Mr. Heller:

I beg to move Amendment No. 741, in page 47, line 9, leave out 'reasonably well' and insert: 'eligible under the rules of the organisation to be admitted as a member and'. In some respects, this Amendment is a continuation of the previous debate. We have reached the crucial Clause 61 which the trade union movement finds particularly obnoxious and which, as a result of the powers given to the Registrar by it, means we are at least heading for a corporate State. Certainly it is corporate State thinking.

We think that the words "reasonably well" are dangerous and can lead to a series of complications within unions and can dilute the character of some unions, particularly those which are craft based.

[Miss HARVIE ANDERSON in the Chair]

10.30 p.m.

The trade union to which I belong, which is a craft organisation, the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, has just united with the Association of Building Trade Technicians, with the bricklayers' union and with the painters' union. I say this for the benefit of those hon. Members opposite who believe that the trade union movement never makes any progress towards amalgamations and unifications. The facts are that within that united organisation we shall continue to have trade sections. For example, it would be unrealistic if a bricklayer was in exactly the section as a joiner or if a joiner was in the same section as a painter, and so on. That is so obvious it hardly needs to be said, but it is important to point the facts.

We do not regard the number of years of apprenticeship, be they four or five or whatever may be the figure, as magic figures. There has been some argument over the years about what the apprenticeship period should be. I myself was in apprenticeship for seven years. At one time it went down to five years, and has now gone down to four. We argue that the number of years can be varied according to the type of training required to carry out a particular job. Therefore, we must be flexible in the matter of apprenticeship.

My organisation accepts workers who have been trained in Government training centres. There was some argument about this matter. Naturally, in areas of high unemployment workers are deeply concerned about workers trained in Government centres who can take work in a particular trade after only a short period of such training. But we have been flexible and have taken in those members in certain circumstances and conditions. However, the Clause says that we have to open our doors to an unlimited number of workers whether or not we wish to have them. The only requirement is that they should be "reasonably well qualified members of the organisation. What is meant by "reasonably well qualified"?

One hon. Member opposite said he felt a little disquiet over this point. The Solicitor-General mentioned in this connection people trained as solicitors or barristers. He said that to be a barrister one had to be a member of the Bar Council, but a person could operate in that profession if he had the qualifications and did not have to belong to a trade union. In our trade union we have to have definite qualifications. If anybody believes that without years of training they can make or hang those doors at the other end of the Chamber, then they do not understand that ours is a highly qualifield and skilled craft. Part of our trade union organisation involves the maintenance of skilled craftsmanship as an important element of our system. Yet the Bill says that they have to be "reasonably well qualified". That is all.

What does "reasonably well qualified" mean? There are people who pick up the trade and become what we call bodgers. They do all kinds of odd jobs, and make an absolute mess of them. Nevertheless, it could be argued that they are "reasonably well qualified" and that the union must accept them. If the union does not accept them, they can make a complaint. It is not just a question of acceptance of Clause 61—

Mr. John Hall (Wycombe) rose——

Mr. Heller:

Clause 62 specifically states: It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any organisation of workers, or any official of or person acting on behalf of such an organisation, to take or threaten to take any action against any member of the organisation or other person in contravention of the principles set out in section 61 of this Act. That deals particularly with subsection (7).

1 think that the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) wished to intervene.

Only because 1 should not want to see that unflattering description of bodgers go unchallenged. "Bodger" is the name given to craftsmen who turn out chair legs in the furniture industry, and they do their job well.

I am talking about bodgers in the building industry. I assure the hon. Gentleman that they do not turn out chair legs very well.

Incidentally, for the hon. Gentleman's information, although I am sure that he knows, my union, A.S.W., and N.U.F.T.O. have an agreement to accept each other's cards, because it is recognised that the members of each union are trained craftsmen, able to do woodworking of one kind or another, who may from time to time have to exchange their particular industries.

That, incidentally, raises another point relating to an agency shop or the sole bargaining agency. In a shop where the A.S.W. became the sole bargaining agent, N.U.F.T.O. members would have to join the A.S.W. or become non-unionists, or vice versa. This is one further example of the complication in the Bill.

Trade unions will be faced with the problem that their strength is likely to be undermined because they have to accept people who are not acceptable. The membership would be taken out of their control in that sense and would be determined by the registrar. It would also be damaging to the skills of the particular trades.

I should like to point out what Donovan says about admission in paragraph 650: The rules should state who is qualified for admission to the trade union … but"— this is the point— unions must be allowed to retain discretion in deciding whom they should admit.

May I ask the hon. Gentleman to read the clause which lies between the two Clauses which he read? It is not even a continuous quotation. if the hon. Gentleman will start at the beginning of paragraph 650 and read the first two sentences the Committee will have the meaning.

