I believe that most of us welcome the Bill. However, many of us go along with what has been said by both sides of the Committee, namely, that we ought not to exaggerate what we are doing, or the extent to which we greet the Bill.

In some respects, the isolation or the bringing out of biological weapons from the generality of the past is a disquieting development. Many of us take the view that the original all-embracing character of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was the right approach to the problem, but there have been scientific developments since then which mean that the range of weapons in this area has markedly increased. It has, therefore, become possible to make the sort of Division that we are making in the Bill, and upon which the convention that it seeks to ratify is based.

It is true that what we are seeking to do now is to say that we shall not do that which we have no intention of doing, at the cost of continuing to be able to do something that we know we ought not to do but think we might do. That, I fear, is precisely what the nations of the world are getting together to do in this agreement. It would pay us to see whether it would be possible to persuade the Government that the Bill ought to go rather farther than it does.

There are difficulties in this, because the Bill presently seeks to ratify the convention as it is. It would be possible, if the Government were so minded, to go further than merely ratifying the convention and say that we shall not merely ratify what we have to, but that we shall take further steps as an example to others.

Were the Government minded to do that, would it be possible? The Foreign Office believes that it would, but the trouble here is the Ministry of Defence. I regret that it is not represented here this morning. I have some experience of arguing with Government representatives in various Departments over the years as a supporter of the Committee on Chemical and Biological Warfare. In that capacity I have discovered that when talking to representatives on the Foreign Office, Ministers from either side of the House, or officials of the Department closely concerned, one is talking the same language. One has the sense that they share the concern and alarm about this and would like to reach satisfactory international arrangements in order to get rid of it.

Unfortunately, that does not apply to the Ministry of Defence. One feels that the Ministry of Defence is of the opinion that it should hang on to the biological weapon. That is at the heart of the whole trouble. Basically, that criticism probably applies to Ministries of Defence and Foreign Offices all over the world. There are those who have the weapon and are determined to hold on to it, or to hold on to the possibility of using the weapon in case they are attacked. That is the defence mentality. The Foreign Office mentality sees its duty, quite properly, as that of reaching an agreement, as a result of which these weapons will no longer exist, thereby removing the raison d'être of the Ministry of Defence. One can understand why this inherent conflict exists between Foreign Office and Defence departments.

The Government have the duty of deciding where the interests of this country lie between those two Departments. I am not suggesting that it would be different if the Government changed, but it is convenient to decide that that is the point of the convention and not to go beyond that.

I do not know the Swedish Government's position in this matter. The Swedes are refusing to ratify the convention because, quite rightly, they say that it does not go far enough. It would be possible for the Swedish Government, if they chose, to say that they will ratify the convention but that they will opt out in terms of chemical as well as biological weapons.

It would be possible for a Conservative or a Labour Government to take up that position, too. I hope that when my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr. Judd) winds up on this debate he will say that a future Labour Government will not be satisfied with a convention of this sort and that we shall want to go much further and prohibit all chemical and biological weapons even though they are scientifically much more spread than they were originally envisaged under the 1925 Protocol.

The interpretation of the range of the 1925 Protocol has changed over the years. Originally, in 1925, it was intended to be all-embracing, and was interpreted as being so by, for example, Mr. Arthur Henderson. I do not have chapter and verse for that, but it will be generally recognised that that was the case. The chief reason for the breakdown of the concept of the 1925 Protocol as being all-embracing in this area was probably the invention of CS gas.

It is sad that it was this country that decided that CS gas was not to be included in the 1925 Protocol. We said that CS gas was useful, that it could be used usefully in Northern Ireland, and that it could be used as a smoke. It was described as a smoke and excluded from the Geneva Protocol.

That rather simplified statement covers what has happened to undermine the general proposition that the 1925 Protocol was all-embracing and not in need of the sort of interpretation outlined in the Bill. Had we hung on to the idea that the intention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol was to ban everything in this area there would have been no need for the sort of definition that we are deciding upon now. There would have been no need to separate chemical from biological, and so on, nor to say that we can abjure this which we do not think we can use, but not abjure that which we think we might use. It is not a noble position in which to find ourselves, and our rejoicing this morning should be modified.

I hope that we can improve the Bill in Committee. One can increase the range of a Bill in Committee to suit one's desires. It is not only possible to modify a Bill, but clauses can be added to extend the range of a Bill beyond the limits laid down, and I hope that we shall do that.

The 1930 Labour Government made their position clear about the protocol. They said that it prohibited the use in warfare of asphyxiating poisonous and other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices"— which is about as all-embracing as it can be, and that— the use in war of other gases, including lachrymatory gases (i.e. chemical irritants) was also prohibited. That was the interpretation in 1930, and it was unfortunate that that interpretation was changed later, because it seems to me that it was from that point that the gradual interpretive process stemmed.

I said that I had always found the Foreign Office ready to discuss these matters, and I should like to ask the Minister whether the Government's position is that described to the Select Committee on Chemical and Biological Warfare on 4th July 1972, when Mr. Summerhayes of the Foreign Office summarised the British position by saying that Her Majesty's Government wished to see a comprehensive ban on the production and stockpiling of "C" weapons—that is to say, chemical as well as biological weapons. I am not holding Mr. Summerhayes responsible for this, because it is an interpretation of what he is supposed to have said on that occasion, but if it is true—and I believe it is—that the Government's position still is that although we are now ratifying only the treaty on biological weapons their ambition is to have an all-embracing treaty, I hope the Minister will say whether the Government want to extend the intentions and effects of the Bill beyond the point to which it currently goes. If the Minister says that, it might persuade the Committee to take an immediate step rather than leave it until some other occasion.

We should emulate the Canadian Government. They are total in their view on the issue. They say that they have never possessed any biological weapons, nor any chemical weapons other than devices of the type used for crowd or riot control.

Here again we come to the CS exception, even in Canada which takes a more total view of this than some other Governments. They say: Canada does not intend at any time in the future to use chemical weapons in war, or to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile such weapons for use in warfare, unless these weapons should be used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its allies. The latter condition is in accordance with the reservations Canada entered at the time of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol". Thus, even Canada, which takes a progressive view on this matter, makes those reservations. As long as countries make such reservations it will be difficult for us to obtain an effective unilateral and enforceable agreement.

I end by echoing the words of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who said that the question of banning chemical weapons is at the forefront of the agenda for the present session of the conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I earnestly hope that it will be possible to reach an agreement on the subject in the near future.

I should like to think of the proposals before us this morning as an interim agreement—a step on the way. If they are not a step on the way to a total attitude to the whole range of chemical and biological weapons, they could be the opposite, namely, a decision which, by isolating something which we do not and cannot feel, leads us to accept chemical weapons as a part of the armoury of mankind.

It is of vital importance this morning for the Government to state that this is a step towards total prohibition, and does not amount to a release of the alternative chemical weapon which the Government wish to embrace. If the Government are able to say that they hope to move rapidly towards a more prohibitional attitude, the Opposition will not recommend that we divide on Second Reading and will see what can be done to enhance, strengthen and improve the Bill in Committee.