STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

Part of Oral Answers to Questions — Defence – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 20 March 1979.

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Photo of Mr Ronald Murray Mr Ronald Murray , Edinburgh Leith 12:00, 20 March 1979

The hon. Member for Edinburgh, West raised a number of other points. The next point that I can properly take up is the time limit of one month which is mentioned in clause 1. clause 1. Perhaps the clearest way to deal with this is to point out that the time limit of one month, which first appears in clause 1(1), is related to the time which is covered by the emergency period.

The provision at the beginning of clause 1(1) states: This Act shall cease to be in force one month after the date prescribed by the Secretary of State by order made by statutory instrument ". Therefore, in regard to what one might call problems of re-entry—getting back to normal after the emergency period after the strike has been settled and so on—the extent of time covered by this is a matter for the Secretary of State to take into account in the statutory instrument which he will issue in due course.

For example, the strike could end in a week's time, but it may be that the points which the hon. Gentleman had in mind would require the Secretary of State to consider a delay of one month before putting forward a statutory instrument. That would require a further period of one month before the Bill itself would lapse. Therefore, the flexibility which the hon. Gentleman thought was desirable is built into clause 1(1).

The hon. Gentleman then asked about the fiscal concession about which the Minister of State had told him in reply to a written question. In particular, he asked whether the concession made in regard to the transitional relief time limit would be extended to other fiscal time limits. I understand that the answer is, in general,"Yes"in cases where there are court proceedings and where court proceedings have led to prejudice by virtue of the strike of court personnel; in other words, where there are relevant court proceedings and where there has been some prejudice due to delay.