Certainly. It says: They should be framed in such a way as to avoid discriminating arbitrarily against any type of applicant, but unions must be allowed to retain discretion in deciding whom they should admit. That is precisely what happens now in my organisation. That is the position.

I think that I was a little more courteous to the Solicitor-General just now in giving way than he was to me, because when I wanted to intervene when he was speaking during the last debate he refused to give way. I do not know why. I have never refused to give way to anybody, whether I have been on the back benches, or speaking from this Box. At no time have I refused to give way, and I hope that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen will be equally courteous when we debate issues of fundamental importance to the trade union movement.

The situation referred to in the Donovan Report is precisely that which exists in most trade unions, and certainly in my organisation. We have rules by which a person can apply for membership. If the branch turns him down—because he has to apply to the branch—he must be told at the branch meeting, and at that point he has the right of appeal to the national executive committee, and there have been occasions when, on appeal to the national executive, the executive has decided to allow the person concerned into the organisation. That happens now. We do not need the law to provide for that, and it is obvious that in introducing this proposal the Solicitor-General is unnecessarily introducing a law at a stage at which it is not needed.

Trade union rules are flexible in relation to the admittance of people into trade union organisations. During an earlier debate, I think that it was the Solicitor-General himself who said that all the Government were hoping to do by having this guiding principle was to bring the backward trade unions up to the standards of the best unions, but this proposal goes beyond that. The Bill says that people must be accepted by trade unions whether the trade unions want them or not. I have already referred to the problem of unemployment. If there is a high level of unemployment, why should a trade union be forced, in those circumstances, to accept people whom it has no wish to accept?

There are many arguments about what "reasonably well qualified" means. Who, for example, is a "reasonably well qualified" docker? Most hon. Gentlemen opposite would not last five minutes on Liverpool docks. None of them is reasonably well qualified to be a Liverpool docker, and neither am I. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, someone could be regarded as being reasonably well qualified. One has only to ask what the phrase means to realise just how absurd it is.

I shall ask my hon. Friends to support the Amendment, and I trust that on this occasion the Solicitor-General, or the Secretary of State, will accept the force of the argument that is put forward and realise that we are arguing a sensible and practical case. This is important to craft trade unions in particular, and to all trade unions in general. This is a matter of great importance to us, and we ask the Government to accept that the Amendment is put forward in the best interests of the trade union movement.

Before replying to the points made by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) on the Amendment, may I say that I hope that I have always tried to give way as often and as graciously as I can and should. If I was discourteous to the hon. Gentleman during the previous debate, I apologise, but one has always to judge between making progress in the debate and in one's speech, and being over-generous in giving way. I certainly did not intend to be discourteous to him.

10.45 p.m.

In this subsection the Government do not intend to prevent organisations laying down their own standards and rules. It is clear that the organisation can prepare its own rules. We say that a prospective member … shall not, by way of any arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination, be excluded from membership … so that the person who is reasonably well qualified for employment should not be arbitrarily or unreasonably discriminated against. This leaves it entirely free for a union or organisation to lay down clear and specific grounds on which a person shall not be admitted or should be expelled. A person with a bad membership record would not have any right to admission. A person with no qualifications at all or who had manifestly poor qualifications would not be entitled to admission. We accept the case for the concept of craft unions and qualifications. The unions have played their part in asserting and raising standards. But there comes a point where qualifications defined in that way are being used as the foundation for excluding people who ought to be entitled to be admitted to particular kinds of work.

If one has, for example, a rule—as one has in some unions—that only a son or grandson of a former union member or a former employee in a particular kind of work should be admitted, how can that be justified? Suppose that people who are superlatively qualified by any standards for the trade which that union is regulating are confronted with rules which say, "I am sorry, but whatever your qualifications you cannot be admitted because you do not meet this arbitrary …"—

Like the House of Lords.

I am trying to get to the argument of the debate. It may be asserted by some hon. Members opposite that entry should be founded upon the hereditary principle. I have not heard it widely argued.

I suggest that it would not be acceptable to either side of the Committee to accept the existence of arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination in respect of well qualified people.

We accept the case for sections and branches. The wording of the Clause: Any person who applies for membership of the organisation, or of a branch or section of the organisation … makes perfectly clear that different standards of qualification for different skills in different branches and sections would be acceptable. I take the point about the ex tent to which unions are merging. One of the ways of facilitating this is the existence of different sections with different skills, as part of the conglomerate. We accept that reasonable standards should be laid down. The only point on which we insist is that there should not be arbitrary discrimination against the background of reasonable qualification.

