I was about to do so but I was recruiting for my lobby, as is my right.

This quasi-automatic process of evolution within the Community from a purely customs union in the beginning to a legal and political personality has already been noted in the European Press, and I quote from journals which are in the Library in translation.

In the Stuttgarter Zeitung of 4th February we read: Defence is Nato's pigeon, the argument runs. Yet of late there have been signs that the EEC is assuming greater importance in the defence sector than the countries concerned are willing to admit. It proceeds with the kind of argument which I briefly outline, that it is inevitable, given the process of fusion and union that is now going on, that at some point an international organisation with its own personality shall be fully armed with all the attributes of a real federation and that defence must feature on the agenda.

A rather less important journal, the Kölnische Anzeiger of 12th February, talks about relations with other countries determining developments on the home front. It goes on: There must be both a supranational body and supranational authority on foreign and defence policy matters. I regard this process as being almost automatic, as being beyond the will of any Minister in this or any other Parliament or even in a European Parliament. As this Community—and it is already three in one, the holy trinity is already with us—evolves, its supranational institutions by and of themselves will proceed to the creation of supranational political institutions, for the reasons so eloquently given by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), and as a natural corollary of that there will have to be a defence organisation related to that political organisation.

In actual fact there is very little going on in Europe at this moment that makes any kind of sense unless it is related to the development of a federal authority in Europe, and a federal authority will have to have a defence apparatus. What form will that defence apparatus take? Very often in order to go forward statesmen go backwards, and I do not regard it as beyond the bounds of possibility that the European defence community idea will be resurrected. It was killed in the French Assembly by 319 votes to 264, but we got something out of the wreckage—Western European Union—and the idea has been canvassed by many defence correspondents in both articles and books that that Western European Union could become the nucleus of a purely European defence force with a very strong nuclear element in it. But the argument proceeded even further, until it reached the Godkin lectures, and it is now before us in the House of Commons. It is the idea that in some strange way the French nuclear force and our own nuclear force should be combined into a unified nuclear deterrent to be held in trust for some future political organisation in Europe.

Technically, this is a load of nonsense, because it is almost as impossible to fuse the nuclear components of our armoury and the French nuclear components of their armoury. It would be like trying to join apples and oranges and produce another type of fruit. What the French have got does not fit in very well with what we have got, and although the French have spent about three times as much as we have done up to the end of 1971 on developing the force de frappe—which has now acquired a newname—its military value will decrease rather than increase as more and more money is spent on it, because the Polaris-type weapons system is about to be superseded; even the system which carries the Poseidon warhead is also about to be superseded.

Therefore, we are dealing not with a fully-fledged nuclear force which can have any meaningful effect upon diplomacy, because only a deterrent force which can in certain circumstances be used can exert any such influence; we are dealing with something which, as far as the French are concerned, is obsolescent. But what kind of doctrine, when we move from the nuts and bolts to the doctrine which guides the deployment of those nuts and bolts would have to be accepted if France and Britain were to form the nucleus of a nuclear force?

The French idea was once eloquently expressed at the Institute of Strategic Studies by a French general whose name escapes me—it is nice to welcome people to the more expensive seats in this theatre—and this was that, whereas the American nuclear force was designed to point roughly in all directions, the apparatus of N.A.T.O. was directed almost entirely towards the east. If we are to enter into a deal with the French and they still adhere to that philosophy—and they have slowed down the process of changing their philosophies in recent years—we are subscribing to something that is very dangerous and that would severely imbalance the present rough balance of terror which we have in the world.

The second thing that has to be emphasised is that if the French doctrine were to be carried to its logical conclusion, we would have insuperable difficulties in producing a suitable command and control structure. It is true that Mr. Franz Josef Strauss, who is my least favourite German, has made suggestions as to what such a command and control structure should be. In his book he suggested that it should be passed to the president of a European federation. Then, with uncharacteristic modesty, he said that such a president would not in any circumstances be a German, that the Germans would impose a self-denying ordinance upon themselves. I do not doubt that he meant what he said and believed it when he said it, but the imbalance in the balance of terror comes from the fact that the Russians will not believe that. They will believe that someone like him at some future time may assume control of the Federal Republic of Germany and may even begin progress towards the presidency of a European federation.

It is perfectly justifiable for hon. Members to say that these are fantasies, but they are based on fears, and fears happen to be facts in international relations. I suggest that this idea—and I do not care who propounds it—would be so severely an imbalancing factor in international relations that it would undo such good work as has been done by the deterrent over the last 15 years.

I do not believe that if a third nuclear centre were established it would be in any position to handle crises, to indulge in what the Americans call crisis management. I happen to believe that nuclear weapons can play a rôle only in that type of crisis management. The last occasion when they played such a rôle was during the Cuban crisis. The essential fact about the Cuban crisis was that two identifiable persons were in charge of authentic nuclear systems that were not threatened. I want to read to the House some very wise words written in 1963 about that situation. This was dealing with Skybolt. The quotation is: Neither the multinational nor the multilateral nuclear force is really necessary from the standpoint of a coherent nuclear strategy. Such a strategy, involving the development of weapon systems to frighten rather than fight with, bears a close resemblance to chess. And only two can play chess. This was demonstrated during the Cuban crisis. Mr. Kennedy did not consult his allies when he made his delicate and dangerous moves in the Caribbean in October 1962. Nor did Mr. Krushchev consult his…Both menunderstood that just as there could be only one finger on the nuclear trigger there could be only one on the safety catch. That was written by a certain Raymond Fletcher in 1963. I often wonder what happened to him.

This Amendment is not presented because it is assumed that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster is a villainous militaristic gentleman, but we do not leglislate for amiable gentlemen in amiable circumstances in the House. In this case, we are legislating for our grandchildren and great-grandchilden. What we are trying to do—so far as I am concerned it is the only thing I am trying to do—is to remove a very dangerous temptation from the hands of any future Government because, given this type of Bill as an Act of Parliament with this Clause unamended, I would not even trust my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) to act in a rational way confronted with this kind of temptation. It is the business of the House as a legislative assembly to remove temptation, from the paths not of virtuous gentlemen like the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, but of such of his successors as may acquire very bad habits indeed.

If we go into this Community in such a way as would augment rather than slow down the processes towards supra-nationalism which must inevitably produce a resurrection of the European Defence Community which took four years to kill, inevitably there will be other fingers on nuclear triggers. I am not talking about any specific nationality at the moment, but the more fingers there are on nuclear triggers the more difficult the handling of any crisis is going to be. If just to gain some hypothetical commercial advantages we are to do this thing in the field of weaponry, in the field of diplomacy and in the field of defence, we