Offshore Safety

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 5:55 pm on 6 November 1980.

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Photo of Mr Tam Dalyell Mr Tam Dalyell , West Lothian 5:55, 6 November 1980

I pestered the Leader of the House in May, June and July for this debate, so I am grateful to the Government for finding time for it. In no curmudgeonly spirit I say that we might want to return to the subject once again when the Norwegian inquiry has been published—which I believe will be in December. It was helpful of the Minister to place in the Library a guide to his acceptance or otherwise of the recommendations.

I make no apology for returning to the topic, which was so eloquently raised by the Opposition Front Bench and by my hon. Friends the Members for Dunfermline (Mr. Douglas), Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan) and Dundee, West (Mr. Ross). I refer to the minority report, which was discussed at Question Time on Monday. The Minister should understand that some of us feel deeply that an improper relationship is involved. Indeed, it is an incestuous relationship. The sponsoring Department has no business getting involved with health and safety.

I make no apology for going into this matter in some detail. Let us consider the Minister's argument. He said "Ah, we must understand that the majority of the Burgoyne committee was of the Government's view." I have friends on the Burgoyne committee, of whom Matt Linning is one. Each member of the committee is associated with the oil industry. Dr. Burgoyne is an oil industry consultant. Mr. Hildrew is managing director of Lloyds Register of Shipping. Professor McNaughton, Mr. Riddlestone and Dr. Weck are also experts in the oil industry.

There was no lay member or umpire on the committee. I am not insinuating that there necessarily should have been, but in the absence of a lay element it is doubly important that in a matter that overwhelmingly affects the trade unions special heed should be paid to what the trade union representatives said.

If the minority report had been accepted, would the arrangements affecing the civil servants involved be different? For example, if the minority report were accepted—not to put too fine a point on it—would it mean upheaval for certain civil servants living in the London area? The answer might be "No." I want a clear statement from the Government that they have not been suckled into rejecting the minority report because of the convenience of civil servants.

All I want at present is an assurance. My question is not rhetorical but genuine. There is a suspicion that part of the reason why the Government have not accepted the minority view and why pressure was put on the Burgoyne committee is that it did not suit civil servants to be inconvenienced.

The Minister said that workers on rigs live on top of one another, and that this presented difficulties. That is another reason for having a change of responsibilities.

I make no apology for going through certain points made by Mr. Miller and

Mr. Lyons. In paragraph 3 they state: a Government Department substantially responsible for the direction and control of an industry should not in any way be responsible for the standards and enforcement of occupational health and safety in that industry. We are entitled to ask for the general philosophy on this issue. I understand the Government's opinion on this subject to be contrary to what is almost a central belief. I am surprised that Ministers from the Department accepted the contravention of that principle.

I come next to paragraph 7. Secondly, the Bingham report on Sanctions Busting records that one of Beckett's assistants. Alan Gregory (later Chairman of BP Trading) asked Shell if information received on sanctions busting could be passed to the Under Secretary of the Commonwealth Office 'on a purely personal basis', so that if 'there were any further signs of Ministers wishing to sound off on this subject the appropriate discouraging noises could be made'. The suggestion here is that top civil servants failed to pass vital information to Ministers. Paragraph 8 states: The possibility of shared values and membership of closed groups amongst offshore managements can have tremendous implications for the independence of inspectors involved. It is our view that any unification of responsibilities under the auspices of the Department of Energy, as the sponsoring Department, entails a continuing risk, to the possible detriment of safety standards. With the certain growing economic and political significance of oil, this danger is unlikely to be reduced in the near future. As my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) and others have quite often said, there is a very quick transfer between the Department of Energy and outside bodies. I have had cause, in a case in my constituency, to be grateful to Ministers in relation to my constituent, Alan Blackshaw. But there are quite a number of civil servants, not only at permanent secretary level, who make a move out of the Department of Energy. I do not want to personalise this issue, but we have all seen the reports about Sir Jack Rampton going over to a key position in industry within a very short time.

