Orders of the Day — Defence

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 19 March 1973.

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Photo of Mr Edward Leadbitter Mr Edward Leadbitter , Hartlepools, The 12:00, 19 March 1973

The Opposition's amendment can only be described as reasonable and moderately critical, with an objective to which, I would have thought, there would have been no opposition from any quarter of the House, namely, that, within the alliance we should bring defence expenditure in line with that of our European allies. I would not have thought that unreasonable. Therefore, there is no case in this two-day debate for heated acrimony, nor is there any reason to make small, inconsequential party political points. The purpose of the amendment is to address ourselves to the kinds of purpose which the nation would expect us to develop.

Therefore I quickly move on to one or two things which will fall in line with that kind of thinking and that kind of approach. The first is that in regard to our troops in Northern Ireland we have to think far more positively, far more pertinently and far more urgently than we have done of the need to get a political solution there. Those of us, on both sides of the House, who have had to meet the parents of young sons and the wives of young soldiers who have been killed in Northern Ireland know full well the heartache and the misery and the frustration the problem of Northern Ireland brings. We know there cannot be a military solution. Just as clearly we know that our troops have to be admired for the excellence of their work in what has been virtually a policing job, and a first-class one. Nevertheless, at the end of the day there must be a political solution.

It is from that point of view that 1 immediately pass to Europe, because while there are talks going on in Helsinki, the prefatory talks for the European security conference, while there are talks going on in Vienna about mutual balanced force reductions, while there are other talks going on, principally between the two blocs, on strategic arms limitations, we see inevitably, immediately we examine them, that no military solution is possible in Europe, that there must be a political solution and a political reappraisal. This is apparent whether we consider the balance of forces or their deployment or the provision of logistic support systems.

The corollary is clear, that they are out of step with one another and that they have been deliberately put out of step in time. For instance, one of the objectives arising from the relaxation of East-West relationships and of meeting political needs was mutual balanced force talks going on in parallel with the preparatory talks for the European security conference, but when Dr. Kissinger came back from Moscow what happened? Parallelism was halted and one set of talks was started two months before the other. What is the consequence? We already have difficulties in Vienna; there is disagreement between America and Moscow on the question of progress with the mutual balanced force objectives; already there is a wrangle going on whether Hungary shall be an observer or an active member of the talks.

So it seems quite clear that we in this country should bring this situation forward and crystallise it so that we can avoid what might be entrance into a further cold war phase. After all the good work that has been done by both the Labour Government and this Government, making great contributions to the relaxation of tension, I suggest that it is imperative that we should avoid going in for a another phase of cold war.

We must recognise the reality of what is happening this year. It is hoped that in November we shall get on with the agenda for the European Security Conference. Those talks will come to nought if they are divorced from the talks in Vienna or if in the SALT negotiations the concept of immutability remains between the two blocs.

Furthermore, it might be wise to have more frankness about the discussions which took place between the Prime Minister and President Nixon on Poseidon and our Polaris submarines. Certain arrangements about nuclear know-how arise from the MacMahon Acts and the Nassau agreement. It is not clear whether we have accepted a commitment. The French Defence Minister, M. Debré, has, perhaps deliberately, confused the situation. If France and Britain have a joint nuclear objective—and the Prime Minister has long talked of this—there is a danger that Russia will say that either Poseidon, or a French/British nuclear marriage, are contributions towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and all the work of the past few years might fall to the ground and hardened situations result.

That is a brief indication of how we should address ourselves to the talks. Let us set up a standing commission in Europe as an umbrella over all the talks, within which could be appointed committees to examine the processes of access, armaments inspection, diplomatic signals, observation of manoeuvres, the passage of knowledge between scientists and technicians and the greater flow of information which is already going on in many parts of Europe. All these subjects could be integrated within the standing commission which would act as an umbrella over the mutual balanced force reduction talks and the SALT negotiations so that there is a comity of relationships and activities in which the political objectives will not get lost.

To come a little nearer home, I hope that the Minister will take to heart what has been said about training by the committee which examined defence expenditure whose report was published last year. There is a case for the centralisation of training in certain areas. I have no wish to break up the sense of pride in each of the Armed Forces—the Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force—but centralised training would produce economies of scale where common training considerations apply. Full details of that suggestion have been made known to the Minister.

I am sorry that following the Rayner Report the Procurement Executive has decided, after only seven months, to take a fragmented approach to the rationalisation of research and development. The closure of the Signals Research Development Establishment at Christchurch and the Services Electronic Research Establishment at Baldock—no doubt strenthening the Royal Naval Establishment at Malvern—the closure of the airfield at Pershore and the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment at Langhurst are geared to a three to five-year programme.

The Procurement Executive intends to look at the rest of the research and development in a second phase, but it might do better to consider research and development rationalisation as a whole. Perhaps it will listen to the scientists and ancillary staffs of the executive, and the staff side and the trade union side of the Joint Industrial Council, which have raised serious objections. The object should be to secure in our research and development establishments manpower promotion and deployment objectives which will ensure continuing confidence among those who service the forces requirements.

Rationalisation must take into account the effect of closures on other parts of the United Kingdom. The transfer from Pershore to Farnham is made where there is already an overloading of air space. The transfer of research and development from one part of the country to another may result in the congestion of roads and may produce social costs which should be taken into account. In addition to a cost benefit analysis there should also be a social benefit analysis to enable us to arrive at the right decisions.

This is an opportunity for the House to show the nation and Europe that in this vital year we have a great contribution to make in discussions on military deployment. With the great financial pressures caused by the burden of arms and the necessity for supplying manpower, all European countries are aching with the need for a political solution and this year we could be successful if we take heed.