Orders of the Day — Defence

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 8 March 1966.

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Photo of Mr Ian Orr-Ewing Mr Ian Orr-Ewing , Hendon North 12:00, 8 March 1966

I am delighted to follow the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). He has probably attended twice as many defence debates as I have, and I am sure he will remember that we always have a defence debate at the beginning of March. Just because the Prime Minister has decided to have a General Election, we should be going back on our duty to the nation if we did not devote two days to discussing this revolutionary White Paper on Defence which has come before us. Perhaps he is thinking too much of the forthcoming election when he suggests that the debate has been fixed to secure a division within his own ranks.

I should have liked to discuss the position of the aircraft industry, in which my constituency is considerably interested, but I know that there are a number of hon. Members who wish to speak and so I shall confine myself to the two subjects of Aden and the aircraft carrier.

When the Foreign Secretary opened the debate today, I was interested to hear him refer to Aden and say that he wanted stability in the Middle East, implying that somehow our evacuation of Aden would secure that end. One of his themes was that we were not wanted in Aden, but that has been completely exposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), my right hon. Friend for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) and my hon. Friend for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher). It is quite clear that the majority of people in Aden want us there to give them security after they have become independent.

The second argument that the right hon. Gentleman used was that we do not need Aden, and that worries me particularly because I am concerned about repercussions in the Middle East from the lack of stability arising out of the decision which has been announced.

The right hon. Gentleman referred to our troubles in Aden, and he mentioned the murders that occur daily. Every one acknowledges that the bombs and the murders, in particular the murder of the Speaker, are incited from Radio Cairo, from Nasser and from across the border in Yemen.

The build-up of Egyptian forces in the Yemen has been mounting over the years. In 1962, Nasser had 3,000 troops there, at a time when the United States said that they would give official recognition to Republican forces in the Yemen if Nasser withdrew his troops. He agreed to withdraw them. However, by December, 1962, the build-up had reached 17,000. By the spring of 1963 it had reached 25,000; by 1964 it was 55,000; and today it is 68,000. I venture to wonder what would happen if we had 68,000 troops fighting in someone else's country. I imagine that the debates in the United Nations would be unending.

Those are the two standards of which my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) spoke some years ago. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North said, in the summer of 1965, the Egyptian troops were in real trouble, having suffered an ignominious defeat. King Faisal was approached, and an arrangement was made between King Faisal and Nasser at Jeddah that there should be a cease fire. Nasser agreed at a subsequent 25-a-side conference in November of last year to start to withdraw his troops, and it was agreed that they would be gone within ten months of last December, which would take us to September 1966. But not one single solider has left the country.

Now we have given an injection of life into that discredited dictator, lifting him up from the dust and giving him an excuse to go back on agreements. Yet, somehow, the Foreign Secretary has the effrontery to come to the House and say that it adds to stability in the Middle East. I cannot imagine that any nation in the Middle East thinks that this decision is acting in favour of stability.

What is so interesting is that there was an immediate reaction in Egypt. There was the usual leak in the national papers, I think in an article by Chapman Pincher. I could understand the Government's difficulties if they had not been so vociferous about the leaks which came from our Government. I remember the Prime Minister, in what we did not think was a characteristic speech, making a personal attack on my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North calling him an incompetent and incontinent Minister. Those were the days when we had not learned to understand these personal abuses which the Prime Minister has made such a characteristic feature of his régime. The Government have not succeeded in preventing the leaks. If anything, they have increased, and we learned in the Daily Express of the 16th February that Aden was to be evacuated. I believe that this was a last-minute panic measure to try to get down to the budget which they had fixed.

Curiously enough, the next day Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, the U.A.R. Vice-President, made a speech in which he said that as a result of this decision they were going to prolong the stay of the Egyptian forces in the Yemen, and this was confirmed by Radio Cairo on the 19th.

We then had the quotation to which I referred in an intervention, when, on the 22nd February, the day on which the White Paper came out, President Nasser, speaking at Cairo University, said of Aden: There was an announcement today that Britain had decided to grant independence in 1968. Well then, we shall stay there"— meaning the Yemen— until after 1968". The Foreign Secretary thinks that the decision to go is adding to the stability of the Middle East, when in fact exactly the opposite is the truth.

