The hon. Gentleman is perfectly right. Perhaps I made an understatement when I said that the Khmer Rouge took an increasingly anti-Vietnamese line. There were serious attacks by the Khmer Rouge on Vietnam.

When the people's army of Vietnam had overrun the country, its tanks were only a matter of hours from Bangkok. Naturally, Thailand and its friends and allies were alarmed. As I am sure the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) will agree—indeed, he has just confirmed it—the Vietnamese invaded for strategic reasons. As Thailand's Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, later told Congressman Solarz: Human rights was not a question; that was their problem … We were concerned only with security. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Evan Luard, stated on 21 March 1979: I do not think that two wrongs make a right. Therefore, however bad the human rights situation was in Cambodia, I do not think that it excuses an almost equally bad situation in Vietnam. It does not excuse an attack by Vietnam on Cambodia."—[Official Report, 21 March 1979; Vol. 964, c. 1479.] The Minister of State, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, referred to one dictatorship imposed upon another."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 14 February, 1979, Vol. 398 c. 1385.] At the same time, the Government decided to terminate most aid to Vietnam. Mr. Luard stated: since 1978 Vietnamese policies on human rights, over the exodus of boat refugees and in relation to Cambodia have caused us increasing concern … Because of our concern about recent developments in Vietnamese policy we have cancelled most of this aid."—[Official Report, 21 March 1979; Vol. 964, c. 1478.]— that is, bilateral aid. We continued the same policy. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister confirmed that on 3 July 1979, when she stated: There will be no more aid to Vietnam so long as the present circumstances continue."—[Official Report, 3 July 1979; Vol. 969, c. 1117.]

The hon. Member for Sunderland, South raised the often misunderstood question of the recognition of Governments and of credentials. Since 1980, Britain has recognised states, not Governments. One advantage of that is that we do not have to judge between competing claimants in circumstances of civil war or conflict. But in 1979, the position was different. Our criterion then for recognition of a Government was whether or not it had effective control over the greater part of the country. That was not a moral criterion, simply a descriptive criterion, and it led us to abandon recognition of the Khmer Rouge Government in 1979.

As we now recognise states, not Governments, our only judgment is whether there is a Government within a country with which we are able to deal. Obviously the extent of that Government's ability of themselves to control their territory, will be one consideration. So will the assessment of British interests. At present, we recognise no Government in Cambodia.

There is also the separate issue of Cambodian credentials at the United Nations, which is mentioned in the motion. It is clear that the credentials committee could find no technical or legal reason for debarring the Cambodian delegation from this year's General Assembly. It is equally clear that, if there had been a vote in the General Assembly, the so-called coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea would have won it overwhelmingly. This has not, therefore, been the most profitable pressure point on which to concentrate.

As I have said, neither our recognition of the reality of the situation, nor any other action of ours implies recognition of the coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea or any other party as the legitimate Government in Cambodia. A dispute over credentials might also have split the unity of the Association of South-East Asian Nations which we hoped would be the principal vehicle for diplomatic progress towards a settlement in Cambodia.

We are adopting our stance at the United Nations. We have taken action with our friends and partners to modify the draft resolution which we, with 74 other member states, are co-sponsoring at the United Nations General Assembly in the debate on 15 November. The changes are intended to make it clear that the situation in Cambodia has altered and that we do not support the Khmer Rouge in any way. They have been welcomed by Hanoi.