Rhodesia

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 8 November 1973.

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Photo of Sir Alec Douglas-Home Sir Alec Douglas-Home , Kinross and West Perthshire 12:00, 8 November 1973

I beg to move, That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1973, a draft of which was laid before this House on 18th October, in the last Session of Parliament, be approved. The purpose of the order is to continue in force for a further year Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which gives Her Majesty in Council power to take whatever measures are necessary to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia brought about by the unilateral declaration of independence. Among the Orders in Council made under the section are, of course, those containing the various sanctions measures.

It is disappointing that, after so many years, it remains necessary to make a continuation order yet again. But I am convinced that, in the circumstances, it is right and necessary, and I shall explain briefly why I think that is so.

When the report of the Pearce Commission was published last year, I told the House that we ought to provide time for the people of Rhodesia to reflect on their future. I said that I hoped that there would be consultations between the races in an effort to reach agreement among themselves. While it is, naturally, frustrating to us here in Britain that progress in this direction has been so slow, nevertheless some progress has been made. The situation now is noticeably different from what it was a year ago, and this is certainly not the moment to give up hope.

It is important to keep clearly in mind what our objectives are and what is the goal we wish to reach. I doubt whether anyone would dispute my description of the goal which we wish to reach—the creation of the conditions in which an act of legislation would bring Rhodesia into a legal relationship with Britain again and once more into the community of nations. To that end we must be able to give Rhodesia independence in a form which will be broadly acceptable to the people of Rhodesia, black and white. A settlement which does not command that support will not last. I believe that this is increasingly being accepted inside Rhodesia, by Rhodesians, African and European.

For this reason, we have concluded that the best, and indeed the only practical, course at this stage is for Rhodesians themselves to try to work out their own solutions to their own problems. I do not, after all these years, underestimate the difficulty of the task which confronts them. This is a country in which there have not been political contacts between black and white on any substantial scale. Perhaps we should not be surprised. After all, we have a parallel in Northern Ireland on our own doorstep. But I believe that they are now making a real effort to tackle this problem. We remain ready to help as and when we can, but meanwhile the important point is that we should do nothing here in Britain which might make yet more difficult the task of creating a constitution by Rhodesians for Rhodesians.

I have seen it suggested in Rhodesia that Britain is no longer interested in achieving a settlement. I do not know why it should be thought that it could be to Britain's advantage to continue one day longer than is necessary the present unsatisfactory state of affairs. At any rate I should like to dismiss any such idea lest it linger on and gain currency. We are as determined as we ever were, in spite of the difficulties, to see a satisfactory settlement in Rhodesia achieved. Measures which get us only half way there will not do. But the British Government remain committed to achieving a settlement in Rhodesia in accordance with the five principles to which we have always adhered

Therefore, how do we help the Rhodesians to get a settlement? One question is how far the 1971 proposals should stay in the picture. That will be for discussion and decision between the those who are talking in Rhodesia. All I need to say is that they contained very valuable advances on the present Rhodesian constitution—for example, a justiciable Declaration of Right, a commission to investigate and recommend on the elimination of racial discrimination, improvements in the franchise system related to membership of the Parliament, and progress towards a common roll and towards majority rule. These advantages should not be lost. It must be for Rhodesians, European and African alike, to see what they wish to keep and how they want to add to those elements in those proposals which were to their advantage.

While these processes of discussion go forward in Rhodesia, our task in Britain at this stage is to hold the ring so that there is the least possible disturbance to them from outside—whether from Britain, the United Nations or other African countries and organisations. It is in this context that the discontinuance or maintenance of sanctions has to be decided. Their impact is indecisive in political terms, but there can be no doubt that if they were lifted there would be so strong an emotional reaction inside and outside Rhodesia that thoughts about a settlement in that country would come to an abrupt end.

I have often been asked by the Opposition whether sanctions can be made to bite any harder. Certainly there is room for improvement in the performance of a number of other countries. Some of the major trading nations have recently shown an interest in improving their domestic controls. It has been suggested—I think by the right hon. Member for Cardiff South-East (Mr. Callaghan)—that we should raise the subject of sanctions breaking in the EEC Council of Ministers. I have considered this, but breaches of sanctions are invariably action taken by individual companies in individual countries. Every member of the community has legislation under which sanctions are imposed. When we receive an indication that a breach of sanctions may have occured, as well as informing the committee of the United Nations which is set up to deal with these matters, we bring it to the notice of the Government of the country concerned. That is the only authority which can have influence on the firm which may be breaking sanctions. That is the right way to handle these matters, directly with the Governments who are responsible for the application in their own countries.

I said earlier that the situation in Rhodesia had changed—