House of Commons (Refreshment Facilities)

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 26 March 1979.

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Photo of Mr Fred Mulley Mr Fred Mulley , Sheffield Park 12:00, 26 March 1979

The hon. Member should follow the logic of his own argument. One would have complete international disarmament only if the Soviet Union and her allies were equally disarmed, with verifiable arrangements. I should have though that that was a wholly desirable objective.

To achieve this level of deterrence does not require NATO to match the Warsaw Pact tank for tank, gun for gun and aircraft for aircraft, but if we are to sustain the credibility of our deterrent posture, the Alliance must have enough forces to fulfil the strategy of forward defence and flexible response. It must be able to convince any potential aggresssor that the risks of any aggression, at any level, are simply not worth taking.

But it is no part of NATO policy to engage in an arms race in Europe. On the contrary, the Western aim is to reduce the level of military potential in Europe through balanced and verifiable arms control which would provide the same level of security for all. Both sides in the MBFR negotiations are agreed that the objective should be to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. We are working for an agreement which would achieve approximate parity, at a lower level, between the forces which NATO and the Warsaw Pact maintain in central Europe.

A successful MBFR agreement on these lines, coupled with the new strategic arms limitations agreement which we hope will shortly be concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, will offer the prospect of a firm foundation for our future security.

I said last year that the key to the MBFR negotiations was the achievement of an agreed assessment with the Eastern side on manpower data. A further year of negotiations has not achieved this, despite the very considerable efforts made by the Western side to find the source of the discrepancy between the figures tabled by the Eastern side and our own estimates of Eastern forces. We will continue to press the East to make a constructive response to our questions on data.

There is, unfortunately, no sign that the Soviet Government and their Warsaw Pact allies intend to reduce their military expenditure. In fact, it continues to rise, and this extra money is almost entirely devoted to the improvement of the quality of their weapons and equipment. This continues to be a matter of great concern to the Alliance.

Faced with these Warsaw Pact improvements, NATO has no alternative but to improve its own forces and devote additional resources to defence, if a credible defensive strategy is to be maintained. The only alternative—which would be quite unacceptable—would be to revert to the old tripwire strategy of deterrence by the threat of massive strategic nuclear retaliation against an attack of whatever kind. The Alliance has rightly rejected this course. Instead, it has agreed to the long-term defence programme, to which I have already referred, which consists of a number of measures intended to improve the readiness and capability of NATO forces in order to strengthen their deterrent posture and to meet the defence needs of the next decade. Britain is playing her full part in these measures, many of which will produce benefits to the Alliance out of all proportion to their cost.