Lords amendment: No. 9, in page 20, line 2, leave out from "is" to end of line 3 and insert
added at the end of subsection (3):—
but in determining whether there was such a likelihood the court may disregard any injury to him and any damage to the vehicle.
(2) The following is substituted for subsection (5) of that section:—
I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Contrary to some of the comments made a few moments ago, I think I can say without tempting fate that it will be almost impossible to keep this amendment going until 5.30 pm—the time allotted to it. I do not invite any hon. Member to interpret what I say as a challenge. If discussion is extended, it will intrude on an important debate afterwards which the Opposition wish to conduct and for which they suggested a 5.30 pm start under the guillotine motion.
This is a technical drafting amendment. It corrects a longstanding drafting anomaly last enacted in the Road Traffic Act 1972. At the moment, as the law stands, under what will become section 6(2), under schedule 8 to the Bill concerning drink-drive offences, it is a defence to the charge of being in charge of a vehicle when above the limit if the driver can show that there was no likelihood of his driving so long as he remained above the limit.
For a long time and for no clear reason, there has been a further proviso to that defence which applies to section 6 but does not apply to section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1972. The defence that a driver can show that there was no likelihood of his driving so long as he remained above the limit is limited by a provision that the court may disregard any injury to the accused and any damage to his vehicle in determining whether it was likely that he would drive. That avoids the nonsensical position arising where a driver asserts that he has not committed an offence because there is no likelihood of his driving while remaining above the limit and the only reason why there is no likelihood of his driving is that he is too injured to drive or the vehicle is so damaged by the accident that it is immobile. Plainly that was not intended to be open to anyone as a valid defence.
It is arguable, on the wording of section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1972, that such a defence is available to someone charged with being in charge of a vehicle while his ability to drive was impaired by drink and drugs. It can never have been the intention of Parliament that the defence under section 5 should not be limited by the same proviso that limits the defence under section 6. This amendment puts the two offences on the same footing in relation to that small provision. I doubt very much whether the difference is of great practical importance. I do not believe that it often comes before the courts, but cases could arise where it was a matter of some significance. I therefore invite the House to take this opportunity to put matters right and back in a logical order.
Lords amendment: No. 10, in page 20, line 6, at end insert—
(6) For the purpose of arresting a person under the power conferred by subsection (5) above a constable may enter (if need be by force) any place where that person is or where the constable, with reasonable cause, suspects him to be.
(7) Subsection (6) above does not extend to Scotland and nothing in that subsection shall affect any rule of law in Scotland concerning the right of a constable to enter any premises for any purpose.
I beg to move, as an amendment to the Lords amendment, to insert after subsection (6)
' ' other than that persons' home and may enter a person's home only when the constable with reasonable cause suspects him of having failed to report an accident in which he was involved in which a person was injured. For the purposes of this subsection a person's home is his usual place of residence'.
The purpose of the amendment to the Lords amendment is to limit the circumstances in which a constable can force an entry into a person's home to arrest him without a warrant on the suspicion of his having driven while unfit through drink. We want to limit a constable's right to force an entry to the time when he has reasonable cause to suspect that the person whom he is seeking to arrest without a warrant has failed to report an accident in which he was involved and in which someone was injured.
This issue raises grave and important questions. Account must be taken, for example, of the privacy of a person's home. That is a civil right. What are the powers of enforcement with which we should invest our police force? How should we proceed with the important new enforcement powers that the Government are proposing to enshrine in legislation?
There are issues that involve a sensitive judgment. We are dealing with what is in practice an amendment to section 5 of the 1972 Act. The amendment does not impinge on section 7 of that Act, which is covered in schedule 8 to the Bill. The amendment would have no effect on the powers of a constable to require a person to take a breathalyser test or to enter a person's home to require him to comply with such a test. Those issues are dealt with in schedule 8.
When the issue was before the Committee charged with the consideration of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Stott) proposed, on behalf of the Opposition, that the power of a constable to require somebody to take a breathalyser test should be extended. Their Lordships have extended it even further than we proposed. That is not the issue before the House now. We are considering the powers to be found in section 5 of the 1972 Act. Until the Bill is enacted, that Act gives a constable power to arrest without a warrant a person committing an offence under the section.
Clause 25 extends the powers contained in section 5 of the 1972 Act by adding the following words:
A constable may arrest a person without warrant if he has reasonable cause to suspect that that person is or has been committing an offence under this section.
The purpose of the section was to give a constable the right to arrest someone on the ground of reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence.
When the Bill went to another place their Lordships decided to extend the power much further. In Lords amendment No. 10 their Lordships have proposed the following:
For the purpose of arresting a person under the power conferred by subsection (5) above a constable may enter (if need be by force) any place where that person is or where the constable, with reasonable cause, suspects him to be.
If we accept the amendment, and if the Bill is enacted, there will be no restriction on a police constable to prevent him from entering if he can contend that he had reasonable suspicion that the person he was seeking was in the premises and had committed an offence. It is an unqualified power in the sense that the police officer does not have to prove that the person is in the premises. He does not have to display proof that the person concerned committed the offence.
We are dealing with an area in which the range of offences is extremely wide. Section 5 refers to an offence which can embrace someone who is arguably on the borderline and is influenced in his control of a vehicle, but which he is not attempting to drive, having had a couple of pints of beer, and an offence in which someone who is in a state that is commonly described as paralytic drives into and kills a group of children.
We contend that there must be some regard for the gravity of the offence before we decide whether we want to give the police the power that those in another place seek to give them. We believe that there is a distinction to be drawn that must be based on the gravity of the offence, and that that must be exercised before a policeman can knock on the door of my home, for example, and say to my wife "I think that your husband is in there and I believe that he has been in charge of a vehicle under the influence of drink. I want to come in and arrest him without a warrant."
If my wife slams the door shut, if the Bill is enacted in its present form the police will be entitled to bash down my door. I might return at night to find the door broken down and to discover that the police have entered. In those circumstances I should have no right of compensation against the police officer concerned if he could show that his suspicion was reasonable. That is not difficult to do. It is not difficult to suspect someone of being at home at night if one does not know that he is a Member of Parliament. It is not difficult to suspect someone of driving or attempting to drive his car when, for example, someone else was driving it. Another possibility is that the car has been stolen. It is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which that might come about.
