Rhodesia

Part of Orders of the Day — Queen's Speech – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 12 November 1965.

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Photo of Mr Humphrey Berkeley Mr Humphrey Berkeley , Lancaster 12:00, 12 November 1965

That is a hypothetical question. What we are discussing is the effectiveness of economic measures, and that is the point on which I wish to concentrate.

When in the past force has been discussed we have suffered from a great deal of confusion of mind. I thought that the observations of the Archbishop of Canterbury a few weeks ago were most unhelpful, first, because of the timing, which I think was lamentable, and, secondly, because it seemed to me that he did not make it in the least clear what type of force or intervention he was envisaging. I am very glad that today the Prime Minister has spelt out in great detail the circumstances in which a military commitment might be involved. All of us must recognise that if there is a breakdown of law and order, if there is an outbreak of violence— all of us hope and pray that that will not occur— and the Governor of Rhodesia appeals to this country, plainly we have a duty to answer that appeal. These are the only circumstances in which I envisage a military commitment being either possible or necessary.

I want to put some points to the Government about the Constitution. First, I see that in the Enabling Bill provision exists for the Constitution to be suspended. It would be helpful for us to know whether there is any intention at present that this should happen. Secondly, I am somewhat puzzled about the reasons why the British High Commissioner in Salisbury has been withdrawn. He is the British Government's representative to the Government of Rhodesia. The Government of Rhodesia at present consists of the Governor. I should have thought that it would have been helpful had the British High Commissioner remained in Salisbury and taken the opportunity, if he was allowed to, not only of keeping in touch with the Governor but also of keeping in touch, as is the duty of any ambassador, with all sections of the Rhodesian population. I should have wished him to stay there unless he had been expelled. I hope that the Prime Minister will comment on this point, because I think it is important.

It seems to me that if we say that our objective is to restore legal rule under the Governor, we ought also to say definitely and clearly two other things because these also will affect the European view and European morale in Rhodesia. First, can we clearly say that we have no intention whatsoever of allowing United Nations entry into Rhodesia by means of a military force or by any other means?

Secondly, can we say that, judging by past and present performance and, indeed, the performance that we saw on television last night, we do not believe that we can hand over in the immediate future to the African Nationalists in Southern Rhodesia? They have not shown themselves as yet to be fit and ready to take over the government of the country. They denied themselves the opportunity of fighting the 1961 Constitution. They have been denied the advantages of higher education and other training by the present Rhodesian Government. By any standards they are not ready as yet to administer the country. I would hope that we would make it clear as a Government that we see the end as being a resumption of legal rule under a Governor with full colonial powers to administer Rhodesia for a period of probably not less than five years and perhaps even more than five years, in which an ordered and steady transfer of power takes place at the same time as an accelerated education programme and a training programme, but this transfer taking place in an ordered way and at a speed of our choosing.

This seems to me to be the important thing for us to emphasise at the present time. It should be made plain to the people of Rhodesia, and particularly to the Europeans in Rhodesia, about whose fate we are all concerned at present, that if Smith's Government falls the result is not going to be a Congo situation— we will not permit that; it is not going to be United Nations intervention—we will not permit that; it is not going to be an immediate transfer of power from white to black—we will not permit that because relations between the races are too embittered at the moment for this to be contemplated; but we intend to take over and firmly guide the territory towards majority rule in a situation in which mutual harmony can exist between the races.

I have been to Rhodesia perhaps a dozen times in the last eight years, and I have seen, as many of us have seen, the appalling deterioration in the relationship between the races. Five years ago it was barely perceptible. Today it is the most obvious feature to anybody who goes to Rhodesia. What is it about? Both races are basically haunted by fear. The Europeans are haunted by the fear that if they give up any of their privileges they will be swept away overnight, the Africans will take over and they will be inexperienced and a Congo-like situation will emerge. The Africans, too, are frightened. They are frightened that now they will never achieve majority rule, never be first-class citizens and will always be denied education and training which is their right and which can fit them to govern in due course.

These are the two basic haunting fears which exist in Rhodesia at present. Therefore, if we can recapture the position, if we can exert British authority, it is essential in my view that we should stay in Rhodesia as the responsible power until black and white can live together in the future without fear and in safety and harmony.