functionally separate and that judges do judging.

Let us look at the historical situation. The hon. Gentleman rightly said that we had had courts in this location for centuries. Furthermore, members of the Judicial Committee have also been members of the legislative body in the House of Lords, but those were different times. When we had our debate in Westminster Hall on the Constitutional Affairs Committee report, I quoted the words of Lord Salisbury on the kind of person who ought to be a judge. He also said that the judges in the House of Lords should be Members of the House of Lords,

"since, practically, they have often to make law as judges, they will do it all the better for having also to make it as legislators".

Frankly, I do not think that that argument holds water any more. I accept the point that judges make law. We lawyers all know that Lord Reid famously said that it was a fairy tale that judges did not make law. They do, but, more importantly, they make law within a social and economic context. In a case before the Privy Council in 1949, Lord Porter said:

"The problem to be solved"— by the court—

"will often be not so much legal as political, social and economic."

Judges make important decisions that have social ramifications.

The fact that we now have the Human Rights Act 1998, that we are getting important decisions such as the Belmarsh decision, and that, in a different context, we have had cases such as the Pinochet case, illustrates that judges are now making decisions that have a much greater impact on our social lives, in terms of both public perception and reality.

I do not want to challenge anything that the hon. and learned Gentleman is saying, but in what kind of forum should a judge be able to say, "The law requires decision X, whereas justice would require decision Y."?

Judges already do that in the context of their judgments, although they might not put it in exactly those terms. The Law Commission, for example, will often draw on what judges have said about changes in the law. A judge might say, "I have to decide this case in this way, but there is a problem with that." That is something that the Law Commission should look at. That judge might suggest that justice required a change in the law, although, as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said, judges have to be extremely careful about what they say.

It is difficult to characterise the times in which we live. In a decade's time, when the supreme court is up and running, we might look back and see this as a fundamental revolution in our constitution. However, the proposal seems to me to be the kind of pragmatic, incremental change that is characteristic of constitutional change in this country. Today seems to be an appropriate time to make that change and I support the Government's proposals.

It is a pleasure to intervene in this debate at this stage, having not taken part in it earlier—perhaps a greater pleasure than for those other Members who have laboured day and night over the Bill. I shall be brief, but I shall also be slightly self-indulgent, because this is an enjoyable extra to my normal duties. I have declared an interest, in that I am a member of the Bar. Although I do not currently practise, I am still a member of chambers, so, like Mr. Grieve, I have performed over the road at the Middlesex guildhall in its capacity as a Crown court.

I want to address the two questions raised by the amendments, but I have one preparatory comment. The good knowledge of history that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield demonstrated reminded me that this place now lacks the kind of great historical contributions that used to be made here. He also reminded me of his very-much-still-alive predecessor, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, formerly Peter Brooke, whose knowledge of London and Westminster history was without parallel. We miss him, although those at the other end of the building still have the benefit of hearing from him.

On the venue for the supreme court, my hon. Friends and I have always supported the idea that there should be a supreme court and that it should be visibly and organisationally separate from the working of the legislature. On Sunday, there was an insert into the "Politics Show" on television; I discovered that it is running a series of them. Last week's asked, "How Conservative are the Conservatives?" This week, it was, "How Liberal are the Liberals?", and next week it will be, "How Labour is Labour?" As I was listening to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, it struck me that, if ever we wanted an illustration that the Conservatives were still Conservative, he would be a living manifestation that that was the case.

We need to scrutinise the argument for keeping an arrangement that grew up for a reason that has now changed. The reason that the courts were in this building, a royal palace, was that the king was the fount of justice. He invited the courts to sit in Westminster Hall and we are proud of Westminster Hall's history, both its conservative and its progressive, radical history. That must include its most radical moment of all, when King Charles I was sentenced to death in the hall attached to this building.

That was the reason for the courts being here and when the fire happened in the 19th century, the opportunity was taken to move almost all the courts to the new law courts in the Strand. The only court that remained here was the Law Lords. They represent the highest court in the land and effectively form the supreme court, but they are also members of the legislature, which is part of the other historical anomaly.

Ross Cranston rightly said that no other place in the world had the same judicial arrangements as ours. Well, no other place in the world has the same parliamentary arrangements as ours, namely an elected Chamber at one end, and at the other, a Chamber that is, with the exception of nearly 100 people who are the elected residue of the hereditary peers, all appointed. One historical anomaly is that, when the senior judges were appointed, the same group of people were appointed to be Members of the House of Lords. We delude ourselves if we imagine that the judges are regular, active participants there, because they are not. They are given that job incidentally, having been appointed as senior judges. They may incidentally contribute to debate and some benefit may result from their being able to talk to legislators, but I envisage much greater benefit from a separate supreme court elsewhere.