I am worried about the definition of "reasonably well". I see the difficulties which the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heller) has raised. Looking at it practically, I find it hard to understand how one could define "reasonably well qualified". Is it not possible to delete those two words and leave it as "qualified"? What would be the disadvantage of doing it in that way?

I take my hon. Friend's point. It marches in line with my next point, and I will answer it.

In the Report of the Donovan Commission, there are two paragraphs dealing with the relationship between training and the right of admission to organisations. Paragraph 358 says: Once objective standards have been laid down by which qualification for skilled work can be judged, trade unions should review their rule books and make any revision of the rules necessary to ensure that no qualified worker will be arbitrarily denied either the right of admission to the union or the right to use the skills which he has acquired. Failing this, any worker who alleges that he or she is qualified to do skilled work but has nevertheless been refused membership of the union … should have the right of appeal to the independent review body … In that paragraph, the word is exactly as my hon. Friend puts it: "qualified", rather than "reasonably well qualified". The intention is that people who are qualified should have the right of admission. But, in many sections of industry at the moment, we have not got clearly laid down objective qualifications. It is a matter which will have to be judged, as we think, in the light of conditions in the industry and in the light of the applicant concerned.

To say "qualified" would imply a plainly identifiable standard. If one takes the case of people who have been through Government training centres and who have achieved qualifications which may not march in line with any statutory or clear standard or any pre-existing union standard, we think that the tribunal which will consider this should be entitled to say whether they are "reasonably well qualified". It is in order to provide that flexibility that the provision is worded in that way. I hope that that meets my hon. Friend's point.

Perhaps I might press the hon. and learned Gentleman a little further on this, because it may help the Committee to understand precisely what "qualification" can mean.

The word can have a variety of meanings. An apprentice, for instance, is obviously qualified when he has served his time. One can have other circumstances in which a person has no qualification that he can present, other than the fact that he has been offered a job. That might be considered a reasonable qualification. Would a union be acting arbitrarily and unreasonably if it refused admission to someone who had no job on the ground that he would be adding to the unemployment in the area, or could it properly refuse admission because the person had not the necessary qualification of an offer of employment?

I appreciate the sector with which the hon. Gentleman is concerned. The possession or non-possession of a job probably would be difficult to identify as a reasonably good qualification. On the other hand, the length of service in a job of the same kind would probably amount to a qualification.

In the case of Equity, X years' or months' service in previous jobs could well be regarded as qualification by service—as one of several; there are others. There are no precise and exact qualifications or certificates. Cases would have to be looked at according to the conditions of the industry and the union operating in it.

We cannot accept that there is any single magic statutory form of qualification which can be encapsulated more precisely than others. On the other hand, we cannot accept that, against the background of reasonable standards, a union should be entitled to exclude from employment in a trade someone who is manifestly qualified for the job and being arbitrarily and unreasonably excluded from it.

Is the word "well" required? Would it not be enough to be reasonably qualified?

There is some force in that point. The word "qualified" by itself implied too precise and objective a standard. "Reasonably" modifies that, but "reasonably well" might modify it too far. We shall certainly look at this again.

Do not both qualifications imply a subjective judgment, which can vary from individual to individual? This is why I object to it, because it is not sufficiently precise. Legislation should be precise. One is either qualified or not qualified.

My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heller) made a reasonable case about the craft unions, and there is another complex point about the general worker unions, like dock workers. Entry of the industry often starts with a sort of routine operation, and one proceeds to the more skilled operations on ships and in the docks.

The phrase "reasonably well qualified" can be interpreted in so many ways. Those who applied for the more skilled occupations on the docks and aboard ships would naturally say that some part of the labour force needed no expertise or qualifications, and they could call in aid this terminology.

People who were well qualified might be the subject of argument as to whether they were "reasonably" well qualified. I can imagine a heyday for those who use words and law as an occupation and who would make the reverse argument, that a man could be reasonably qualified but not well qualified. The situation for these unions is too blurred for clear definition, and this would be bad law.

With these other occupations, for which there are no diplomas or professional standing, people might transfer from one occupation to another, because of unemployment, on the basis that they were reasonably well qualified for any occupation. This would never do.

I am more concerned with the case law which would follow this legislation. Might not any court conclude that no one could be debarred from membership on the basis that he did not possess the appropriate qualifications?

Paragraph 650 of Donovan shows that the unions have the necessary knowledge and information to protect their rules and constitution, and therefore shows those who are eligible for membership of the various general worker unions, and the various crafts and firms and extra specialities involved. This would be adequately covered by the Amendment. It would cover the situation to such an extent that there would be no dubiety.