We are saying that we must discriminate and that that must be the test before we give such sweeping and almost punitive enforcement power to the police. We have decided that the test should be whether someone has been injured by a driver who has not stopped and the driver gives a police officer reasonable cause to believe that he was driving. That, and only that, should enable the officer to go into the suspected person's home.
On Second Reading the Secretary of State inadvertently misled the House when he said that the amendments to section 5 and schedule 8 dealt with increasing the powers of the police to obtain a breathalyser test. They do not. Obviously the schedule 8 amendments have that effect, in that they seek to rewrite part of section 7. However, the change in respect of section 5 stands on its own. If a constable has arrested someone under section 5, it is understandable that he will require him to take a breath test. He would be rather a silly constable if he did not. He does not need the power in section 5 to do that. He will have the necessary power under the amended section 7 if we accept schedule 8 and the amendments thereto.
The power to arrest without a warrant was given to a constable to deal with someone who had committed an offence. It has been extended to give the officer power to enter someone's home. The right of a citizen to the privacy of his home should not be forfeit to police enforcement powers irrespective of the nature of the offence. We should take into account the nature of the offence.
The right of a citizen to the privacy of the home should not be forfeit without regard to whether the enforcement action is based solely on the suspicion of an offence having been committed. There is a distinction between the enforcement power in respect of something that is suspected and the enforcement power in respect of somebody having committed an offence. When the offence is grave, forcible entry may be justified. We do not deny that. It may be justified, even on suspicion, if it is suspicion of an extremely grave offence. The offence of having injured a person and not having reported it is such a case.
I shall remind the House of what the Secretary of State said on Second Reading when he was challenged by one of his hon. Friends about why he was not introducing the random tests proposed in the Blennerhassett report. He gave three reasons, which are relevant to the amendment. He said that the Bill contained sufficient powers to deal with the issue. If that is correct, there are now more than sufficient powers, because the Bill has been amended to increase the powers.
Secondly, the right hon. Gentleman said that because there were sufficient powers the additional power was unnecessary. Certainly, there are sufficient powers. In view of the enormous strengthening of section 7—the right to enter premises to require the test, the right to enter the home, and the right to use force to enter to require the test—we believe that the additional power is unnecessary.
Thirdly, the Secretary of State said that one of the things that had influenced him in rejecting the Blennerhassett proposition about random tests was that it was important to have in mind the relationship that exists between the police and the motorist. He said that that relationship was an important part of police public relations and that an extension of power of this kind—the Blennerhassett proposal—could damage that relationship.
What could be more damaging to the relationship between the motorist and the police than for the motorist to arrive home and find that his door had been broken down by a policeman entering on suspicion? If the Secretary of State does not think that that is potentially damaging, he should go to Brixton and talk to people who have had their doors knocked down by policemen and see whether it has harmed the relationship. Of course it is a potentially damaging action. I find myself at one with the Secretary of State in saying that that is one of the matters that should be considered.
If all, or any, of the reasons that the Secretary of State gave for rejecting the Blennerhassett proposal are valid in relation to that proposal, they are equally, if not more, valid in respect of this power which the Lords propose to add to section 5 of the 1972 Act. As we seriously consider the appropriate punishments or penalties in relation to the seriousness of crimes, we should also consider whether the enforcement rights that we give to the police are appropriate to the offences with which they are dealing, or the suspicion of offences, particularly if we can accord those powers to the police at the cost of impinging on a citizen's privacy in his own home.
Those who believe that there should be no limitation on police powers to enforce if there is any suspicion of an offence having been committed, that the police are entitled to break into any home or premises on the ground of suspicion, must vote against the Opposition amendment. However, those who believe, as we do, that the privacy of a person's home is an important civil right and should be subordinated to the enforcement powers of the police only when there is serious justification will welcome the amendment and give it the serious consideration that it deserves.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) that the amendment raises important issues. As he knows, they have been troublesome throughout our proceedings on the Bill. We had a short but serious debate on the matter in Committee, and the Government undertook to consider it in the light of the various reactions received to our original draft. As a result of that careful consideration, the Government tabled amendment No. 10 and the amendments also selected for this debate which I propose to commend to the House.
I am sorry to intervene so early, and I thank the Under-Secretary for giving way. We did not debate clause 25 in Committee. We debated the schedule 8 amendment to section 7, and it was in that regard that the undertaking was given by the Government to reconsider the matter. Clauses 25 and 26 were two of the victims of the guillotine.
I agree, but the same issues were raised about the police being given a power of entry to enforce particular aspects of the breathalyser law. I agree that our debate was so confined that the matter arose on schedule 8 on that occasion.
The right hon. Gentleman raised two issues. I shall deal with them separately. First, I shall deal with the slightly less serious question of the way in which the Bill widens to a certain extent the power of arrest which has long existed under section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1972. Section 5 is the old pre-breathalyser law governing the offences of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle when under the influence of drink or drugs. Clause 25 slightly widens the power of arrest to include the case where a constable has reasonable cause to suspect not only that the person is committing an offence, but has been committing an offence under this clause. That is in line with the changes that we made in what is the new clause 7 in schedule 8, dealing with constables' powers to require a breath test for prescribed reasons. We have slightly extended the grounds on which a policeman may require a breath test—in two cases to introduce the past tense, that not only is a person driving but has been driving in prescribed circumstances that give rise to the requirement of a breath test.
I suggest that that is not a very wide extension of the power of arrest. A police officer has the power to arrest on reasonable suspicion of the commission of many criminal offences. That is the usual test that a police officer has to apply before deciding to arrest a person. We are merely saying that a police constable may arrest if he has reasonable suspicion, not only that the person is driving under the influence of drink but that he has been driving. That covers the kind of cases that have been described. The offence can be serious, if a policeman has seen someone driving, perhaps hopelessly under the influence of drink, but by the time the policeman gets to him he has stopped driving, parked his car and is walking away from it. Those are circumstances in which I am sure that the House would not object to the power of arrest being extended, and it was not challenged in our earlier proceedings.
That brings me to the more substantial point that was put by the right hon. Gentleman: the question of when the police should have a power of entry into premises for the purpose either or requiring a breath test or of arresting someone for a section 5 offence without a warning.