Let us take the great December judgment, when the House of Lords decided by a majority of eight to one that the Government were acting illegally—unlawfully. It is interesting to note that Ministers find it very difficult to use those two words. The Lords said that the Government were acting without the law in detaining people in Belmarsh and required them to change the law. That was a hugely significant constitutional judgment, for which many of us are very grateful.

The House of Lords does its job in a very different style from the one that people would normally expect. The Lords do not sit in robes or on pedestals and do not wear wigs, but the House of Lords hardly ever experiences public involvement, acclaim or participation in its processes. People go much more often to the law courts in the Strand, and even more often to Crown courts around the country, which are visited by school parties, college and university students and others with an interest. Very few people come to the supreme court of this country, although it would be far better if they did.

Members have given examples of courts in other countries that are frequently visited. There is the Supreme Court of the United States. There is the European Court of Human Rights, which has its own building in Strasbourg. There is the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. People go to those courts and see judges interpret the law, and it is important that the judges can be seen to do that in a way that the public can fully appreciate. The public would be far more likely to appreciate the significance of what the judges do here if they were in a free-standing location and seen to be wholly independent of the legislature. This is about perception as much as reality.

I am entirely in favour of people being able to see the supreme court in action, but its work will be similar to that of the Law Lords, and that—as many Law Lords have acknowledged—does not attract much wider public interest, because of its extremely academic and slightly esoteric nature. The High Court in the Strand offers more opportunity for excitement. That will continue to apply wherever the court is, and in whichever building it sits.

The hon. Gentleman is right, to an extent. People can no longer come here to see whether someone is sentenced to death or not. They cannot come here to discover whether a conviction for one of the gruesome murders featured in the tabloids will be overturned by the court of criminal appeal. Nevertheless, great constitutional judgments of our day such as the one in December are important, not only to academics but to a huge number of people.

I believe that the first point is made. Let me deal with the second tangentially. My colleagues and I want a mostly elected second Chamber. I should like 80 per cent. of its members to be elected, with a residual number of appointees. That debate is, of course, as yet unresolved, although we hope it can be resolved in the next Parliament, whatever the outcome of the election.

With a minority of appointees, it would be possible to secure the expertise of those in the legal and judicial professions. A nominee might have been a member of the supreme court or been nominated by the judges. With the disestablished Church that some of us favour, denominations of the Christian and other faiths could be equally represented. We need not lose the voice of judicial experience in a second chamber, but the representatives should not be trying to do two jobs at once. It is clearly unfair for someone to be legislating at one moment and judging at the next. There is no weakness in a system whereby judges come fresh to the law and interpret it—they need not have sat through the debate. If the Lord Chief Justice or the president of the supreme court wants to issue a warning that the Government are behaving inappropriately, he or she can do so by calling a press conference or making an announcement, or as part of a judgment.

Then there is the question of the venue. There is no magic in establishing the supreme court in the Middlesex guildhall. I have no absolutist view on that, but take a pragmatic, sensible view on what constitutes an appropriate location. Of course a supreme court could sit at the end of this building without going anywhere else, but if we are to start with the new structure clear, it is surely better on balance for us to vacate space that has been accidentally occupied in this building and move to a convenient location nearby at no huge public expense, if that is possible. It would then be possible to consolidate all the other activities of Parliament in this building. We have "outhouse" buildings that we rent to accommodate people, such as No. 7 Millbank and the buildings in Abbey gardens. Perhaps we could save those costs. Filling the space will be no difficulty in practical terms.

If it is decided that a move would be better, or possible, where should the move be to? It would be logical to choose somewhere near the centre of traditional power in the land. We have Government in Whitehall and the legislature here at Westminster, so the logical venue for the supreme court is close at hand. What are the options? I suppose there is the chapter house of Westminster abbey, although it is not terribly convenient. The court could squat in some of the rooms at Westminster school, although the school might have something to say about that, or we could ask the General Synod of the Church of England whether some hot desking would be possible in Church house. The Synod might not think that appropriate, but I believe that Church house has been used on a temporary basis before: I think that during the war Parliament moved in when this place was bombed. We could talk to the Methodists very nicely—Central Hall Westminster is capacious. It would even be possible to book a few rooms at the Queen Elizabeth II conference centre.

All those are options, but directly opposite us—on the other side of Parliament square—there happens to be a building that was originally the shire hall for the very county in which Parliament was for hundreds of years. It is, indeed, the very county in which Parliament still is, for the old county of Middlesex includes this place. The government of Westminster has moved up the road to less pleasant-looking premises in Victoria street, the city council offices, but that building was our county headquarters. Moreover, it is a court building. It is not as if it would be taken from local government to become a court. Of course some adaptations would be necessary, and I support the Law Lords' wish to retain the style that they have had before, but I cannot believe that that would be impossible in the Middlesex guildhall.