If the Secretary of State is concerned about registration and believes that the Clauses concerning registration would provide adequate protection, I cannot understand his reluctance to accept the concept that the trade unions should be left, with their experience, to draw up appropriate rules; because the Registrar, under preceding Clauses, would have the control and, if he thought that the rules did not sufficiently indicate the qualifications which would be necessary to secure membership, he could ask that they be stated in the rules. The Amendment is far better in its approach, application and effect than the words in the Bill.

11 p.m.

I am delighted that my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General has undertaken to look at the Clause again. One of the difficulties facing us arises because of the varying skills required of different craftsmen. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer) and myself have a reasonable knowledge of conditions and practices in the building industry. There are many trades in that industry where this provision might cause confusion.

I suggest a simple solution. "Reasonably well qualified" could lead to difficulties of interpretation. Will the Solicitor-General consider adding "having regard to the skills required in that craft", which would make it easier to interpret the provision if a court ruling was required?

If the Amendment were accepted the Clause would read thus: Any person who applies for membership of the organisation, or of a branch or section of the organisation, and who …(b) is eligible under the rules of the organisation to be admitted as a member and qualified for employment as a worker of that description. What has been said on both sides has indicated that the Amendment should commend itself to reasonable people. The uncertainty of the situation has been mentioned. This could lead to a tightening of admission clauses.

Equity exercises no determination in respect of qualifications. It leaves this question entirely in the hands of the employer. If the employer thinks sufficiently well of the person concerned to give him a contract, the union accepts that and does not attempt to determine whether the person is qualified.

I ask hon. Members to consider what can happen if the concept of reasonable qualification, which is within the union's determination, is introduced. If a pop singer wanted to follow in the tracks of Tommy Steele and the National Theatre wanted to cast him in the role of Bottom or what-have-you, that pop singer would have no qualification, never having undertaken any training of that sort. The union is to be given the power to determine casting, something which the union has rejected hitherto. Equity has always said, "It is not our role to say whether or not pop singer Tommy Steele shall or shall not appear at the National Theatre." Parliament is now saying to Equity, "It is your job to say whether Tommy Steele or his successor or the man who follows his successor is reasonably qualified to do this, that or the other."

I am not sure whether the Solicitor-General said what was imputed to him by the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain), namely, that he was ready to examine the Clause again and come back on Report with a new proposal. Persuasive arguments have been put from both sides of the Committee, and it may be that the Secretary of State is prepared to accept the Amendment as it stands. I think that he would have great difficulty in improving upon it. But, if he does not accept it as it stands, will he say that he recognises the force of the case which has been put, he will consider the matter, and come back on Report with a proposal designed to meet it? I do not know, not having discussed it with them, but I imagine that, if we have a firm assertion of that sort, my hon. Friends might be prepared not to press the Amendment to a Division.

I shall be interested to hear the Government's view. For my part, if we have a firm assurance in those terms—and it must be firm—I should be ready to accept it instead of going into the Lobby on the Amendment.

The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) referred to people who take courses at Government training centres and acquire new skills. There is a Government training centre at Manchester which was opened about four years ago. When I visited the centre at about that time I was told—I think that the Minister of Labour made the same point in opening the centre—that it was a great pity that virtually no engineering training could be undertaken there. I think that the only engineering trade taught at that time was welding, which was not covered by the Amalgamated Engineering Union.

The reason for that gap in the training facilities was that the district branch of the A.E.U. would not allow any trainee who came out of that G.T.C. to join the union. The hon. Gentleman notes that I speak of the district branch——

Mr. Heller:

The district committee.

The district committee. I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. At the material time, the district organiser was Mr. Hugh Scanlon, who is now—is this right?—the general secretary of the union at its national headquarters.

Mr. Heller:

The president.

The president, I beg his pardon.

The hon. Gentleman said—I can understand the point—that in areas of high unemployment there was a natural reluctance to admit to the union people who had not gone through the normal period of apprenticeship. But an area of high unemployment is an area where firms are reluctant to open new plants, and often the reason for their reluctance is the lack of skilled labour in the area. So the union is, in effect, promoting a vicious circle: it will not allow trainees from the G.T.C. into the union, and the area remains one of high unemployment—a development area, a depressed area, however one chooses to call it.

I understand that that practice in the Manchester area is still followed by the successor organisation, the A.E.W.U. I have no doubt that it would not be acceptable under the terms of the Clause as drafted. I should be very glad to hear from the hon. Gentleman whether he thinks that that practice is defensible, and how it would be affected by the Amendment, if at all.

My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) put the industry side very well, and was supported by someone on the employers' side of the building industry. The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) also gave the picture from the employers' side of the furniture industry.

