Adjournment (Royal Wedding and Summer)

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 5:19 pm on 23 July 1981.

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Photo of Bernard Braine Bernard Braine , Essex South East 5:19, 23 July 1981

I would not normally oppose the motion that we adjourn for the Summer Recess. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have had a gruelling time during the past few weeks, and they need a respite. Indeed, the speech we have just heard, delivered with great sincerity and out of a deep concern for the situation in South London, reflected the strain which some hon. Members have had to bear.

There is, however, in my view, a compelling reason why the House should not rise before a clear statement is made by the Government on a matter that affects directly the safety of at least 34,000 of my constituents and also concerns public confidence in the quality of the advice given in this area to Ministers.

I make no apology for raising this matter, because if I remain silent and the House goes into recess for almost three months, there will be no means of compelling a Minister to explain his actions—or, in this case, his inaction—to Parliament, and a danger that could affect the safety of a very large number of people will be allowed to continue.

I shall be as brief as possible, because I wish to respect your request Mr. Deputy Speaker, but it is necessary to describe the background to the very serious charge I am making.

On Canvey Island, in my constituency, 34,000 people live next door to the largest concentration of gas, chemical and oil storage installations in the kingdom. I shall not recite the story of our long and bitter struggle to stop the destruction of our environment by the deliberate piling of hazard upon hazard in a confined area, in defiance of the wishes and the objections of the local people and their elected representatives. The House has heard me speak on that subject before. Suffice it for me to say that five years ago our plea seemed to have been heard.

The newly established Health and Safety Executive was asked to investigate the totality of the risks to which our people were exposed. The Health and Safety Executive's report, which was published in 1978, justified our worst fears by identifying a terrifying array of risks to health and safety—each serious enough in itself but compounded by its close proximity to others.

The report showed that the risks from gas, oil and chemical installations already operating in the area were undeniable, unacceptable, and would have to be reduced. These risks embraced the possibility of explosions rupturing storage tanks and causing burning liquids to reach people's homes, spreading fire and destruction en route; of escaping ammonia killing people; and of spillages of liquefied gas giving rise to clouds of flammable mixture that could ignite and explode either over the installations or over the residential area. The report demonstrated all too clearly the fact that in the event of an accidental release of gas, nothing could be done to prevent disaster.

The report dealt too with the possibility of collisions involving tankers carrying hazardous cargoes. Also, for full measure, it drew attention to the complex network of pipes crossing the area carrying liquefied gases and to the possibility of something going wrong with ammunition loading off the eastern tip of Canvey.

The report even revealed a risk that none of us knew existed, namely, the accidental release of highly toxic hydrogen fluoride, which can also kill people. Its most significant finding, however, was that the British Gas methane terminal, which receives 12,000 tons of liquefied natural gas every week and stores vast quantities of both LNG and LPG close to people's homes, constituted one-third of the total potential risk for the whole area.

The report made some suggestions for reducing those risks, not all of which, we have subsequently discovered, were practical. It also reached a conclusion that well-nigh destroyed the credibility of the Health and Safety Executive, namely, that when the HSE's suggested improvements had all been carried out and the level of risk reduced by about half, additional hazards in the form of oil refineries could be safely introduced to the island.

That was in 1978. Since then we have had several narrow escapes. There have been fires on tankers while discharging petrol and naphtha. We have had revealed the appalling neglect of elementary safety precautions at the methane terminal. It is almost unbelievable, but true, that at the very time that the Health and Safety Executive was advising the local authority not to allow, for the sake of safety, any additional planning permissions within a 1 km radius of the terminal, the management inside the terminal was taking risks with fundamental safety precautions. It was not until over a year later that the HSE tumbled to what was happening and served three enforcement notices. In my view, there should have been sackings.

Last summer saw the holding of a long-delayed public inquiry into the totality of the risks that the islanders face. It was presided over by an inspector, General Sir Richard Ward, who brought exceptional qualities of patience and understanding to a very difficult and complex hearing. His report, published in March this year, went right to the heart of the matter—although it has not yet been debated in this House—and for the first time the gravity of our position was exposed to full view. That report concluded, first, that such was the concentration of hazard in the area that no less than ¼ million people over a wide area of South Essex were at some risk.

Secondly, the report concluded that a major spill of LNG, LPG, hydrogen fluoride or ammonia could kill a great many people and that such a disaster would not only totally shock, but would totally undermine the country's confidence in planning and environmental policies where potentially dangerous installations were sited near built-up areas. Thirdly, the report concluded that the risk would remain very great in spite of the improvements that the Health and Safety Executive was determined to achieve, but that even after suggested improvements had been made the people of Canvey were confronted with nearly 10 times the chance of being killed by an accident from the installation than by being killed in a car crash. Fourthly, it was said that the methane terminal had a bad reputation and that there was no confidence that the necessary safety standards would be maintained, that British Gas witnesses were unconvincing, and that consideration should be given to closing down the terminal altogether.

