Orders of the Day — National Emergencies Organisation

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 12 November 1968.

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Photo of Mr Merlyn Rees Mr Merlyn Rees , Leeds South 12:00, 12 November 1968

It may help the House if at this stage of the debate I try, first, to set in perspective the disasters and emergencies which arise in this country—in other words, what we are dealing with—and second, describe in outline the arrangements which are made locally and nationally to deal with them.

National and other disasters, when they come, receive a great deal of publicity and are the focus, quite properly, of much attention while they last. We should recognise, however, that we are fortunate as a nation in that large-scale disasters seldom occur in our land. We do not have earthquakes, forest fires, avalanches and volcanic eruptions. We have our troubles, but, looking back over the years, there have been only a few which were on a large scale, like this year's floods, the wreck of the "Torrey Canyon", the Aberfan disaster, the Glasgow storm of January this year, and the East Coast floods in 1953.

The use of ever larger forms of transport by sea, air and land and the movement of highly dangerous substances may bring new problems which we ought to be alert to cope with, but we should nevertheless not base our plans on the premise that major disasters, national or man-made, are frequent.

The hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) mentioned Canada. The weather situation in Canada is different from ours. We have to look at our problem in the light of the sort of situation which we experience in this country.

A second consideration is that no two major emergencies are at all alike in their circumstances and effects. It is necessary to refer only to the East Coast floods, different from Aberfan, and different again from the "Torrey Canyon" shipwreck. It follows that the Government's approach should not be to prepare detailed plans for every emergency which may or may not arise.

If the possibility of a particular emergency arising can be foreseen, the right course is not to prepare a contingency plan but to take steps to prevent it. Like crime, emergencies are best prevented. As the House knows, there are many safety and other measures in operation to prevent the occurrence of accidents which could lead to large-scale disasters. After the East Coast floods in 1953, the Storm Tide Warning Service was set up, and standing arrangements which are reviewed every year, were made for warning the public. But—and this was no less important—the coastal defences were built up so that a flood tide as high as that of 1953 would not now have effect on anything like the same scale.

If the right measures are taken to prevent such disasters as can be foreseen, those that do occur will be the result either of a residual risk which is too remote to be guarded against or will be unforeseen and unpredictable. For these emergencies it is of over-riding importance that there should be as much flexibility as possible in the organisation available for dealing with such emergencies so that the most appropriate arrangements may be made in the particular circumstances which arise.

I come now to the arrangements, national and local. In any emergency the rôle of the police, particularly in the opening phase, is likely to be crucial. It is to the police service that the public always turn first for assistance when in distress. Police officers on patrol on foot or by vehicle are likely to be the first persons with authority on the scene of a disaster, and reports of what has happened are likely to be received first at police stations. The police are able to make use of their wireless communications to assemble rapidly a force of men and vehicles to take immediate action where help is needed, and to call in other services such as the fire and ambulance services to assist.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the Royal Observer Corps, for which in my new post I have some responsibility, as I did when concerned with the R.A.F. The communications system of the fire service and the police is far better than that of the Royal Observer Corps. The hon. Gentleman used the wrong example. The communications system of the Royal Observer Corps is geared to war, whereas that of the fire service and the police is geared to the civilian organisation and is much better for this purpose.

The police will also establish, where necessary, traffic control points and information posts, and direct the removal of casualties to places where they can be dealt with expeditiously. It is through the chief constables that the assistance of the Armed Services would be obtained. It is from the senior police officer in charge on the spot that the first comprehensive assessments of the extent of the disaster would be obtained to enable the local authority and, if necessary, the central Government to decide what further action was likely to be necessary. It is the availability of a widespread communications system in particular which will enable the police always to make a major contribution.

Most disasters are well within the capacity of local authorities with the resources at their disposal in the fire service and the ambulance service, to which the hon. Gentleman gave well deserved praise, assisted as necessary by neighbouring police and other forces and the Armed Services. For railway accidents, these other services include the railways themselves which have their own accident organisation. In such an event as the Aberfan disaster, the National Coal Board has its own organisation. When there are multiple crashes on the motorway, the fire services are soon involved, as they are in the collapse of buildings or bridges, local floods, and so on.

Local authorities are experienced in dealing with such events, and their services are so organised as to be able to adapt themselves rapidly to deal with events which may differ widely in character. The hon. Gentleman spoke of the weather. I shall return to that in a few minutes, but I have a comment to make with reference to notification of unusual weather to local authorities. We hear a lot nowadays about letting local authorities do things themselves and not allowing it all to be done centrally. One criterion by which, after nearly three years of responsibility for the Meteorological Office, I should judge a local authority is whether it bothers to pay the minimal amount of money to ensure that it receives a weather forecast to tell it what it should know, and, even more, whether it makes arrangements to receive the report in the middle of the night, for instance, so that it may do something. I do not believe that it is the job of the national Government to do that. If we talk in this place about devolution, one may add the comment that in many cases local authorities ought to pull their socks up in that sense.