should like, first, to congratulate the hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Foley) on his translation to the Ministry of Defence. Any hon. Member would be proud to speak for the Royal Navy from that Dispatch Box. I must admit that I envy the hon. Gentleman, but I hastily add that I do not envy him having to reply to this debate.

We are to discuss the Simonstown Agreement between Britain and South Africa. The House will recall that this Agreement was signed in 1955, and that the main terms were as follows: first, it provided for the defence of sea communications in an area vital to the free world. Secondly, it provided for South African naval expansion, and it laid down that ships would be built by British yards. Thirdly, it provided for British naval command in both peace and war, and for the use of the Simonstown base in both peace and war. It also provided for other facilities in other parts of South Africa for British forces, and it stated that the British C.-in-C. was to have operational command in a war in which both countries were involved.

In short, the Agreement provided our country with everything that she wanted if South Africa was a co-belligerent or if she was at peace. It did not commit Britain to help South Africa if South Africa alone was involved in hostilities. I suggest, therefore, that the Agreement was very much to our benefit. It is quite clear that it was a package deal, tied to the purchase of British warships, and it is inherent in that deal—certainly there is a moral obligation—that these warships should be supplied with spare parts and ammunition, and I shall come to this question a little later.

On 3rd February, at column 195–6, in answer to a Written Question from myself the Government said that representatives of our Government and of the South African Government met in Cape Town on 25th to 27th January of this year to discuss certain aspects of the Simonstown Agreement. It also said that the British C.-in-C. South Atlantic would be withdrawn, that the frigate normally on the South African station would be withdrawn, that alternative command arrangements were being worked out, and that the whole question of British naval representation was under discussion.

What does all that mean? If the C-in-C South Atlantic is to be withdrawn, what is to happen to the very important communication and intelligence facilities operated by his staff in Southern Africa? I would remind the Minister that the intelligence officer on the staff of the C-in-C South Atlantic is responsible for the whole continent of Africa from Senegal in the west, to Tanzania in the east. He is also responsible for the Antarctic and half the continent of South America. This is a vitally important intelligence post and I should like to know how the British Government will be apprised of this important intelligence if the C-in-C and his staff are withdrawn. I have a particular interest in this, because, traditionally, the S.O.I. South Atlantic has always been a member of the Royal Marines.

What is to happen to the command in war time? I have already shown the House that the Agreement laid down that the British C-in-C would have command in war. If we are not to provide a C-in-C in South Africa, or any ships, how is this Agreement to be maintained?

Perhaps more immediate is the whole question of the provision of spare parts and ammunition for the frigates and destroyers which South Africa has bought from us since the signing of the Agreement. I submit that the Government have a rather guilty conscience over this, because on 16th November last my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) asked about the supply of live ammunition for South African ships, and in column 107 he was referred to the Prime Minister's statement in November, 1964. On 28th November my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) asked much the same question. He was told that spare parts and practice ammunition were being supplied. No mention was made of live ammunition. On 1st December I asked a similar Question, and was referred to the United Nations resolution of 1964. On 14th December I asked the same Question and was told that there was no obligation under the Simonstown Agreement to supply live ammunition, which showed, by implication, that it was not being supplied. Finally, on 25th January of this year my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Wingfield Digby) asked the same Question and was told that only practice ammunition was being supplied. This was the first time in two months' questioning that the Government were prepared to clearly admit that they were not supplying live ammunition to South Africa.