The Army

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 7:48 pm on 13 January 1987.

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Photo of Mr Tam Dalyell Mr Tam Dalyell , Linlithgow 7:48, 13 January 1987

I thank the hon. Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Mr. Conway) for recognising that people in the armed forces vote for all parties and that the armed forces are not the preserve of one particular party. Thirty-five years ago I was in a tank crew as a national service man on the north German plain, like many others of my age group. Therefore, I remain especially sensitive to people who say that the British Army of the Rhine is vulnerable to some sort of threat. I refer to the exchange between my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) and the Minister on the subject of a short-range Soviet nuclear capability against 1 Corps.

What consideration has been given to the assessment that may have been made in Moscow after Chernobyl of what would happen to Mother Russia herself if a nuclear holocaust or nuclear attack were to be launched against western Europe? We have had enough trouble with caesium 137 in the Outer Hebrides and the mountains of Wales. Given a prevailing south-west wind, is there a cow, a calf, a sheep or a lamb anywhere between Minsk and Leningrad that could graze safely? There is not. Three days after Russia used nuclear weapons in western Europe there would be considerable trouble in the Russian homeland. That, rather than the British possession of nuclear weapons, is the safeguard against the vulnerability argument with which the Minister tried to persuade my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli.

What assessment has been made, in the light both of what we know has happened since Chernobyl and the agricultural difficulties that we have faced, of a Russian attack anywhere in western Europe on Russia herself?

Secondly, I should like to say a word about procurement. Today the Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement answered the question: if he will hold discussions with Plessey about the eventual control of high-technology development as a result of its £1,100 million agreement with Boeing; and whether it will pass to American control. He answered, "I shall answer shortly." I make no complaint about the answer. All I ask for is a considered reply. This is a difficult subject and it is better that it should be considered rather than answered within three days.

In the same breath I draw to the Minister's attention the problem of Electronic Data Systems, on which I have tabled questions and about which David Rose of The Guardian has written. I refer to a memorandum from EDS in the name of Lana Lewallen dated 10 May 1985. It is addressed to staff coming to Britain from the United States to work on electronic data systems. I have given copies of it to the Treasury and in a letter to Ministers at the Home Office. It states: For TDYs, the answers to these questions are crucial because you can be denied entry into the country with the wrong answers. Since you are on temporary assignment here, you are only CONSULTING during your stay here. According to British Immigration Authorities, that is not 'business'. Therefore, do not reply 'business' or 'work' because you are NOT, according to their definition. An acceptable answer to the first question is 'pleasure'. It is acceptable, if you wish, to add that you may consult a bit for the London branch of your American employer. You may mention EDS, but do not mention BUPA. The best advice however is not to offer any information other than what you are specifically asked.If you have family who are coming over with you or who will join you later, they should NEVER say they are coming to visit or stay with their spouse/parent who is working in London.In answering the question 'how long will you be in the UK?', remember that you will probably leave the UK several times for trips abroad during your stay. Therefore, do NOT answer six months or four months because that is incorrect. Rather, you can state 'about four weeks at present' because that will be more factual.When you do leave and re-enter the UK, please follow these same instructions. It is important that you know and adhere to these instructions upon entry. It is your responsibility to get yourself into the country; EDS cannot exempt anyone from passport control. The memorandum states: You will also be queried as to 'the nature of your visit to the United Kingdom: business or pleasure?' and 'how long do you plan to be in the UK? That raises questions about the possible deception of immigration authorities. My understanding is that the Home Office is looking into this whole matter. Does the Ministry of Defence want to award contracts, which may have a greater value than those for AWACs, to a company which behaves in that way towards British immigration control, rather than to Plessey, Racal or some other British company? As I say in my letter to the Minister of State, Treasury, who is co-ordinating the committee: What concerns me infinitely more is whether EDS, operating in such a way, is the type of company who should be given preference by the British taxpayer over Racal, Plessey or British Telecom. Not only do vast sums of money appear to be at stake, but a lot of high-tech research is clearly involved. If EDS were to get the contract, would that R and D at advanced level be done in the UK? I think the answer is no. On 7 January David Rose wrote in The Guardian: The first check to EDS's plans for government contracts came in December, when the £10 million Passport Office computer was awarded to a British rival.This followed the Guardian's disclosure that the firm had urged American staff to lie to immigration officials in order to work in Britain illegally, the admission by Mr. Ross Perot, the former EDS chairman, that he paid £2 million into a Swiss bank account as ransom for American hostages in the Middle East: he had been asked to do so by the disgraced Lt-Col Oliver North, the central figure in the Irangate scandal.The loss of the contract came as a shock to EDS staff. What is the position of the Ministry of Defence in relation to EDS?

I interrupted the Minister's opening speech to ask about the talks in Washington about the Falklands. It may be primarily a Foreign Office responsibility, but it is not sufficient for a Defence Minister simply to say that that does not concern the British Ministry of Defence. Certainly it does. Therefore, I look forward to some reconsideration of that in the Minister's reply.

Following my surgery on Saturday I wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence. Two constituents came to see me and were absolutely furious about what had happened to the Queen's Own Highlanders in Kenya, with which a relative of theirs is serving. I have put the matter in writing to the Secretary of State, but I might not have raised the matter had it not been for today's news. The high commission in Kenya has said that it greatly regrets that any instructions were given to service men not to go to Mombasa and the coast. Apparently the doctor attached to the forces is saying that he hopes that no more British service men will take leave on the coast. Which is right—the high commission or the forces?