My hon. Friend has a point here. The Solicitor-General now admits that it is very difficult to explain the words "reasonably well qualified". He does not know whether "reasonably" or "well" should be left in, but he evidently thinks that "qualified" should be left in.

I do not know why the trade unions should be restricted like this. They should be the ones to decide who should or should not be admitted. I do not see why they should be tied to a restriction on whether a person is reasonably well qualified, or qualified at all. They should decide, in the same way as I am sure the Institute of Directors would not admit my hon. Friend. He would rightly say that he would not want to be admitted. [Interruption.] I am glad to have the sotto voce interjection that it would say that he is not qualified. I agree, because he is not a director. I also heard a comment from an hon. Member opposite about the Stock Exchange. It has very restrictive rules. I think that members have to pay £76,000 to join. I suppose that being able to pay that could be argued as being "reasonably qualified".

The Solicitor-General made a little aside that rather upset me and, I am sure, my hon. Friend. He made a slighting reference to dockers restricting membership of their union to the family, the son of the father. I asked whether the House of Lords did not restrict its membership to the sons of the fathers, with the qualification that they must not be certified as lunatics. Apart from that they can be anything. They can be crooks. They can follow their fathers and be called "reasonably well qualified".

The hon. Gentleman has always been an opponent of the proposition that hereditary qualification is reasonable. I find it difficult to understand why he should propose that it is reasonable in this case, when he has spent many hours of the time of the House attacking it in another case.

11.15 p.m.

The hon. Gentleman is missing the point. It was not I who said it but the Solicitor-General. The Solicitor-General was attacking the dockers for carrying out something which he supports. I am not defending the dockers. All I am saying is that they are only doing something which the Solicitor-General and the Government have been doing by maintaining an institution which has been going on for 700 years. f the right hon. and learned Gentleman is attacking one as an example, he should attack both.

Another aspect of this matter concerns safety. There are many people who call themselves handymen, particularly in heating, plumbing and ventilation. As has been mentioned, the term in the building trade vernacular is "bodgers". Does the Solicitor-General realise how dangerous the activities of these people can be to life and limb? They establish one-man businesses for the installation of central heating systems which are often death traps. The national Press has taken up this matter. A man who is a bit disreputable and not qualified in the strict sense of the word may say that he is "reasonably well qualified" because he has installed several central heating systems. But they may be faulty and may not work from the date of installation and be a danger to the public. He may say, "The union will not be able to refuse me a ticket because I have shown that I am 'reasonably well qualified', and under the terms of the Bill I shall demand a ticket".

Mrs. Smith, having seen the publicity in the Press about being careful of the activities of these "bodgers" installing heating and ventilation systems, may say, "Before you start, I want to see your qualifications". He will say, "You have heard of the A.E.U., which is a craftsmen's union? Here is my ticket". By law, he will have to have a ticket, even though he may not be qualified.

Another illustration which is vital to the safety of life and limb concerns repairs to cars and other vehicles. When I take my car to a garage I know that the engineer is qualified and that the car will be dealt with properly and will be safe to go on the road. [Hon. Members: "Oh"'.] Do hon. Members opposite say that garages do not do a good job? People who have no proof of qualification will be able to get a ticket by saying, "I am a qualified engineer because I have by law been admitted into the engineering union". The union concerned will not be able to refuse him a ticket.

I do not think that in discriminating against such a person a union would be accused of being either "arbitrary" or "unreasonable", and therefore I do not think that such a person would qualify for membership.

I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. Much as I respect and admire his point of view and opinion, the Solicitor-General is the person to whom I must listen because he has admitted that "reasonably well qualified" is open to doubt. As the Clause is drafted, the union would have to admit the person into membership if he can claim that he is "reasonably well qualified". The Solicitor-General has agreed to look at this point because he acknowledges that the wording is too wide.

The hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis) has again tried to woo the Committee by suggesting that it does not matter really whether the union should be allowed the complete right to decide who should join or who should not join. If we were talking about golf or tennis clubs, that argument would be a good one. But we are not. We are talking about organisations which, in certain sectors of industry, are in a position where their refusal of a union card virtually means that a man cannot obtain or keep employment. That is the major point.

I suppose that one could say that, with the registrar now supervising much more closely the rules of a union, the terms of the Amendment might be sufficient in that members should be those who are … eligible under the rules of the organisation.…

Does not my hon. Friend agree that the terms of the Amendment in relation to subsection (2)(b) are covered by the terms of sub-subsection (2)(a), which says, … in accordance with the rules of the organisation …"?

That is true. On the other hand, I see no reason, other than that of tidiness, why, if one thinks a thing worth saying, one should not say it twice. I was attracted to the wording of the Amendment because at present there is no close supervision of union rules and therefore society should have that sort of protection. But under the new Registrar it may well be that the kind of wording proposed will cover the case.