There are conflicting considerations, and we must find a compromise somewhere between them. The first consideration is the need to make the laws about drink and driving sensibly enforceable. The law is designed to protect innocent members of the public against death or injury caused by the thoughtless actions of others. That law must be enforceable. There is the equally valid consideration that we do not wish to give the police such powers to enforce the law that the civil rights of innocent people may be infringed or, as the right hon. Gentleman said, the ordinary good relationship between the police and public disturbed.
Under the existing law on drink and drive, as embodied in the 1972 Act, although the police have a wide range of circumstances in which they can require a breath test, and although they are empowered to arrest someone for drunk driving or being drunk in charge, they have no power of entry to premises to enforce the law. They have certain powers of entry to enforce criminal law, which are usually governed by section 2 of the Criminal Law Act 1967. That lays down that the police power of entry is confined to those offences where the penalty is imprisonment for a maximum of at least five years. That does not cover any of the breathalyser or drink and drive offences, or any of the requirements for a breath test.
The police have enforced drink-drive cases without difficulty, except in the few cases where the suspect has gone onto premises, revoked the police licence and made the police trespassers. At that point the police are obliged to withdraw as quickly as possible. Any action they may take as trespassers on the premises is not in the enforcement of their duty, and matters can be taken no further. At one stage there was some doubt about the extent to which the police could enter premises against the wishes of the owner, to ask for a breathalyser test or to make an arrest. However, a case known as Morris v. Beardmore, and successive cases have made it clear that the police have no such powers.
We must consider whether the police should have powers to enter premises even to the extent, as the right hon. Gentleman said, of forcing the door if the owner of the premises refuses admission when the police try to obtain a breath test or effect an arrest. We agonised carefully about that matter. We originally drafted a Bill to try to reflect the case laws that were established in Morris v. Beardmore. That would have given a wide sanctuary to suspects against police in almost all cases where, on any premises, the owner revoked the police licence to be there and said that they were trespassers. There was understandable police objection to that. They said that farmers could jump into their fields and order the police to go away, even though the farmer might obviously be drunk or might have been involved in a serious accident. People could go to their shop premises and exclude the police. They could run to the home of a friend and ask the friend to exclude the police. The police would be left powerless.
We are not dealing with the ordinary case where somebody approached at his door is asked for a breath test and is inclined to give it. We are dealing with someone who is approached by the police, who have reason to require a breath test or effect an arrest, but who refuses entry and will have nothing more to do with the proceedings. That leaves the police impotent and powerless, simply gazing at the suspect. It need not be a case where a person has simply shut or bolted the door. Following Morris v. Beardmore, there have been cases of drivers leaving their cars in circumstances that gave rise to suspicion. The police may even talk to a driver on the driveway of his house, and his breath may smell of drink. He can say "Go away, I shall not give a breath test". If the police wish to arrest him he can again say "Go away". Every action (hat the police took thereafter would be ineffective because they would be trespassers. They could leave the suspect in a serious case making rude gestures over the hedge, and be quite powerless to do anything about it.
The Law Lords said that Parliament should decide whether it wishes the law to be enforced properly. We must decide what can be done to give the police the necessary rights to demand a breath test or effect an arrest while, at the same time, not causing unnecessary offence or difficulty to the public or an intrusion into civil liberties.
We arrived at the conclusion that is embodied in the amendments. Police should have the necessary powers of entry in the most serious cases. We do not think that it is the general wish of the public, or of the House, that police should be given the right to force an entry following some minor traffic offence. However, there are certain circumstances where, in our opinion—and I trust with the consent of the House, and certainly with the consent of another place—the police should have a right of entry if a serious offence may have been committed. The police should be entitled to investigate that properly.
The Bill, as amended in another place, gives the police the necessary powers of entry, using force if required, into any premises for three purposes. First, if they require to take a breath test if a person has been driving or has been in charge of a vehicle that has been involved in an accident in which another person has suffered personal injury. For example, if someone has left the schene of an accident in which a person has been injured, the police should have the power of entry to obtain a breath test. Secondly, there should be the power of entry to arrest a person who has been required to take a test in those circumstances if he gives a positive reading or if he refuses to comply.
Broadly speaking, that is the personal accident case. The right hon. Gentleman did not challenge that. The point is not raised by his amendment. It is relevant to our debate because of the Lords amendments. The provision is very much in line with an amendment moved by the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Stott) in Committee. I think that we are all agreed abou the personal injury cases.
The third purpose is to enable the police to arrest a person if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that he has committed a section 5 offence—that is, driving or being in charge of a vehicle while unfit to do so because of the effect of drink or drugs. The right hon. Gentleman has doubts about that. We have chosen that further provision as another category of serious offence. It is not simply a breathalyser offence where someone is required to give a breath test although he may not have committed an offence. It is not against the law of Britain to have a drink while driving, but only to be above the limit. However, if a driver has drink on his breath he is liable to be asked to give a breath test. That is fair enough on the road, but there is no reason why a power of entry should be given in that case.
However, in the section 5 case where we propose to give a power of entry, the police have reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed. The circumstances where that is likely to arise is where someone has been observed by the police—or by someone who has reported that to the police—as driving or being in charge of a vehicle when plainly under the influence of drink. That covers the cases of someone who is weaving about while driving home, or the driver who may hit something, such as a lamp post, have left the car and staggered home or into some nearby premises. Those are cases where people are under the influence of drink.
If the police have reasonable grounds to suspect that someone is under the influence of drink and that his driving is impaired, it must be right to empower them to enter premises and effect an arrest. They would be entitled to effect an arrest if the person was still on the public highway. That person should not have the right to refuse admission. The arrest should be effected. That is a further category that will catch the serious offences.
I do not accept the right hon. Gentleman's comparison between our attitude to that category and our attitude to random tests. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, myself and the Government have been strongly against the idea of introducing random breathalyser tests. However, that is a different circumstance. There is no reason why any driver should have been committing a criminal offence. Random tests would give the police the power to stop any driver and require a breathalyser test, even when the driver was doing nothing to give grounds for that other than sitting in a vehicle and being on a road.
That is a long way from the category of cases that we are describing where a policeman has grounds for thinking that someone is doing what is colloquially known as drunk driving. It covers those cases where the person happens to be on premises by the time the policeman catches up with him. In the few cases in which the owner of the premises—it might be the person's home—tries to revoke the police licence to be there and treat them as trespassers, they will then have the necessary powers of entry to enforce the law.