I have only one other thought. I have not gone around with a questionnaire consulting Law Lords or anyone else, but the only other building with a logic to it—if it were adaptable—would be the Privy Council building in Whitehall. It is near enough, and part of the Government's complex of buildings. I should be interested to learn from the Minister whether that has been considered. I share the view that buildings further afield, such as Somerset house, are inappropriate.

I feel that the proposition that the Middlesex guildhall could be adapted is reasonable. I note that the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs—chaired by my right hon. Friend Mr. Beith, who has had to leave the Chamber—decided that it was entirely reasonable, and I hope that it could be adapted at minimal cost. I should also be interested to know what contingency arrangements are in hand for moving the current work of the courts. I have three Crown courts in my constituency just over the bridge: the inner London court of session, which has been there for many years; Southwark Crown court, which is extremely busy; and Blackfriars Crown court. There are spaces in London for other courts. The courts administration could doubtless be adapted and, if the presiding judges were given due notice and help from the Minister's Department, appropriate buildings could be found.

There is a cost issue and it is true that we ought not to spend huge sums. If we were starting from scratch, we could build a new building, but no one is saying that we should do so. I assume that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield is not suggesting that it is Conservative policy to build a new building for a supreme court. Mr. Letwin has not added the associated cost to the list of additional Conservative expenditure, which will of course be balanced by £35 billion-worth of Conservative cuts. In the light of such cuts, it would be difficult to squeeze out of the Tory budget money for a new building.

I was amused to hear the hon. Gentleman refer to £30 million costs as minimal—he is being very liberal with the largesse involved. We want the court to remain in the current building because that is the proper setting, but if it is the Government's wish to splash out public money, in our view, the building that has been identified—notwithstanding what the hon. Gentleman says—is wholly unsatisfactory.

We can debate that issue and express our views but, in the end, if the Government get their Bill, they can implement the proposal.

In a rare moment of accord, we have tabled no amendments in Committee to a Government proposal—[Interruption.] No, that is no precedent for the future —not even for the short period before we are the Government and Labour are the Opposition. [Interruption.] That period may be shorter than Labour Members think. That said, I shall not be distracted into too much preliminary electioneering. The reality is that the Bill contains a contingent proposal: there will be a supreme court, but only if it moves from this building. I am surprised that the Government are being so definite about this proposal. I can see the logic of it in one sense, but as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield will agree, it is entirely possible to have a supreme court—the most important point—without moving it immediately, which is a less important point. We must get the priorities right.

I turn to the bigger issue, with which amendment No. 328 deals: whether we have Lords of Appeal in Ordinary or supreme court judges, with all that that entails. My hon. Friends and I approach this issue from different traditions and perspectives, but we share the common view that there is merit in having a supreme court. As my hon. Friend Mr. Heath said on Second Reading, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are certainly not "ordinary" and therefore have an anomalous name. The role that they fulfil would be more clearly perceived as judicially independent were we to bite the bullet and adopt the proposal before us.

This is not a new proposal that the Government have just dreamed up—it has been around for a long time, and we Liberal Democrats are glad that they have grasped this issue. Implementation of such a proposal is overdue. It would make it clear that there is a difference in democracies between government, legislature and the courts. It is important that those elements be separated, because at the moment, there are all manner of anomalies, such as the Lord Chancellor having three jobs and the Law Lords acting as legislators. That is why we will vote against the amendments if they are pressed to a vote. We hope that we can proceed to a satisfactory solution that will cost the taxpayer little money, but which will give us clear judicial independence, separation of powers and a separate, self-contained place in which the Law Lords, in their new role as the supreme court, can do their work.

Simon Hughes advertised his speech as a short one, but it ran to 19 minutes; mine will be shorter than that. The first question to ask is why we are paying the price of a ministerial brainstorm that occurred during a botched reshuffle. Abolishing the Lord Chancellor and the issues arising from that proposal have resulted in a Bill of 227 pages. The major associated cost—[Interruption.] I do not intend to be interrupted too much by the Minister's Parliamentary Private Secretary. The major associated cost is the capital cost, but there are also high recurring costs.

When the Law Lords appeared before the Constitutional Affairs Committee—I am very grateful to them and to the Lord Chancellor for doing so reasonably frequently—Lord Bingham said that the current arrangements passed the Bingham "pudding test", but not Bingham; in other words, appearances seem to be more important than anything else. If the issue is separating the place where the highest court will sit from the Palace of Westminster, I should point out that in doing so we would be separating it from the legislature, not the Government. I was intrigued by the idea, as advanced by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, of locating the court in a Government office. It would be far better to locate it in the legislature instead, but perhaps we can sort out that difference of opinion later.

