To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the cost of refitting Polaris submarines in the current financial year.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the future of the British nuclear deterrent.

HMS Renown, now nearing the completion of her refit, is the only Polaris submarine under refit during the current year. The cost of the work to date has been about £150 million.

Britain's credible and effective independent nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantee of our security. The strategic deterrent will continue to be provided by the Polaris force until Trident comes into service from the mid-1990s.

Is not the Polaris fleet plagued with cracks to the nuclear reactor, and has not the game been given away by Mr. Reg Farmer, a former member of the Ministry of Defence safety of nuclear warships committee? Is it not time that the Secretary of State came clean and admitted to the House that the boats are dangerous, the cost of repair and renovation is beyond reasonable expenditure and the boats should be withdrawn? By taking that action, the right hon. Gentleman would be conforming with the United Nations nuclear nonproliferation treaty for the first time.

That question shows the weakness of preparing a supplementary before hearing the answer to the main question. If the hon. Gentleman had listened carefully to my reply, he would have realised what rubbish his supplementary was.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the distribution of its nuclear weapons around the country, it is extremely important for Britain to maintain its nuclear deterrent and to be ready for any eventuality?

Certainly I agree. At a time when the world's largest nuclear power is in the process of disintegration into separate republics, if not worse, and when 27,000 nuclear weapons exist there, the vast Majority of which are capable of inflicting considerable damage on this and other countries, it would be lunacy for us to undermine our nuclear deterrent. It is the one nuclear shield that we have. Had the advice of some hon. Members been followed over the years, we might now be in a very exposed position.

The Secretary of State must reflect a little on the answer that he has given about the Soviet Union. Does he accept that one of the reasons for the United Kingdom's continued possession of a strategic deterrent was the fact that it would provide another centre of power, and thus create disequilibrium in the mind of a potential foe? If so, how does he justify the fear that there may be a number of fingers on the disintegrating Soviet strategic deterrent, when at the same time he seeks to justify the proliferation of nuclear strategic deterrents in the hands of France, the United Kingdom and the United States?

That is a fairly complicated question, which may confuse people and prevent them from seeing our present need clearly. It is vital that we preserve our own independent nuclear deterrent as protection against nuclear blackmail; it is equally important that we take every possible step—as we are doing—to ensure that the process of rapid political change, and the change of authority that has taken place in what was the Soviet Union, do not lead to a more dangerous situation in regard to the present control and authority over nuclear weapons. To try to wrap up that question in the way in which the hon. Gentleman has suggested, or to lose sight of either of those objectives, would be extremely unwise.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of that highly unsatisfactory and inadequate reply, I give notice of my intention to raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.