Defence Policy 1970

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 19 November 1970.

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Photo of Mr Roland Moyle Mr Roland Moyle , Lewisham North 12:00, 19 November 1970

I always thought the hon. and gallant Gentleman read my speeches. I was prepared to argue for this policy in spite of the fact that it was not popular on my side of the House. In fact very few of my colleagues were prepared to agree with me. I was encouraged to carry on arguing because of the contributions by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite and the thought that when they came back to power there would be a substantial return east of Suez. For example the right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon), speaking in this House on 4th March, 1969, referred to the presence east of Suez and the forces that will be sent there and said: That force would be present on the spot to do what a general capability cannot do; that is, avert trouble before it becomes serious."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1969; Vol. 779, c. 259.] When we bear in mind that there are about 500 hard-core Communists in South Thailand and that the accepted ratio of regular troops to defeat them is about 10 to 1—and that is only one problem that they face—we get some idea of the size of force being alluded to.

Then that great Captain Manqué when Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Bexley, said on 5th March, 1968: … what does concern me is that Europe as a whole, with all its wealth and riches, is playing no part, or almost no part, in the outside world. I have always hoped that Europe would come to a position in which it would recognise its responsibilities and that, when it did so, Britain would have kept open for it the opportunities to exercise those responsibilities. But it is those opportunities for the future which Her Majesty's Government are now in the process of liquidating.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1968; Vol. 779, c. 259.] They were vague, sweeping words designed to identify the mainstream of history, and one was led to feel that possibly the forces that would be committed east of Suez would be of a size commensurate with the oratory being deployed. But if ever there is to be a return east of Suez by British Forces the time is now. Yet all that the Conservative Party can produce after all its labouring over the past years in the area east of Suez is five frigates, a battalion, a battery, an air platoon, four Nimrod aircraft and—this is heady stuff—a subtle hint of even a submarine being made available.

What right hon. Gentlemen opposite have done is the military equivalent of sending about five loaves and two fishes without providing the parallel supernatural power that is essential for success under these circumstances. Why have they taken this course over the past couple of years? We are all familar with the military and industrial complex mentioned by President Eisenhower and among the many complexes among hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite is a military complex.

We should not think of it in terms of being a sinister general staff. However, on the benches behind the right hon. Gentleman and throughout their party heirarchy in the country the ranks are littered with retired military officers all in key positions. They form possibly one of the most powerful political pressure groups on the party opposite when it is in opposition and when the Tory Party is deprived of the patronage it exercises in government.

These gentlemen have had to be strung along over the past few years. The grim realities had to be kept away from them. The way it was done was for this rather vague and generalised language to be used. When one looks at the matter one finds that any textual construction could be placed on the language in regard to the British commitment east of Suez once the Conservative Party won the election. But the context in which the language was used was designed to encourage the belief that there would be a substantial return of British forces east of Suez if they won the election.