We could say that the Lord Chancellor's house need not be used by the Lord Chancellor. It could be defined as being outside Parliament, but still fall within the Palace of Westminster security screen. As a result, there would be no additional costs. In other words, we could deal with the situation by changing people's perception and altering the definition, in the same way as—as has been suggested—we could change the name from Lords of Appeal Ordinary to supreme court justices.

The Government seem not to understand the difference between continuity and improvement and change. They have shown a lack of respect for an institution that has worked pretty well and they are obsessed with constant change. As a constituent of mine wisely said, if they were half as good at delivering results economically and effectively as they are at launching their ideas, life would be likely to improve. Not a single improvement will follow the high cost, disruption, argument and delay in which the Government's proposal will result. A far better idea would be to say that we prefer that the Law Lords do not vote in the upper House. That could be done by convention and, through a minor adaptation, we could establish that the Lord Chancellor need not sit on cases. The third problem could be solved by defining the place where the Law Lords meet as theoretically outside the Palace of Westminster. The only remaining issue would then be the best way of appointing the judges—an issue with which different clauses deal.

I hope that the Committee will forgive me but I will have to leave the Chamber at 2 o'clock because the Constitutional Affairs Committee, which has contributed to this debate, will be in session and it needs to be quorate.

I endorse and support what my hon. Friend Simon Hughes said earlier. I am stimulated to say something else, as well, by the contribution of Peter Bottomley, who is of course a member of the Constitutional Affairs Committee. My right hon. Friend Mr. Beith has left to prepare for the meeting to which the hon. Gentleman just referred, so I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is still here to hear what I have to say.

The role of the Constitutional Affairs Committee in preparing for this debate has been an extremely useful innovation, and we owe it to its members to take their advice very seriously. I am sorry that Conservative Front Benchers have not done so, because a considerable section of Members support the proposition before the Committee. The hon. Gentleman may want to comment on the fact that the Select Committee did not divide on paragraphs 37 to 54 of its report, which endorse the proposal for a supreme court that is separate from the present legislative role of the Law Lords.

To avoid having Divisions all the way through our proceedings, the hon. Gentleman will want to advise the Committee that unfortunately, it was necessary during our Select Committee proceedings to have two votes on paragraph 55, which in essence deals with this issue. The hon. Gentleman is not reflecting fairly, therefore, the decent, gentle and courteous behaviour of the Select Committee.

I am surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman make that point because I have read the report very carefully. It is true that there were some Divisions on paragraph 55, which dealt with the actual location of the court, but the principle of setting up the supreme court is dealt with in the earlier paragraphs.

I want to respond to the particular point about using this building for this particular purpose, while still maintaining the separation of powers, to which I and my colleagues are very much attached. I accept that there is an argument for doing so in the transitional period. That is why I want to deal with what Mr. Grieve referred to as the sunrise clause. My colleagues and I have some concerns about it—it is clause 120—because it provides a safety valve that could easily become a blocking mechanism if particular members of the judiciary decided that the accommodation was unsuitable, not ready, or not of the sufficient calibre, standard or quality to which they were attached as residents of this building. The hon. Member for Worthing, West has made an important contribution in that it would be perfectly possible during the transitionary period to use this building until the Middlesex guildhall is available.

The hon. Gentleman puzzles me now, because the recommendation in the report wholly endorses the need for a sunrise clause and states that no supreme court should come into operation until a new building has been identified. Is there not some inconsistency between what the Select Committee said and the hon. Gentleman's current view?

Not at all. I want to make it absolutely clear that my colleagues and I are not seeking to exclude the sunrise clause. What we are saying is that the Government owe it to the Committee now to explain precisely how they intend to handle the transition. That is a perfectly reasonable request to put to the Minister, and it is in those terms that I draw his attention to the possibility that the sunrise clause could be used as a blocking mechanism, which I believe would be very damaging to the reputation of Parliament. It would allow one part, albeit an extremely important part, of our body politic to hold up the will of Parliament. I hope that the Minister will respond to that particular point.

I believe that the Select Committee's other comments are admirable. The Committee came down firmly in favour of Middlesex guildhall as an appropriate location, which I believe is a measured and sensible recommendation. The Committee also gave considerable thought to the interim arrangements that will apply until the recommended building is ready. I hope that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has read that section of the Select Committee report. I endorse the Select Committee's measured approach—I include Conservative members of the Committee in my praise—and I greatly prefer it to the apocalyptic approach of Conservative Front Benchers.