Clause 61(2) seeks to prevent a union from acting arbitrarily or operating unreasonable discrimination against a person. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Kirkdale (Mr. Dunn) made the valid point that in most skilled trades or crafts it would not matter much whether one stipulated "reasonably well qualified" or "qualified" or anything else, because there is a recognised standard, which is generally accepted, before a person can become a fully skilled member of the union. We are talking about the kind of people he referred to—those in the theatrical profession, in the docks and so on. Indeed, a whole host of people are concerned.

My hon. and learned Friend has gone a considerable way in accepting the fact that "reasonably well qualified" may not be the right form of wording and may leave the definition much too wide. I would have thought that "qualified" would be enough, but I hope that he will look at the matter between now and Report to ensure that the wording is such that it will achieve the objective that a union should not be unreasonably required to take into membership a person it believes has not the qualifications it would normally require, while ensuring that it cannot operate arbitrary or unfair or unreasonable discrimination against an applicant. This is where the balance must lie.

I hope that my hon. and learned Friend can assure us that he will study the matter and, if necessary, produce some words on Report to meet the case which hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have made.

I have intervened before the Solicitor-General because as the debate has proceeded I have begun to realise more sharply than ever the reason for the insertion of the subsection and the misconception on which it is based. The arguments of Government supporters have shown how necessary the Amendment is. Quite apart from exposing the Solicitor-General's complete lack of understanding of trade union rules, they have clearly shown that the situation at which the Government are tilting and which is mentioned in the Report of the Royal Commission and about which we have read so much in the Press in recent years may be described by saying that we are spending a great deal of money on Government training centres to produce the craftsmen necessary for the expansion of industry, but the obstructive attitude of the unions is preventing such people from obtaining employment and so making a contribution to industry.

This attitude is based on a misunderstanding, and it is a confusion of two separate matters. The Solicitor-General referred to paragraph 358 of the Report of the Royal Commission which mentioned the products of Government training centres. The hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse) referred to a specific situation. What is being discussed is not a man's admission to union membership, or which union it would be appropriate for him to join, but his admission to employment.

As the hon. Member for Oxford mentioned, the A.E.F., my own union, may I put the record right? I am familiar with the situation in Manchester, having lived for many years close to the Government training centre there. It has been established not for four, but more nearly 20 years at Denton. I was formerly a shop stewards convenor of the A.E.U. in that district.

The attitude of the A.E.F. is that it expects the first opportunity to fill a skilled vacancy to be offered to unemployed time-served skilled craftsmen in the district. If there is none, or if none wishes to occupy the vacancy, it should be offered then to a person appropriately qualified by virtue of experience and service in the establishment where the vacancy has arisen. If, those first two priorities having been met, the vacancy is still unfilled, the union has no objection to a Government trainee occupying it. That seems to be a reasonable position for the A.E.F., and it is not the position of obstinate obduracy about which we have heard so often and which was implied by the hon. Member's description.

[Sir ROBERT GRANT-FERRIS in the Chair]

I am listening to the hon. Gentleman carefully. Would he deny that it is the case that no engineering skills covered by his union are taught at that Government training centre—for the reasons that I stated. Furthermore, exactly the same criticism I made was made four years ago by his right hon. Friend the then Minister of Labour.

11.30 p.m.

Former Ministers on either side are not oracles and masters of the absolute truth. With the greatest respect to my right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Gunter), for whom I have a great deal of affection and respect, for the reasons that I have given, I can claim to be more familiar with the situation than he. He relied on the advice of his Department and I think that I know more about that situation than those officials. Hon. Gentlemen must bear in mind that this centre has not attempted for many years to put on courses in engineering, other than a welding course, so it has not tested the situation. Let it do that. Perhaps the hon. Member prefers to rely on the word of the local Engineering Employers Federation. The position in the A.E.F. is as I have described, and I have done it with care because it needs to be placed on the record. I said that the situation with which this subsection seeks to deal is not the real problem. The subsection deals with union membership, with whether the man will be accepted for a particular employment situation but hon. Members opposite seem to think that what is at issue is the denial of the man's right to be a member of the A.E.F. It centres around the confusion between the different sections of membership in the A.E.F. and the distinction between section 1 and section 5. There is a common assumption that section 1 is exclusively reserved for craftsmen and if an applicant is not admitted into that section then he cannot, in A.E.F. terms, be a skilled craftsman.

