F111K Aircraft Contract

Part of Orders of the Day — Supply – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 1 May 1967.

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Photo of Mr Edward Bishop Mr Edward Bishop , Newark 12:00, 1 May 1967

The Conservative Government, either by ordering American aircraft direct or by leaving behind deficiencies in the British aircraft programme, made it essential for the Government who were to succeed—I use that word in the two ways—to order American aircraft. The fact is that the Conservative Government, in office for 13 years, should have reviewed the position long before. I remind the Opposition that their stewardship led Sir Roy Dobson, Chairman of Hawker Siddleley, to say: the Conservatives just wouldn't make up their minds about anything; they just waffled. That is still the situation with the party opposite. They can present no genuine alternative to the Government's policy. It is inconsistent for any party responsible for the cancellation of at least 26 aircraft projects while they were in power, at a cost of at least £300 million, to attempt a minor censure of the present Government's policy. We know the immense problems before my right hon. Friend. He has to estimate our defence rôle and decide the strategy. He must decide on what is needed to fulfil that rôle and anticipate our needs eight or ten years ahead. He must decide on the specifications—whether short range, long range or medium range, high level or low level, subsonic or supersonic—and all these other technical aspects so as to ensure, that, when the time should come, the aircraft are ready for their rôle. The weapons we need and the strategy we employ are of great importance to our country. We shall need advanced aircraft.

When the decision had to be taken on the TSR2, the Government knew very well that the aircraft would have been ready too late and at too great a cost. For good or ill the choice had to fall on the FIIIK on the ground that it would be ready much more quickly and at a considerably lower cost. The figures given by my right hon. Friend today fully confirm that point of view and the forecast made at the time.

At the time, some of my hon. Friends and I suggested that the Government should give serious consideration to the alternatives of the Buccaneer and the Spey/Mirage. It was suggested that the Spey engine could be put into the Mirage. All these matters of "know-how" and experience are important if we are to make the right decision in the long run. We realised, of course, that we could not just take an engine from the Mirage and hope to produce what we wanted in a very short time. It is very important to bear in mind when discussing and assessing aircraft needs that an aircraft designed for one rôle cannot be adapted to fulfil the needs of another rôle in a short time and at no great cost. With the Spey/Mirage, engines would have had to be fitted and the centre of gravity would have been affected as would the centre sections, the nacelles and the aerodynamic features and much else. In the circumstances, deplorable though it was, we were forced to buy American aircraft, and the Government did the only thing possible to guarantee that the operational requirements would be met in the early 1970s.

In deciding on the replacement for the Canberra, the Government had to consider three major factors. There was, first, the Royal Air Force, and I am sure that we all agree that the R.A.F. ought to have the best possible aircraft and weapons at the lowest possible cost to carry out its rôle. Secondly, it is important in future as in the past for the Government at all times to consider the effect of their policies on the British aircraft industry. Those are two basic considerations in matters of this sort. Thirdly, at the same time as we were condemned by the Opposition for cancelling one or two other British projects, we all know that had those projects continued, the sought-after Anglo-French collaboration which is now a reality would not have been possible. The curtailment of the TSR2 programme has resulted, as my right hon. Friend has said, in substantial savings and in ensuring that we get the specification needed and that it is available at the right time.

My right hon. Friend made one or two points which are most important to total costs. The defence correspondent of The Times recently made a useful comment when he said on operating costs that, given the figures for the F111 and the AFVG, the cost of the basic aircraft was about half the cost of keeping it operational for ten years. I am pleased to note that the Government are at last doing something which was not done by their predecessors and which is to pay increasing attention to the reliability and maintenance of the aircraft which they order.

One of the examples is that to change (he engines of the TSR2 would have taken twelve times as long as to change the engines of the F111.