It has been interesting to hear the debate so far, not least because the arguments both for and against have been put forward so well by my hon. and learned Friend Ross Cranston and by the hon. Members for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) and for North Cornwall (Mr. Tyler). I agree with many of the points that those Members advocated, though my reading of the amendments before us is rather different from that of Conservative Members, particularly regarding the entire deletion of the creation of a supreme court in one form or another. I accept some of the points made about particular aspects of the building, appointments to the supreme court and so forth, and I shall try to deal with them in turn.

At present, the highest Court of Appeal in the land sits as a Committee of Parliament—the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. To anyone except a seasoned observer, it can appear that a legislative body is interpreting legislation. The status quo thus has potential flaws that could cause difficulties. About half of the present Law Lords are now reported to be uncomfortable with their position in the legislature, which potentially conflicts with their judicial role. They have had to exercise a self-denying ordinance in recent years in order to avoid speaking or voting on legislation that might later prejudice their objective application of those laws.

Although the present system works, the time has now come to make improvements. Part 3 of the Bill, from clause 20 onwards, therefore proposes the creation of a new supreme court for the United Kingdom that is separate from Parliament, removing the potential conflict between the legislative and judicial roles of our most senior judges, and providing greater clarity and visible independence for our highest court.

Ideally, the functional separation of the judiciary from the legislature and the Executive is a cardinal feature of any modern, liberal and democratic state that is governed by the rule of law. Pragmatically, the business of justice should be, and should be seen to be, independent of the business of Government and the business of Parliament. That was argued strongly by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. The interpretation and application of laws should not be undertaken by those intimately involved in making the laws. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has welcomed the proposal because it reduces the prospect of a critical judgment in the future that a free and fair tribunal should not be prejudiced by preconceived potential bias. Greater clarity is necessary for public confidence and for our continued reputation in the wider world.

Specifically on the comments by Mr. Grieve about the location and nature of the prospective building, we believe that a new supreme court must be established in an acceptable way, in a manner fitting to the principles of the highest court in the land and the dignity commensurate to its status, while simultaneously securing value for money for the taxpayer.The Bill places the Lord Chancellor under a duty to provide appropriate accommodation and facilities—and here the sunrise clause 120 additionally ensures that commencement will not occur until those facilities are available. I am glad that the Select Committee commented favourably on those arrangements—in particular on page 20 of its report. To explain a little further, the arrangements were made in order to placate some of the concerns expressed in the other place—that there might be a hasty removal or eviction of the Law Lords from the House of Lords to somewhere they regarded as unsuitable. Ministers will approve the new building and ensure that consultation with the Law Lords takes place throughout the process until they become supreme court justices.

The Government announced in December—I believe on either 14 or 19 December and in a written ministerial statement—the preferred option of Middlesex guildhall, the Crown court that we now see on the opposite side of Parliament square, as the new, separate supreme court building. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that I somehow sneaked this out on Second Reading, because there was, as I said, a voluminous written ministerial statement about it. Never mind, but that statement would probably answer many of the questions that the hon. Gentleman put to me today.

The advantage of this particular site—I have advocated it throughout as the most obvious choice—is, of course, its prime constitutional location in Parliament square, with legislature, Executive, the Church and now the judiciary to be represented on all four sides. Furthermore, that location would represent a potentially vast improvement on the cramped conditions of the present accommodation in the House of Lords. Middlesex guildhall is already owned by the Department for Constitutional Affairs and is used as a Crown court.

I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, who quoted the concerns of Lord Bingham, but they relate to the building that is used now. I believe that it is perfectly possible to strike the right balance between preservation of the key features—we would need planning permissions elsewhere, which is one of the reasons why the Middlesex guildhall remains our preferred location at this stage—and the more traditional approaches of the Law Lords who prefer to sit in panel and have a more open and transparent method of conducting their hearings. I believe that Middlesex guildhall can be refurbished and changed to meet those concerns. I also believe that that location will provide good value for money, in being a refurbishment rather than a new building. It also has the architecture most likely to galvanise widespread recognition and respect among the general public. We know that it also has the support of the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs.

The costs of fitting out and refurbishing the building are on the record. They are significant, but modest in comparison with the costs incurred by some of the big institutional building projects that have taken place already this century. The total of £30 million covers fees, value added tax and a 50 per cent. optimism bias. Also, £15 million will be spent to provide additional Crown court rooms elsewhere in London. We have not announced where those will be, but the options will be reviewed over the next few weeks. Some of London's Crown courts have rooms that are under used, and Middlesex guildhall may not always be the most appropriate place for Crown court hearings, given its wide catchment area and the fact that there might be more suitable locations elsewhere.

We announced in a written ministerial statement that we had looked at various different options, including Somerset house. Our preferred option, the Middlesex guildhall, was chosen according to the statement of requirements agreed with Lord Bingham. We considered it suitable because of its location, and on the ground of value for money. Developing and refurbishing court houses, including listed buildings, is already part of the Department's core work. We have a good track record and we work on such schemes around the country every day.

