asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs his policy towards the zero-zero option for intermediate nuclear forces.

NATO partners have consistently made it clear that arrangements on INF must include equal and global limits. An agreement for the elimination of longer-range intermediate nuclear forces in Europe would have to include tight constraints on the numbers of SS20s in Soviet Asia, and on Soviet shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces. Effective verification will be essential.

Was not President Reagan's unilateral action in breaking the SALT 2 agreement a retrograde step? Likewise, have not the British Government been equally destructive regarding agreement on a zero-zero option by linking it with conventional reductions? Is it not time for a constructive dialogue on those important issues?

I agree with the hon. Gentleman's last point. That is precisely what has been happening in recent weeks, and what we hope will continue to happen in the months ahead. On SALT 2, we have repeatedly made it clear that the SALT agreements should be observed by both sides. We have also made it clear that the Soviet Union has a case to answer as regards possible breaches and that it should respond to legitimate United States anxieties about Soviet compliance. On zero-zero, it is clear that as we move, as I hope we shall, in the months ahead to long-term elimination of long-range weapons and constraints on short-range weapons, the disparities in conventional weapons and conventional manpower, which are much in favour of the Soviets at present, must be confronted at the same time, especially if central Europe is to become a safer place.

Can my hon. Friend think of any conceivable reason why the Warsaw Pact should reduce its INF deployments to zero if the west adopted the policy advocated by the Opposition of reducing ours to zero without any conditionality on the Soviets or any negotiations with them?

That is right, of course. The fact that NATO countries were so firm in deploying cruise and Pershing in western Europe has brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table and will, we hope, lead to an eventual zero-zero intermediate forces agreement.

Are there not great gains for Europe—

Owen's puppets.

—especially in the intermediate nuclear forces zero-zero option? Given that those are not directly linked to SDI, what initiative are the Government making in respect of the Geneva talks to put that question back on to the agenda?

I am sorry, but due to the interruptions of hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner), I did not hear the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question.

What are the gains for Europe in the zero-zero option on intermediate nuclear forces? What initiatives are the British Government taking?

Of course, there are great dangers to Europe in moving towards the removal of long-range intermediate nuclear forces. Secretary Shultz consulted extensively NATO allies after the Reykjavik talks and the Vienna talks. The Americans have shown considerable willingness to listen to west European NATO allies' points of view on that subject. Most recently, the statement arrived at by President Reagan and the Prime Minister at Camp David was a positive step forward that has been welcomed by our European allies.

As we move towards zero-zero in intermediate weapons, are there any discussions with the Soviets on short-range nuclear weapons—the SS21, 22, 23 and 24—which must be linked with any reductions in intermediate weapons?

My hon. Friend is right. There must be an agreement to limit short-range intermediate nuclear weapons. We would like to have an INF agreement that would incorporate a freeze on Soviet SS22 and SS23 systems. This would circumvent agreement on long-range intermediate nuclear weapons and, at the same time, there would be an agreed right, if necessary, for the United States to match the figures that the Soviets have at present.