The second part of the question arises from what my constituents told me. They said that their relative had told them—I do not know the accuracy of this—that the warning about AIDS on the coast had been given in a frivolous, ribald manner. I remember easily what happened in my national service days. The inimitable regimental sergeant-major, the late Frank Dodd, of the Royal Scots Greys used to say, "Be careful, lads. Remember your French letters when you leave the guardroom. Ho! ho!" That is how it was put. My hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Mr. Rogers), who has great Army experience, knows exactly what I am talking about. Precisely what instructions were given and what warning was brought home to those men before they went on leave on the Kenyan coast? What is the Government's position as between our own high commission and the advice that is attributed to the Army doctor?

I should like now to discuss Army responsibilities and military intelligence as this is one of the few opportunities that hon. Members get to address such matters. I had the first question to the Prime Minister today and asked her whether she would place in the Library a copy of all correspondence conducted on her behalf between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Chapman Pincher. The right hon. Lady replied: It remains inappropriate to comment on matters in issue in the Peter Wright case in Australia. I also intend to follow the precedent set by previous Governments of not commenting on security matters. This is not the occasion to go into the merits of the Australian court case, and I shall not do so. However, I refer to the leader in The Scotsman on 16 December 1986, which stated: Tam Dalyell has a fair point when he asks, 'Is there any effective ministerial control over breaking into houses? Which Minister is responsible for any rules on breaking in?'". I am referring to ministerial authorisation because, quite frankly, Mr. Chapman Pincher has told me on the telephone—I know him of old and believe him on this—that he did not collude in giving "Their Trade Is Treachery" in December 1980 to the Government agency involved. Therefore, it was either done from inside Sidgwick and Jackson or it was done by theft and housebreaking. Following my question to the Prime Minister, I should like to ask whether theft or housebreaking was involved and whether there was ministerial authorisation for burglary. We are concerned about ministerial control over state burglary.

I should like to know also how it came about that MI5 was apparently talking to Sir Robert Armstrong without the Attorney-General being consulted. An Army debate is the only time that one can raise such issues. Some of us might say that if the Attorney-General was not consulted that was because the Government did not want the Attorney-General to be in the position of having to ask awkward questions.

Precisely what is the ministerial control over military intelligence? What can Peter Wright have meant by saying that he took part in operations that were "deniable, authorised and illegal"?

That brings me to the activites of the Wilson years. You and I, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and several other hon. Members lived through those years and we can be forgiven for being extremely curious about what happened, because many strange things happened then.

The first time that I became interested in such matters was almost 20 years ago, when my friend—the friend of many hon. Members—the then Member of Parliament for Ealing, Acton, Mr. Bernard Floud, tragically took his own life. We wondered at the time what exactly had happened because it was public knowledge that the then Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, had understandably offered Bernard Floud junior ministerial office. That offer was withdrawn when an MI5 report—this was public knowledge at the time—suggested to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet office that Bernard Floud was not a proper person to hold ministerial office. Some hon. Members will recollect that Bernard Floud took his own life in a gas-filled room.

I have talked about that to my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) and we should like to ask the Government, since we now know that Bernard Floud's MI5 monitoring officer went by the name of Peter Wright, whether there is not a case, even 20 years later, for Ministers calling for the Government agency security file on the Bernard Floud case, and making some sort of assessment. I am not asking to be shown that file but could not my right hon. Friend, a former Home Secretary, and a Privy Councillor, be shown it? If he says that everything is all right, that would satisfy me. Alternatively, the Government might think that it was the kind of thing that could be shown to the Leader of the Opposition.

Bernard Floud was a friend of some of us, and in the light of what we now know about Peter Wright being his monitoring officer and about what Peter Wright has said in the Australian court about burgling his way through London, we should like to know the agony that our friend the then Member of Parliament for Ealing, Acton was put through.

I refer to The Times of 10 December 1986, which asks, "What is a deniable operation?" Mr. Wright is quoted as saying: I have taken part in tens, possibly hundreds, of illegal operations, for which I might have been sent to prison, if detected. Were those operations secretly authorised on the condition that they could be publicly disowned? Some of us would like to know the answer to that question. It could be said that that is raking up the past for the sake of raking up the past, but I reply to that in terms of the judgment in an Australian court six years ago of Mr. Justice Mason, who said: It is unacceptable that in our democratic society there should be a restraint on the publication of the information relating to a Government where the only vice of that information is that it enables the public to discuss, review, and criticise government action. In justifying myself for going back two decades, I refer to the noble Lord Dacre of Glanton, Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper, who, although a political opponent, did me the courtesy of writing a foreword to a book that I wrote. We are personal friends. He said that a country, as the price of protecting its present, it should yield up the records of its past. Those are not the words of a Labour politician. They are the words not so much of the Conservative party as of the intellectual Right wing of British society.

Finally, I should like to give a short explanation. It is true that after much thought and discussion with colleagues, and with the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition, I have referred the case of the forged bank account of Lord Glenamara to the Security Commission. I thought that that was the proper way to do it and, quite frankly, that that would be more likely to get a serious reply than if I had sent it to Ministers.

The background is that Lord Glenamara—your friend and mine, Mr. Deputy Speaker, when he was known as Mr. Ted Short, our Chief Whip—asked me to look into the whole background of how he got into difficulties with a Swiss bank account which turned out to be forged.

I am asking present Ministers—regardless of how Lord Griffiths, Lord Justice Lloyd, Philip Allen, Sir Alan Cockerell, Sir Hugh Beech, Sir Alisdair Steedman and Sir Michael Palliser decided to act—to take some responsibility in looking up the files of those days and asking direct questions of the security services. I do not know whether the Security Commission, converting itself as it is entitled to do after asking Parliament's permission into a tribunal, is the best way to go about it. However, I am jolly sure that some of us are not going to let the Ted Short affair rest until such time as we have had an explanation. I use this Army debate with its connections with military intelligence to say that explanations are due from two decades and less ago.