Orders of the Day — Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 4:14 pm on 6 March 2000.

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Photo of Ann Widdecombe Ann Widdecombe Conservative, Maidstone and The Weald 4:14, 6 March 2000

This is an important Bill, dealing with very complex matters. Given the enormous advances in technology and the possibility of its lawful and unlawful use, we fully acknowledge that the time has come to look again at updating the Interception of Communications Act 1985. We are therefore broadly supportive of the principles behind the Bill. We will not be opposing Second Reading, but that does not mean that there are not areas of fairly serious concern that we will wish to examine in considerable detail during the Bill's passage.

The last time I told the Home Secretary that I did not oppose a Bill's Second Reading he evinced some displeasure when I chose to oppose it at further stages of its proceedings. The fact that we support Second Reading—or that, at any rate, we do not oppose it—should not be taken as indicative that, if our concerns are not met, we shall continue to support the Bill throughout its future stages. Perhaps, as I have put that on the record, the right hon. Gentleman will not be greatly disappointed later. However, I hope that it will not be necessary to oppose the Bill; I hope that he will allow us to improve it so as to meet our concerns.

We accept that the explosion in methods of communication has given rise to a similar explosion in new methods of committing crime. If we failed to update the legislation that we introduced in 1985, we should damage the capability of this country's law enforcement, security and intelligence services to do their job.

However, the Bill is like the curate's egg—it is good in parts. We accept the need both to widen the power of interception to cover modern communications methods and to regulate surveillance and covert human intelligence. However, it is important that the Bill should be effective and still strike a proper balance between the needs of the crime fighter, the legitimate concern of business to avoid overweening regulation and the interest of the citizen in respecting fundamental human rights.

In some ways, the Bill does not provide crime fighters with all that they need. For example, clause 6 deals with those persons who may apply for interception warrants. It lists the head of every major security service and provides for the Secretary of State to designate "any … other person", but one notable omission is any provision for a senior official responsible for the detection of serious benefit fraud to apply for an interception warrant. Given that such fraud is by far the most substantial crime by value committed in the United Kingdom, it seems a bit odd that no senior official at the Department of Social Security can apply for a warrant—even in the most serious cases of benefit fraud; for example, those involving international gangs.

The powers in the Bill need strengthening to ensure that law enforcement agencies can obtain the evidence they need when dealing with serious sex offenders, drug traffickers and those involved in organised and terrorist offences by intercepting their communications and being able to break the codes that are used. I shall deal with that matter more fully when I come to the use of encrypted communications.

One of the great successes of the past few years has been the UK's growing information technology industry. The industry realises that it is important that law enforcement agencies should be able to carry out their work and that there should be provision to allow the interception of communications.