I cannot be expected to agree with the thrust of the last remarks of the hon. Member for Worsley (Mr. Lewis) but I concur with his alarm at the outcome of the cases that he described. He was kind enough to give me notice that he had corresponded with the Attorney-General and others. So, with his permission, I shall answer with a considered commentary on one of those cases—the Crown v. Hodgkiss, Dixon and Boyd. He can then judge whether what I shall say demonstrates not only concern but a willingness to ensure that such chains of events do not occur again.

As the hon. Gentleman said, in that case three men were charged with serious offences. They were committed for trial and a pre-trial hearing took place on 5 May 1995. Thereafter, the case was listed for hearing on three occasions: 31 July 1995, 12 December 1995 and 12 February 1996. On all those dates, the case was listed as what is called a "floater" and, in the event, it did not come before the judge until the last date. As the hon. Gentleman knows, a "floater" is a trial not allocated to a specific court or judge but which may be taken in any court within a court centre whenever a gap appears in any of the lists during the day. It is not tied to a single courtroom and can be taken in the first one that becomes free. It is necessary to run such a system because it is impossible to predict the precise length of trials and, if there were no such system, a court in which the fixed list finished early would simply be left with nothing to do, which would represent a waste of public money and increased delays. However, it is clearly unsatisfactory that a serious case such as this should be listed as a floater on three separate occasions. The Court Service is well aware of that fact and is taking steps to prevent a recurrence.

On 12 February 1996, when the case finally came to court, the defence applied for an adjournment as an expert witness was not available. Furthermore, prosecuting counsel was unable to reach the court due to adverse weather conditions. Although the court was told that the prosecution could proceed on the following day, the judge decided to grant the defence request for an adjournment.

The case was then listed for a fourth time, but this time as a fixture, on 30 April 1996. On that day, prosecuting counsel instructed by the CPS—who was new to the case—decided to seek an adjournment so that clothing from two of the defendants could be examined forensically. That was counsel's decision and contrary to the view of the police and the CPS, which did not consider such an examination necessary. The defence had not sought an examination either, despite being informed of its availability early in the proceedings.

The judge retired overnight to consider his position. The following day, he was informed by prosecuting counsel—following consultation with the CPS—that the trial should proceed. However, he was not informed that the defence had earlier been offered an opportunity to examine the clothing and declined. He was also told that the reason for the adjournment on 12 February was the unavailability of prosecuting counsel—the unavailability of the defence expert witness was not pointed out to him. On the basis of that incomplete information, the judge directed that the case should not proceed as the defendants would be put at a considerable disadvantage. He therefore stayed the proceedings.