The Government have provided the Egyptians with an excuse to go back on agreements with Saudi Arabia which would have added to the stability of the Middle East. It cannot be in our interests to have 68,000 of Nasser's troops on the borders of Aden, and the sooner they go the better. This blood transfusion which has been given to Nasser may make it more worth while for the Communists, probably the Russians, but it may be the Chinese, to back Nasser further. The tanks which he uses in his invasion of the Yemen are Russian. The aircraft are Russian. The napalm bombs are Russian. The high explosive and chemical bombs are Russian. The bazookas are Russian, and he has many Russian technicians and advisers to help with his troops.

Some people may wonder how it is possible to sustain an immense force of 68,000 troops in an under-developed country, where communications are poor. Perhaps they have forgotten that in recent years Russia has built a formidable deep water port at the southern end of the Red Sea at Hodeida, and that alongside the port there is a modern airfield. If we evacuate Aden, I presume that we will also evacuate Perim, the old coaling station at the south end of the Red Sea. If the vacuum which we create in Aden is not filled by Nasser and his backers, there will be in that area a ready-made deep water port which could form a useful base for the communist world. They have always wanted a base on the bridge between the Middle East and Africa so that, when they got the chance, they could stoke up the anxieties, the sabotage, and the subversion which is taking place all over Africa, and which is adding to the confusion in that desperately unhappy continent.

Over the years Nasser has shown that he can control the Suez Canal at will. Despite constant resolutions by the United Nations, he has denied the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, and he is still doing so. Why, therefore, should we offer to evacuate our base at the southern end of the Red Sea and make the whole passage of the Red Sea through the Suez Canal even more vulnerable?

I am not casting my mind back to the nineteenth century. I am not one of those who think in terms of the nineteenth century. I am being realistic when I say that the trade of the free world, and, incidentally, the military and logistic supplies to all our troops east of Suez, needs to go through the Suez Canal and through the Red Sea. Can it therefore be in the interests of the international trade of the Western nations to evacuate Aden and leave a vacuum, and leave this Russian port of Hodeida which could easily be manned up and become a thorn in the side of the West?

There was an alternative route, at least for oil supplies, which was secured as a result of the Israel's Sinai campaign. That was the route which passed Aden and Perim, up the Red Sea, through the straits of Tiran and up to Akaba, where the pipelines could be enlarged to carry oil supplies to Mediterranean ports. This is a useful alternative, but this, too, would go if we handed over this linch-pin, this position at the southern end of the Red Sea. It will go if we rat on our undertakings to that part of the world.

I believe that Nasser is the Dean of Overseas Adventurers in the Middle East. I believe that he is militarily discredited, and I think that it would be very unwise indeed if the Government did not, as my right hon. Friend suggested, think very deeply, even at this late stage, about the evacuation of Aden, because it must cause trouble. As Nasser's prestige went down, so tension in the Middle East was going down. We were beginning to get an element of modus vivendi and relative peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours. This decision will give new life to Nasser, and will, I am sure, add to instability in the Middle East.

I want now to deal with the other argument used by the Foreign Secretary and by the Minister of Defence, namely, that we do not need Aden. Apart from our treaty obligations, which are very considerable, can they really say that we do not want Aden? If we have considerable troops committed east of Suez, and if we have Singapore at the eastern periphery of this area, do we really not want some sort of base at the western end of this vast expanse of ocean? Can we really afford to give up an area which is a base not only for the Army but for the Royal Air Force and for the Royal Navy? It has workshops and underground armament stores which stretch deep into the hills of Aden. It has facilities for re-victualling and restoring our ships. Can all this be given up with any safety at all?

It was amazing to hear the Minister of Defence say yesterday that in spite of all the troubles in the past we were apparently not going to have trouble in the future. Every time he says that he can bring troops back from the Caribbean, or from East Africa, he is putting a bigger load on the Royal Navy. The Navy cannot operate east of Suez, or support an Air Force or Army, unless it has a base of reasonable proportions from which to operate, and I do not believe that it is economic to try to provide a base at Bahrain. In Aden there are air-conditioned barracks, workshops, radar defence, and in fact everything that we need. Why bow down to appease the terrorists who are being stimulated and activated by Nasser?

