Qualifying Bodies

Part of Clause 12 – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 8 July 1976.

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Photo of Mr Mark Carlisle Mr Mark Carlisle , Runcorn 12:00, 8 July 1976

I have listened to the debate while mainly waiting to hear a later debate on the effect of the Bill on clubs. Having listened to what has been said, I ask the Home Secretary to consider whether this subsection is not wildly and unnecessarily wide in its terms.

I was not very impressed by the Home Secretary's justification—the fact that a similar section appears in an Act passed by his own Government, from the same Department and the same Home Secretary, last year. It does not seem necessarily correct to say that because this provision was in the Sex Discrimination Act which he introduced and which was not opposed at the time it is therefore wrong that it should be opposed on this occasion.

As I understand it, the Bill is concerned with attempting to deal with discrimination against minority groups. In principle, unlike some of those who have spoken in the debate, I tend to support the aim behind the Bill—the need to prevent discrimination so as to ensure that there is equality of opportunity for all people in this country irrespective of the colour of their skins.

However, surely the Home Secretary would agree that this subsection has nothing to do with avoiding discrimination against coloured minorities. It is a means of adding an additional form of penalty upon anyone who, at any stage and at any time, apparently, appears to have been involved, innocently or otherwise, in any form of discrimination.

I would not go as far as my hon. Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) in my main objection. However, it seems to me that the subsection is totally otiose, unnecessary and in principle somewhat unattractive. As I understand it, what it says is that any professional body, when required to look at a person's character, shall be required to take note of or to have regard to anything in his past, or the pasts of those who have been his agent or his employee, involved with the practice of discrimination.

This provision goes extremely wide. The Home Secretary said that it was right that a body should take note of a persistent history of discrimination. He may be right. A persistent history of discrimination practised by an individual might be suitable matter on which a professional body could decide that the person in question was not of good character and was unsuitable for membership of that body. But, surely, that is a matter for that body.

The Bill does not say that a persistent history of discrimination by an individual may make him unsuitable for membership of some other body. It says that that body shall be required to have regard to any evidence tending to show that not necessarily that individual but his agents or employees have at some stage been involved in the practice of discrimination. The phrase "shall have regard to" may give undue prominence to that evidence when the tribunal is assessing the character of the individual. It would be far better to leave it to the good sense of the tribunal.

The tribunal or body required by law to consider a person's good character is bound to take account of evidence of past discrimination by his employees or agents, even if the person resented the discrimination and his decision to leave his employment and join another body may have been caused by his revulsion against that discrimination. A person's employees may insist on practising discrimination in deciding whom to accept as fellow members of a work force. If he resented it, left his job and applied to join a body or authority for which his character had to be assessed, the evidence of his previous job would have to be taken into consideration against him.

It is extraordinary that the Bill refers to the need to have regard to any evidence tending to show that a person committed any act of discrimination, whether past or present, at a time when, with the blessing of the Home Secretary, the House recently passed the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, which specifically provides that a man applying for a job need not disclose that he has had a criminal conviction provided that it was more than two years ago.

If I am convicted of fraud and serve a sentence of up to two years' imprisonment, there will come a time when I shall be able to apply to become a member of a body which requires an assessment of my character, and I shall not have to disclose or answer any questions about the fraud for which I served a term of imprisonment. If I did not go to prison, I should not have to admit the offence three years after I committed it. That same body will be required to take note of evidence from perhaps 20 years ago of the commission of an act which can be said to be an act of discrimination.

That is wildly out of proportion. An act of discrimination is to last for the rest of a person's life, whereas a criminal offence is to be forgiven if he has been of good character for two, five or 10 years. If I am right in my understanding of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, that is another argument why the right hon. Gentleman may feel that the clause is unduly wide in its interpretation.