South Africa

Part of Opposition Day – in the House of Commons at 6:38 pm on 17 June 1986.

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Photo of Mr Julian Amery Mr Julian Amery , Brighton, Pavilion 6:38, 17 June 1986

I wish to develop the point.

The eminent persons' second condition was that the South African Government should withdraw the police and the army from the townships while negotiations took place—the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) may think that is a good idea — and that the townships should become no-go areas. Some of the townships might, during the negotiations, come under ANC control. I cannot imagine any Government in their right senses accepting such a condition.

I think that the eminent persons felt that on that point they were on weak ground. Instead of the eminent persons arguing that the dismantling of apartheid involved a transfer of power, they went on to a new line of argument. They warned that there would be a blood-bath unless the transfer of power took place. They tried to make British flesh creep by suggesting that unless we helped the process of the transfer of power, our interests would be seriously damaged. Mr. Malcolm Fraser developed the idea at a press conference in the United Kingdom.

I think that the eminent persons may have exaggerated the effectiveness of the ANC. It is perfectly true that there have been casualties, but nothing like the Lebanese, Ugandan, Sri Lankan and, as far as I can make out, the Punjab casualties. I would not underrate the danger that there could be further casualties in future, but I think that the eminent persons failed to understand the basic position in South Africa.

Over the past 15 years, a generation of black middle class intelligentsia has arisen. Some are lawyers, doctors, journalists, teachers, churchmen, shopkeepers, and business men. In the homelands, some are Ministers and Government officials. Others are skilled workmen and trade union leaders. Some are radicals and sympathise with the ANC and other radical movements. Many—although they are by no means supporters of Mr. Botha's Government—have no love for the ANC and no desire to see repeated in South Africa the kind of semi-Communist experiment that has taken place in Mozambique and Angola, or even the Socialist experiment still in the making in Zimbabwe.

Both the radical and the moderate blacks know that the whites must do a deal with the blacks. The question is, which blacks? Attachment to private enterprise, tribal structures—we have seen in Matabeleland how strong the tribal influence still is — and anti-communism, inculcated by the Churches, favours co-operation between the moderate blacks and the whites. It would be foolish to brush aside the moderate blacks. Chief Buthelezi probably commands the allegiance of some 6 million Zulus. His Inkatha organisation has bashed the ANC hard in some townships. The Church of Zion, which claims 2·5 million supporters, gave President Botha a tremendous welcome at Easter last year. Bishop Mokoena, who has visited Britain, claims the support of more than 4·5 million. Add up numbers and jot them down, and one will find that more than 10 million blacks are already in the, I would not say Botha camp, but anti-ANC camp.

The real confrontation is between not black and white, but between radical and moderate blacks. That is why I am interested in the analogy drawn by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Central—I am sorry that he is not present—with the resistance movement during the war. Those who have studied the movements—I lived through them—saw that, as the end of German domination became clear, they began to fight each other, even before the Germans had gone, to see who would be in charge. That is what is happening in South Africa. I would not underrate for a moment the radical forces of the ANC or the moderates. I believe that the white-moderates combination, if it comes off, is more likely to prevail than the radical revolution, and it is in our interests that it should. It is anti-Communist and pro-private enterprise. It would be, on the whole, more favourable to our way of thinking. I think that it will develop if South Africa is left to itself.

The real danger of the report of the Eminent Persons Group—tendentious, one-sided and emotional as it is—is that it will discourage the moderates and the whites from doing a deal. The moderates will feel that the outside world is going towards the ANC and will ask whether they should go with the tide. The whites will feel that they must batten down the hatches. That is why I deprecate the report and the tone of much of what has been said in the House today.

I urge my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to stand absolutely firm against economic sanctions. A great deal of progress has been made in South Africa, especially in the past 18 months. More is in the pipeline and more could be obtained by quiet diplomacy. I see no justification for punitive measures. Indeed, if progress is made on the Group Areas Act and on bringing the blacks into the political process, I think that that would justify lifting existing sanctions on oil and arms.