I am obliged for that reminder, Mrs. Jeger, which was no doubt intended for recalcitrant Tory Members, who will have plenty to grumble about.

We are now discussing the enshrinement in our law of a weapons treaty. As tong ago as July 1968, even before the written memorandum was submitted, the British representative at the disarmament conference first put forward the suggestion that there might be a Division between chemical and biological warfare in order to get some focus on the latter.

That was followed by a working paper in August 1968 which laid down the guidelines for an approach to this subject. It is worth bearing in mind that the suggested approach did not, at that stage, command universal international acceptance, and it is a great tribute to Her Majesty's Government—of both parties—that they have worn down the Opposition and belief that the Geneva Protocol is the last word on the subject.

Welcome though the Bill is, it contains a number of weaknesses, most of which are possibly the result of weaknesses in the original treaty and its drafting, but some of which are inherent in the drafting of the Bill itself. I hope that when the Under-Secretary of State replies to the debate he will deal with them.

The first weakness of the treaty, and therefore of the Bill, is in the definition section. The Minister was good enough to give us a definition of what he meant by a "toxin". All that the definition part of Clause 1 does is to reproduce what is said in the convention itself, without attempting to define further what is meant. It is my belief that that may have the effect of encouraging States either to put a restrictive interpretation upon the meaning of the treaty, or to claim an exception to the ban, unless "biological agent" and "toxin" are more closely defined.

In Committee my hon. Friends and I shall seek to insert a better definition of "biological agent" and "toxin" with the commonly accepted intention of making it clear to the world where Britain stands, what view we take of our obligations, and what view we take of the weapons and agents that are included in the Bill. So far as I can see, there is no inhibition against our doing that. Ratification of the treaty to make clear where we stand and what agents we believe should be within the Bill will be a valuable step forward and a further portent of British sincerity in this matter. The World Health Organisation attempted such a definition of biological agents some time ago.

The second weakness in the Bill is also in the treaty. It is in the wording of Clause 1(1)(a) which merely bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of any biological agent or toxin of a type and in a quantity that has no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes". "Prophylactic" clearly deals with immunisation, and so on, against disease. "Protective" is apparently explained in the convention to mean the development of defensive counter-measures such as masks, clothing, and so on, to counteract any possible biological effects.

One of the great omissions from the Bill, certatinly in the view of most commentators who have submitted written commentories upon the treaty, is research work. The reference to protective or other peaceful purposes", together with the omission of the research prohibtion, means that there will be continued research into biological agents and testing in both the laboratory and in the field, and that will be lawful within the definition of this treaty.

This is, therefore, only a partial success, and it points to the further weakness that one can never be sure where defensive measures stop and offensive uses start. The development of biological agents from the point of view of taking defensive measures against them also has within it the capacity to use those biological agents as offensive weapons should the need arise.

The Minister will no doubt say that the treaty also seeks to ban any weapon or delivery system, but, at any rate according to American scientific articles, it is admitted that the United States has conceded that its delivery systems for biological weapons are no different from delivery systems for more conventional weapons. If, therefore, a State were malign enough, it could seek to evade the issue because of the vagueness of the treaty. The treaty as drafted does not go far enough and is too imprecise, and I think that the Government should try to go further and lay it down that no biological agents or toxins shall be developed which are not strictly necessary for prophylactic and protective purposes.

The third weakness, as I think the Minister will readily concede, is that in the present state of international relations no system of verification of the treaty is laid down. Even before the treaty was announced, the United States had made a unilateral renunciation of biological weapons and had turned Fort Detrick into a cancer research laboratory. Britain announced at that time—I think it was in 1969—that she had no biological weapons, and had no intention of acquiring any.

The trouble in international affairs is that doubt and suspicion have always outweighed—and probably always will—the amount of mutual trust existing between nations. The Minister mentioned France and China as non-ratifiers of the treaty. I accept that France has introduced domestic legislation, but the non-ratification by those two countries is a serious gap, particularly in the case of China. It is a serious gap in the international solidarity on this issue, and as that gap exists doubts must occur all round.

In an article in July 1972 in the United States publication Science, and in a further article in the New Scientist in December 1972, doubts were expressed about whether, for example, the United States had lived up to the bald statement that had been made about the renunciation of biological weapons; because after that announcement it was said the army Institute of Infectious Diseases had received a 50 per cent. increase in its budget for research, the inference being that potential biological agents were being researched in a country that had apparently unilaterally renounced biological weapons.

May I suggest what the Government should do in this debate to allay fears in this country? There is no doubt that Britain is doing research and has research laboratories which have attracted the attention of hon. Members and others from time to time. I appeal to the Government to be as candid as they can be about the effect of the laboratories in Britain and their proposals for what is to be done with them if the Bill becomes law. If the doubts of a country's elected representatives cannot be resolved internally, then our chances of international agreement are weak.

I have dealt with the weaknesses in the treaty and where, in my opinion, it has led to weaknesses in the Bill. I now turn to the Bill itself. I take issue on one point with the Minister. I yield to no one in my abhorrence of the weapons concerned and my support for the measures being introduced, but my reading of Clause 1(3) is not that there should be a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, but that there shall be a fixed penalty of life imprisonment, which is very different. However horrifying any weapon is, and however heinous the crime of creating it, there must be room in any Act of Parliament for flexibility for recognising degrees of guilt.

Let me give an example. Obedience to orders is no defence to a charge of having committed a crime, but we would fall into a great error if we were to suppose that the corporal or sergeant, or whoever carried out orders, was as culpable as the man who devised the evasion and gave the orders. I believe that we should, as we did in the Genocide Act, provide some flexibility.

The Minister will recall that in the Genocide Act there is a clear division when genocide has caused killing and when the offence might potentially have done so. In the former, a sentence of life imprisonment is reserved. In the latter, the sentence is 14 years' imprisonment.

I appeal to the Government to consider this again to see whether there can be greater flexibility in the punishment of those who, on any view of the matter, are morally less responsible than others for the development of these weapons.