Orders of the Day — Defence

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 2 March 1971.

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Photo of Dr David Owen Dr David Owen , Plymouth, Sutton 12:00, 2 March 1971

I am not giving way again to the hon. Gentleman. I am saying that these policies, if unchecked, could eventually lead to the state in which this country found itself in 1963 when we inherited from the Tory Government in 1964 a serious state of affairs. We inherited a strategy which was still largely based on massive nuclear retaliation. We inherited forces extending all round the world, overstretched, ill-equipped. Even spending just under 7 per cent. of the gross national product on defence as the Tory Government then did, we could not meet all the financial requirements dictated by these commitments.

So we are left with the Secretary of State boasting in another place that this year's White Paper is 30 pages shorter and 7½p less than the 1970 White Paper—altogether, he claims, a good example of Conservative cost-effectiveness. What drivel. This House wants more information, not less about defence policy and wants it in this House—not in a totally undemocratic assembly, composed of a cross between hereditary peers and Prime Ministerial appointees.

The White Paper says very little about the all-important strategic arms limitation talks which are now taking place. I understand the problems involved. In my view, it has been a major omission from recent defence debates how little serious discussion Parliament gives to this whole area of nuclear disarmament. It is no good us leaving it entirely to the two super powers to argue about the major issues. It is particularly important for Britain, which is one of the few countries that possesses enough nuclear know-how to argue with its ally, the United States, that our voice should be heard, and that that voice should not always be confined behind closed doors. I realise the problems of defence Ministers. The fact is that in the past in regard to the S.A.L.T. real mistakes have been made. The real tragedy is the way in which first the Johnson Administration, then the Nixon Administration prevaricated over proposing a M.I.R.V. testing moratorium. This was the one really effective immediate initiative open to the United States Administration in a serious attempt to halt the arms race.

By the time that the S.A.L.T. actually began, the United States had almost completed its M.I.R.V. testing programme, and so the one opportunity for taking a major step to halt the quantum leap that M.I.R.V. deployment involves was lost. It is now unlikely that the Russians will agree to an immediate ban on M.I.R.V. testing, knowing, as they do, that the Americans could easily circumvent such a ban by fitting M.I.R.V.s without further testing and with a fair measure of confidence in their existing technology. History will show the reluctance to push a M.I.R.V. moratorium to have been a massive error of judgment.

Admittedly, all weapon moratoriums have their dangers, but, even with the Russians' persistent refusal, to consider on-site testing, there were reasonable grounds for believing that modern detection devices would have been able to pick up the testing of M.I.R.V., and even, if necessary, banning the testing of M.I.R.V.s and decoy testing. It is because of the imbalance of M.I.R.V. technology, with the United States having a clear lead, that initially S.A.L.T. is likely to prove disappointing. However, the long-term prospects for talks continuing over the next four or five years could involve major changes in current nuclear policy. At this stage, the Russians will probably be unwilling to accept a freeze on the existing level of missiles and aircraft unless this is accompanied by a total M.I.R.V. ban or by including M.I.R.V.s in the total number of missiles counted. They know that they have fewer missiles than the United States and that the United States is possibly developing a new generation of bombers. They also know that they are behind in applying M.I.R.V. technology, and so a freeze would be likely to ensure a widening of the missile gap for some years to come.

The other issue for the S.A.L.T.—and it is important in terms of the massive drain on financial resources in the two countries—is whether there can be any agreement on reducing or banning A.B.M. deployment. The Soviet Union already has deployed round Moscow the Golosh system, and the United States has become committed to putting the safeguard system round their Minuteman sites and probably round Washington. This problem of A.B.M. deployment must be taken seriously, and when the Prime Minister says that he is being kept informed about the S.A.L.T. and is taking an active interest in them, I hope that he is putting in a specific British input to the United States.

The United States recently has become very concerned about the Russian SS9 missiles which have three warheads and which, though not at present independently controlled, are able to land in a pattern which could effectively knock out a Minuteman site, even when hardened by the addition of extensive reinforced concrete round the launching base. The facts are well known in the United States, but they are rarely discussed here. The main American concern is that this could provide the Russians with a first-strike weapon system and it was this concern which formed the major argument for deploying an A.B.M. system.

It seems extraordinary that Congress could decide actually to slow down the conversion rate of Polaris submarines to be fitted with Poseidon, which is a system with a proven second-strike capability, and at the same time accept, after tremendous opposition in the United States, the case for an A.B.M. system which would at best, if proved technically successful, confer a limited second-strike capability on the vulnerable Minuteman sites. It would, however, be achieved at a tremendous financial cost. Let us hope that a total ban on A.B.M. deployment is being actively discussed and pushed by Her Majesty's Government.