No Government could possibly ignore such a report. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment acted with commendable speed. In a statement on 24 March he announced that a full inquiry would be held into the safety of the terminal, pending which decisions on planning permissions in respect of other hazardous industry would be suspended. That was a wise and timely decision that was warmly welcomed by everyone in South-East Essex, including the local authority.

In the meantime, however, British Gas announced its intention to reactivate the liquefied petroleum gas pipeline connecting the terminal with the oil installations to the west of the island, in Thurrock. The House can imagine our consternation in South-East Essex when we learnt that the HSE had advised my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment that it saw no reason to oppose this on grounds of safety. That advice, as I shall show, was contradictory, illogical and totally unacceptable to the people of Canvey and to me. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) is normally interested in matters connected with the Health and Safety Executive. I am glad to see that I have his sympathy and support.

Incredibly, the disposition of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment is to accept that advice, and for the past four months I have been battling with him. The time has now come to reveal to the House what has been happening and to demand a clear statement and firm decision before the House rises.

I make it plain that I am not just expressing an opinion. I base my argument on fact. The HSE report published only three years ago was quite categoric about the dangers of the LPG pipeline, along its entire length. On page 20 it states: A pipeline from the tanks crosses the area. In the opinion of the team, it would be possible for a substantial quantity of LPG to be released from any one of the three refrigerated storage tanks, giving rise to sufficient vapour to form a large cloud of flammable mixture that could ignite and explode, causing casualties in the vicinity of the terminal. While the pipeline from these tanks remains in commission, there is a chance of failure which could cause casualties. Here I should explain that the three storage tanks are on Canvey, and the passage I have quoted makes it quite plain that the danger was and is now on Canvey itself.

On page 27, the report recommends: Since it is no longer in use, the pipeline from the methane terminal containing liquefied petroleum gas could be emptied and taken out of service. This would effectively remove the potential hazard of explosion for those who live near the route of the pipeline". If the pipeline and the three storage tanks were considered a potential danger to people in 1978, when the former was not in use, how can the Health and Safety Executive advise that there will be no risk if it is reactivated now? What has happened in the interval to invalidate what was said in the HSE report? The conclusion is that either the report was wrong in 1978, in which case an explanation is long overdue, or it was right, in which case the advice that is now being given is wrong and should be rejected.

Only this afternoon, no doubt prompted by the fact that I was seeking to raise this matter on the Floor of the House, my hon. and learned Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Employment saw fit to send me a note to answer a point that I raised with him months ago. He argued that the report really meant to say that the danger was only where the pipeline ran close to the homes of people living in Stanford-le-Hope, many miles away to the west of Canvey, and since that section of the pipeline would not be reactivated there was no danger to the people of Canvey. That is complete and utter nonsense, as I have demonstrated.

In fact, a few months ago I pointed out to my hon. and learned Friend that the pipeline also ran close to homes on Canvey, but his advisers chose to fudge the issue by saying that on Canvey people were living further from the pipeline than they actually were. I had the distance checked by the local authority. I told the local authority: "This is what the Department is saying; please measure the distance." This was done. The Minister was wrong. Subsequently, my hon. and learned Friend wrote to me saying that he was sorry that he had been misinformed. What he had not grasped then, and what he has not grasped now, is that the situation on Canvey is such that, pending the outcome of the proposed inquiry into the future of the methane terminal, nobody has any moral right—neither the Government, British Gas., nor anyone else—to add the slightest additional risk to those that my constituents already face.

Since the Government have decided to delay all other planning decisions affecting hazardous industry on Canvey until the proposed inquiry into the closing down of the methane terminal takes place, it would be wholly reasonable not to proceed with the reactivation of the pipeline. Not only is the credibility of the Health and Safety Executive at stake, but also that of the Department of Employment. The HSE has not only contradicted itself but has assumed that no one will notice. It has gravely misjudged us in South-East Essex. This is not a game. It is a deadly serious matter affecting the safety of very many people.

There is, of course, the wider question of whether the blunders that the HSE has committed and seems hell-bent on continuing to commit, where Canvey is concerned, do not reveal a structural weakness in the Health and Safety Commission as well as its executive arm. The House may not know that the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act provided for a commission of nine members, but only eight have ever been appointed. It is high time that something was done to shake up this cosy arrangement, possibly by appointing to the vacancy a person who has at heart the interests not primarily of industry or the trade unions but of the public at large and who is a qualified safety expert.

I ask my right hon. Friend to note that the House has never debated the workings of the Health and Safety Commission since its inception. It is high time that it did so. I hasten to add that if this body did not exist, it would have to be created. I do not underestimate the value of the routine work that it has been carrying out over the country as a whole.

For the time being, however, I ask my right hon. Friend to give me an assurance that the Secretary of State for Employment will make a statement about the LPG pipeline before the House rises, and that, in the light of what I have said, he follows the lead already given by the Secretary of State for the Environment in regard to new hazardous undertakings and directs that British Gas does not proceed to reactivate the pipeline before the inquiry has been completed into the future of the terminal. Nothing less than that will satisfy me or my constituents.