Power to Provide Constitution for Zimbabwe

Part of Clause 1 – in the House of Commons at 4:15 pm on 12 November 1979.

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Photo of Hon. Sam Silkin Hon. Sam Silkin , Southwark Dulwich 4:15, 12 November 1979

One must recognise that the Government face a very great difficulty here. Clearly the only true and effective way of deciding whether a settlement has the support of the people of Rhodesia as a whole would be by conducting a referendum such as that to which we have referred in amendment No. 17. Of course, I accept that in practice if one got the agreement of all the parties at Lancaster House, even though it might be possible for Mr. Smith to opt out in the end, one could assume from that that the agreement would have the support of the overwhelming mass of the people of Rhodesia generally.

4.30 pm

The agreement might not have the support of some white people but it will certainly have the support of black people. If we leave out of the equation the views of the Patriotic Front, whether its support is inside or outside Rhodesia, we leave out of account an unknown but considerable number of people. I am talking not about the possible effects of a civil war but about whether we succeed in achieving a settlement which has the support of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

It is quite clear that, unless all the people are involved in this—we might need a referendum or at least the agreement of all the parties—we cannot be sure that the conditions for a settlement will be satisfied. If we cannot be sure, I ask the Lord Privy Seal to give a clearer reply than heretofore about the Government's intentions. It is not sufficient to say that the Government will then have to consider what should be done because the right hon. Gentleman should know now what can and should be done.

Will the Government say that if they do not have the sine qua non—the conditions which are absolutely essential for a settlement in accordance with the principles of the Security Council mandatory resolution—therefore nothing further can be done? Will the Government test the matter through a referendum, as is suggested in amendment No. 17? If it is not so tested, what will be done? Will there be an imposed solution notwithstanding that there is no clear evidence of the agreement of the people of Rhodesia as a whole? That would flout not only the mandatory resolution but the six principles and thus run into the enormous danger of civil war, the advent of which has been painted, and not over-painted, in such striking terms.

I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to be perfectly honest, as I know he wants to be, and to tell us exactly what the Government have in mind if those unhappy circumstances, which we all hope will not occur, do occur.