Amendment No. 350 would force the supreme court to remain in the Palace of Westminster. Various Law Lords have complained over the years that this building is too cramped. Middlesex guildhall would offer much more space, with better rooms for hearings as well as better libraries and office accommodation. Those facilities will help the supreme court's very important judges make correct decisions.

If we retained the supreme court in the Palace of Westminster, there would be no benefit arising from a visible separation between it and the legislature, and such an arrangement would invite questions about the separation, free from parliamentary interference, of funding, facilities and governance arrangements. I hope that the creation of the new supreme court will ensure that separation and transparency.

Many of the amendments deal with the title "Supreme Court Justice". The hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that his aspiration was to be the Conservatives' conservative and ensure the retention of the title of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. Most people find that title confusing and anachronistic. The title of Supreme Court Justice is far clearer and more accessible. The title of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary was coined in the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. In addition, the phrase "in Ordinary" derives from ecclesiastical law, which makes things even more confused.

Another oddity is that our constitution means that the proposed court will not be a supreme court so much as the final Court of Appeal for the UK. Moreover, in the Strand there sits already the supreme court established by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1891. The Government have not explained what they intend to do with that, but it is one reason why it might have been appropriate to call the supreme court's judges Lords of Appeal—whether in Ordinary or not.

Some courts are commonly called supreme courts, although they are not used as such, and we have suggested that they be called superior courts. The supreme court will be the UK's final Court of Appeal, but it will not take on what are regarded as the functions of the US Supreme Court. Our supreme court will act as the Court of Appeal for cases produced in all of the UK's different jurisdictions. The proposed title is the one that will best fit its functions.

We consulted widely about the name change. The proposal to adopt the title of Supreme Court Justice received widespread support from those who responded to the consultation process.

My party supports the proposal for a supreme court, with supreme court justices. However, will the term for those who do the Appeal Court job remain Lords Justices of Appeal? In any case, the supreme court will be able to do its job properly only when we have our own Bill of Rights.

The hon. Gentleman may be the Liberals' liberal, but the changes on the tables are enough for now. I shall stick to them.

Various amendments apply to the appointment process for Lords of Appeal and Law Lords. However, increased transparency in the appointment process is not the only requirement when it comes to reforming the system. We want there to be a separate court, so it would therefore not be enough merely to change titles. The court must be separated from Parliament.

I appreciate that the amendments envisage retaining an appointments procedure, but that mechanism is rendered ponderous by the requirement that there be a president of the supreme court, and a deputy president. At present, the senior among the corporate group of judges is, by convention, the one who presides and undertakes a certain amount of regulatory function. The provision in the Bill represents quite a change, as we shall discuss at more length in the debate on clause 21 stand part. However, I should be grateful if the Minister would say why the Government have decided formally to appoint a president and a deputy.

The proposed president of the supreme court will have different functions and characteristics from the present senior Law Lord. We believe that the job will merit its own appointment process. The appointment process for supreme court justices will have to be more transparent and formalised than at present, and I know that the hon. Gentleman agrees with that. That reform is well worth while.

Although the amendments are founded on clear principles, I hope that the Committee will reject them. We need to move away from having a legislative body that interprets and applies the laws that it passes. It must not be perceived to do that, so we must secure the functional separation of judiciary and legislature. The highest court in the land must have clarity, transparency and visible independence. These are high constitutional matters, although the hon. Member for Beaconsfield suggested that they were academic and esoteric, without great importance for the public at large. He said that the expenditure incurred by the reform was not necessary, and it may be true that the constitutional environment just at the moment is placid and calm. However, we should not ignore the potential problems in the system or shy away from making improvements.

I do not disagree with the last part of the Minister's peroration, but he did not understand at all my use of the words "academic" and "esoteric". I was talking about how members of the public might regard the deliberations of the court, but I did not intend to diminish the importance of what it does. In its current form, the court performs vital work. It will continue to do so in any new form that it might be given.

I understand what the hon. Gentleman says, but his earlier comments betrayed a view that these issues are remote and distant from the public at large. They are fundamental and that is why they require attention, even if they seem from time to time to be academic. They are central questions and my point is simply that it is important to keep the health of our institutions in prime condition. We should not accept a conservative attitude from the Opposition. We have a duty to maintain the health of our institutions as best we can and that is why a new supreme court is necessary. I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn or, if not, rejected.

I am a practising solicitor and, technically, a solicitor of the Supreme Court. The Minister may wish to consider the fair point made by Simon Hughes that there are complications surrounding the use of the words "supreme court". Those will need to be dealt with if the Bill is passed in its current state.

