I must confess some surprise at the remarks of the right hon. and learned Member for Aberavon (Mr. John Morris) in opening this debate for the Opposition when he spoke about Westland helicopters. Has he forgotten the deliveries to South Africa of the Puma helicopters in the joint Anglo-French project which took place during the tenure of the Labour Government of which he was a member? I wonder what consultations took place then with the Nigerian Government of the day.

I welcome the heavy hint about the naval version of the Harrier given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence. I accept that it may not be appropriate to make an announcement at this stage, but there will be a widespread welcome that at last we are coming to the point of decision on what could be an important export winner. I accept my right hon. Friend's strictures to the effect that it is not possible immediately to evaluate the lessons to be learned from the recent conflict in the Middle East. Nevertheless, I should like to offer a few observations as one who makes no pretension to any military expertise.

At the root of this conflict is seen the hand of the Soviet Union. This was a view put forward forcibly by the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman). It is difficult for us to comprehend the volume of equipment pumped into this theatre of war, for such it is, by the Soviet Union. In the period since the war of June 1967, 3,800 tanks have been delivered by the Soviet Union to Egypt and Syria alone, leaving aside Algeria, Iraq and other countries nearby. In addition, the Soviet Union has sent to Egypt and Syria nearly 1,000 front-line tactical fighter aircraft of the highest sophistication, and large quantities of missiles—not only anti-aircraft missiles but also the soft-target surface-to-surface Scud missiles with a range of 160 miles—which means that even from the West side of the Suez Canal they can reach within 30 miles of Tel Aviv. This is something which clearly will have a substantial bearing on any question of the future of the Sinai in the event of an Israeli withdrawal.

It must be clear that no peace settlement in the Middle East can survive such an unrestricted injection of weapons of war into this area. The level of delivery by the Soviet Union to the Arab States has been running at more than three-to-one the rate of United States resupply to Israel.

A second lesson of which we would do well to take note is that surprise attacks can come like thunderbolts out of a blue sky. It is very much the basis of NATO strategy that there will be a period of tension of several weeks before we need be at a high level of readiness. This is something that can no longer be indefinitely relied upon.

Various speeches have dealt with the problem of how the new missiles introduced by the Soviet Union into the Middle East conflict may affect the situation in Central Europe and indeed the future of the fighter bomber and the tank. It is clear that the SAM missiles supplied by the Soviet Union were in no way decisive in this conflict. The Israeli Air Force attributes no more than 10 per cent. of its losses, which total approximately 100, to SAM 6. The overwhelming number were lost to heavy concentrations, literally in their thousands, of quadruple 23 mm, 37 mm and 57 mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as SA2's, SA3's and the SA7 Strela missiles launched in salvoes of eight from tracked vehicles—a modification of the single-shot version, which appeared in North Vietnam.