This shows the error of the subsection to which we are drawing attention. The restrictions imposed on admission under section 1 are not merely restrictions placed upon applicants in terms of craft qualifications. They are restrictions in terms of age, because of the friendly benefit provisions. This is where the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends misunderstand the British trade union movement. One respect at least in which it is near unique among trade union movements throughout the world is in its deep involvement with friendly benefit provisions. It is this which is often a crucial factor in determining to which section an individual should he admitted.

There may be someone who has served 20 years in a skilled trade in the engineering industry, perhaps as a colliery fitter and therefore a member of the N.U.M. If he leaves the coal mining industry because of contraction there, because of a pit closure, and makes an application to be a fitter in an engineering factory, it may well be that he is denied admission to section 1 of the A.E.F., not because the A.E.F. says that he is an unskilled man, but because we say that he has passed the age of 40. That age is inserted because of actuarial considerations in determining superannuation benefit that goes with that section of membership. This is the point at issue in our Amendment and this is why we seek the insertion of these words.

I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman has arrived at that position, because my feeling is that the 50- and 60-year- olds—the hon. Member takes it down even to the 40-year-olds—are denied reasonable access. Is that hon. Gentleman honestly saying that to his fellow members?

I am sorry; perhaps I am not making myself clear. I am trying to say that the widespread assumption that the distinctions which are drawn between the sections in the A.E.F. are based exclusively on craft or otherwise is false.

Let me read quickly from the A.E.F. "blue book" and quote the relevant part of the rule relating to admission into section 1. This is the green card section. I have my green card in my pocket—paid in advance, I might say. I quote: A candidate into section 1 who has worked three years in the workshop in addition to at least four years in the engineering department of a technical school shall be eligible. Candidates into section 1 shall be at least 19 and less than 40 years of age. I said that that age band is chosen because one of the crucial differences between section 1 and other sections of membership is that it provides a superannuation benefit, and the superannuation fund has to be operated on an actuarial basis taking age considerations into account.

Let me turn to section 5 membership, the rule for which states that this section is open to Any male person between the ages of 19 and 50 years employed in the engineering trade. … Candidates desiring skilled status must produce evidence as provided in Rule 23"— that is, evidence of having served the appropriate number of years. That makes quite clear that an individual can still be a skilled man in section 5 enjoying fully-skilled status. The only reason why he is driven into section 5 instead of section 1 is that the age factor hinges on the superannuation benefit.

Nothing that the hon. Gentleman is saying makes any difference to the rule book that he is reading. If the rules are aceptable to the registrar, subsection (2), which has two paragraphs, (a) and (b), which run together, read together and are one sentence, provides that the worker must not only be reasonably well qualified, but must be of a description which is in accordance with the rules of the organisation". It does not, therefore, make any difference.

If I believed that the hon Member was right, I should be urging my hon. Friends to reconsider whether we should divide. Subsection (2) states, however: is a worker of the description, or (as the case may be) of one of the descriptions, of which, in accordance with the rules of the organisation, the organisation or that branch or section, as the case may be, is intended". It is "the description". That seems to me to say that irrespective of age, if under paragraph (b) a person is deemed to be reasonably well qualified, he can say "I can produce evidence of having served the requisite number of years in a fully-skilled trade. I therefore demand admission into section 1 of the A.E.F." That is what it seems to me to say. [HON MEMBERS: "No."]

If the Secretary of State or the Solicitor-General tell me that I am absolutely wrong, perhaps we should look at it again. Until we are convinced that we are wrong, however, I say that there is no reasonable objection to inserting the words of our Amendment, which seems to me to be reasonable and is carefully constructed. In any event, if the Government accept that what I have said should be the case, that will only underpin what we are seeking. Consequently, it should not be objectionable and, therefore, should be acceptable.

I hope, therefore, that when the Minister replies, he will say that the subsection means what I want it to mean and, therefore, he will have no objection to inserting the words which we suggest to make it clear beyond peradventure, because they could not be harmful. If he says otherwise, we must press our Amendment to a Division.

I hope that I have cleared up once and for all that silly nonsense we hear about the denial of the right to work for people who have attended Government training centres or such a denial because people are not admitted to skilled status in the A.E.U. At the same time I hope we have demonstrated that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite do not understand what union rule books are all about.

My hon. Friend has been dealing with the problem of what is meant by "reasonably well qualified", and he has no doubt noticed that subsection (3) uses the phrase "reasonable notice". Does he think the use of this term in the Clause has any significance in view of the power given to the Registrar in Clause 71 to examine the rules? Does he regard this as a means of letting the Registrar interfere directly with the rules of the union?

My hon. and learned Friend has put his finger on a crucial weakness in the provision.