The arguments against the creation of the Government's new supreme court were eloquently set out during the Bill's passage through the other place.

I need to correct a comment that I made earlier. I said that we would change the colloquial term Supreme Court, covering the High Court and Appeal Court, to the superior courts. In fact, the title in England and Wales will be the senior courts and in Northern Ireland it will be the court of judicature. I wanted to put that on the record.

I thank the Minister for that clarification.

Arguments against the creation of the new supreme court were set out on Second Reading in this House and by my hon. Friends the Members for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and for Worthing, West (Peter Bottomley) today. Because the Government will not drop this divisive proposal, my hon. Friends and I feel that we must speak out again in the hope that some sense might prevail. We remain convinced that the creation of a new supreme court would not only be a pointless and costly exercise, but cause significant damage to the excellent position we enjoy now.

Despite all their attempts to convince us otherwise, the Government's proposals to scrap the judicial functions of the House of Lords in favour of a new supreme court are unnecessary. Ross Cranston spoke about the chances of the Bill leading to a fundamental revolution. This Bill will not do that. It is a damp squib or, at best, what my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West described as change for change's sake. The proposed court would exercise the same role already carried out by a combination of the existing Appellate Committee and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Under clause 21, the existing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary would, logically, become the first judges of the supreme court. Legal rulings by the Law Lords already command the highest respect in this country and around the world. Indeed, there is no suggestion from any quarter that the existing Law Lords are anything other than excellent at their work, and the hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North made that point earlier.

What is the justification for wrecking the present arrangements? Again, we come back to change for change's sake and the Minister citing what he thinks is a modern, liberal separation of powers. Not only would the move to a new supreme court do nothing to improve the Law Lords' reputation, the opposite might be the case, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead rightly pointed out in the other place. The Appellate Committee's esteemed reputation might not pass seamlessly to a new body. The proposed supreme court would not begin its life as a supreme court as the term is understood in almost any other jurisdiction. It would not have the power to override parliamentary supremacy and strike out legislation as unconstitutional. The question then arises as to whether we would be swapping the prestige of our present Appellate Committee for a court perceived, as the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf said, as a sort of "second class" supreme court.

The Government justify the new supreme court on the grounds of ensuring the independence of the judiciary, yet concerns about that have never been more than anecdotal. No one has seriously suggested impropriety on the part of the Law Lords.

What of the Human Rights Act 1998? I concur with the view expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield on Second Reading when he suggested that only the fact that the Lord Chancellor sits as a judge—we are all happy to change that—could, arguably, provide grounds for a human rights challenge. That aside, one can point to the fact the despite all the scaremongering, no legal challenge has ever been made to allege that our existing arrangements do not ensure a fair trial, in line with the European convention on human rights. The need for greater separation of powers in the British system is also a spurious justification for a supreme court. As Lord Kingsland said in the other place,

"the argument that the separation of powers requires these reforms proposed by the Government is wholly unsustainable."—[Hansard, House of Lords, 12 February 2004; Vol. 657, c. 1222.]

Democracy has long been upheld in this country without the requirement for the type of rigid separation of institutions favoured in, for instance, the United States. Even if some notion of political correctness were to require such separation, would not the link between the legislature and the Executive be rather more pressing? However, there are no plans—as far as I know—to remove the Executive from this place, notwithstanding the fact that it has vastly more impact on the affairs of the legislature than a few Law Lords in the other place.

Another of the Government's arguments has involved the inadequacy of the present working arrangements for the Law Lords, but it is far from the unanimous view of the Law Lords themselves. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, for instance, responded to the suggestion that the Appellate Committee made do with impoverished and substandard facilities by saying:

"Nothing could be further from reality."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 December 2004: Vol. 667, c. 1552.]

He also said that the Law Lords unanimously favour some of the advantages that the present arrangements bring, such as the informal layout and procedures, which are conducive to the promotion of dialogue. In contrast, Lord Bingham of Cornhill has previously noted that the Law Lords have grave doubts about the suitability of the Government's proposed choice of Middlesex guildhall for the new supreme court. The arguments have been made already today, and I shall not go over them again. However, in terms of prestige, what more fitting location is there for our highest court than right in the heart of Britain's seat of power—here, in the Palace of Westminster? How can a move away from here be anything other than a negative step?

The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey acknowledged that the House of Lords does its job in an unusual way, and that few people were able to watch it. However, the Law Lords' method of working is collegiate and deals with points of law, rather than the exciting facts of the case as does the High Court. I do not see that as a strong argument. Nor would hot-desking in Church house be a good alternative. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman rejected that suggestion.