I hope that with that explanation I have managed to answer some of the understandable concern expressed by the right hon. Member. I believe that in a difficult area we have the balance about right between, on the one hand, the liberties of the individual—certainly the liberties of the innocent motorist—and on the other the need to make the law properly enforceable and to avoid cases where motorists cock a snook at the police when they have possibly been guilty of a serious offence which has caused risk to other people.
The amendments were commended by the other place. There is a wide area of opinion on the subject, which is why it has taken so long to come up with this package, but I suggest that the balance is about right. If the right hon. Gentleman does not withdraw his amendment, I fear that I must invite my right hon. and hon. Friends to resist it. I commend to the House Lords amendment No. 10 and the two amendments grouped with it.
If one examines the law in this country today, one finds that the police may not enter premises, whether it be for reasons of drug offences or anything else, without first obtaining a warrant. In the amendment there is an attack on the personal liberty of the individual. The old saying that an Englishman's home is his castle is under attack. In a day and age in which we hear so much about human rights, one wonders where such laws are taking us.
I shall give a hypothetical case to the Minister. What would happen if someone were speeding home in a motor car, managed to get into the driveway, left the car and entered the house? The police might force entry because they were suspicious, because the person was driving quickly, that he had had a certain amount to drink, but they might not be able to identify the person. Let us say that the husband, who had been at home drinking, came to the door, and his wife had been the offender driving the speeding vehicle. How would the police prove their case? What protection has the individual in such circumstances?
A dangerous precedent is being set, because it could be the thin end of the wedge. If we pass legislation such as this, are we embarking on a course that will mean that in the next Transport Bill, not just for three cases of suspicion, but for many cases of suspicion, the police will have right of entry? In the longer term we are in grave danger of opening the door that leads to all sorts of legislation which says that the police may enter, because we shall have set the precedent in this case.
There is also the question of an accident. What does "a serious accident" involve? Could it involve a bruise? I believe that the terminology would be difficult to probe. Therefore, in the circumstances, much as I wish to, I feel that I cannot support the Government on this issue.
My main fear is not just about the pursuit by a police constable of an allegedly drunken driver but about the consequences of that.
I shall give one case as an example. A person was rolling about in front of a garage fighting with a policeman after he had been suspected of having had too much to drink. There was no accident, but in the course of the skirmish the man was alleged to have bitten the policeman because he fiercely resented being pursued almost into his home. If the amendment of my right hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) is not passed, one could presume that the policeman would be able to go into the man's premises because of his suspicions.
That case involved a West Indian family that has a high reputation in the local church. Those circumstances arose after what was supposed to be a farewell party because the family were emigrating to Canada. The outcome was that the Canadian authorities would not accept the man, he having been convicted not only of drunken driving but of assault on a policeman. The assault on the policeman was considered by the Canadian authorities to be the graver of the two offences, yet one offence arose out of the other.
Such circumstances may arise. My right hon. Friend's amendment is perfectly reasonable, because none of us would want to protect someone who had caused accidents as a result of having too much to drink, even to the extent of going into the home in such circumstances. Cumulative effects may arise from such a situation. They are too dangerous for the House to permit the amendment to go through unamended.
Having supported the original Bill on Second Reading and in Committee without this provision, it would be foolish at this stage for one to be dogmatic and say that the Lords amendment is absolutely right. It is a difficult matter. There is no doubt that an amendment that extends the rights of the police to enter the home of a motorist is an important matter and one that the House must take seriously. In all of us it raises conflicting opinions. We all still like to cherish the notion, which is probably based on an illusion, that the Englishman's home is his castle, but, on the other hand, most of us want to see effective measures taken against drunken driving. Therefore, I recognise that there is a real conflict.
It is with a sense of relief that I notice an almost total absence of lawyers from the debate.
I hope that I have not provoked my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg). I apologise—I had not seen him sitting there. I should have thought that a question of such significance would present a feast day for lawyers. It is a difficult question for all of us. It would be foolish to be dogmatic.
It is equally important to recognise that we are not debating a fundamental matter of principle, because we are debating the amendment proposed by the Opposition. It does not go the whole way to counter the proposal to give extra powers to the police. All that the right hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) proposes is that those powers should be exercised only in limited circumstances. I wonder whether his amendment is practical. I should be interested to know whether he thinks that it can be operated. We are not debating whether the police have the right to enter a man's home and all the things mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman—bashing down the door, using force and upsetting the motorist. The right hon. Gentleman concedes that that can be done, but only if the police officer has reasonable cause to suspect that there has been an accident which the motorist has failed to report and which involved injury.
I wonder how practical the amendment is, because, presumably, in many circumstances the policeman must respond instantaneously when he sees a drunken driver and an accident occurring. He does not have time to stop to investigate the nature of the accident. He must pursue the motorist quickly to his home. How can he make a prompt judgment on whether there was an injury—it does not matter whether it was a serious or a minor one—to find out whether he has the right and reasonable suspicion to pursue the motorist to his home? If, in the interests of the safety of the public, we are asking the police to stop drunken drivers, we must give them reasonable powers to pursue that person to his home and make an arrest if necessary.
I think that the hon. Gentleman will accept that the Opposition amendment deals not only with an issue of principle but, as we can see under section 5, with the right to enter a home in a case where a driver has been involved in an accident in which someone is injured. We are not objecting to the ability of a policeman, under schedule 8, to enter a home for the purposes of taking a breath test. It cannot be said that by our amendment we are making the police ineffective. We are saying that the police must go through the procedure that gives a right of privacy and protects the civil liberty of privacy in the home.
That is a fair point. The House generally seems to accept the principle that the police will have the wider power to pursue a suspected drunken driver to his home and to enter that home by force if necessary in certain circumstances. It is important to recognise that there is no fundamental difference between hon. Members who have spoken so far. In the interests of trying to make these new drink driving laws effective, this is something which, reluctantly, we must accept. We can accept it largely because it will happen only in a very few cases. I should be interested to learn just how often this has caused policemen difficulties. I suspect that it is rare for a man to drink so much that he cannot find his way home, put the car in the garage and get indoors before the police have caught him. That must be a rare event.
Circumstances of that sort will not apply to the vast majority of law-abiding motorists. It is something with which we should agree. We should therefore accept the Lords amendment and reject the Opposition amendment.
