Falkland Islands

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 8:10 pm on 7 April 1982.

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Photo of Mr Keith Speed Mr Keith Speed , Ashford 8:10, 7 April 1982

I very much agree with the last point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin). It is inconceivable that our friends in the EEC or in NATO can be neutral on this matter. In most parts of the House—with one or two notable exceptions—there is a general feeling that we should now support our forces. We hope that there will be the minimum casualties, whether they involve Argentines, Falkland Islanders or British troops and sailors. Ultimately, a solution will have to be reached by diplomacy. We shall have to regain our sovereignty. I certainly do not flinch from that word.

If force has to be used in one operation or another, we should not flinch from it. It would be wrong and we should fail the task force sailing down the Atlantic if there were any hint that the vast majority of hon. Members were not prepared, in extremis, to use that force and to stand behind it.

Our first priority must be the 1,800 people on the Falkland Islands with whom we have such a close affinity. They wish to live in freedom under British law. However, I should not wish the debate to pass before we have considered several other aspects of the Falkland Islands. It is sad that over the years Governments of all political persuasions have made little attempt to assess the mineral wealth of the Falkland Islands, in the Antarctic and in the dependent territories. I almost feel that we might be ashamed to find the untold treasures that may lie beneath those sometimes inhospitable shores. There are strong indications that there is considerable wealth both in and under the seas. The fishing industry has not been properly developed, although it could have considerably assisted those living on the Falkland Islands.

I turn to a sensitive but important point. Both world wars have shown the strategic importance of the Falkland Islands. I need hardly mention the battle of the Falkland Islands in the First World War or the battle of the river Plate in the Second World War. Given the instability of the Argentine Government, it is not impossible that if events move in a certain way and we do not regain our sovereignty and control over the Falkland Islands, they could become naval bases for a power that is by no means friendly towards us. Indeed, the Falkland Islands could become Soviet naval bases. That should concern our friends and allies in NATO.

As regards operations on the spot, a great deal will depend on events during the next fortnight, on the diplomatic moves made by our various friends and on internal pressures within the Argentine. During the past few days I have been persuaded that to provide for the minimum loss of life and the maximum pressure, there should probably be a blockade, in the fullest sense of the word, of the Falkland Islands. That might put some worthwhile cards in the hands of our diplomats, because they do not have too many now.

There should be a blockade by sea, a blockade of airborne supplies to the islands and an electronic warfare blockade. If we can make those islands, and particularly the occupying powers, incommunicado with the outside world, we may bring pressure to bear. That has the added advantage that Argentines who try to run the blockade will be seen as the aggressors. However, we must face the fact that we may then be forced to take military action against Argentine surface ships, submarines or aircraft. Again, we cannot flinch from that harsh decision.

The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) mentioned a war zone. I agree with him. I should welcome some comment from my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. At this very minute, there are no doubt a considerable number of Soviet submarines in the area, which will be doing their best to gather what intelligence they can. They may well reap a harvest by watching our operating tactics and by listening to the things that submarines are interested in. I have no doubt that the ubiquitous AGI intelligence gatherers will be there. We do not want the Soviets, or anyone else, becoming involved in an incident that is at present limited between the Argentine and us and that might then flare up into something else.