It is in those circumstances that the Department, to protect its flank, must be seen to be whiter than white. I assure the Minister that, as he must know from his constituency of Ross and Cromarty, there has been enormous dissatisfaction about injuries in the North Sea and what has happened about them. There was a long case in the mid-1970s of a diver from Bathgate who lost his life. His family were far from satisfied about what happened after the accident. They may or may not be right, but it is insufferable that such dissatisfaction could be intertwined with the feeling that perhaps those in the industry in the North Sea are all in it together. Even if there was no cover up—I am not saying that in that case there was—it is of the utmost importance that it should be seen that there is a separate judgment by an outside organisation, as is taken for granted in the mining industry. In that industry it would be unthinkable to have this degree of cosiness.

I repeat that I am not saying that there was anything underhand or that there was a cover-up in that case. I say only from personal experience that it must be doubly clear that the organisation that is passing judgment on what did or did not happen in a tragic accident should be seen to be separate. There has been reference to my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott). I know that he and his union feel that equally strongly. I hope that he has a quick return to the House.

I come to paragraph 12 of the minority report, which states: No offshore safety committee visited by us has ever seen a PED inspector. PED told us they have never needed to meet safety committees or safety representatives offshore, or advise them of their visit offshore. That needs some explanation. I find it astonishing in the context in which it is put, and it provides another reason why the Government should handle this issue with kid gloves.

Paragraph 15 states: The vast majority of offshore accidents, including even many of the most technologically-celebrated ones, arise out of circumstances which would be perfectly comprehensible to an ordinary Factory Inspector. Indeed, the ' unique' aspects of offshore operations are frequently overstressed, a tendency probably exacerbated by the retention of direct and agency responsibility within a specialised Department. What was the Minister saying in his opening speech to the effect that this was all so complicated and technical that others could not pass judgment? My position here is like that of the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch). I have visited Alverstoke, which is the naval diving establishment, and I have also visited the establishment at Loch Linnhe, Fort William. I will pass on judgment on the latter, because I was impressed when I went there on 4 January 1979. I was totally surprised.

I just do not accept that all these judgments are so technically advanced that the Factory Inspectorate is not in a position to make the necessary kind of judgment.

Paragraph 18 states: One operator having experience in both Norwegian and United Kingdom sectors gave evidence to the Committee. This leading trans-national corporation found the Norwegian Inspectorate much 'tougher' than the 'weaker' United Kingdom system. Norwegian inspectors, for example, make sudden inspections, with legal rights to seize seats on helicopters without notice, unlike the United Kingdom situation where advance notice is given to the operator for access, with all that that implies. The operator, of course, prefers the United Kingdom system; especially the close relationships' enjoyed with the Department of Energy. The fact that in an official report both trade union representatives should state their belief that that was the situation, regardless of whether it was true, seems to me sufficient reason why the Government should be quite clear about separating the various organisations. On this, therefore, I simply say that the purpose of a second reading debate is surely to allow the Government to think again. There would be no loss of face. Ministers have heard my right hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) and several other Labour Members. They have heard the hon. Member for Canterbury, who has considerable industrial experience. How is it that we are all reiterating the same point? On this sort of matter the opinion of the House of Commons should be taken into account, so I leave the matter there.

I should like to go through other points that have been raised, and I quote here from page 2 of the briefing that was placed in the Library. In addition the pressure systems and well head equipment of each well are designed to take account of the particular geological specifications of the well. This information is made available in confidence to the Department of Energy by the operator and could not be passed on to the Certifying Authorities". I wish to know why it cannot be passed on to the certifying authorities. People at Heriot Watt want to ask the same question. At the bottom of the page it states: The Certifying Authorities are being asked to draw up minimum requirements for notification. The question arises of when that will be done, as it is an urgent matter.