The premise of this debate is that there are situations in which unions can control a man's right of access to a job by controlling his right of access to membership of a union. The examples given by my hon. Friends the Members for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse) and Totnes (Mr. Mawby) made that point. In these circumstances, we cannot acknowledge a union's right, any more than did Donovan, totally to control access to membership of people qualified by skill, craft and training for work in such a way to allow the union unreasonably and arbitrarily to exclude those people from jobs. That is both the starting and finishing point of the matter.

We attach importance to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes on the need for some control of a union's rules. He attaches importance to the fact that rules are now to be under some kind of regulation and control as giving the safeguard that is needed. It is right that in Clause 71 the Registrar will have to see that the rules of registered unions dealing with matters such as the right of admission to a union are in accordance with these general principles. That is the central point.

On the precise formulation of the matter, I take note of the points made by my hon. Friends the Members for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) and Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain), who speak with experience in different industries, that all we want to achieve is that a person qualified for employment has access in the last resort to membership of a union and cannot be excluded by arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination. We are willing to look again at the words "reasonably well qualified" to see that they march in line with the point made in the Donovan Report. I was interested to hear the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) when describing the Manchester rules of the A.E.F. use the phrase "appropriately qualified by their experience and skills". There are many different ways of formulating this, and we would be willing to look at the matter.

I regret that we cannot accept the wording of the Amendment that eligibility under the rules of the organisation to be admitted as a member is a sufficient test. If we were to accept those words, it would mean that a union could write into its rules, any kind of conditions it likes as to eligibility. We cannot accept that, although we are prepared to look again at the way in which we formulate the right of people qualified for work to get into unions. We cannot accept the Amendment because we cannot concede that amount of control over the structure of their rules to unions, registered or unregistered.

11.45 p.m.

I strongly urge the Solicitor-General to think again. No one involved in industrial relations can lightly view a Government interfering with and directing independent organisations as to the members they should accept.

I say that people involved in industrial relations cannot view this matter lightly, because every organisation in industrial relations will come within the principle enunciated by the Government. Employers' organisations, although this might not be known to the Government, will come within the same definitions, and many of them are extremely concerned about the Government's intentions.

I do not think that any promise to examine further whether a man is qualified or reasonably well qualified has any bearing on the matter. The Solicitor-General, to some extent, misunderstands the union position. I do not blame the hon. and learned Gentleman, because he lacks knowledge of the practicalities of unions. But I think that the Committee as a whole must recognise that unions are not merely associations of people qualified to do a certain job. Unions, in a great part, when admitting people to membership, take account of ethical and moral considerations. This provision will completely rob them of any right to judge membership of any man or woman on ethical and moral standards. The Government may think that this is not so, but I believe that if the Clause is passed as it is a great deal of interference will take place which cannot be justified.

The Solicitor-General has made clear what the debate is about. It is not about membership of trade unions at all; it is about the right of a man who is qualified to obtain work within an industry.

Must union rules be restricted because of the right of a man to work within an industry? It seems odd that a Government dedicated against the closed shop principle should, de facto, by this provision, accept the closed shop situation where a man must be a member of a union to obtain employment.

I now turn to another point which the Secretary of State might take rather more seriously. This principle will apply de facto to employers' associations and to everyone else concerned in industrial relations. I must here declare an interest. I am associated with the Federation of Builders, which was set up primarily for servicing matters in the industry and to adjudge codes of conduct. That organisation has local admission committees in different localities which judge the ethical and moral standards of people who apply to join.

According to the Bill, any employer within any industry automatically has the right to join his association, just as any man who is adjudged to be reasonably well qualified has the right to join a union. What will this mean to employers' associations if it becomes law? It will mean that discretion on ethical standards is completely withdrawn from those local admission committees. At the moment a local admission committee might say, "This builder in this locality is well known to be a jerry builder". It will therefore refuse him membership and not have to explain why. If the Clause is accepted as it is, I am sure that any builder so excluded will demand an explanation and the local admission committee, unless its decision to exclude stands up in law, cannot refuse him membership.

Some people may ask: why should anyone be excluded on hearsay evidence? I am merely saying that the position will be extremely serious. It emphasises what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer)—that to introduce legal proceedings in cases like this will lead to a great deal of distortion of membership in all organisations in industrial relations.

I put the case forward with sincerity, and I hope that the Solicitor-General will look again at what is an extremely grave matter—that of the House of Commons interfering with the rights of independent organizations to adjudge what calibre members they will admit.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes, 254, Noes 285.

It being after Twelve o'clock, The CHAIRMAN proceeded, pursuant to Standing Order No. 43 (Business Committee) and the Orders [25th and 27th January], to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the Business to be concluded at that hour.

Question put, That the Clause Stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 283, Noes 253.

Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.