Defence Estimates 1980

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 6:31 pm on 29 April 1980.

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Photo of Sir John Langford-Holt Sir John Langford-Holt , Shrewsbury 6:31, 29 April 1980

We did not take evidence from the source that the hon. Gentleman mentions. All the contacts I have had—and no doubt those that other members of the Committee have had—with the shipping industry will tell the House that the Soviet merchant fleet has increased enormously in the past 15 or 20 years, and the same cannot be said of ours.

We also noted with regret that there seems to be a lack of offensive mine-laying capacity in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. It was mentioned earlier this afternoon that President Carter had considered using mines in the Persian Gulf area. It may well be that he would be most unwise so to do. But the United States forces' ability to do so would offer a course that is short of major global war. I hope that the Government will have more to say about that.

In our inquiry we paid considerable attention to the use of reserves and the possible use of women in the Services. My hon. Friend mentioned this afternoon—and the White Paper makes it equally clear—that it will be increasingly difficult to recruit the number of men required to bring our forces up to strength. I hope that the proposals which he made this afternoon will go a long way to help. For this reason, if for no other, we need to tap all our resources and make the greatest possible use of reserves and the women's branches of the Services to fulfil the tasks in hand.

We took no evidence on the subject of whether women should be used to carry arms, but we do believe that a more determined effort should be made to recruit women for and fit them into a wider range of duties than at present.

Our report makes a number of points about future purchases of equipment, on many of which decisions will have to be taken shortly. I will not reiterate the Committee's comments in this debate, but I stress the importance of the procurement of British-made equipment to British industry. The Ministry of Defence has a very difficult problem. It has to obtain the best equipment and do so at the lowest cost, whilst seeking, not only for economic reasons, to maintain and support home-based industry. It is near-impossible task.

To look for a moment at wider defence interests, because of the great strains on the defence budget we had to consider—and, indeed, the Government do the same—whether all the current commitments—the strategic nuclear force, the maintenance of British forces in Germany, the defence of the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas and the defence of the United Kingdom itself—could continue in their present form. We note that the Secretary of State did not rule out a change in these commitments if the burden becomes insupportable, but this would have to be done in consultation, and only in consultation, with our NATO allies.

At this stage, we did not disagree with the Government's view that the current commitments could be met, but we regard it as essential that these policies should continue to be assessed realistically so as to ensure that resources are commensurate with commitments.

We examined the statement of the Government in paragraph 409 of the White Paper that the Services should be able to operate effectively outside the NATO area without diminishing the central commitment to the Alliance. We have pointed out in our report that the Government are perhaps thereby seeking to assume wider responsibilities without adding any substantial extra resources. We have supported the planning for contingencies outside NATO and the anticipation of operational requirements, but we must have some doubts about actual firm commitments to action which must be made in addition to existing major NATO commitments, the resources for some of which are already severely stretched.

I should like to depart for the moment from the Select Committee's report to express a doubt of my own. The view of the Ministry of Defence is, I believe, that the best defence against one tank is another tank. The spearhead of a Warsaw Pact attack would be tanks; and on the NATO front the Warsaw Pact outnumbers us by three to one. Is it not right, therefore, to ask this question? Even if one tank is the best answer to another, is it true to say that one tank is the best answer to three tanks, even if the quality were equal? Would it not be well worth while to examine closely the possibility of using the huge reserve of intelligent and free manpower in Western Europe? These people will defend their homeland with dedication and with courage. They could perform this duty with a mass of anti-tank weapons, both guided and unguided.

It is worth remembering that for one tank we could buy either 150 anti-tank guided weapons or more than 1,000 man-portable unguided weapons. These, in whatever mix, could be used by reserves in their homeland who are trained in their use. There is no doubt that this would provide Europe with a defence displaying both flexibility and depth. It would stretch from the East German border to Cherbourg, and for not one foot of the way could an aggressive army feel safe, and any aggressor would think many times before launching his army into such a spiky scene. This would surely prove to be the greatest deterrent of all.

In conclusion, I should like, on behalf of the Committee, to welcome, as others have done, the improved form of the White Paper. It includes more information in a readable and well-presented manner, and we hope for further improvements along the same lines in the future. We recognise the current White Paper as an opportunity for a better and more informed debate on defence, which ought to be to the benefit of the House and probably—much more important—to the benefit of the public at large.