It is clear, therefore, that the 1970s will present a completely new dimension of increase in nuclear weapons if the S.A.L.T. fail, and it is against this background that we in this country must discuss the comparatively insignificant strategic forces of Britain and France. It is particularly gratifying to hear that the present Government have not made any attempt to link entry into the Common Market with discussions with the French on nuclear matters. The complete absence of any move by this Government or the French is to be welcomed. Many of us on this side of the House, though strongly committed Europeans—and 1 make no secret of my views on the subject—and hoping that the Common Market talks are successful, would strongly condemn any linking of nuclear weapons with the Common Market negotiations. At one time, it seemed as though the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister in his Godkin lecture, was proposing such a link. It is good to know that the E.E.C. negotiations are not straying into the possibility of committing this error. It is a quite separate problem and should be discussed in the environment of the N.A.T.O. Alliance.

Europe has a real interest in the outcome of the S.A.L.T., especially as they relate to the large number of existing Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles which are targeted on Europe. We in this country have made it clear to the United States that we would be deeply concerned if the Americans were to propose any unilateral reduction in the 7,000 nuclear weapons at present in Europe. These weapons are considered to be now an indispensable element in N.A.T.O.'s deterrent against attack, and any future reduction, which hon. Members on this side of the House will welcome, would have to be accompanied by equivalent reductions of the Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

A.B.M. deployment is also of concern to the British and the French because the effectiveness of their existing strategic forces could be weakened by widespread A.B.M. deployment. My message to the Government is that this is an area of vital interest to Europe and to this country. I hope that they will not feel that they must necessarily endorse American initiatives because of some feeling of nuclear inferiority. There is no need for pessimism. The S.A.L.T. could still represent a major break-through in halting the arms race.

The greatest contribution that we could make to intelligent discussion of these crucial issues is to challenge technically, as an understanding but nevertheless independent critic, the assumption on which American policies are based within the Alliance.

I do not wish to embark on too long a discussion of maritime strategy, for much of the ground will have to be covered tomorrow when we come to debate the Government's deplorable decision to sell arms to South Africa. However, one cannot look at the White Paper without criticising the whole concept of the supposed military threat of Russian naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

No one who has served in the Ministry of Defence will deny that this Ministry is not usually short of military threats. In fact, they abound in every corner. One can barely hold a meeting without being confronted by some new threat. The job of Ministers is usually to inject a degree of realism into the assessment of potential military threats. I find it all the more inexplicable and extraordinary, therefore, that this Government should have found it necessary to find a military threat all on their own. It is a very remarkable achievement. For the last four years, the Ministry of Defence has quite rightly watched the growth of the Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean very carefully. Never at any time was the threat judged to be anything other than primarily political; yet, suddenly, having taken office on the afternoon of 19th June, by Monday. 22nd June, the Foreign Secretary decided to change the assessment of the political threat in the Indian Ocean to a major military threat. The topic turned into a discussion of protecting our sea lanes and returning to concepts of future naval war that were slowly being abandoned in the 1950s, let alone the 1960s.

Not unnaturally, the Ministry of Defence is already beginning to revise its previous judgments. It would hardly be in the nature of the Ministry to turn down a threat offered to it on a plate by no less a person than its own Prime Minister. The difficulty of obtaining a sensible dialogue on the possibility of limiting war at sea is that each side of the argument tends to overstate dramatically its case. For example, it is inconceivable that the super Powers will ever again face the same type of prolonged maritime warfare, going on over many years, as they did in the last two world wars. However, it is a realistic planning assumption that an initial maritime incident could be contained using conventional weapons over many more days than are likely to be possible with an initial land-based incident. At sea, with no rigid boundaries, the probability is of a slower escalation with more time for second thoughts, and, in consequence, a higher nuclear threshold.

To that extent, limited war at sea is credible. The proponents of extended war at sea, however, talk of the need for the worldwide protection of sea lanes and constantly reiterate import figures and merchant ship numbers to show the vulnerability of various nations to interference with their seaborne overseas trade. These arguments are very hard to sustain, and my experience is that the more sophisticated naval officers are themselves unconvinced that this is a sensible strategy on which to base their future policy. It becomes particularly irrelevant when one considers how strongly the then Opposition used those same arguments as a reason for not withdrawing from the Persian Gulf. Yet now the Government have accepted the logic of the argument that this was not a major factor and it was more important to ensure peaceful relations with the States surrounding the Gulf.

The only case for accepting that a military threat exists in the Indian Ocean was the view that there might be interference with Western tankers sailing from the Gulf. The Government are obsessed with the Cape. If there really is a military threat, why are the Government leaving the Gulf? They must know that of all the assessments for withdrawal the one case strongly contested by the Americans was withdrawal from the Gulf far more than from the Far East. It is the Gulf area which is the most likely place for any interference with Western shipping—the Gulf and its surrounding areas to the Indian Ocean.

Can anyone seriously believe that the Western Alliance, if confronted with a persistent threat over a period of a few days of the Russians interfering with our merchant fleet, would take—[Interruption.] The Minister of State must not make such offensive remarks. Why should we choose the Cape, far away from our shores? Why not choose an area of the sea, if we wish to risk escalation against the Russians, nearer home?