I did not intend to intervene, but there are several points that I should like to raise on behalf of my constituents. Most of them appreciate the work done by the police, but there are some occasions when it is felt that the police are over-zealous. That occurs in parts of my constituency where there is a fairly high proportion of flats in which parties often take place in the evening. From time to time I receive complaints from constituents who feel that they are put under unfair pressure.
What would happen if, under this section, someone disappears into a block of flats? Would that give the police the right to look in each of those flats? If so, how will the police exercise that discretion? If, at two o'clock in the morning, someone disappears into a large block of flats, it may be difficult for the police to decide which of the flats that person entered. If the police knock on the doors and are told that the person is not there, do they go away or do they insist on looking in those flats? That could cause considerable distress and upset to a person not involved in the suspected offence.
It also places the police in a difficulty. If they see someone disappearing into the front entrance of a block of flats, it is difficult for them to tell which of the flats that person has entered. It will be even harder in my constituency where there are houses in multiple occupation where it is often difficult to ascertain which rooms belong to each flat.
I accept that the police have a difficult task. There are occasions when some of my constituents feel aggrieved. At the moment, the problem usually arises where there is a suspicion that drugs might be on the premises and where the police decide to search for them.
What safeguards will there be in carrying out the requirements of this section so that the police do not cause unnecessary hardship to people who are in no way involved? Sadly, on some occasions the police have caused upset to some people, particularly late at night, as a result of their existing powers to enter premises, which has led to the police forfeiting the good will of some of my constituents. There could well be a problem about flats and houses in multiple occupation. Problems could also arise in other areas when it is unclear which house a policeman ought to enter to look for the suspect.
I do not think that the fears expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) are well based. He was talking about the world before police cars were in touch with a computer giving the address of the car owner. It is no longer the case that a person must be pursued home by a policeman or he is lost and gone forever. So long as they can identify the car, the police call back to base, and within 30 seconds they receive an answer from the computer in Swansea. I therefore do not believe that there is a degree of urgency.
Moreover, if my hon. Friend remembers the pamphlet published by the British Medical Association before the breathalyser was first introduced, he will know that for about 40 minutes after a drink is consumed the alcohol concentration in the blood rises and then remains at a plateau for about two hours before it starts to fall. Therefore, there is not a degree of urgency. Indeed, it could work the other way, because the delay in being breathalysed could result in a much greater concentration of alcohol being found in the blood than when the person was driving, possibly well below the limit.
The Opposition amendment does what most hon. Members would wish if they were present in the Chamber to hear its merit debated. It deals with a serious case where there has been an accident at which a driver has not stopped—because the policeman would have breathalysed him there and then if it was thought a reasonable thing to do—but has gone home or, rather, where the policeman believes he has gone home.
This is not a matter of seeing an event. It is measuring by breathalyser a concentration of alcohol in the blood which will not go away in a few minutes. We know that to be the case. If the case is serious, the constable can get a warrant, go into the premises concerned and get the person if he needs to. However, both the Opposition amendment and the Lords amendment are not about whether a police officer can go into someone's home to require him to take a breath test or arrest him. They are about whether the policeman should be able to do so without a warrant, and that is a different matter.
The argument advanced by the Government has tended to ignore that important premise. The Opposition amendment states that the offence must have been a visible event. Without that amendment it is possible that no offence would have occurred. Yet, the Government are asking us to allow a policeman to break the door and enter someone's home without a warrant. It is not reasonable to ask the House to do so, given that only one magistrate needs to be satisfied to sign a warrant to give the police officer such a power.
That protection of obtaining a warrant is still a valuable one to the citizen. I therefore ask my hon. and learned Friend to reconsider his position. I suspect that he has omitted to tax himself with that question, which is not whether a policeman in no circumstances should be able to enter someone's house but rather whether he should be able to do so without a warrant.
In response to my hon. Friend's earlier remark, may I point out that the vast majority of cars in this country are purchased by companies? Presumably, therefore, any police inquiries through a computer will simply produce the name of a company, which will not help find the name and address of a person whom they suspect of drunken driving.
That may be, but, by the same argument, if the police follow the car to the door, they still know where they want to go. If they do not know the name of the person before they go into the house, they still do not know the name of the person who was driving the car.
The Opposition are saying that this power to enter without a warrant will be granted only if two things happen: if there has been an accident in which a person has been injured and if, subsidiary to that, police officers have reasonable cause for believing that someone who was involved in that accident, and who did not stop to report it, has gone into his house.
The Opposition amendment is a reasonable compromise between the various opposing social needs. My right hon. Friend and my hon. and learned Friend would do well to consider the merit of that, rather than saying, in effect, "Let us just get the Lords amendments through and out of the way." I know that there are good reasons for wanting to get the Bill through tonight—excellent reasons concerning the precarious position of people who do not have driving licences and who are suffering great hardship. I have constituents in that position, too. However, that is not a reason for passing bad law, least of all when there is an opportunity, by accepting the Opposition amendment, to avoid doing that and to do what I believe both public opinion and the majority of hon. Members who are apprised of the argument would wish to do.
With the leave of the House, may I first assure my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) that the decision to invite the House to enact this law has not been lightly undertaken. As I said at the beginning of the debate, the Government and the House have spent a great deal of time considering the matter. I know from discussions that I have had thoughout the passage of the Bill that there are about as many opinions on the subject as there are individuals likely to take part in the discussion.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) for showing that there are two sides of the picture, as I began by saying. There are some circumstances in which the police must have the power to arrest without a warrant. Indeed, they already have that power in a wide range of cases. It is not necessary to have a warrant to enter premises to effect an arrest for many serious offences. Under the Criminal Law Act 1967, that power is expressly given for more serious criminal offences.
Common sense in all these cases, including the breathalyser cases, leads one easily to foresee circumstances in which that power is needed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton said, one could ring up the Swansea computer, find out the driver's registered address and get a warrant to go there, or, if the police had followed him to certain premises, they could obtain a warrant and then go back and arrest him. But that supposes many things. The first is that the motorist has gone to his home or the place where the car is registered, or that if he has entered other premises he will stay there while the police go away and obtain a warrant. Those considerations in many criminal offences or serious traffic offences would bring about a situation in which the police could not enforce the law.
