Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 31 October 1973.
Mr Julian Amery
, Brighton, Pavilion
12:00,
31 October 1973
The time is very short and I must get on. No doubt I shall be dealing with the hon. Gentleman's point a little later.
Let me turn to the main theme of the debate, which has dealt with the problems which have arisen in the past few weeks and which were mentioned by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East and also by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Dr. David Owen), in a remarkable contribution. I refer to the problems that bear on Anglo-American and European-American relations. On the question of the alert the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East said that the principle should be that the United States should give notice to the United Kingdom if it wants to use its bases in the United Kingdom for any purpose which might endanger us and that we must be free to withhold our permission. That is the position now, and it is the position which was defined by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister yesterday.
The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton said that the embargo, the use of British bases, including Cyprus, and the ceasefire proposals in the Security Council were important not so much in themselves as in their bearing on Anglo-American relations. We discussed the embargo thoroughly last week, and I need not return to that. The United States never asked to be allowed to use the bases in this country or Cyprus for the movement of supplies to Israel, so no question of refusal ever arose.
The question of the cease-fire proposal in the Security Council was prominently mentioned in one of the newspapers this morning. It was suggested to us that we might table a resolution. We were satisfied that such a resolution would not be accepted by the two belligerent parties, and an inquiry by our American friends confirmed that our original judgment had been right.
The Leader of the Opposition left me under the impression yesterday that he thought there had been insufficient consultation between us and the American Government. I do not think that that is so. We have an extremely capable Ambassador in the person of Lord Cromer, to whom I pay tribute. My right hon. Friend saw Dr. Kissinger not only when he passed through London the other day but at a meeting of the United Nations quite recently. There is close contact between us, closer perhaps than is sometimes understood. After the Cuban crisis we were sometimes taunted by those who said "Although you are a nuclear Power, you did not have much influence in this crisis." I suspect that it was only when the last volume of Mr. Macmillan's memoirs were published recently that people realised how close consultation had been.
In discussing these matters with our American friends, we are dealing with an extremely complex situation. There are two distinct but sometimes converging adversary relationships. There is the adversary relationship of Israel and her Arab neighbours, and there is the adversary relationship of East and West. The adversary relationship between Israel and the Arab countries has its own distinct historical origins. The position of all British Governments from the very beginning, even going back to the Mandate, has been even-handed, and as long as it remains a purely Arab-Israel problem that should be our position. But in the adversary relationship between East and West we are four-square with the United States. There is no doubt about it.
Sometimes the adversary relationship of the Arabs and Israelis converges with the East-West adversary relationship, as it did after the 1967 war, and some might even think before that war.
It has been argued for some time that the Egyptian Government for one were anxious not to be wholly dependent upon the Soviet Union, and that was confirmed to the world with the expulsion or sending home of the Soviet advisers and forces who were established in Egypt in large numbers after the 1967 war.
We believed when the last outbreak of fighting occurred that it was not an East-West conflict but an Israel-Arab conflict. It may be that as a result of the war there is again a degree of convergence, but we still think that it is the wish, certainly of at least two of Israel's Arab neighbours, and probably of Syria as well, not to be completely dependent upon the Russians.
The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East said that he thought that our so-called even-handed policy had impaired our ability to help. I believe that the contrary is the case. By keeping ourselves detached and not supporting the claims of either side we are in a position to help if an opportunity arises. We could not have done so if we had not pursued an even-handed policy. Incidentally, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mrs. Sally Oppenheim), who remarked that the phrase "evenhanded" was becoming a little suspect in this country, that the phrase is regarded as pro-Israeli in Arab circles.
The cease-fire is only the end of the beginning of what will be a long process. We now enter a new phase. It would be appropriate to pay tribute to the contributions which our American friends and the Soviets have made in bringing about the cease-fire—and to the Secretary General of the United Nations for getting forces in place at short notice. I am sure the House will also wish to pay tribute to the RAF for getting the truce forces in place so quickly.
We now face a number of immediate problems such as those of the prisoners and the Egyptian Third Army and the Bab el Mandeb straits—immediate irritants which have to be got out of the way as quickly as possible. After that it will be a long process, however great an impetus we have, to build up towards negotiations. There are already the beginnings of a force in place to supervise the truce. I agree entirely with the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East that neither we nor the super-Powers can impose a settlement. All will have to do their best to work towards one.
In this the United Nations will have an important, perhaps critical, part to play through the Security Council and the Secretary General. I was glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friend the Member for Caernarvon say that they endorsed my right hon. Friend's view that in the longer term it will be necesary to have effective guarantees for any settlement that is reached and that these guarantees are likely to involve an international force sufficiently effective to prevent any renewed breach of the peace.
I was also glad to hear the right hon. Gentlemen say that we also believe that, if we are wanted, we in Britain ought to contribute to such a force. We certainly have every interest in seeking to help bring about a settlement. Europe is more concerned than anyone outside with a settlement in the Middle East. It is not just a question of oil. Geography and history link Europe to the Middle East, and always will, even when the last oil well has dried up.
I do not underrate the importance of oil. The right hon. Member for Caernarvon was right to stress it, and I gladly give him the assurance, that we shall be watching the situation carefully from day to day and even from hour to hour. We could not afford a drying-up of that muscle in our industrial make-up. The importance of oil is clear.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East that we must not let our policy be influenced or directed by what he called oil blackmail. The prospect of oil blackmail is not likely. The Arab oil producers and the Majority of the moderate Arab leaders know very well that the Soviet Union is not in a position to deliver Resolution 242, or progress towards it. They know, because they are wise men in many ways, that progress will come only through their own efforts in co-operation with the United States and Europe. It is only when guarantees have been secured which are acceptable to Israel and the more moderate Arab forces that there will be a settlement and progress can be made towards the implementation of Resolution 242. The Arabs realise that to injure their friends in the West would be counterproductive from the point of view of achieving their aims.
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