Another weak line of argument with which the Government have attempted to sell us their proposals is confusion among the British public. As Lord Norton of Louth made clear in Committee, the Government cannot provide us with any empirical evidence on that point. The British public are, apparently, overwhelmingly confused about the judicial function of the House of Lords. Well, we beg to differ on that point. As others have pointed out, does it matter if the public cannot always remember that the Law Lords are in fact Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, sitting together as the Appellate Committee? The important point is that the public understand the role of the Law Lords as our highest court, independent of the Government and making decisions on the most important legal issues of the day.

There is an argument that some confusion may occur through the use of the name "House of Lords" to describe sittings of the Law Lords, but if that is the root of the alleged confusion, the solution would be as simple as removing reference to the House of Lords from the name of the court. That would avoid any confusion with the House of Lords as a legislative body, but would allow the existing Appellate Committee to continue with its work free from the unnecessary upheaval of leaving its present surroundings. Just such an outcome would have resulted from the amendment tabled by Lord Howe on Third Reading in the other place. To address that issue, we have again proposed an amendment that any supreme court should remain situated in the Palace of Westminster. As Lord Kingsland pointed out when he moved Lord Howe's amendment, the renamed court could be provided with its own entrance, such as the present Black Rod's Entrance, in order to underline further the court's separation to the wider public. Instead of supporting such sensible proposals, the Government continue to insist that what is required is nothing less than the complete uprooting of the Law Lords to less appropriate and more costly accommodation.

In dubbing the proposed court a supreme court, the Government may in reality just add to the level of public confusion. That is because, as I have already mentioned, the court will not be supreme over Parliament. Perhaps a name along the lines of "Final Court of Appeal" as in Hong Kong, for example, would be a more appropriate title.

As I have stated, not only do we believe that the creation of a supreme court is unnecessary, we would go further and state that the measure will have a damaging effect on the Law Lords and the House of Lords overall. As Lord Norton of Louth pointed out, a freestanding supreme court might be isolated and vulnerable to attacks from Ministers, including having its budget cut. As Lord Kingsland pointed out on Report in the other place, it also appears that the new supreme court

"will enjoy less financial independence than . . . the Appellate Committee".—[Hansard, House of Lords, 14 December 2004; Vol. 667, c. 1244.]

The public's perception of the court could suffer, too. Would not the judges in a new supreme court, away from the House of Lords, be more open to accusations that they were sitting in some ivory tower cut off from real decision making? The introduction of the supreme court could herald the first steps towards the type of rigid written constitution adopted in the United States.

Before the hon. Gentleman reaches his coda, I have a question for him. I know that he lives in Huntingdon and represents it, but has he ever calculated the distance between the House of Lords and the proposed new premises? By my calculations, the distance is about 100 yd. That is hardly an ivory tower, miles away, far out of sight and mind.

Many Members have spoken about the special historical significance of these premises. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman pointed out that the execution warrant of Charles I was signed in Westminster Palace, so he makes my point for me.

As Lord Rees-Mogg stated in the Select Committee in the other place, there must be serious concerns about the developments that would follow the creation of a supreme court. Would such a court begin to debate whether it should in fact respect the very cornerstone of our British constitutional system—the supremacy of Parliament? As we shall no doubt consider in detail in relation to clause 109 later on, the other place would also lose the valuable input of the Law Lords.

There are so many more arguments that can be ranged against the Government's supreme court proposal, but I cannot sit down without touching on one of the most significant—the cost of the supreme court. Members will need no reminding that the Government's estimates—or should I say the estimate emanating from the ex-Minister for the dome?—are a capital outlay of £30 million. The Minister said that refurbishment would be cheaper than new build, but let us see where the Government get to. We say it will be £50 million, and how much more? Who knows? On top of that, there will be yearly running costs of £8 million, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield made clear, compared with only £168,000 for the Appellate Committee at present.

I repeat what I said on Second Reading—that we will be far from surprised if those figures do not grow significantly by the time the money is actually spent. How can those costs be justified to the British public when, as my hon. Friend said, we can all agree on much more pressing uses for that amount of money? Without even venturing beyond the bounds of the justice system, there would be many better uses.

This unnecessary new supreme court is not a priority for the people of Britain and does not even command the full support of the Law Lords. It will damage our constitution and the high regard in which the Law Lords are held at present. The Government should desist from their attempts to force the proposal through during the remainder of this Parliament. Our view on the proposal could not be stated more clearly and simply than by quoting the Government's former Chancellor, Lord Irvine:

"a sufficient case has not been made for the abolition of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and its replacement by a separate new supreme court."—[Hansard, House of Lords, 10 June 2002, Vol. 636. c. WA3.]

The Government have completely failed to convince us on this issue and we ask that amendment No. 350 be put to the vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 114, Noes 285.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.