I do not think that my right hon. Friend, I or the Government in general have less sensitivity than those who have spoken about the rights of the individual. But there are serious aspects of the law that must be enforced. The Government's original proposals were severely criticised by the police and by liberal opinion outside as being far too lax. The police made a serious criticism of the provision as it was first drafted. I listened to my own chief constable of Nottinghamshire speaking on the radio as spokesman of the chief constables on traffic matters. He said that we had created a nonsense. We were also criticised by The Guardian for having created a drunken drivers' charter in proposing the law as we have.
We are dealing with an aspect of the law that has been found defective by a wide range of opinion. I cited earlier one or two cases that had given rise to concern and led to Parliament being asked to clarify the matter. I should like to give a brief quotation from Lord Diplock's judgment in two cases—Finnigan v Sandiford and Clowser v Chaplin—in both of which the motorist stood in his own doorway, speaking to the policeman through an open door. As soon as he realised that he was in difficulties and might be breathalysed or arrested, he simply retreated inside the house and told the police to go away.
We are talking not about dramatic attacks by policemen through closed doors but simply about someone who realises that he is in trouble and who, over the garden hedge or standing inside his doorway, tells the police to go away. In the two cases that I have mentioned, both offenders were gloriously acquitted, thanks to the state of the law that we are now trying to rectify.
Lord Diplock, who is not an illiberal or unreasonable man, said that the reasoning of one of his colleagues
leads … to tie conclusion that once again the way in which the 'breathalyser' provision of the Road Traffic Act 1972 was drafted has enabled motorists to 'cock a snook' at the law.
The case in question was decided while the Bill was going through the House. Lord Diplock went on:
The revision of the breathalyser provisions is under consideration in the Transport Bill now before Parliament. It is for Parliament to make up its mind whether it wants this lamentable state of affairs to continue.
We are all sensitive about the rights of the individual, but we cannot allow it to continue to be possible for police to be ordered off any premises when investigating serious offences. We are not dealing simply with "home". We are talking about a policeman who has reasonable grounds to suspect that a motorist is
under influence of drink or drugs",
when the motorist happens to have reached the nearest premises, where, the proprietor or owner tells the police to go away and does not allow them to enter and effect an arrest.
Certainly not. The police may have a licence to enter premises for various purposes, but the moment the owner or anyone in a position to refuse them right of entry tells them to go away, they must do so. It could be the owner of a shop, a friend of the motorist whose house the motorist has happened to enter, of a farmer whose field the police have entered. They can be ordered to leave.
The right hon. Gentleman is taking me on to the Opposition amendment. Because my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton is concerned about the matter, he has been attracted by the amendment. I did not deal with it in sufficient detail when I spoke before.
The amendment tries to confine the provision when the motorist is in his own home to those cases, even drink and
drive cases, in which an accident has occurred. With everyone's approval, we have already covered accidents in breathalyser cases. There is the difficulty of defining what are "home" and "usual place of residence" for this purpose. With a bewildering range of the population, it is difficult to decide what is their "home" or "usual place of residence". The Opposition amendment says:
a person's home is his usual place of residence".
That is by no means an easy question to answer for many people. It is certainly not a question that can easily be answered by a policeman standing at the door of someone who is telling him to go away or who has a friend telling him to go away.
I pray in aid the example cited by the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett), of multi-occupied houses. The police could easily get themselves into difficulties, as could the courts in interpreting the law, if someone insisted that a certain place was his home, whereas in fact he had a range of residences, or was a visitor who happened to be living in a particular place at the time. Under the amendment, what is the position of someone who is away from his usual home for any length of time? He may be visiting somewhere and staying for a period that is not fixed. It is very difficult in many cases—probably in the case of Members of Parliament—to decide what is the "usual place of residence". It is arguable that some people have more than one place of residence.
The amendment also tries to tie the definition to cases in which there has been failure to report an accident. Failure to report an accident is not necessarily an offence. Injury accidents do not have to be reported by a driver unless he has not given his name and address to any person having reasonable grounds for requiring them. Even where the offence of failure to report has been committed, it is not normally possible to demonstrate that it has been committed until 24 hours after the accident, as the driver is allowed that period in which to report the accident. By that time, all traces of alcohol may have disappeared.
The amendment does not say to whom the accident has not been reported. It does not say that the person's involvement in the accident should have been while driving or being in charge of a vehicle that was involved. The reference to injury does not exclude injury to the driver himself. The amendment is therefore riddled with technical deficiencies.
I therefore commend to the House the proposal that we should give to the police the power of entry to effect an arrest in the comparatively serious cases in which a person's driving is affected, because he is unfit or his driving is impaired by drink or drugs, or to personal injury accidents where power of entry exists to require a breath test. That is the Government's recommended solution. It is clearly embodied in the Lords amendments.
I know that the Opposition do not like necessarily to accept the opinion of another place, and neither do we. We are all conscious of the rights of this House. Nevertheless, the Law Lords have been much agitated by this matter, and the amendments were accepted without challenge in another place. I believe that it would be unwise now to venture into the Opposition amendment and to return to a position in which I believe that we should be confining the powers of the police unnecessarily.
As Lord Diplock said in the case that I mentioned, motorists would be able to cock a snook at the law. Moreover, the average member of the public would not feel that we were protecting him properly if, when the police had reasonable grounds to suspect that a person had been guilty of drinking and driving or being drunk in charge, the driver could stand behind his own hedge, or could stand behind a friend's hedge and get the owner to tell the police to go away and nothing further could be done to effect an arrest or to enforce the law.
These are not draconian measures. We have expressly ruled out what some enthusiasts of breathalyser law would have liked, namely, giving a wide power of entry in all circumstances to carry out breath tests. We have confined it to personal injury cases. We are not interested in allowing entry in cases where the only offence is that of speeding, as in the case cited by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Bendall). We expressly do not wish to provide the power of entry in those comparatively minor cases. We have chosen the serious cases, and this is one of them. I therefore believe that the Opposition amendment is misconceived.
With the leave of the House, first, I fully accept the Under-Secretary's statement that he has given serious consideration to this matter. I do not allege any failure to take the matter seriously or to give considerable time to it. The debate has shown, however, that there is a grave concern about how one strikes a balance between effective enforcement of legislation passed by the House and respect for the privacy of a person's home in circumstances in which there is no proof that the person has committed an offence, that is to say, in the difficult area in which a constable seeks to enforce the law on the basis of suspicion. In this instance we are talking not about a single suspicion, but about two suspicions, either or both of which may prove to be wrong.