I ask the Government to think again, even at this late stage. Let us make two conditions about moving out. Let us say, first, that we will leave Aden if the local people want us to do so. This would be after a fair and not a biased vote. Secondly, let us say that we will leave Aden if its retention is not essential to meet our commitments east of Suez. I believe that under both those headings it will be found that we should stay there.

I propose now to say a word about aircraft carriers, because this is the big issue in this debate. I am not a dyed-in-the-wool, blue water, type. I was in the Royal Air Force for six years. For two years I was Under-Secretary of State for Air—and I am glad to see my successor in his place—and then I spent five years on the Board of Admiralty, answering for the Royal Navy in this House. So I should be able to be reasonably objective about the issue.

My biggest concern is the atmosphere of quarrelling created between the R.A.F. and the Navy. As the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) said, this arose because of the £2,000 million target. This was fixed as an immovable and un-negotiable target before commitments were considered. It instantly started quarrels as to how much each Service was to get within the target.

During my seven years in the two Ministries, it was my desire, perhaps unsuccessfully fulfilled, to try to draw these two great Services together and not to divide them in quarrelsome conflicts of this type. I had this hope because I was fortunate enough to serve with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Caspar John. He was the first Fleet Air Arm pilot to become First Sea Lord, and his personality and ability confirmed me in my hope that perhaps this would be an appropriate time to draw the two Services together, particularly as Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Thomas Pike headed the R.A.F. and he was a good friend as well.

I hoped that the time was propitious because a new generation of aircraft carriers was contemplated. We were thinking about designs. Moreover, we were coming to the phase of the vertical take-off aircraft and thought that possibly a common aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force was feasible. For these very good reasons, as well as for reasons of sentiment, I hoped that we would see the two Services drawn together. Unfortunately, the common aircraft, the P1154, fell by the wayside. The operational requirements of the two staffs became too divergent and it was decided that the P1154 would be used by the R.A.F. and the Phantom by the Navy. This was unfortunate, but operational requirements must take priority.

I remind myself, however, that the Phantom was developed in the United States for the U.S. Navy, and it was only some good head-bashing by Mr. Robert McNamara that forced the U.S. Air Force to accept it, for it was loth to do so. It has the Phantom now, however, and I understand that it is delighted with the aircraft. If we are to have a common aircraft in future, there will have to be tough dealing by the two Service Ministers and the Defence Secretary if such an aircraft is to be accepted by both Services.

Then we considered the size of the new carrier. It was clear, at least in my mind, that the Buccaneer would be the last aircraft that we could afford to develop specifically for one Service, particularly for the Navy. Our production requirements were too small to justify the costs specifically for that task. The question arose of buying United States aircraft.

Of course, the American carrier fleet is so very much bigger than ours. The largest units are the ships of the 84,000-ton Forrestal class. They are far bigger ships than we could afford to operate. We realised that we might find that their aircraft were more suitable for their own carriers than for ours. Alternatively, therefore, we could develop a joint aircraft for the use of both the Royal Navy and the R.A.F.

I was mindful of the fact that other nations had small carriers and were looking for suitable aircraft for them. The Dutch have a carrier and the French have a carrier force, including bigger vessels, the 31,000-ton Clemenceau and Foch. The Indian Navy has the Vikrant and Australia has the 22-000-ton Melbourne. Canada has the similar Bonaventure. All these nations were feeling some financial pinch and looking for aircraft to operate from these relatively small carriers which would be cheap, economic and effective.

Of course, I recognise that a large carrier is more efficient. It can have a much bigger punch. It is more economic. On a value analysis, I am sure the choice would fall on a bigger carrier. But I always feared that in going for the best we might lose the good—and I also had in mind that there might at some time in future be a Labour Government and that that Labour Government would go in for defence economies as they did in the 1929–31 period. I felt, therefore, that a smaller carrier would have a better chance of survival, and even at this stage I urge the Government to re-examine the proposition to see whether it is possible to have a smaller carrier, perhaps of about 35,000 tons. But why does the Minister of Defence for the Army laugh?