Paragraph 6.11 states: Consideration should be given to a scheme of official approval of independent surveyors qualified to undertake specialised surveys, if required, on behalf of the Certifying Authorities. The Minister will recollect that that was one of the recommendations that he rejected. He said: It is considered that this would not be appropriate. Official approval of independent specialised surveyors to be employed by Certifying Authorities would detract from and confuse the latter's certification responsibilities. The experts on the Burgoyne committee did not think that there would be any confusion. They said: It … was suggested that the work of the Certifying Authorities could be facilitated if the Secretary of State were to grant and publish approvals of suitable specialist organisations to undertake specified surveys for the Certifying Authorities. I must return to the point on which I interrupted the Minister in his opening speech, namely, the evidence from the British Insurance Association. It states: Apart from the obvious commercial disadvantages, this policy has the following side effects:

  1. (a) In spite of being accepted as the country's main independent source of expertise, the engineering offices have lost the opportunity to participate in offshore-technology at the construction stage, to the detriment of both their own stature and the national confidence in the industry.
  2. (b) This in turn inevitably makes competition for future work both home and overseas all the more difficult.
  3. (c) Because of their long-established activity in the in-service/statutory inspection field, the engineering offices present an invaluable source of expertise which should be called on in the interests of safety in offshore installations. Lack of prior involvement at the pre-commissioning stages makes effective contribution in the in-service phase more difficult.
  4. (d) This continuing failure to draw on the country's main source of appropriate expertise must throw doubt on the efficacy of a system intended to ensure the operational safety of our installations in the face of an increasing public demand for greater measures to prevent losses.
We support steps which might lead to the imposition of specific requirements on Certifying Authorities to stipulate the need for independent inspection and certification of certain items by approved UK inspecting organisations. The engineering offices would be glad to cooperate in drawing up advice and guidelines to the Department both on the degree of inspection required and on the criteria for approval of inspecting organisations. I do not apologise for having read that, because it is crucial. It is a case that must be answered when the Minister replies tonight and not at a later stage.

Paragraph 6.13 states: UK civil and criminal law should be applied to vessels engaged in pipeline works and the problems of its application to attendant vessels should be thoroughly investigated". The Government replied: This will be examined in the wider context of consideration of the Law Commission's Report on the Territorial and Extra-Territorial Extent of the Criminal Law. There are however formidable difficulties in the way of extending UK law in general to foreign flag vessels. During the summer I talked to a number of people in the industry. They think that it is unacceptable that foreign flag vessels should not come under British law. Difficult though the lawyers may be, I do not believe that it is beyond the ingenuity of the Foreign Office lawyers—Sir Ian Sinclair and his colleagues—to find some way around that difficulty. I am asking Energy Ministers to tell their advisers and the legal Department of the Foreign Office "This is a must. It is a requirement from Government." We must be able to alter the law to cover foreign flag vessels.

Paragraph 6.19 states: Guidance should be given to Employers and Offshore Installation Managers on reconciliation of the conflict regarding their responsibilities introduced by the application offshore of the 1974 Act. The Government replied: These recommendations are being considered, but it may prove difficult to draw a clear distinction between the responsibilities of Employers and Offshore Installation Managers. What is the difficulty in drawing that distinction? There may be some difficulty, and I look forward to the Minister's reply. Some of us do not see any difficulty.

I return to a question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline. Paragraph 6.28 states: Regulations should be made as soon as possible for the control of occupational safety during offshore construction. The Government replied: The general duties of the Health and Safety at Work Act already apply and HSE has issued Guidance Notes. The need for Regulations will be reviewed in the light of experience in two years' time. I ask the question a second time—why should that take two years? Perhaps we have twice the chance of an answer.

I return to the central issue. I repeat my question: as it is almost the unanimous opinion of those who have spoken, other than the Government Front Bench, will the Government not think again, without any embarrassment and without any loss of face, and accept the view of the two trade union representatives on those issues on which the trade unions have a special right to have a determining say?