The first point on which I seriously disagree with the Under-Secretary is on what he says about the power being limited to serious cases. The Lords amendment does not limit to serious cases the power of arrest without warrant, the police having effected a forced entry into a person's home. That power is given to the constable in respect of any offence under section 5 of the 1972 Act. I believe that the majority of the constituents whom we represent would accept that a wide range of seriousness or comparative lack of it is involved in offences under section 5, from the case of the person who is technically in charge of the vehicle because he still has the keys although he has not been near it, to that of the person who has driven when he was clearly unfit to do so, and in a dangerous way. The Lords amendment is therefore very sweeping and is not limited to serious cases.
The amendment does not impinge upon that part of the Bill which determines the circumstances in which a constable may require a person to take a test. That is an important part of the Bill, but the amendment does not impinge upon it. I do not object to the Minister referring to it, because that is another area in which difficult decisions have to be made between the power of enforcement and the civil right or the right to privacy of the citizen. In that area, views have changed. I do not complain about that. It is right that the Government should reconsider their position and change it in the course of the Bill if they are persuaded by argument.
I deal now with the right to require breath tests. When the Bill was first introduced, as the Under-Secretary fairly said, a person was protected from the requirement to take the test if he went on to any premises where he could hold that the constable was trespassing. We objected to that. We said that the power was not strong enough. In a sense, the amendments have strengthened it. But if those powers are not strong enough, the correct way to deal with the matter is in the section dealing with the right to require a person to take the test. Once a test has been required, it will show how much drink the person has had. The court may then judge whether he was fit to drive. If the person is found guilty, the court will issue a warrant for his arrest if he has refused to make himself available to the court.
It is important to recognise that the effectiveness of the law in respect of the right to require a test is not impinged upon by the amendment. The amendment impinges upon the right of a constable without a warrant to break down the door of a person's home and to seek out that person because he suspects that he is there and has committed an offence under section 5. That is the right conferred by the Lords amendment.
Whether the way in which we have qualified that is the right one is a matter for the House to judge. We have chosen to qualify it with reference to a person suspected of having been involved in an accident in which somebody is injured. I accept the Under-Secretary's observation that we have not excluded the driver himself.
Under our amendment, if the driver were injured he could be held liable to submit himself or to report the accident, in which case he could be required to take the test. I accept that. That is the scope of the amendment and in no way do we seek to hide it. We believe, nevertheless, that a distinction can be drawn at that point.
Did my right hon. Friend read the recent report of a prominent person who is known to all of us—I shall not mention his name—who was stopped by the police near here and who refused to give a specimen of his blood or his urine? He refused to take a test, but merely gave his name. He has now been charged. Surely a person doing that should have the same right in his own house. If it was sufficient for that person to give his name on the road, it should be sufficient for me if a policeman comes to my house. What is the difference? Why should the driver on the road be treated differently from the driver in his house?
I agree with my hon. Friend. If a person has a right to refuse on the road, he should have the same right in his own home, but the Bill does not concede the right of a person to refuse to take the test on the road. On the contrary, he will be obliged to take such a test. The amendments to schedule 8 relate to the circumstances in which he might have the right to refuse in his own home only or in which a constable may require him to open his door or have it broken open for a test to be taken. We shall therefore decide those matters later.
I return to what concerns me, which is that if there is a chase by the police and a suspected person gets into his home, how will the police prove who was the driver of the vehicle without having had a clear look at the suspect? A chap could, for example send his wife to the door and say that she was the driver of the vehicle. We have heard of suspects swapping driving seats after accidents and other stratagems. The situation is open to abuse and is dangerous.
I accept the hon. Gentleman's point as relevant to whether one should proceed on suspicion, as opposed to arresting a person who has committed an offence. We have to make a distinction. Where there is a strong suspicion of someone having committed a serious offence, a right of entry may be granted even without a warrant. However, on the basis of the arguments that we have heard so far, unless there is a serious suspicion on the part of the constable that a person has evaded reporting an accident I do not accept that the constable should have the power, without a warrant, to enter that person's home to arrest him. The power to require drivers to take a breathalyser test is another and important matter on which we should give police proper powers.
The power to arrest without warrant, which is contained in section 5, is not limited by the Lords amendment, and it should not commend itself to the House. Therefore, I cannot respond to the Under-Secretary's request that we withdraw our amendment.
|Division No. 291]||[6.22 pm|
|Anderson, Donald||George, Bruce|
|Archer, Rt Hon Peter||Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John|
|Atkinson, N.(H'gey,)||Graham, Ted|
|Bendall, Vivian||Grant, John (Islington C)|
|Bennett, Andrew(St'kp't N)||Hamilton, W. W. (C'tral Fife)|
|Bidwell, Sydney||Hardy, Peter|
|Booth, Rt Hon Albert||Harrison, Rt Hon Walter|
|Bottomley, Rt Hon A.(M'b'ro)||Home Robertson, John|
|Bradley, Tom||Homewood, William|
|Buchan, Norman||Hooley, Frank|
|Callaghan, Rt Hon J.||Hoyle, Douglas|
|Callaghan, Jim (Midd't'n & P)||Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)|
|Campbell-Savours, Dale||Hughes, Roy (Newport)|
|Clark, Dr David (S Shields)||Jones, Barry (East Flint)|
|Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)||Jones, Dan (Burnley)|
|Cohen, Stanley||Kerr, Russell|
|Coleman, Donald||Kilroy-Silk, Robert|
|Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.||Lambie, David|
|Cook, Robin F.||Leighton, Ronald|
|Cowans, Harry||Lewis, Arthur (N'ham NW)|
|Cox, T. (W'dsw'th, Toot'g)||Lyon, Alexander (York)|
|Crowther, J. S.||Lyons, Edward (Bradf'd W)|
|Cryer, Bob||Mabon, Rt Hon Dr J. Dickson|
|Cunliffe, Lawrence||McCartney, Hugh|
|Cunningham, Dr J. (W'h'n)||McDonald, Dr Oonagh|
|Dalyell, Tam||McElhone, Frank|
|Davis, T. (B'ham, Stechf'd)||McKay, Allen (Penistone)|
|Deakins, Eric||McKelvey, William|
|Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)||Marks, Kenneth|
|Dixon, Donald||Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)|
|Dobson, Frank||Mason, Rt Hon Roy|
|Dormand, Jack||Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin|
|Douglas-Mann, Bruce||Maynard, Miss Joan|
|Dubs, Alfred||Mikardo, Ian|
|Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.||Millan, Rt Hon Bruce|
|Eastham, Ken||Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)|
|Edwards, R. (W'hampt'n S E)||Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)|
|English, Michael||Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)|
|Ennals, Rt Hon David||Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)|
|Evans, loan (Aberdare)||Morris, Rt Hon C. (O'shaw)|
|Evans, John (Newton)||Morton, George|
|Field, Frank||Newens, Stanley|
|Fitt, Gerard||O'Halloran, Michael|
|Flannery, Martin||O'Neill, Martin|
|Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)||Orme, Rt Hon Stanley|
|Foot, Rt Hon Michael||Palmer, Arthur|
|Forrester, John||Park, George|
|Foster, Derek||Parker, John|
|Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald||Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)|
|Garrett, John (Norwich S)||Prescott, John|
|Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)||Rees, Rt Hon M (Leeds S)|
|Richardson, Jo||Tilley, John|
|Robertson, George||Tinn, James|
|Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)||Wainwright, E.(Dearne V)|
|Rooker, J. W.||Walker, Rt Hon H.(D'caster)|
|Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)||Welsh, Michael|
|Sheerman, Barry||Whitehead, Phillip|
|Shore, Rt Hon Peter||Whitlock, William|
|Silverman, Julius||Wigley, Dafydd|
|Skinner, Dennis||Willey, Rt Hon Frederick|
|Soley, Clive||Williams, Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)|
|Stallard, A. W.||Williams, D.(Montgomery)|
|Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)||Winnick, David|
|Stott, Roger||Tellers for the Ayes:|
|Strang, Gavin||Mr. Frank Haynes and|
|Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley||Mr. James Hamilton|
|Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)|
|Adley, Robert||Hannam, John|
|Alexander, Richard||Haselhurst, Alan|
|Arnold, Tom||Hawkins, Paul|
|Atkins, Robert(Preston N)||Heddle, John|
|Atkinson, David (B'm'th,E)||Henderson, Barry|
|Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)||Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.|
|Beith, A. J.||Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)|
|Benyon, Thomas (A'don)||Holland, Philip (Carlton)|
|Berry, Hon Anthony||Hooson, Tom|
|Bevan, David Gilroy||Hordern, Peter|
|Biggs-Davison, John||Hunt, David (Wirral)|
|Blackburn, John||Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)|
|Bonsor, Sir Nicholas||Hurd, Hon Douglas|
|Bright, Graham||Jessel, Toby|
|Brinton, Tim||Jopling, Rt Hon Michael|
|Brittan, Leon||Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine|
|Brown, Michael(Brigg & Sc'n)||Knight, Mrs Jill|
|Bruce-Gardyne, John||Latham, Michael|
|Budgen, Nick||Lawrence, Ivan|
|Bulmer, Esmond||Le Marchant, Spencer|
|Butcher, John||Lester, Jim (Beeston)|
|Carlisle, John (Luton West)||Lloyd, Ian (Havant & W'loo)|
|Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)||Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)|
|Chapman, Sydney||Loveridge, John|
|Churchill, W. S.||Luce, Richard|
|Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)||Lyell, Nicholas|
|Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)||McCrindle, Robert|
|Colvin, Michael||Macfarlane, Neil|
|Cope, John||MacGregor, John|
|Costain, Sir Albert||McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)|
|Cranborne, Viscount||Major, John|
|Crouch, David||Marland, Paul|
|Dorrell, Stephen||Marlow, Tony|
|Dover, Denshore||Mates, Michael|
|Dykes, Hugh||Mather, Carol|
|Eggar, Tim||Mawby, Ray|
|Elliott, Sir William||Mellor, David|
|Eyre, Reginald||Meyer, Sir Anthony|
|Faith, Mrs Sheila||Mills, Iain (Meriden)|
|Fell, Anthony||Mills, Peter (West Devon)|
|Fenner, Mrs Peggy||Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)|
|Fisher, Sir Nigel||Moate, Roger|
|Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles||Molyneaux, James|
|Forman, Nigel||Montgomery, Fergus|
|Fowler, Rt Hon Norman||Morgan, Geraint|
|Fox, Marcus||Morris, M. (N'hampton S)|
|Goodhart, Philip||Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)|
|Goodhew, Victor||Murphy, Christopher|
|Goodlad, Alastair||Myles, David|
|Gow, Ian||Neale, Gerrard|
|Gower, Sir Raymond||Needham, Richard|
|Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)||Neubert, Michael|
|Greenway, Harry||Newton, Tony|
|Griffiths, E.(B'y St. Edm'ds)||Normanton, Tom|
|Griffiths, Peter Portsm'th N)||Onslow, Cranley|
|Grimond, Rt Hon J.||Osborn, John|
|Grylls, Michael||Owen, Rt Hon Dr David|
|Gummer, John Selwyn||Page, John (Harrow, West)|
|Hamilton, Hon A.||Page, Rt Hon Sir G. (Crosby)|
|Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)||Page, Richard (SW Herts)|
|Hampson, Dr Keith||Parris, Matthew|
|Patten, Christopher (Bath)||Steel, Rt Hon David|
|Patten, John (Oxford)||Stevens, Martin|
|Pawsey, James||Stradling Thomas, J.|
|Penhaligon, David||Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)|
|Prentice, Rt Hon Reg||Tebbit, Norman|
|Prior, Rt Hon James||Temple-Morris, Peter|
|Proctor, K. Harvey||Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)|
|Rathbone, Tim||Townend, John (Bridlington)|
|Rees-Davies, W. R.||Trippier, David|
|Renton, Tim||Viggers, Peter|
|Rhodes James, Robert||Waddington, David|
|Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon||Wainwright, R.(Colne V)|
|Roberts, Wyn (Conway)||Wakeham, John|
|Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)||Waller, Gary|
|Rossi, Hugh||Warren, Kenneth|
|Rost, Peter||Watson, John|
|Sainsbury, Hon Timothy||Wells, Bowen|
|Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)||Wheeler, John|
|Shelton, William (Streatham)||Whitney, Raymond|
|Sims, Roger||Wilkinson, John|
|Skeet, T. H. H.||Wolfson, Mark|
|Squire, Robin||Tellers for the Noes:|
|Stainton, Keith||Lord James Douglas-Hamilton|
|Stanbrook, Ivor||and Mr. Donald Thompson.|