Foreign Affairs

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 9:25 pm on 18 June 1986.

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Photo of Mr Ivan Lawrence Mr Ivan Lawrence , Burton 9:25, 18 June 1986

Having praised the Government, I must also say that there are one or two inconsistent features of our policy. If we are determined, as the Foreign Secretary said we were—and I am sure we are—to take a stand against terrorism and violence, which we would all applaud — and to that extent we sent packing two representatives of the PLO who refused to renounce violence—why then do we call for the release of Nelson Mandela before he renounces terrorism and violence? That is an inconsistency.

On a less violent and more ideological level, the determination to enhance Britain's reputation and to foster adherence to principles of democracy and freedom under the law, which we all embrace and would like to see advanced, clashes somewhat with our reluctance to spend adequately on teaching overseas students in this country and bringing our system of education and the British way of life more closely into their lives. I sometimes think that the same is true of our reluctance to fund BBC overseas services properly, which would do more than anything to spread abroad the good name of Britain's democracy and our way of life and rule of law.

Perhaps I should tell my hon. Friend the Minister of State that a famous refusenik—I am sure he will not mind my naming him—Victor Brailovsky in Moscow told me that he thought the reason why the Soviet Union did not jam the BBC overseas services in English was that the authorities had some respect for the quality of the broadcasts, which were balanced, and contrasted with some of the other English language broadcasts from other nations, which will remain nameless. That is my tour d'horizon.

I now turn to the central issue of both Front-Bench speeches — United Kingdom-Soviet relations. Soviet leaders listening to the speech of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and to a lesser extent to speeches of other Opposition Members, will have reason to pat themselves on the back for having taken in some important Members of Parliament. Obviously, Mr. Gorbachev is a new leader with a more presentable arid attractive face, and so has his wife. Surely it is far too premature to conclude on that evidence that this is a new Soviet Union with a new approach to the United States and Western Europe?

Hon. Members should ask themselves some questions. Would Mr. Gorbachev have come so far so quickly if he had not had the backing of the old guard, which means that he was endorsing their policies? Is there any reason to think that the international department of the Supreme Soviet, which inspired the invasion of Afghanistan, has changed its attitudes or policies? Does not the appointment of a Soviet Foreign Minister with little experience of foreign affairs—the right hon. Member for Leeds, East used that fact in support of his argument—mean that foreign policy is more likely, not less likely, to be guided by party officials—the apparatchiks? When we have weak leadership, Ministers or councillors, who takes power? It is the civil servants and local government officials. Is there any reason to think that the KGB or the GRU are to be wound down, or that subversion will be any less in the world than it has been in the past? What evidence is there that the Soviet Union has changed its ideological and opportunistic spots? It has not withdrawn from Afghanistan. It has not stopped banning Russian-speaking broadcasts. It has not improved the free flow of ideas. It has not done much to improve trade between our nations, and it has not made any noticeable concessions on human rights.

As the Foreign Affairs Select Committee stated in paragraphs 2.10 and 2.11 of its third report on United Kingdom-Soviet relations, which was published at the end of May: No one who has had direct discussions with contemporary Soviet leaders can fail to have observed their implacable ideological opposition to Western capitalism, their attribution to the United States and its allies of responsibility for the current causes of international tension, their belief (though declining) in capitalism's 'inevitable' demise, and their professed faith in the inevitable victory of world socialism…There was no sign of a shift away from these fundamental, ideologically-based perspectives in Mr. Gorbachev's recent report to the 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, nor could such a shift be expected. To conclude that the Russian bear after Mr. Gorbachev's accession is a different animal, or that the fresh mind referred to by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East is necessarily a different mind, is wishful thinking of the kind in which the right hon. Gentleman usually indulges to great excess.

Lest I sound despairing, I tell my hon. Friend the Minister that I am not. It is quite clear that a change of attitude is emerging in the Soviet Union from which the world could benefit. It is important to appreciate that we are dealing with a new position. We should not be deluded into thinking that we are dealing with a different adversary.

The change of attitude has come about because the Soviet Union is desperately anxious for nuclear disarmament. I think that all hon. Members welcome that and agree with it. The main reason for that change is that the Soviet Union has now to face the problem of a total lack of resources in the face of the strategic defence initiative. The problems facing the Soviet Union are many. It has difficulty feeding itself. It has difficulty running its economy efficiently. It has difficulty, in a world of mass communication, keeping its consumers happy. Its consumers will shortly, if they do not already, be able to see more clearly on their television screens the pleasures enjoyed by citizens of other countries. The Soviet Union has difficulty funding its satellite countries.

The Foreign Affairs Select Committee recently visited Vietnam. It was clear to us that the Russians have put a limit on the amount of money that they are able to pour into Vietnam and the army in Kampuchea. I think that that is why a date of 1990 has been set for their withdrawal, although that seems to me to be contrary to what one would expect to happen in the far east. If the Russians do not withdraw in 1990, there will be a loss of face.

The Soviets have difficulty funding Cuba, Central America, and all their activities throughout the world. They have difficulties within their own empire. One of those is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which is beginning to worry them greatly. They have problems of defence against China, ideologically as well as militarily, on their borders. They have difficulty controlling the far-flung provinces of the Soviet Union. Vladivostok is almost a million miles away from Moscow. One can see, when the Soviets have to deal with the leaders of those countries, how difficult it is for them to exercise control.

I do not know whether the stories from Chernobyl are true. Stories are coming out of Chernobyl that the extent of the medical disaster is more considerable than we would like to think. If that is so, the Soviet Union will shortly be trying, throughout the world, to gain access to medical equipment and supplies which it cannot provide.

As a result of all those problems and the strain on the resources of the Soviet Union, the new man with the new look has come in. He visited the United Kingdom in November 1984 as the guest of the IPU and the Select Committee. He came with his Foreign Affairs Committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee of this Parliament and the IPU visited the Soviet Union. The Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee is, we hope, to visit Britain again. The Soviet Foreign Minister is coming here in July. There is a greater exchange between the Soviet Union and Britain. I have no reason to think that the same thing is not happening with other countries.

The Soviets are wooing the United Kingdom in particular. That is not just because they have a certain admiration for my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister which I think was manifest to us when we were in the Soviet Union. They have a certain respect for the prompt action that we took in the Falklands. They think that we are capable of putting a restraining hand on the United States of America. They hope that they can drive a wedge between the Atlantic Alliance and either Britain or Europe and stop the United States developing the strategic defence initiative. They are afraid of matching the expense of that programme. I cannot help but feel that those in Britain who press strongly for the reversal of that programme and for Britain to stop its support of it are playing the Soviet game.

In the face of such an objective, we should be strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, not weakening it, and backing the strategic defence initiative, not trying to kill it. When we were in Russia, it was clear that the Supreme Soviet was paranoid about SDI—as paranoid as some of those hon. Members who have spoken against SDI. If that is a fair assessment, that feeling provides the best hope of bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table, which it did, and keeping it there, which it is doing. We hope that the Soviet Union will come forward with more genuine, meaningful, and acceptable proposals for nuclear and conventional arms reductions. The card of the SDI is a strong one in Western hands.