The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Ironically, one of the beneficial consequences of the Bill will be the strong financial incentive, for the first time, for the defendant's insurers to speed up the process. That will happen after October, because recoupment and liability stop at settlement or determination. So for the first time, once the Bill comes into effect, there will be a direct financial incentive for the defendant's insurers to press for haste.

As is well known, some such insurers have before now dragged out litigation on the basis that, five years down the line, the plaintiff may have died, or become exasperated, or gone away, or decided to accept a pittance, or not turned up on the day. It may have become easier to buy the plaintiff off by then, and in any case the money allocated will come from the sixth financial year, not the first or second—even though the latter might have been more just and commonsensical. That is all part of the workings of the insurer's mind.

In short, this legislation will act as a powerful financial incentive for insurers to get a move on, because recoupment will be more substantial. That is a good thing, but it may be awkward and unhelpful for the class of person to whom the hon. Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone (Mr. Clapham) referred, who may be wondering what will happen between April and October. Such a person, who may have begun the court process, may want to stop it reaching court before October because that will be to his advantage.

There may be quite powerful tools in the hands of the defendant's insurers, enabling them to make life awkward for the plaintiff. They can make generous payments—one can only hope, generous enough to compensate for the circumstances. At least in England and Wales—I cannot speak for Scotland—Lord Woolf's inquiries into speeding up the civil justice system have all been directed to the sort of judicial activism that speeds up these processes. In this context, that has led to a problem.

One of the difficulties inherent in a substantial change to the law, as this is, is that some people will be adversely affected if they are on one side of the line rather than the other. I can see the force of the argument for activating the measure earlier, but I cannot carry out the undertakings that the Government have given and, at the same time, implement the proposals earlier.

To make matters more complicated, I can well understand the purpose of the amendments from a purely humanitarian point of view. We all have constituents in this position; they tell us that the Bill is necessary and represents an improvement. It rights a harsh injustice for the limited class of people whom the Select Committee rightly identified as needing assistance from legislation. I regret to say, however, that complications arise when some people are caught out by the timing.

An additional problem is the fact that the amendments do not even accomplish what they are meant to. I regret to say that they would bring about general chaos, with unknowable consequences. Amendment No. 1 means that clause 2 alone would come into effect on Royal Assent. Clause 2 reads: This Act applies in relation to compensation payments made on or after the day on which this section comes into force". The problem with the amendment is that nothing else would come into force until the Secretary of State issued the appropriate commencement orders—I refer at this point to amendment No. 2.

The results would be complications beyond measure. One is that the clause in the Bill which repeals part IV of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 would not be implemented. We would thus have one law prescribing one regime, and a later section of the new Act suggesting that there was a new regime in force. Unless the Secretary of State then advanced the process of implementing the remaining sections, there would be no machinery to apply the new regime—no framework for regulations to come into force. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State would not have the power to make such regulations unless the rest of the Act was in force, too.

I cannot predict what the courts might make of that. I can only respectfully suggest that it would generate such uncertainty that I cannot believe that the hon. Member for Greenock and Port Glasgow would want to place us in that position. Litigation and/or chaos would be left to resolve the situation; it certainly would be an unfortunate one.

I fully appreciate the hon. Gentleman's desire for us to hurry up and activate the legislation at the earliest possible moment, but I cannot see how to do that practically. I am stuck with the undertakings given by the Minister in the other place. What is more, the 1948 scheme was riddled with anomalies and difficulties until it was swept away, on 1 January 1989, by the present arrangements. I suggest, in the interests of the expeditious disposal of personal injuries litigation, that we get the rules and regulations right and make them fair and comprehensible for all involved.

Accepting the force behind what the hon. Gentleman is attempting to achieve, I invite him not to press the amendment, for the reasons that I have outlined.