Intermediate Nuclear Weapons

Part of Opposition Day – in the House of Commons at 5:42 pm on 9 March 1987.

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Photo of Mr Michael McNair-Wilson Mr Michael McNair-Wilson , Newbury 5:42, 9 March 1987

The last. words of the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) are of the greatest importance and I am sure that his support for the initiative in Geneva will add great weight to those considerations.

As the Member for Parliament for Greenham common, and as one who has INF missiles in his constituency, it is hardly surprising that I welcome Mr. Gorbachev's positive response to the Western position over the zero option and the withdrawal of intermediate range nuclear missiles. It is the fulfilment of the West's declared policy which began at the start of this decade that no cruise or Pershing II missiles will be deployed in NATO if the Soviet Union dismantles its SS20 force. Clearly, although we have been forced to deploy cruise and Pershing II because of Soviet intransigence, now that it has seen the error of its ways, who can do other than applaud it?

From the speeches so far, there is a danger of us all being sure that in Mr. Gorbachev's statement about moving towards the dismantling of medium-range missiles his definition of those missiles is the same as it is in Western Europe. In his statement he used three different descriptions for nuclear missiles in Europe. He described medium-range missiles, enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles and operational-tactical missiles. The question of definition will play an important part in the considerations at Geneva. Clearly, it is vital that we and the Soviet Union think in exactly the same terms.

If to the Soviet Union the zero option simply means withdrawing SS20s in exchange for withdrawing cruise and Pershing IIs, but leaving SS12s, SS22s and SS23s in place—weapons which can strike deep into Western Europe as far as Great Britain—we must all think again about the possible benefits of the treaty that seem to be within our grasp.

Verification appears to be a thorny issue. Satellite reconnaissance can do so much, but only so much. Unless each side is willing to allow something more, I find it difficult to know how a treaty can be made to stick. It is possible to hide missiles out of sight of satellites, so something like on-the-spot verification will be crucial.

If I sound marginally sceptical, it is because I have my constituents in mind. They accepted cruise missiles, not because they wanted a new generation of missiles in their midst at Greenham common, but because the continued security of NATO seemed to demand the deployment of those weapons. They believed, as I believed, that multilateral disarmament was the only safe way to reduce the nuclear threat. The question to which we require an answer is whether the withdrawal of SS20s, cruise and Pershing Hs will leave Western Europe as secure in the future as it is at present, or whether other circumstances have been created which reduce the effect of the zero option.

One is bound to ask, what has happened to make the Soviets change their mind from their apparently intransigent stand at the beginning of this decade to their present position? Within that change of stance there is now a willingness to uncouple an arms agreement on INF weapons from a halt to the American strategic defence initiative to consider the zero option as a relevant proposition.

I do not rule out the obvious differences which Mr. Gorbachev has made to East-West relations, but the difference seems to lie in his perception of the cold war—something on which the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) touched. Clearly, Mr. Gorbachev does not believe that the peace movement, CND, the Greenham protesters, the Greens in West Germany or even the Opposition's policy are likely to have much effect on the West's policies for the defence of Western Europe. That suggests that he does not think that the Opposition will win the general election.

Mr. Gorbachev also knows that the present American Administration will not abandon the SDI. Therefore, he seems to have calculated that what is necessary for Soviet security is a reduction in the immediate interface between the nuclear forces of the United States of America and the USSR in Western Europe. Perhaps the limited flight time of Pershing Hs from West to East has created too great a threat in his mind for him to feel easy leaving those weapons in West Germany. Perhaps he is seeking to lower the nuclear threshold.

One of the inevitable results of the iron curtain since it fell across Europe 40 years ago has been to make Europe the most likely battlefield for world war three. Yet it would be a battlefield in which the inhabitants were not really the protagonists. The Warsaw pact without the Soviet Union poses no real threat to the Western European members of NATO, but once the Soviet Union and America are included in the groupings those countries become involved in a different way. While the Soviet Union dominates the Warsaw pact, who can think of any reduction in the American involvement in NATO, except with profound unease?

Perhaps Mr. Gorbachev believes that Europe would be more secure if the face-to-face confrontation of the superpowers was of a different order, or was of a kind which compelled the United States of America to retaliate with long-range missiles at a Soviet Union seeking to create a nuclear shield for itself. That is why I believe the Soviet unwillingness to bring its short-range nuclear missiles more into line with NATO's numbers—we have already heard that the disparity is about 9: 1 in the Warsaw pact's advantage—is an acid test of Soviet good faith in negotiating over INF. Otherwise one will be tempted to believe that the INF proposal is an attempt to gain a different nuclear advantage for the Soviets which, taken with their advantage in conventional weapons, could give us all cause for renewed anxiety.

Those are my worries. They must sound like a halfhearted response to the most positive initiative of the superpowers that we have heard for at least a decade. When it comes to making a choice between peace and disarmament, I choose peace. The two are not necessarily synonymous.

The Geneva talks and the visit of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to Moscow at the end of the month are clearly crucial. A satisfactory outcome must be judged not just in terms of advantage to the superpowers but by reference to the peace and security of Europe. That is why I hope that our American allies will fully consult us—and, indeed, all members of NATO in Europe. I hope, too, that any agreement will not put the possibility of a conventional European war back on the agenda. Sometimes in our desire to be rid of nuclear weapons we lose sight of that possibility, but we must remember that the prospect of a winnable conventional war, far from allowing us to sleep more easily in our beds, would give us cause for the greatest concern.

We should be sceptical about all the proposals on the table. We must probe and define and we must be sure that the verification arrangements are such that the treaty, if it is signed, will last.